State v. M. A. C.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 2, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos.
2023AP2181 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2022JC701
2022JC702
2023AP2182
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

APPEAL NO. 2023AP2181

IN THE INTEREST OF N.M., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

M.A.C.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL NO. 2023AP2182

IN THE INTEREST OF I.W., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.
Nos. 2023AP2181
2023AP2182

M.A.C.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
REYNA I. MORALES, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

¶1 GEENEN, J.1 Molly appeals the circuit court’s orders finding her in
default and striking her contest posture related to CHIPS2 petitions involving her
two children, Natalie and Iliana.3 Molly argues that the circuit court’s orders
taking jurisdiction over her children by default for her failure to appear at the
March 15, 2023 status hearing was an erroneous exercise of discretion because her
conduct was not egregious or in bad faith. Specifically, Molly contends that she
was unable to attend the status hearing because she was attending a hearing in a
separate matter, in a criminal court, which ran late, and that these circumstances
constitute a clear and justifiable excuse for her nonappearance. The facts do not
establish that Molly’s conduct on March 15th was egregious or in bad faith. For
the following reasons, we reverse the orders of the circuit court and remand for
further proceedings.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
2
CHIPS is an acronym used “to denote the phrase ‘child in need of protection or
services’ as used in the Wisconsin Children’s Code, chapter 48, Stats.” Marinette County v.
Tammy C., 219 Wis. 2d 206, 208 n.1, 579 N.W.2d 635 (1998).
3
For ease of reading, the family in this confidential matter is referred to using
pseudonyms. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(g).

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BACKGROUND

¶2 On October 4, 2022, the State filed petitions under WIS. STAT.
§ 48.13(10) alleging that Natalie and Iliana were children in need of protection or
services.

¶3 Molly’s attendance at early hearings in the case was sporadic. She
attended a temporary physical custody hearing where the court commissioner
generally warned that failure to be present at scheduled court dates could result in
a default finding. Molly did not appear at the initial scheduled plea hearing,
though it was unclear whether she had been served, and the circuit court4
adjourned the hearing. Two months later, Molly did not appear at the adjourned
plea hearing; the hearing was again adjourned, this time due to the motion for
substitution that Molly filed prior to the hearing. Molly attended the adjourned
plea hearing on January 13, 2023, and entered a plea contesting the CHIPS
petitions and preserved her right to a jury trial. The court scheduled a settlement
conference for the following month.

¶4 Molly did not appear at the settlement conference on February 14,
2023. At that conference, Molly’s counsel, acting on her behalf, requested a jury
trial. The guardian ad litem (GAL) for Iliana requested that the court
commissioner conducting the conference take a default finding for Molly under
advisement due to her failure to appear. The State supported the GAL’s request,
noting that the settlement conference was at least the second hearing

4
This case was initially before the Honorable Laura Gramling Perez before it was
reassigned to the Honorable Reyna I. Morales; we refer to both as the circuit court.

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Molly has missed. The court commissioner granted the request and stated:

The parents are advised they must attend all future court
proceedings. They are advised through their counsel.
Should they fail to appear, they may be found to be in
default and if they are found to be in default, decisions
regarding the well-being of the children may be made in
their absence.

¶5 Molly attended the next status hearing in the case on February 21,
2023. After confirming that Molly still wanted a jury trial, the circuit court agreed
to schedule the jury trial at the permanency plan hearing, which had already been
scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on March 15, 2023. The circuit court then stated, “I
understand that sometimes issues come up, but then we will be selecting dates on
that day. Everybody … is advised that they need to be present. Failure to be
present will result in default.” Following the court’s statement, Molly’s counsel
requested rescheduling to accommodate a scheduling conflict in his calendar, but
his request was denied.

