Rafeal D. Newson v. Jeffrey Wagner

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 9, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP714 Cir. Ct. No. 2020CV4744

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

RAFEAL D. NEWSON,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

JUDGE JEFFREY WAGNER, MILWAUKEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
JUDGE, JUDGE KITTY BRENNAN, MILWAUKEE COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT JUDGE, JUDGE JOHN DIMOTTO, MILWAUKEE COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT JUDGE, MILWAUKEE COUNTY AND COURT COMMISSIONER
FRANK J. LISKA, JR., MILWAUKEE COUNTY,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL O. BOHREN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2021AP714

¶1 PER CURIAM. Rafeal Newson, pro se, appeals an order
dismissing his claims against current Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge
Jeffrey Wagner and former Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judges
Kitty Brennan and John DiMotto (collectively, “the judicial defendants”).
Newson also appeals an order that: (1) denied his motion for a default judgment
against Milwaukee County and former Milwaukee County Court Commissioner
Frank J. Liska, Jr. (collectively, “the county defendants”); and (2) dismissed his
claims against the county defendants. In response, the county defendants assert
that Newson’s appeal is frivolous, and they request an award of fees and costs
under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3) (2021-22).1

¶2 We conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed Newson’s
claims against the judicial defendants because those claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. We further conclude that the court properly
denied Newson’s motion for a default judgment and dismissed his claims against
the county defendants because Newson failed to prove that he properly served the
county defendants. We therefore affirm. We do not, however, conclude that
Newson’s appeal is frivolous under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3). Accordingly, we
deny the county defendants’ request for fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

¶3 In 2000, Newson was extradited from Arizona to Wisconsin to stand
trial for first-degree intentional homicide in connection with the 1996 death of
Terrance Maclin. See State v. Newson, No. 2017AP551, unpublished slip op.

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

2
No. 2021AP714

¶¶4-6 (WI App Sept. 18, 2018).2 Newson was found guilty of that offense
following a jury trial in March 2001, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment,
with eligibility for parole beginning on January 1, 2050. Id., ¶6. Newson’s
sentence was to be served consecutively to an Arizona sentence, and he was
returned to Arizona to complete his sentence there. Id. In July 2016, Newson was
released from prison in Arizona and was remanded to the custody of the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections to serve his Wisconsin sentence. Id., ¶12.

¶4 Over the years, Newson has unsuccessfully challenged his
Wisconsin conviction in multiple prior appeals. See State v. Newson,
No. 2002AP959-CR, unpublished op. and order (WI App Sept. 22, 2003); State v.
Newson, No. 2004AP2988, unpublished slip op. (WI App Sept. 20, 2005); State
ex rel. Newson v. Circuit Court, No. 2011AP1569-W, unpublished op. and order
(WI App July 27, 2012); Newson, No. 2017AP551; State ex rel. Newson v.
Foster, No. 2019AP1464, unpublished op. and order (WI App May 4, 2021); State
v. Newson, No. 2020AP1041, unpublished op. and order (WI App Dec. 6, 2022).

¶5 On August 11, 2020, Newson filed a complaint (but no summons)
against the judicial defendants and the county defendants, asserting claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Newson alleged, generally, that the judicial defendants and
Commissioner Liska had violated his civil rights by approving a warrant for his
extradition from Arizona and by presiding over various stages of his criminal
proceedings.

2
Subject to limited exceptions that are not applicable here, an unpublished opinion may
not be cited as precedent or authority. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(a)-(b). We do not,
however, cite our decisions from Newson’s previous appeals as precedent or authority. Instead,
we cite them to provide necessary background and context for the issues raised in this case.

3
No. 2021AP714

¶6 More specifically, Newson alleged that when Judge Wagner was
presented with an application for a writ in connection with Newson’s extradition,
Judge Wagner “certified that the facts recited [were] correct” and “transmitted the
action in accordance with its terms and the provisions of the [Interstate]
Agreement on Detainers [IAD].” Newson alleged that the writ transmitted to the
State of Arizona “contained a copy of a December 6, 1996, unfiled criminal
complaint, that was not done before a court commissioner or judge, and had no
case number, nor file-stamp from the Clerk of Court showing authenticity.”

