Church of God of Crandon v. Church of God

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
October 15, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1863 Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV40

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

CHURCH OF GOD OF CRANDON,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

CHURCH OF GOD,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Forest County:
WILLIAM F. KUSSEL, JR., Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. The Church of God of Crandon (“Crandon
Church”) sued the Church of God (“COG”), seeking a declaration of interest in
No. 2022AP1863

real property and other relief. The Crandon Church appeals from an order of the
circuit court, which granted the COG’s motions to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of
standing and for attorney fees and costs, and which denied the Crandon Church’s
motions for a preliminary injunction and to vacate the COG’s excommunication
decision. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The COG is a national religious organization headquartered in
Tennessee. At the time of the filing of the present lawsuit, the Crandon Church
was organized as local congregation within the COG. In May 2021, the COG
informed the Crandon Church that the Crandon Church would merge with a
COG-affiliated church in Rhinelander and that the COG planned to sell the
Crandon Church real property, which includes the Crandon Church’s place of
worship (“property”).1

1
For purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to note that the property was placed in trust
via warranty deed in 1994 for the “exclusive use and benefit of” the COG. The 1994 warranty
deed provides:

If the local congregation … shall at any time cease to function,
or exist, or act contrary to the [COG] polity, … then said trustees
shall hold title to said real estate including personal property for
the [COG] generally in the state where said real estate is located;
and said trustees shall convey the said real estate upon demand
to the State Board of Trustees of the [COG] in said state ….

We note that the 1994 warranty deed included in the record appears to be a COG template deed
and is not signed, dated, or notarized. Because both parties accept the fact that such a deed
exists—and neither party challenges the validity of the 1994 warranty deed (with the exception of
one Crandon Church argument that we address later, see infra ¶31)—we will assume without
deciding that the 1994 warranty deed exists and is valid.

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¶3 Later that month, the Crandon Church filed the present lawsuit
against the COG, seeking declarations of interest in the property and two accounts
at CoVantage Credit Union. The Crandon Church also sought a preliminary
injunction “enjoining the [COG] from preventing [the Crandon Church] from
continuing to occupy the [property] and that [the Crandon Church] be allowed to
use all church property, real and personal, in the same manner as [the Crandon
Church] has previously used said property.”

¶4 After the present lawsuit was filed, Timothy Cushman, the
administrative bishop for the COG’s Great Lakes Region, executed a “Declaration
as to Excommunication and Disfellowship” (the Declaration), in which he
excommunicated certain members of the Crandon Church due to their “unruly and
uncooperative actions.”2 According to the COG, the Declaration was made
pursuant to the 2018 “Minutes of the International General Assembly of the
[COG]” (2018 Minutes), in which bishops were given the authority to
“excommunicate an unruly or uncooperative member without a formal hearing” if
it was deemed “in the best interests of the local church.”3 Pursuant to the COG’s
appeals process, the Crandon Church challenged the Declaration through the
COG’s International Executive Committee, which voted unanimously to deny the
Crandon Church’s appeal on August 19, 2021.

2
According to Cushman, the remaining members not excommunicated were those who
“chose to work in harmony” with the decision to merge the churches.
3
The 2018 Minutes also state that “should any member or members … take action
contrary to the polity of the [COG], it is understood that the ownership of all property, both real
and personal, remains with the [COG].”

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¶5 Subsequently, the COG filed a motion to dismiss the Crandon
Church’s lawsuit, arguing that the Crandon Church lacked standing after Cushman
issued the Declaration. The COG asserted that the Crandon Church could no
longer demonstrate any real or immediate injury—and that the Crandon Church
was no longer affected by “the issues in controversy”—because “by virtue” of the
Declaration, the Crandon Church had “no remaining members” and “effectively
ceases to exist.” According to the COG, the Crandon Church “has no remaining
members of the [COG] … and is therefore no longer entitled to maintain or
possess any real property currently held in trust for the general use and benefit of
the [COG].”

¶6 In response, the Crandon Church filed in the circuit court a motion to
vacate the Declaration, arguing that Cushman lacked the authority to issue the
Declaration. The COG then asserted that the “ecclesiastical doctrine” under the
First Amendment prohibited the court from resolving any issues raised in the
Crandon Church’s motion to vacate the Declaration.