¶6 Molly was not present at the status hearing on March 15, 2023.
Instead, Molly was in a different Milwaukee County Circuit Court courtroom
awaiting a hearing in a criminal traffic case, scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m.
Molly’s criminal counsel notified the circuit court prior to the start of the CHIPS
status hearing that Molly was attending a hearing in the criminal court on her
criminal case. When the CHIPS hearing began at 10:00 a.m., the circuit court
informed the parties that Molly’s criminal counsel had notified the circuit court
earlier that morning that Molly “had something at 9:00 a.m.,” referring to the
criminal hearing, and that she “may be here, but she may be late.” Molly did not
attend the CHIPS hearing. The criminal court hearing did not begin until
10:46 a.m., and the CHIPS hearing ended at 10:32 a.m.

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¶7 During the March 15th CHIPS hearing, the State requested that the
circuit court find Molly in default for her nonappearance, and the GAL supported
the State’s request. Molly’s counsel opposed the request and, after reiterating that
Molly was not present in the CHIPS court because she was in another courtroom
for a different matter she was also required to attend, stated, “We are set here … to
pick a trial date and I’m prepared to do that, and I’m authorized to do that. So I’m
asking the [c]ourt to reject the State’s request for default, and permit me to pick
trial dates,” and argued that default would be inappropriate.

¶8 The circuit court found that Molly’s failure to appear was egregious,
struck Molly’s contest posture, and took jurisdiction over both children by
default.5 The circuit court reasoned that Molly was aware that the hearings in her
criminal case and CHIPS case were scheduled at conflicting times, and that the
parties had been previously warned both by the circuit court and the court
commissioner that a failure to be present at hearings could result in default. The
circuit court stated that Molly could have “gone on to a breakout room and … just
let [the circuit court] know what is going on.” It further explained that “this matter
just has been lagging on for a while. This is children’s court. We have to look [at]
what is in the best interest of the children.” Aside from characterizing Molly’s
conduct as egregious, the circuit court cited no rule, precedent, statutory basis, or
standard for its decision.

5
The circuit court did not expressly address whether Molly had a clear and justifiable
excuse for her absence, but a circuit court is not required to use “magic words.” See State v.
Brown, 2020 WI 63, ¶27, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584 (“The law generally rejects
imposing ‘magic words’ requirements.”). We therefore presume that the circuit court determined
that Molly did not have such an excuse. See State v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 673, 499 N.W.2d
631 (1993) (“When a [circuit] court does not expressly make a finding necessary to support its
legal conclusion, an appellate court can assume that the [circuit] court made the finding in the
way that supports its decision.”).

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¶9 Molly filed a motion for the circuit court to reconsider its orders,
arguing that her failure to appear was not so egregious to warrant a default finding
as a sanction. Molly explained that her criminal hearing ran hours late, thus
preventing her from attending the CHIPS hearing because failing to appear in
criminal court would result in the issuance of a bench warrant to secure her
appearance. Therefore, Molly contended that these circumstances constituted a
justifiable excuse for her nonappearance at the CHIPS hearing, which was only
scheduled to choose trial dates.

¶10 The circuit court denied Molly’s motion for reconsideration. It
stated that it “must look at the whole case history and not view [Molly’s] failure to
appear at the March 15, 2023 hearing in a vacuum.” It reasoned that Molly’s
criminal counsel would have been able to ask the criminal court judge to allow
Molly to leave the criminal hearing to attend the CHIPS hearing and that, based on
its own experience with criminal court, after Molly’s case was called “[s]he could
have potentially … chosen to log in [to the CHIPS court’s Zoom hearing room] at
that time and come on into this hearing. She chose not to.” Thus, the circuit court
denied Molly’s motion for reconsideration and let the default judgment stand,
concluding “[t]hat based upon the case history, [Molly’s] failure to appear at the
March 15, 2023 hearing was intentional, egregious, or without justifiable excuse.”

¶11 Molly petitioned this court for leave to appeal the circuit court’s
order denying her motion for reconsideration; we denied the petition on May 16,
2023. On June 2, 2023, the circuit court held an adjourned disposition hearing.
When that hearing began at 8:31 a.m., Molly was again absent, and the circuit
court defaulted Molly as to jurisdiction and entered dispositional orders for both
Natalie and Iliana. Molly eventually arrived at 8:55 a.m., and the court ordered
the default finding and the dispositional orders to remain.