¶7 Newson next alleged that after he was extradited to Wisconsin,
Commissioner Liska conducted his initial appearance, during which the clerk
referred to a “modified” criminal complaint with a new case number that had been
filed on August 29, 2000. Newson alleged that Commissioner Liska then made a
finding of probable cause that Newson had committed a felony.

¶8 Newson further alleged that Judge Brennan presided over his
criminal case from September 8, 2000, until March 5, 2001. According to
Newson’s complaint, Judge Brennan “was well-aware of the IAD, yet pressed on
for trial.” Finally, Newson alleged that Judge DiMotto “presided over [his] trial,”
his sentencing, and his “extradition back to Arizona” and “ruled over [his] post-
conviction/appeal process in initial filing, during December 2001 – January 2002.”

¶9 Newson’s complaint alleged that “[a]ll Defendants were derelict in
their duties in directives from the Wisconsin Supreme Court, all Defendants
breached the IAD contract/compact, [and] were parties to the fraud.” As relief,
Newson sought $20,000,000 in damages from each defendant, as well as an order
for his immediate release from prison.

4
No. 2021AP714

¶10 On August 27, 2020, the judicial defendants filed a motion to
dismiss Newson’s claims against them on multiple grounds, namely: failure to file
suit before the applicable statute of limitations expired, judicial immunity, failure
to serve a written notice of claim, and failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted. Thereafter, on September 30, 2020, Newson filed a summons, which
included an attached copy of the same complaint that he had previously filed on
August 11.

¶11 On December 1, 2020, Commissioner Liska filed a motion to
dismiss, asserting that Newson had failed to properly serve Commissioner Liska,
that Newson had failed to file a notice of claim, that Newson’s claims were barred
by the applicable statute of limitations, and that Newson’s claims were barred by
judicial immunity. Milwaukee County subsequently filed its own motion to
dismiss on January 29, 2021, on the grounds of improper service, failure to file a
notice of claim, failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitations, and
failure to state a claim against Milwaukee County on which relief could be
granted. Newson moved to strike the pleadings filed by Commissioner Liska and
Milwaukee County, and he asked the circuit court to find them in default for
failing to timely respond to his complaint.

¶12 The circuit court held a hearing on the parties’ pending motions on
April 13, 2021. After hearing arguments from the parties, the court granted all of
the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied Newson’s motions for default
judgment against the county defendants.

¶13 With respect to the judicial defendants, the circuit court determined
that Newson had not filed his complaint within the time limit prescribed by the
applicable statute of limitations, that Newson’s claims were barred by judicial

5
No. 2021AP714

immunity, and that Newson had failed to state a claim for his immediate release
from prison. The court further concluded that although Newson had properly
served Milwaukee County, he was not entitled to a default judgment because his
complaint failed to state a claim against Milwaukee County on which relief could
be granted. The court next concluded that Newson had not properly served
Commissioner Liska and, therefore, was not entitled to a default judgment against
him. In addition, the court concluded that Newson’s claims against Commissioner
Liska were barred by judicial immunity and by the applicable statute of
limitations.

¶14 Newson now appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred by granting
the defendants’ motions to dismiss and by denying his motions for default
judgment against the county defendants.

DISCUSSION

I. The judicial defendants

¶15 We conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed Newson’s
claims against the judicial defendants because those claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations. In light of this conclusion, we need not address
the parties’ other arguments regarding Newson’s claims against the judicial
defendants. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628,
673 N.W.2d 716 (court of appeals need not address all issues raised by the parties
if one is dispositive).

¶16 When the facts are undisputed, whether the applicable statute of
limitations has run on a given claim is a question of law. Munger v. Seehafer,
2016 WI App 89, ¶18, 372 Wis. 2d 749, 890 N.W.2d 22. Here, Newson’s

6
No. 2021AP714

complaint alleged claims against the judicial defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
WISCONSIN STAT. § 893.53 is the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983
claims. Hemberger v. Bitzer, 216 Wis. 2d 509, 519, 574 N.W.2d 656 (1998). At
the time of the acts alleged in Newson’s complaint, § 893.53 required an action to
be commenced “within 6 years after the cause of action accrues … or be barred.”
WIS. STAT. § 893.53 (2001-02).3 A § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff has “a
complete and present cause of action”—that is, “when ‘the plaintiff can file suit
and obtain relief.’” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (citations omitted).