¶7 The Crandon Church also challenged the COG’s approach—or lack
thereof—to winterizing the property and filed with the circuit court an
“[a]pplication pursuant to [WIS. STAT. §] 844.01(1) and (2)” (2021-22)4 and a
proposed order. The proposed order, to which the COG objected, required that the
COG heat the property at a specific temperature during the winter. Following
written submissions from the parties and a motion hearing, the court ordered the
COG to drain the property’s water pipes, insure the property, and appropriately

4
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2022AP1863

deal with snow accumulation at the property. The court determined, however, that
the COG was not required to heat the property. The court stated that the COG
decided that it was not in a “financially []suitable” situation to heat the property
and that it would instead rely on insurance in the event something occurred to the
property. The court found that the COG had the “ability to make that financial
decision.”

¶8 Following the circuit court’s oral ruling on the winterization issue,
the Crandon Church served the COG with a set of interrogatories inquiring about
the property’s winterization. A letter accompanying the interrogatories stated that
the Crandon Church was concerned with items within the property, including
“cloth on the pews,” and stated that Cushman would be “responsible for any
damage” to the items. The letter also requested “to see [Cushman’s] cash position
vis à vis a heating bill. If he has the money, [the Crandon Church] will ask the
[c]ourt to reconsider its ruling.” The interrogatories requested Cushman’s
personal address.

¶9 In turn, the COG filed a motion for a protective order, which the
Crandon Church opposed. See WIS. STAT. § 804.01(3). The COG argued that the
winterization issue was “already litigated,” and the circuit court had granted the
protective order. The COG filed a subsequent motion for attorney fees and costs
for bringing the motion for a protective order. See WIS. STAT. § 804.12(1)(c).
According to the COG, the Crandon Church’s opposition to the protective order
was not “substantially justified” because the “sole purpose” for the Crandon
Church’s interrogatories “was to produce information to relitigate the
winterization” issue.

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¶10 The circuit court held hearings over two days to address the COG’s
motions to dismiss and for attorney fees and costs, as well as the Crandon
Church’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court heard testimony from
several witnesses, including Cushman. Following testimony and written
submissions from the parties, the court issued an oral ruling on the Crandon
Church’s motions for a preliminary injunction and to vacate, as well as the COG’s
motions to dismiss and for attorney fees and costs.

¶11 The circuit court concluded that it could not review the COG’s
actions with respect to the Declaration because “to do so would violate the
restrictions of the First Amendment.” In so ruling, the court noted that Cushman
issued the Declaration pursuant to the authority vested in him by the COG—
specifically, the 2018 Minutes.

¶12 The circuit court reasoned that the Crandon Church’s lawsuit “must
now be reviewed in regard[] to [the COG]’s motion to dismiss for standing.”
According to the court, after the Declaration was issued, the Crandon Church no
longer had standing to bring the lawsuit because it “fails to exist” and “can no
longer legally possess or maintain the subject property held in trust [for] the use
and benefit of the [COG].” The court declined to address the Crandon Church’s
assertion that the COG attempted to defeat jurisdiction through the Declaration,
stating that there was not “sufficient evidence presented as to the alleged motive
of” Cushman. Therefore, the court granted the COG’s motion to dismiss.

¶13 In addition, the circuit court granted the COG’s motion for attorney
fees and costs. The court found that the Crandon Church’s opposition to the
protective order was “not substantially justified” and that the Crandon Church had

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No. 2022AP1863

failed to provide “any justification for why imposition of [attorney] fees would be
unjust.” The court awarded the COG $1,725.

¶14 Accordingly, the circuit court denied the Crandon Church’s motions
for a preliminary injunction and to vacate the Declaration. The court
memorialized its oral ruling in a final written decision and order. The Crandon
Church now appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. First Amendment and standing

¶15 We first note that neither party on appeal addresses the appropriate
standard of review under which we should address the Crandon Church’s standing.
The COG challenged the Crandon Church’s standing via a motion to dismiss. “On
review of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, [a] court must ‘take all facts
alleged by [the petitioner] to be true in determining whether he [or she] has
standing to bring his [or her] claim.’” Friends of Black River Forest v. Kohler
Co., 2022 WI 52, ¶11, 402 Wis. 2d 587, 977 N.W.2d 342 (second alteration in
original; citation omitted). However, “[w]hen, on a motion to dismiss, parties
present matters outside the pleadings, the motion should be processed as one for
summary judgment.” Converting/Biophile Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ludlow Composites
Corp., 2006 WI App 187, ¶2, 296 Wis. 2d 273, 722 N.W.2d 633.

¶16 Although the circuit court did not expressly convert the COG’s
motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, both the COG and the Crandon
Church presented evidence to the court outside the pleadings, including witness
testimony. Neither party objected to the other’s evidence on the grounds that it
was not procedurally permitted or that the court did not properly convert the

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No. 2022AP1863

motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See WIS. STAT.
§ 802.06(2)(b). We therefore interpret the issue of the Crandon Church’s standing
in the summary judgment context.