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¶12 Molly now appeals the circuit court’s orders.

DISCUSSION

¶13 As a threshold matter, the State argues that this appeal, solely as it
relates to Iliana, is moot because Iliana’s underlying CHIPS case was closed, so
“there is no relief this [c]ourt could grant [Molly] since there is no underlying or
existing controversy[.]”6

¶14 “In Wisconsin, dismissal of a case as moot is an act of judicial
restraint rather than a jurisdictional requirement.” Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022
WI 46, ¶19, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162. “A case is moot when the
resolution of an issue will have no practical effect on the underlying controversy.”
Id. A case “is not moot when the direct or collateral consequences of the order
persist and vacatur of that order would practically affect those consequences.” Id.
See Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶23, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901
(discussing how “[t]he idea that collateral consequences can render an otherwise
moot issue not moot is nothing new in Wisconsin.”). “[W]hether a collateral
consequence renders an appeal not moot turns on the existence of a ‘causal
relationship’ between a legal consequence and the challenged order.” S.A.M., 402
Wis. 2d 379, ¶20.

¶15 Molly contends that this appeal is not moot because she was ordered
to pay child support to Iliana’s father at the case closure hearing. Molly reasons

6
The GAL filed a Statement of Non-Participation indicating that he would not
participate in this appeal because he also believes that this appeal, as it relates to Iliana, is moot,
and that, to the extent this court disagrees, he believes the State’s response sufficiently represents
Iliana’s best interests.

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that the child support payments are a collateral consequence of the circuit court’s
orders taking jurisdiction over her children by default; thus, this appeal is not
moot. We find Molly’s reasoning persuasive. The child support payments are a
collateral consequence of the circuit court taking jurisdiction over Iliana that
persists beyond the closure of Iliana’s underlying CHIPS case and would be
affected by the vacatur of the circuit court’s orders finding jurisdiction by default.
Accordingly, this appeal is not moot.

¶16 We therefore turn to the merits of Molly’s claims. Molly argues first
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it sanctioned her
with a default finding because it “relied on inaccurate facts and neglected other
relevant facts[.]” Molly also argues that the fact that she was attending a hearing
in a criminal court constitutes a clear and justifiable excuse for her nonappearance
at the March 15, 2023, CHIPS hearing.

¶17 “[A] circuit court has both inherent authority and statutory authority
under WIS. STAT. §§ 802.10(7), 804.12(2)(a), and 805.03 to sanction parties for
failing to obey court orders” by entering default judgments against noncomplying
parties. Evelyn C. R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶17, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d
768 (footnotes omitted). The circuit court is limited, however, to imposing
sanctions that are “just.” Sec. 805.03. A default judgment is a drastic penalty that
should be imposed only when such a harsh measure is necessary. Mohns Inc. v.
BMO Harris Bank N.A., 2021 WI 8, ¶36, 395 Wis. 2d 421, 954 N.W.2d 339.
Therefore, the court is required to make the heightened findings of “egregious
conduct” or “bad faith” without a “clear and justifiable excuse” before granting a
default judgment to ensure the sanction is just. Id.; see also Industrial Roofing
Servs., Inc. v. Marquardt, 2007 WI 19, ¶43, 299 Wis. 2d 81, 726 N.W.2d 898.

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¶18 “The decision to impose sanctions and the decision of which
sanctions to impose … are within a circuit court’s discretion.” Marquardt, 299
Wis. 2d 81, ¶41. “A circuit court properly exercises its discretion when it
examines the relevant facts, applies a proper standard of law, and using a
demonstrated rational process reaches a conclusion that a reasonable judge could
reach.” Dane Cnty. DHS v. Mable K., 2013 WI 28, ¶39, 346 Wis. 2d 396, 828
N.W.2d 198. “This process must depend on facts that are of record or that are
reasonably derived by inference from the record[.]” Gahl v. Aurora Health Care,
Inc., 2023 WI 35, ¶22, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 989 N.W.2d 561 (citing McCleary v.
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971)).