¶17 Newson’s claims against the judicial defendants were based on
actions that they allegedly took between April 2000 and January 2002. The
actions in question were judicial acts that were either effectuated upon Newson or
occurred in his presence. As such, Newson would have been aware of each of
those acts at the time that they occurred. In fact, Newson’s claims against the
judicial defendants are based on the premise that the alleged errors in the
extradition process were so obvious and egregious that the judicial defendants
were “derelict in their duties” by failing to notice and correct them. If this
assertion is correct, then the errors would also have been obvious to Newson and
to his attorney in the criminal case, such that Newson could have filed suit and
obtained relief against the judicial defendants at that time. Under these
circumstances, Newson’s § 1983 claims against the judicial defendants accrued at
the time of the actions alleged in his complaint—that is, between April 2000 and
January 2002. Newson did not file the instant lawsuit until August 2020—over

3
WISCONSIN STAT. § 893.53 was amended in 2018 to change the limitations period from
six years to three years. See 2017 Wis. Act 235, § 26. The judicial defendants concede that the
amended statute does not apply to Newson’s case.

7
No. 2021AP714

eighteen years after the last of the acts alleged in his complaint. Newson’s claims
against the judicial defendants are therefore barred by the applicable six-year
statute of limitations.

¶18 Newson’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. First, Newson
argues that “kidnapping/false imprisonment” is a “continuing offense,” and
because he is still in prison, the violation is ongoing and the statute of limitations
has not yet begun to run. Newson’s complaint does not, however, allege any
conduct by the judicial defendants that would constitute kidnapping. Newson does
not, for instance, allege that any of the judicial defendants acted “[b]y force or
threat of imminent force” or “[b]y deceit induce[d him] to go from one place to
another.” See WIS. STAT. § 940.31(1)(a)-(c).

¶19 With respect to false imprisonment, Newson cites Wallace for the
proposition that the limitations period for a false imprisonment claim begins to run
“when the alleged false imprisonment ends.” See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389
(citation omitted). The Wallace court went on to state, however, that “[r]eflective
of the fact that false imprisonment consists of detention without legal process, a
false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process—
when, for example, he [or she] is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on
charges.” Id. Thus, Newson’s alleged false imprisonment would have ended
when he was bound over for trial, which necessarily would have occurred before
his jury trial in March 2001. Consequently, to the extent Newson’s complaint
states a claim for false imprisonment, that claim would have accrued before
March 2001 and is therefore barred by the applicable six-year statute of
limitations.

8
No. 2021AP714

¶20 Newson next argues that the IAD “has no expressed statute of
limitations” and that, because the IAD gives rise to a “public right,” a state statute
of limitations is not binding in an action to enforce the IAD. This argument fails
because Newson’s claims against the judicial defendants arise under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, not the IAD. As noted above, the limitations period in WIS. STAT.
§ 893.53 applies to § 1983 claims. See Hemberger, 216 Wis. 2d at 519.
Moreover, the case that Newson cites in support of his “public right” argument
actually held that “state statutes of limitation neither bind nor have any application
to the United States, when suing to enforce a public right or to protect interests of
its Indian wards.” United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 196 (1926)
(emphasis added). The fact that a state statute of limitations does not bind the
United States when suing to enforce a public right does not mean that a state
statute of limitations is inapplicable to Newson, a private individual.

¶21 Newson also asserts that under WIS. STAT. § 893.19, his claims did
not accrue until July 2016, when he was released from custody in Arizona and was
returned to Wisconsin to begin serving his sentence here. That statute applies,
however, “[i]f a person is out of this state when the cause of action accrues against
the person ….” Sec. 893.19(1) (emphasis added). Here, the issue is not when a
cause of action against Newson accrued but when Newson’s cause of action
against the judicial defendants accrued. We therefore agree with the judicial
defendants that, under the circumstances of this case, § 893.19 “affords no
extension to Newson for the time he spent in Arizona prisons.”