¶17 We review an order for summary judgment de novo, using the same
methodology as the circuit court. Yahnke v. Carson, 2000 WI 74, ¶10, 236
Wis. 2d 257, 613 N.W.2d 102. Summary judgment “shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” WIS.
STAT. § 802.08(2). Standing also presents a question of law that we review
de novo. MacLeish v. Boardman & Clark LLP, 2019 WI 31, ¶21, 386 Wis. 2d
50, 924 N.W.2d 799.

¶18 “[S]tanding in Wisconsin is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of sound
judicial policy.” Friends of Black River Forest, 402 Wis. 2d 587, ¶17 (citation
omitted). To have standing, a party must show that it “suffered or w[as]
threatened with an injury to an interest that is legally protectable.” Krier v.
Vilione, 2009 WI 45, ¶20, 317 Wis. 2d 288, 766 N.W.2d 517. “An organizational
plaintiff may have standing to bring suit on either its own behalf (‘organizational
standing’) or on the behalf of one or more of its members (‘associational
standing’).” Munger v. Seehafer, 2016 WI App 89, ¶53, 372 Wis. 2d 749, 890
N.W.2d 22 (citation omitted). Organizational standing requires an organizational
plaintiff, “like an individual plaintiff, to show ‘actual or threatened injury in fact
that is fairly traceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a
favorable court decision.’” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.

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United States Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted).5

¶19 We agree with the COG that if the Declaration is upheld on appeal,
the Crandon Church lacks organizational standing to bring the present lawsuit
because it will have “no remaining members of the [COG]” and will no longer be
“entitled to maintain or possess any” property pursuant to the 1994 warranty
deed.6 In particular, the 1994 warranty deed states that all property—both real and
personal—becomes the property of the COG should a “local congregation” “cease
to … exist.” The Crandon Church cannot file a lawsuit to obtain an interest in
property that it does not own. Because we conclude that the First Amendment
prohibits our review of the Declaration, the Crandon Church lacks standing to
bring the current lawsuit seeking interests in the property and the CoVantage
accounts.

¶20 Under the so-called “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,” the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not permit civil courts to
adjudicate “strictly and purely ecclesiastical” issues within a hierarchical religious
organization.7 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
708-09, 713 (1976); McRaney v. North Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist

5
The Crandon Church does not dispute that the standing issue is one of organizational
standing.
6
Of note, the Crandon Church does not contend that the non-excommunicated members
of the local congregation remain members of the Crandon Church. Indeed, it appears from the
record that those members joined the COG-affiliated church in Rhinelander.
7
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits states from making any law “respecting [the] establishment of
religion.” See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

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Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 2020). Such disputes include
theological controversies, church discipline, or the conformity of the members of a
church to the standard of morals required of them by the church. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. at 713-14.

¶21 “Should we be faced with a dispute that hinges on an issue of
religious doctrine or polity, we must defer to the resolution of the highest authority
of a hierarchical church organization.” Wisconsin Conf. Bd. of Trs. of United
Methodist Church, Inc. v. Culver, 2001 WI 55, ¶20, 243 Wis. 2d 394, 627
N.W.2d 469. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine protects the right of
hierarchical religious organizations “to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952).

¶22 That said, Wisconsin courts may address “church property disputes
under the neutral principles of law approach outlined” by the United States
Supreme Court. Culver, 243 Wis. 2d 394, ¶21. Under this approach, courts
address such issues “upon any number of neutral legal principles, including ‘the
language of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, the state statutes
governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of
the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property.’” Id.
(quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979)).

¶23 There is no dispute here that the COG is organized in a hierarchical
fashion. Dennis Watkins, the COG’s in-house legal counsel in Tennessee,

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No. 2022AP1863

testified to this fact at the hearings, stating that the COG’s hierarchical structure is
prescribed in the Book of Church Order.8 There is similarly no question that the
decision to excommunicate certain members of the Crandon Church from the
COG was ecclesiastical in nature as it involved disciplining COG members, see
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 717 (“[Q]uestions of church discipline … are at the core
of the ecclesiastical concern ….”), and—to the extent the neutral principles of law
approach permits us to review the COG’s procedures and Cushman’s authority—
the Crandon Church does not argue that Cushman or the International Executive
Committee acted outside the authority vested by the 2018 Minutes.