¶19 In the case of sanctions assessed for egregious conduct, a court
erroneously exercises its discretion “if the aggrieved party can establish a ‘clear
and justifiable excuse’” for the conduct at issue. Marquardt, 299 Wis. 2d 81, ¶89
(Butler, J., concurring) (citing Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261,
273, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Marquardt, 299
Wis. 2d 81). See Brandon Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Pearson Props., Ltd., 2001 WI
App 205, ¶11, 247 Wis. 2d 521, 634 N.W.2d 544; Taylor v. State Highway
Comm’n, 45 Wis. 2d 490, 494, 173 N.W.2d 707 (1970) (noting that a party may
establish an erroneous excercise of discretion if they show a “clear and justifiable
excuse” for noncompliance). Therefore, we must examine whether the circuit
court imposed the default sanction in accordance with the law upon a reasonable
determination of the facts in the record, and whether such facts establish egregious
conduct and the absence of a clear and justifiable excuse.

¶20 Molly did not comply with the circuit court’s order when she did not
attend the March 15, 2023 hearing, but she offered the circuit court a clear and
justifiable excuse for her failure to comply. There is no doubt that the excuse was

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legitimate, but the circuit court rejected the excuse and found Molly’s conduct
egregious for two reasons: first, its belief that “[Molly] could have gone on to a
breakout room and then just had, you know, go in there and—and just let us know
what is going on,” and second, that Molly should have avoided a scheduling
conflict altogether by either asking the circuit court to reschedule the CHIPS
hearing, or by not allowing the criminal case to be scheduled for a hearing on the
same day. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the circuit court erred as a
matter of law when it concluded that Molly’s conduct was egregious and without a
clear and justifiable excuse when Molly, in fact, presented such an excuse.

¶21 Molly was required to attend both a 9:00 a.m. hearing and a
10:00 a.m. hearing on March 15, 2023, in different courtrooms. When Molly’s
criminal counsel realized the criminal court was running late, he contacted the
circuit court—prior to the start of the CHIPS hearing—to notify it of the potential
scheduling conflict, and indicated that Molly would appear at the CHIPS hearing
after her case was called if she was able.7 However, when the 10:00 a.m. CHIPS
hearing began in the circuit court, Molly was still waiting to begin the hearing on
her criminal case, which was not called until 10:46 a.m., after the CHIPS hearing
had already concluded. Molly therefore did not attend the CHIPS hearing. It is
undisputed that Molly’s criminal hearing was called well after the scheduled start
time and ran late, and that Molly waited for that case to be called. There is also no
genuine dispute that Molly had any control over the timing of when her criminal
case was called.

7
The circuit court’s description of the statement Molly’s criminal counsel made to the
circuit court was that Molly “may be here, but may be late;” it did not imply any certainty about
Molly’s attendance.

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¶22 Our supreme court has noted that a “clear and justifiable” excuse is a
defense for not complying with the rules. State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 470,
592 N.W.2d 628 (1999). Beyond that statement, Wisconsin courts have not
extensively considered the meaning of “clear and justifiable excuse,” or what
constitutes such an excuse. The phrase, however, is used in the context of
ignoring court orders, and thus implies that there can be reasons for a party’s
noncompliance that reduces one’s culpability for the failure to comply.