¶22 Newson next cites WIS. STAT. § 893.40, which states that an action
“upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of any state or of the United States
shall be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered or be
barred.” Newson believes that under § 893.40, he had twenty years to file his

9
No. 2021AP714

§ 1983 claims, rather than six years. By its plain language, however, § 893.40
governs actions to enforce judgments or judicial decrees. Newson’s § 1983 claims
do not seek to enforce any judgment or judicial decree, and § 893.40 is therefore
inapplicable.

¶23 Next, Newson argues that there is no statute of limitations for a
lawsuit challenging a “void judgment” and that an objection to a circuit court’s
subject matter jurisdiction may be brought at any time. This argument fails
because Newson’s current lawsuit is a civil rights action against various judicial
officials and Milwaukee County, not an action to attack the judgment in his
criminal case. Stated differently, in the instant case, Newson is not directly
challenging his judgment of conviction on the grounds that it is void or that the
criminal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; instead, Newson is arguing that
various actions taken by the defendants violated his civil rights. As already noted,
WIS. STAT. § 893.53 provides the applicable limitations period for a civil rights
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

¶24 Newson also asserts that a defendant in a civil rights action is
estopped from pleading the statute of limitations when the defendant’s own
fraudulent conduct prevented the plaintiff from filing suit within the applicable
time period. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 498 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (E.D. Wis.
1980). Newson then contends, without any supporting citations to the record or
specific allegations, that the “identit[ies] of liable defendants were fraudulently
concealed” from him. We reject this argument because Newson’s complaint does
not allege that the identities of any defendants were fraudulently concealed from
him. Consequently, nothing in Newson’s complaint would support a conclusion
that the defendants committed fraudulent conduct, much less that such conduct

10
No. 2021AP714

prevented Newson from filing suit within the applicable six-year limitations
period.

¶25 Finally, Newson contends that because his complaint alleged that the
defendants committed fraud, he was necessarily entitled to a jury trial and the
circuit court could not dismiss his claims on statute of limitations grounds. The
legal authorities that Newson cites do not support this proposition. Here, the
allegations in Newson’s complaint, if true, show that his § 1983 claims against the
judicial defendants (including any claims for fraud) accrued when the acts alleged
in the complaint occurred—that is, between April 2000 and January 2002. Under
these circumstances, Newson’s claims against the judicial defendants, which were
not filed until August 2020, are clearly barred by the applicable six-year statute of
limitations. Consequently, the circuit court properly granted the judicial
defendants’ motion to dismiss.

II. The county defendants

¶26 As noted above, Newson argues that the circuit court erred by
denying his motions for default judgment against the county defendants and by
granting the county defendants’ motions to dismiss. We conclude that the court
did not err in these respects because Newson failed to prove that he properly
served the county defendants. Given this conclusion, we need not address the
parties’ other arguments regarding the county defendants. See Turner, 268
Wis. 2d 628, ¶1 n.1.

¶27 “The service of a summons in a manner prescribed by statute is a
condition precedent to a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction.” State v. One
1997 Ford F-150, 2003 WI App 128, ¶9, 265 Wis. 2d 264, 665 N.W.2d 411.
When a defendant appears in an action and challenges the sufficiency of service,

11
No. 2021AP714

the plaintiff must provide proof of service as required by WIS. STAT. § 801.10(4).
See One 1997 Ford F-150, 265 Wis. 2d 264, ¶9. Under that statute,

[p]ersonal or substituted personal service shall be proved by
the affidavit of the server indicating the time and date,
place and manner of service; that the server is an adult
resident of the state of service or, if service is made in this
state, an adult resident of this state or of Illinois, Iowa,
Michigan, or Minnesota and is not a party to the action; that
the server knew the person served to be the defendant
named in the summons; and that the server delivered to and
left with the defendant an authenticated copy of the
summons.

Sec. 801.10(4)(a) (emphasis added).4

4
Paragraph (b) of WIS. STAT. § 801.10(4) pertains to proof of service by publication, and
paragraph (c) relates to a defendant’s written admission regarding service. Those paragraphs are
not at issue in this case.

Newson was required by statute to personally serve the summons on
Commissioner Liska. See WIS. STAT. § 801.11(1)(a). In order to serve Milwaukee County,
Newson was required to personally serve the chairperson of the county board or the county clerk
or to leave a copy of the summons “in the office of such officer … with the person who [was]
apparently in charge of the office.” See § 801.11(4)(a)1., (b).

