Waukesha County v. G.M.M.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 18, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1207 Cir. Ct. No. 2021ME204

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF G.M.M.:

WAUKESHA COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

G.M.M.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
MARIA S. LAZAR, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2022AP1207

¶1 NEUBAUER, J.1 G.M.M. appeals from orders extending her
commitment under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 for twelve months and permitting
involuntary administration of medication and treatment during that time. G.M.M.
argues the orders should be reversed for three reasons: (1) Waukesha County
failed to prove that she is mentally ill; (2) the County failed to prove that she is
dangerous; and (3) the circuit court failed to make the findings required under
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶59, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277.
This court concludes that G.M.M.’s arguments are unavailing and affirms the
orders.

BACKGROUND

¶2 A brief discussion of the legal framework governing involuntary
commitment in Wisconsin will focus and contextualize our discussion of the facts.
Wisconsin law permits a person to be committed involuntarily if the petitioner
proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person is: “(1) mentally ill; (2) a
proper subject for treatment; and (3) dangerous to themselves or others.” D.J.W.,
391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶29. The petitioner must prove the same three elements by clear
and convincing evidence each time it seeks to extend a commitment. Id., ¶31.

¶3 WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 51 sets forth what a petitioner must show to
satisfy these elements. For the purpose of involuntary commitment, a person is
deemed to have a “[m]ental illness” if he or she has “a substantial disorder of
thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory which grossly impairs
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2019-20).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.

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demands of life.” WIS. STAT. § 51.01(13)(b).2 WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 51 also
provides five standards for proving dangerousness. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)
2.a.-e. At issue in this case is the third standard, which requires proof that an
individual:

Evidences such impaired judgment, manifested by
evidence of a pattern of recent acts or omissions, that there
is a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury
to himself or herself or other individuals. The probability
of physical impairment or injury is not substantial under
this subd. 2.c. if reasonable provision for the subject
individual’s protection is available in the community and
there is a reasonable probability that the individual will
avail himself or herself of these services[.]

Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶4 An individual who is receiving treatment at the time an extension is
sought may not have exhibited any recent acts or omissions demonstrating
dangerousness because the treatment ameliorated such behavior. Thus, in the
context of a recommitment,3 the petitioner may instead show that there is a
substantial likelihood of dangerousness should treatment lapse. Portage County v.
J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. Accordingly,
dangerousness in extension proceedings “may be satisfied by a showing that there
is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment record, that
the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were
withdrawn.” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am).

2
Alcoholism is specifically exempted from the definition of “[m]ental illness” in WIS.
STAT. § 51.01(13)(b), but no party contends that condition is at issue in this case.
3
“[R]ecommitment” is synonymous with “extension of a commitment,” and the terms
will therefore be used interchangeably. See Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, ¶6 n.3, 402
Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733.

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No. 2022AP1207

¶5 If the County relies on WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) to prove
dangerousness, a link to one of the five dangerousness standards in § 51.20(1)(a)2.
is required. See D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶¶32-34. Moreover, “[i]t is not enough
that the individual was at one point a proper subject for commitment.” J.W.K.,
386 Wis. 2d 672, ¶24. “Each extension hearing requires proof of current
dangerousness.” Id. With these legal standards in mind, this court turns to the
facts.

¶6 In early May 2021, law enforcement responded five times to the
home G.M.M. shares with one of her sisters in response to reports that G.M.M.
had expressed delusional and paranoid thoughts, yelled and caused repeated
disturbances, and eventually became physically aggressive towards her sister. A
responding officer spoke with G.M.M.’s sisters and learned that she had been
dealing with untreated mental illness for more than a decade. Her sisters believed
that she is schizophrenic because her symptoms were similar to those of one of her
sisters who had been diagnosed with that condition. They described G.M.M. as
“no longer ha[ving] a connection with reality” and “a completely different
person.”