¶23 While the court speculates that Molly could have found a way to
appear remotely in the circuit court for the CHIPS hearing while waiting for her
criminal case to be called, there was no evidentiary hearing or offer of proof that
precipitated the default finding that supports the court’s speculation and rejection
of Molly’s clear and justifiable excuse. There was no testimony or other factual
evidence that the criminal court would have allowed Molly to step out to attend
another hearing without consequence to her position in that court. No facts in the
record establish that Molly knew that the circuit court expected her to take
extraordinary measures to appear remotely in the CHIPS hearing despite the risk
of potential consequences, and despite giving the circuit court a clear and
justifiable excuse for her tardiness or potential absence.8 And while, perhaps,
Molly should have notified the court or counsel in her various proceedings about
other court dates to ensure a conflict was avoided, there are no facts in the record
that suggest that Molly knew that these hearing times would conflict or that she

8
When discussing the motion for reconsideration, the circuit court also stated that Molly
would have been free to leave the criminal courtroom and appear remotely in the circuit court
after her criminal case was called, but the case was not called until after the CHIPS hearing
ended. Molly would not have been able to appear at the CHIPS hearing after her criminal case
was called, and the circuit court’s conclusion to the contrary is unsupported by fact.

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would not be able to attend both hearings, such that the conflict can be solely
attributed to Molly.9

¶24 Molly’s failure to attend the circuit court hearing was due to
circumstances over which she had no control—the criminal court running late.
She could not reasonably be in two places at once. Molly provided the circuit
court with a clear and justifiable excuse related to her attendance prior to the start
of the CHIPS hearing. There is no dispute that Molly was waiting for her criminal
case to be called and that the case was not called until after the CHIPS hearing
concluded. The circuit court’s refusal to accept Molly’s excuse under the
circumstances is unreasonable because the circuit court’s reasoning is supported
by its own speculation instead of relevant facts. See Bentz v. Bentz, 148 Wis. 2d
400, 403, 435 N.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1988) (“[I]f the [circuit] court’s decision is
based on facts which do not exist, an abuse [of discretion] has occurred.”).
Therefore, the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it found that
Molly was absent from the CHIPS hearing without a clear and justifiable excuse.
Molly’s conduct was not egregious because Molly presented a clear and justifiable
excuse.

¶25 While the State argues that Molly’s failure to appear at hearings both
before and after the March 15, 2023 CHIPS hearing supports a finding that

9
While the circuit court found it egregious that Molly did not notify it of the conflict
earlier or ask for the hearing to be rescheduled because it was “as accommodating as possible,”
we note that the circuit court was less accommodating than it recalled. When Molly’s CHIPS
counsel told the circuit court that the March 15th hearing presented a scheduling conflict for him
and asked to reschedule, the circuit court responded, “If you look at my calendar, I have—I have
absolutely no openings and I’m not going to move it.” Therefore, even if Molly recognized that it
would be prudent to ask the court to reschedule, it would not have been unreasonable for her to
think that the hearing date and time were immovable and attempt to attend both hearings.

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Molly’s pattern of conduct was egregious, we disagree.10 Although the circuit
court did not discuss Molly’s prior nonappearances in any detail and was clear that
Molly’s absence from the March 15, 2023 hearing was the trigger and primary
basis for the circuit court’s finding of egregiousness, this court “search[es] the
record for reasons to sustain the [circuit] court’s exercise of discretion.”
Lofthus v. Lofthus, 2004 WI App 65, ¶21, 270 Wis. 2d 515, 678 N.W.2d 393.
Upon review, we conclude that the facts in the records do not indicate that Molly’s
three prior failures to appear were “‘so extreme, substantial and persistent’ that the
conduct may be considered egregious[.]” See Mable K., 346 Wis. 2d 396, ¶70.

¶26 Molly’s first nonappearance at the initial plea hearing involved a
question of whether she was properly served, and the circuit court adjourned the
hearing for that reason. Molly’s second nonappearance at the adjourned plea
hearing did not result in any delays because Molly had, prior to the hearing, timely
filed a motion for substitution which deprives the circuit court of jurisdiction and
would require it to adjourn the hearing, which it did immediately after Molly’s
counsel notified it of the substitution request. See WIS. STAT. § 801.58(2).