While Newson contends that he was not required to personally serve Commissioner
Liska, he is mistaken. Citing WIS. STAT. § 806.02(2), Newson asserts that “[p]ersonal service is
not required in actions other than those on contract for money only.” Section 806.02(2),
however, says no such thing. Instead, § 806.02(2) states in full:

After filing the complaint, counterclaim, or cross claim and
proof of service thereof and after filing an affidavit that the party
against whom judgment is sought is in default for failure to join
issue, a party may move for judgment according to the demand
of the complaint, counterclaim, or cross claim. If the amount of
money sought was excluded from the demand for judgment, as
required under [§] 802.02(1m), the court shall require the
moving party to specify the amount of money claimed and
provide that information to the court and to the other parties
appearing in the action prior to the court rendering judgment. If
proof of any fact is necessary for the court to render judgment,
the court shall receive the proof.

(continued)

12
No. 2021AP714

¶28 Thus, when a defendant challenges service, WIS. STAT.
§ 801.10(4)(a) requires a plaintiff to produce an affidavit of the person who served
the defendant in order to prove that personal or substituted personal service was
effected. Here, both Milwaukee County and Commissioner Liska challenged
service in their respective motions to dismiss. In response, Newson did not submit
any affidavit from a person who had allegedly served either Milwaukee County or
Commissioner Liska.

¶29 Instead, Newson submitted a document captioned “Proof of
Service,” which was signed by Newson and which “certif[ied]” that a copy of the
summons and complaint had been served on Milwaukee County via the county
clerk’s office on November 5, 2020. The same document “certif[ied]” that
Commissioner Liska was served “via Certified Mail” to his attorney on
November 9, 2020. Newson also submitted a copy of the first page of the
summons, which bears a stamp indicating that it was “received” by the Milwaukee
County Clerk on November 5, 2020. Newson further submitted what appears to
be a certified mail receipt showing that mail of some sort was received by the
Milwaukee County Corporation Counsel’s office on November 9, 2020. Finally,
Newson submitted his own affidavit, in which he averred that the Milwaukee
County Clerk’s office “stamped an ‘Authenticated and Filed’ copy of the
complaint and summon[s]” on November 5, 2020, and that the Milwaukee County
Corporation Counsel’s office “received” an “‘Authenticated and Filed’ copy of the
complaint and summon[s]” on November 9, 2020. None of these documents

Nothing in this statute states that personal service is required only in actions on contracts for
money.

13
No. 2021AP714

provide the proof required by WIS. STAT. § 801.10(4)(a)—that is, an affidavit of
the person who effected personal or substituted personal service on the defendant.

¶30 During the hearing on Newson’s default judgment motions and the
defendants’ motions to dismiss, Newson told the circuit court that he “had
somebody go down to the county clerk and personally serve them the paper and
get it stamped.” Newson also asserted that he “did a courtesy copy certified mail
to the office of the [corporation] counsel in Milwaukee.” As the county
defendants correctly note, however, “Newson’s own representations” regarding
service “are insufficient to meet the requirements of” WIS. STAT. § 801.10(4)(a).

¶31 Because the county defendants challenged service in their motions to
dismiss and Newson subsequently failed to prove service in the manner required
by WIS. STAT. § 801.10(4)(a), the circuit court properly denied Newson’s motions
for default judgment against the county defendants. See Davis v. City of Elkhorn,
132 Wis. 2d 394, 398-99, 393 N.W.2d 95 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a plaintiff
must prove proper service in order to obtain a default judgment). In addition, the
court properly granted the county defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, based on Newson’s failure to prove that the county
defendants were properly served. See One 1997 Ford F-150, 265 Wis. 2d 264, ¶9
(“The service of a summons in a manner prescribed by statute is a condition
precedent to a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction.”).5

5
The circuit court determined that Milwaukee County was properly served, based on the
file stamp showing that the summons was “received” by the Milwaukee County Clerk’s office on
November 5, 2020. We may, however, affirm a circuit court’s decision on different grounds. See
State v. Smiter, 2011 WI App 15, ¶9, 331 Wis. 2d 431, 793 N.W.2d 920 (2010).