¶7 G.M.M. was emergently detained in May 2021 and a probable cause
hearing was held at which a court commissioner found sufficient grounds to
continue her detention until a final hearing. A subsequent filing in the case
detailed the incidents and behavior that led to her detention:

[G.M.M.] was placed under a Chapter 51 Emergency
Detention on 05/2/21 after becoming violent with her sister,
with whom she lives. It was reported that the day prior,
May 1, 2021, officers responded to her residence 5 times
due to her yelling and causing a disturbance. She believed
that the birds outside of her window were there to kill her
and were talking about her. She also made reference that
her sister was not actually her sister, but someone wearing

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No. 2022AP1207

a mask to look like her sister that works for the Iranian
government, and who tortured and killed her real family.
Family indicated that for the past 2 days [G.M.M.] became
increasingly more loud, fearful of others, and making
irrational statements. On 5/2/21, she became aggressive
with her sister [T.V.G.], as she believed [T.V.G.] was on
the phone talking about her. [G.M.M.] threw a remote at
the wall, slammed doors, and pulled the phone out of
[T.V.G.]’s hand while she was talking to their brother,
causing the phone receiver to hit her in the right cheek.
Police described [G.M.M.] as irrational and making
incoherent statements. She indicated that radio waves were
coming to her through the TV, was paranoid about the
officers jurisdiction, stating she only wants to talk with the
FBI, and making reference several times that the officers
were not real and discussing a 50 year conspiracy of people
wearing masks and pretending to be people they were not.
It was reported that she had not left her home in 2 years due
to her fear of germs, and believing that she had a chronic
illness, which is untrue. She believed that she had
infections resulting in her having cysts all over her body
and brain and that she bleeds internally, and that if she went
outside she would die. The family reported that they would
observe her screaming out the window at people who were
not there, talking to herself, and that she has ideas of
reference that people outside are talking about her.
Additionally, she stopped attending medical appointments
2 years ago due to her fear that people were talking about
her outside.

¶8 The circuit court appointed two doctors who examined G.M.M. and
filed reports before the final hearing. At the hearing, counsel for the County
summarized the reports and the incidents that led to G.M.M.’s detention.
G.M.M.’s counsel waived her appearance and informed the court that G.M.M. did
not object to “a six-month commitment with the medications order.” Based on the
lack of objection, the materials in the record, and the statements of counsel, the
circuit court found the three elements for commitment were met and entered
orders committing G.M.M. for six months and allowing involuntary medication
and treatment. G.M.M. returned to her sister’s home ten days later and began
receiving outpatient treatment.

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No. 2022AP1207

¶9 Towards the end of the six-month period, the County filed a petition
to extend G.M.M.’s commitment and medication orders for another twelve
months. The circuit court appointed Dr. Cary Kohlenberg and Dr. Robert
VerWert to examine G.M.M. and submit reports on her mental health condition.
Both doctors concluded that G.M.M. continued to meet the requirements for
involuntary commitment.

¶10 The circuit court held a hearing on the County’s extension petition
on November 2, 2021. G.M.M. contested the extension but again waived her
appearance. The County presented testimony from Dr. VerWert and Danielle
Weber, a clinical therapist and court monitor for the Waukesha County
Department of Health and Human Services.

¶11 VerWert, a licensed psychologist, spoke with G.M.M. by phone for
about an hour a week before the hearing, talked to her sister, and reviewed the
County’s report supporting the extension request as well as other records. He
testified regarding each of the three elements for commitments under WIS. STAT.
ch. 51. First, VerWert stated that G.M.M. suffers from schizophrenia and
described some of the delusions that had precipitated her initial confinement. He
also described some of the delusional thinking G.M.M. had displayed during their
phone call:

Well, she pretty much admits that she has her reality and
that the things that she’s expressed in these delusions are
her reality and that others are trying to change that.
Therefore, they are harassing her. She’s pretty insistent
that this was her reality and she has the right to have those
delusions. So when I would ask about the TV, there were
indeed voices or sounds coming from the TV aimed at her.
She made some strange comment about these were word
associations. They’re still there, but they’re more
manageable now.