¶24 Accordingly, a civil court cannot, under the First Amendment,
review: whether the 2018 Minutes complied with due process or the Bible; what
the COG meant by “unruly or uncooperative”; or whether Cushman properly
determined that the excommunicated members were “unruly or uncooperative.” 9
Similarly, the First Amendment prohibits a civil court from examining the
International Executive Committee’s review of those issues. To hold otherwise
“would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper
subject of civil court inquiry.” See id. at 713. Under the facts of this case, we
must defer to the resolution of any ecclesiastical issues by the International

8
The Crandon Church called former COG Bishop Robert Kimberling to testify at the
hearing. Like Watkins, Kimberling stated that the COG “is organized in a hierarchical fashion.”
9
The Crandon Church also argues that even if the Declaration is upheld, the Crandon
Church still has standing to claim the CoVantage accounts because its members did not act
“contrary to polity.” See supra note 3. However, like the issues posed with the Declaration,
considering whether members acted contrary to polity would violate the First Amendment. In
addition, the 1994 warranty deed contradicts the Crandon Church’s claim, for the reasons already
articulated. See supra ¶19.

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Executive Committee, which denied the excommunicated members’ appeal.
See Culver, 243 Wis. 2d 394, ¶20.

¶25 The Crandon Church nonetheless asserts that review of the
Declaration is permitted in this case “by the fraud or collusion exception to the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.”10 According to the Crandon Church, “[t]he
very fact [that] excommunication was used the very next day to challenge standing
raises an inference of fraud.”

¶26 To the extent the Establishment Clause permits civil courts to review
ecclesiastical issues under the “fraud or collusion” exception to the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine, we conclude the exception does not apply to the facts of this
case. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 609 n.8; Askew v. Trustees of Gen. Assembly of
Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith Inc., 684 F.3d 413, 420
(3d Cir. 2012) (“A doctrinally grounded decision made during litigation to insulate
questionable church actions from civil court review may indeed raise an inference
of fraud or bad faith.”).

¶27 The record does not support the Crandon Church’s claim regarding
fraud. Rather, the evidence from the motion hearing and the pleadings
demonstrates that Cushman issued the Declaration excommunicating the members
based upon their actions prior to the Crandon Church’s present lawsuit. These
actions included: the members’ unwillingness to accept the merger; their holding

10
The Crandon Church also contends that review of the Declaration by a civil court is
permitted because Cushman “acted under a common law conflict of interest.” The Crandon
Church supports this argument with citations to a number of cases, none of which demonstrate
that a conflict of interest permits this court to review ecclesiastical issues within a hierarchical
religious organization.

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No. 2022AP1863

of an unsanctioned meeting contrary to the 2018 Minutes; and some of the
members calling the police on Cushman after he attempted to lock the property’s
doors. At the motion hearing, Cushman denied knowing that the Declaration
would have any impact on the lawsuit.

¶28 As such, the First Amendment prohibits our review of the
Declaration. We therefore defer to the International Executive Committee’s
decision, which denied the excommunicated members’ appeal. Accordingly, the
excommunicated members are no longer part of the Crandon Church, and, as the
COG argued in its motion before the circuit court, the Crandon Church
“effectively ceases to exist.” The Crandon Church therefore lacks standing to
bring this lawsuit.

¶29 The Crandon Church raises several issues regarding the merits of its
complaint seeking declarations of interest in the property and the CoVantage
accounts. In particular, the Crandon Church argues that the 1948-1994 COG
assembly proceedings “constitute the equivalent of legislation prevailing over any
conflict”; that Cushman’s plan to sell the property “without a substitute in the
vicinity violates the terms of” a 1953 deed; and that we must interpret the 1953
deed and determine whether the Declaration violated the deed’s terms.

¶30 There is no need for us to address these additional issues raised by
the Crandon Church because this court decides cases on the narrowest possible
grounds. See Patrick Fur Farm, Inc. v. United Vaccines, Inc., 2005 WI App
190, ¶8 n.1, 286 Wis. 2d 774, 703 N.W.2d 707. Simply put, if the Crandon
Church ceases to exist, it has no legal right to the property or to the CoVantage
accounts pursuant to the 1994 warranty deed.