(continued)

14
No. 2021AP714

III. Frivolous appeal

¶32 The county defendants assert that Newson’s appeal is frivolous, and
they therefore ask us to award them fees and costs under WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.25(3). To find an appeal frivolous, we must find either that: (1) the
appeal was filed, used, or continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing
or maliciously injuring another; or (2) the party or the party’s attorney knew, or
should have known, that the appeal was without any reasonable basis in law or
equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law. RULE 809.25(3)(c).

¶33 In support of their assertion that Newson’s appeal is frivolous under
these standards, the county defendants cite our 2021 decision in case
No. 2019AP1464, in which we affirmed a circuit court’s order denying Newson’s

In any event, even assuming that Milwaukee County was properly served, we would
nevertheless affirm the circuit court’s decisions denying Newson’s motion for a default judgment
against Milwaukee County and granting Milwaukee County’s motion to dismiss. To secure a
default judgment, a plaintiff must make two preliminary showings: (1) that the complaint was
served in the manner and within the time prescribed by statute; and (2) that the complaint
contains allegations sufficient in law to state a claim for relief against the defendant. Davis v.
City of Elkhorn, 132 Wis. 2d 394, 398-99, 393 N.W.2d 95 (Ct. App. 1986).

The circuit court concluded—and we agree—that Newson’s complaint fails to state a
claim against Milwaukee County on which relief can be granted. As the court aptly noted,
Newson’s complaint contains no allegations whatsoever pertaining to conduct by
Milwaukee County, as opposed to conduct by the judicial defendants and Commissioner Liska.
Although Newson asserts that Milwaukee County is liable for the acts of the other defendants
pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, a municipality “cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978) (italics omitted). Instead, to prove municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must
identify a municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury. Slabey v. Dunn County,
2023 WI 2, ¶24, 405 Wis. 2d 404, 983 N.W.2d 626. Newson’s complaint does not identify any
Milwaukee County policy or custom that caused his alleged injuries. As such, Newson’s
complaint fails to state a claim against Milwaukee County under § 1983 on which relief can be
granted.

15
No. 2021AP714

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Newson, No. 2019AP1464. In that case,
Newson challenged “the legality of his extradition to Wisconsin from Arizona in
2000 to answer a criminal charge against him in this state.” Id. at 1. We
concluded that Newson was not entitled to habeas relief, and we noted that
Newson had “claimed in multiple proceedings that errors in the extradition process
resulted in jurisdictional flaws that invalidate [his] judgment of conviction.” Id. at
9. We observed that “[t]his issue is resolved,” and we cautioned Newson that “we
are prepared to impose appropriate sanctions should he persist in making repetitive
allegations, regardless of whether they are couched as motions, petitions, or
appeals.” Id. at 9-10.

¶34 The county defendants assert that despite this admonition, Newson
“continues to harass current and former officials and entities including
[Commissioner Liska] and Milwaukee County, and he does so knowing that his
efforts to escape responsibility for his decades-old conduct are without any
reasonable basis in law or equity.” Although we acknowledge the county
defendants’ frustration regarding Newson’s repeated filings, we deny their request
for fees and costs for two reasons.

¶35 First, although Newson has repeatedly challenged his criminal
conviction in prior appeals, this case does not involve an attack on his judgment of
conviction. Instead, Newson argues in this case that the defendants violated his
civil rights and are therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, the claims that
Newson has asserted in this case do not fall squarely within our admonition to
Newson in case No. 2019AP1464.

¶36 Second, although we affirm the circuit court’s orders for the reasons
explained above, we cannot conclude that Newson’s entire appeal is frivolous

16
No. 2021AP714

under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3). See Howell v. Denomie, 2005 WI 81, ¶9, 282
Wis. 2d 130, 698 N.W.2d 621 (providing that an appeal is not frivolous under
RULE 809.25(3) unless the entire appeal is frivolous); see also Thompson v.
Ouellette, 2023 WI App 7, ¶44, 406 Wis. 2d 99, 986 N.W.2d 338 (applying a
similar standard under WIS. STAT. § 895.044(5)). While we are not persuaded by
Newson’s arguments, we cannot conclude that those arguments lack any
reasonable basis in law or equity or were advanced solely for the purpose of
harassing the county defendants. We therefore deny the county defendants’
request for fees and costs under RULE 809.25(3).

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17