¶27 Finally, Molly’s third nonappearance at the settlement conference
before the court commissioner also did not cause any delays because her counsel
was authorized to act on her behalf. While the court commissioner took the
State’s and the GAL’s request for a default finding under advisement, it did not
make such a finding, and neither the State nor the GAL renewed its motion for a

10
Molly’s failure to appear at hearings after the circuit court’s default order on
March 15, 2023, cannot be used as a basis to support the circuit court’s finding of egregiousness
because they occurred after the circuit court defaulted Molly, thus they were not facts available to
inform the circuit court’s exercise of discretion at the time.

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default finding solely based on Molly’s three nonappearances at the next hearing,
at which Molly was present. Based on the facts in the records, we cannot say that
Molly flagrantly disregarded the judicial process, or that these three absences were
“extreme, substantial, or persistent”; especially, in light of the extenuating
circumstances, because that they did not contribute to any significant delays in the
proceedings. See Mable K., 346 Wis. 2d 396, ¶70. See also Taylor, 45 Wis. 2d
490, 494 (stating that a “clear and justifiable excuse for the delay” in proceedings
can establish an erroneous exercise of circuit court’s discretion. (Emphasis
added)).

¶28 The State also argues that reversing the circuit court’s orders “would
waste the [circuit court’s] valuable resources and further delay stability for these
children.” As the State notes, WIS. STAT. ch. 48 recognizes “that instability and
impermanence in family relationships are contrary to the welfare of children” and
that it is important to “eliminat[e] the need for children to wait unreasonable
periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions that prevent their safe
return to the family.” WIS. STAT. § 48.01(1)(a). While this is undoubtedly true, it
is also true that the circuit court only has the power to impose “just” sanctions on
parties for failing to obey court orders. See WIS. STAT. § 805.03. We cannot
ignore that the circuit court’s default ruling here was not a “just” sanction for
Molly’s nonappearance at the CHIPS hearing, particularly when Molly’s CHIPS
counsel was authorized to schedule the trial despite Molly’s absence, thus

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avoiding any delay resulting from her absence. See also Mable K., 346 Wis. 2d
396, ¶61 (“[P]arents must be provided with fundamentally fair procedures.”).11

CONCLUSION

¶29 The decision to issue a default ruling against Molly resulting from
her inability to attend a hearing because she was, simultaneously, in a criminal
court hearing that the circuit court knew about—on a case she would likely need to
resolve as a part of CHIPS proceedings—is unreasonable.12 Molly had a clear and
justifiable excuse for her nonappearance at the March 15th hearing. Additionally,
Molly’s three prior nonappearances were not so extreme, substantial, and
persistent on their own to support the heightened finding of egregious conduct
necessary for the circuit court to issue such a drastic sanction. See Mohns, Inc.,
395 Wis. 2d 421, ¶36. Therefore, the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion when it sanctioned Molly with a finding of default because it failed to
rely on the relevant facts to reach a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.

¶30 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s orders taking jurisdiction
over the children by default, and remand for further proceedings consistent with

11
WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.01(1)(ad) provides that a purpose of proceedings under WIS.
STAT. ch. 48, like CHIPS proceedings, is “[t]o provide judicial and other procedures through
which children and all other interested parties are assured fair hearings and their constitutional
and other legal rights are recognized and enforced, while protecting the public safety.”
12
A common condition for a parent whose children are subject to a CHIPS dispositional
order is that the parent must resolve all outstanding criminal cases in order to have their children
returned to their care. See e.g., Sheboygan Cnty. DHHS. v. Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶5, 325
Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369; State v. D.K., Nos. 2023AP292 and 2023AP293, unpublished slip
op. ¶3 (WI App Jan. 3, 2024); State v. A.A.L., No. 2022AP1074, unpublished slip op. ¶25 (WI
App Oct. 11, 2022). The circuit court did, in fact, apply this condition to Molly in its June 2,
2023 dispositional order.

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this decision. The orders of the circuit court made after March 15, 2023, pursuant
to the jurisdiction it found by default over both children, are now void.

By the Court.—Orders reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

16