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¶31 The Crandon Church also argues that the 1994 warranty deed failed
to comply with the statute of frauds and that “[t]itle to” the CoVantage accounts
“has never been transferred to” the COG in violation of WIS. STAT. § 241.25.
Although the Crandon Church questioned Watkins on the applicability of the
statute of frauds at the hearings, it never argued to the circuit court that the statute
of frauds applied to this case. Likewise, the Crandon Church failed to raise an
argument in the circuit court with respect to § 241.25. The Crandon Church
therefore forfeited these issues, and we will not consider them further.11 See Schill
v. Wisconsin Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶45 n.21, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786
N.W.2d 177. Similarly, the Crandon Church, for the first time in its reply brief,
argues that we should exercise our discretionary reversal authority. We need not,
and do not, address this issue because this court does not address issues raised for
the first time in a reply brief. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 222
Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998).

II. Attorney fees and costs

¶32 The Crandon Church also argues that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion by granting the COG’s motion for attorney fees and costs.
As outlined previously in this opinion, the court granted the COG’s motion for a
protective order, see WIS. STAT. § 804.01(3)(a), as well as the COG’s motion for

11
The Crandon Church touches on many other issues in its appellate briefing regarding
its standing to bring the present lawsuit. These references are, at times, difficult to decipher, and
it is difficult to determine whether the Crandon Church is attempting to raise independent
arguments. For example, the Crandon Church contends that the Declaration did not render the
church dissolved because “[t]wo or three members can constitute a [c]hurch” under
“Matthew 18:20.” To the extent we do not address an argument raised by the Crandon Church on
appeal, the argument is deemed rejected as undeveloped. See State v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc.,
81 Wis. 2d 555, 564, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978); State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d
633 (Ct. App. 1992).

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attorney fees and costs, see WIS. STAT. §§ 804.12(1)(c)1., 804.01(3)(b). “A
[circuit] court has the authority under … § 804.01(3)(a) to issue a protective order
for good cause.” State ex rel. Robinson v. Town of Bristol, 2003 WI App 97, ¶43,
264 Wis. 2d 318, 667 N.W.2d 14. “Section 804.12(1)(c) applies to the award of
expenses incurred in relation to the motion.” Sec. 804.01(3)(b); see Robinson,
264 Wis. 2d 318, ¶47 & n.21. Under § 804.12(1)(c)1., a court shall require the
party “whose conduct necessitated the motion” “to pay to the moving party the
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified
or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id.

¶33 We review a circuit court’s decision to award attorney fees and costs
under WIS. STAT. § 804.12 for an erroneous exercise of discretion. See Robinson,
264 Wis. 2d 318, ¶47. “A circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it
applies an improper legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably supported
by the facts of record.” 260 N. 12th St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶38, 338
Wis. 2d 34, 808 N.W.2d 372.

¶34 In granting the protective order, the circuit court articulated that the
information requested by the Crandon Church was related solely to its concern
regarding damage to items within the property. The court noted, however, that it
had already ruled on the winterization issue and had required the COG to take
certain winterization measures at the property. The court questioned whether
mold would be an issue in the winter months, but it found that even if there were
damage to the inside of the property, the property was insured. The court stated
that it did not see the relevance of financial data on the winterization issue given
that the issue was already decided. The court also found that the requests for
information were “oppressive,” “unreasonable,” burdensome, and irrelevant.

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¶35 Later, in its oral decision on the COG’s motion for attorney fees and
costs, the circuit court stated that the Crandon Church’s opposition to the COG’s
motion for a protective order was not substantially justified because the
information the order sought to protect was irrelevant and pertained only to an
issue that was already decided. The court also found that the Crandon Church
failed to provide “any justification for why imposition of attorney[] fees would be
unjust.”

¶36 According to the Crandon Church, the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion by granting the motion for attorney fees and costs because
it “incompletely analyzed the risk from mold to the cloth on the pews.” Even if
the Crandon Church is correct that mold may grow on the pews in the winter, that
fact is irrelevant to the issue of whether winterization had already been litigated
and decided by the court. The court previously addressed the winterization issue
and ordered the COG to insure the property. The requested financial information
had no relevance to the Crandon Church’s claims seeking declarations of interest
in the property or the CoVantage accounts.

¶37 The Crandon Church further asserts that the financial information
was relevant to whether the COG could afford to heat the building, which would
have been the basis for a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court’s
winterization order. However, the COG’s financial ability to heat the property
was not something that the court considered in issuing the winterization order.
Rather, the court found that the COG was the proper party to determine whether it
should heat the property. The court determined that a failure to heat the building
was not at issue because the property was insured.

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No. 2022AP1863

¶38 In short, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion
by ordering the Crandon Church to pay the COG’s attorney fees and costs. The
court applied the proper legal standard under WIS. STAT. § 804.12 and reached a
decision reasonably supported by the record.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17