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No. 2022AP1207

VerWert admitted that G.M.M. had not vocalized thoughts about wanting to kill
herself or harm her sister. But in light of the delusions she did express, VerWert
agreed that G.M.M.’s condition is a substantial disorder of thought and mood that
grossly impairs “her judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality” and
“ability to participate” in ordinary life. He also relayed that G.M.M. had “denied
having any mental illness or need for medication,” and testified that she lacks
insight.

¶12 Next, VerWert confirmed that G.M.M. is a proper subject for
treatment. He acknowledged that G.M.M. needed medication to treat her
condition and that medication improves but does not eliminate her symptoms. He
did not believe that she would take medication if not compelled to do so because
she had previously indicated that she believed it was causing other health
problems and because she “still doesn’t think she has a mental illness.”

¶13 Lastly, when asked whether he believed G.M.M. would become a
proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn, VerWert said “yes”
and cited her precommitment aggression and his concern that her family, who
were providing “everything—food, clothing, [and a] place to live,” might not be
able to continue caring for her if she stopped taking medication. VerWert also
expanded on his opinion that G.M.M. presented “a substantial probability of
physical impairment or injury to [herself] or others due to impaired judgment” by
explaining that her delusions “get in the way of making any proper judgments at
all” and by citing her yelling and aggressive behavior towards her sister that
precipitated her initial commitment. VerWert also testified that he explained to
G.M.M. the advantages and disadvantages of, and alternatives to, her medication
but agreed in response to questions from the County’s counsel that she is not
capable of expressing an understanding of accepting treatment or of “applying the

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No. 2022AP1207

advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives in order to make an informed choice
about whether to accept” medication.

¶14 The other witness, Ms. Weber, testified about the extension report,
which summarized the care and treatment G.M.M. had received since her initial
commitment. When asked to describe G.M.M.’s level of compliance since she
was committed, Weber testified that G.M.M.

has attended her appointments, but she has made it known
that she is only compliant due to her court order. She
presents because she is court-ordered to attend and court-
ordered to take medications. She has expressed that she
doesn’t feel she needs medication and holds paranoid
beliefs that the medications are causing heart arrhythmias
and low blood pressure and that she doesn’t want to take
the medications.

Like VerWert, Weber expressed her belief that G.M.M. will not “remain
medication compliant without the court order” and is concerned “that she would
become aggressive at the home again with her siblings.”

¶15 The circuit court also received the County’s report in evidence,
which further described G.M.M.’s condition since the initial commitment:

Following her 2nd injection of Invega Sustenna, [G.M.M.]
became less somatically focused and was able to come out
of her room more frequently at the Mental Health Center.
She continued to express some paranoid delusions, such as
that she was in danger of bleeding in her brain due to a
tonsillectomy that she received in the 9th grade, and she
would not sign any papers, believing that she had a lack of
oxygen in her brain due to heart arrhythmias. She returned
to her sister’s home on 5/21/21 and was referred to
outpatient care and treatment at the Department. She has
met with her outpatient prescriber on 3 occasions since her
discharge to outpatient care and treatment. Throughout her
outpatient treatment, she has consistently displayed poor
insight into her disorder and need for medications,
indicating that the altercation with her sister was all a
misunderstanding, and she has continued to express

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No. 2022AP1207

delusional beliefs that she will contract infections from
going outside. She has expressed to her treatment team that
her commitment was result of a misunderstanding with her
family, and that the only reason she is presenting for
appointments to receive her long-acting injection is because
she is court ordered to do so. [G.M.M.] reported that she
does not feel she needs an injection and indicates that it is
interfering with a cardiac condition. She later indicated
that she has not seen a cardiologist in at least 2-3 years and
has no basis for her belief that her long-acting injection
would be affecting a possible cardiac condition. She has
also expressed concern that her injections are causing her to
experience low blood pressure, however her blood pressure
is always within normal range when she presents for her
appointments. Ms. Mercy Mahaga, APNP has opined that
[G.M.M.] lacks insight into her disorder and need for
treatment, and that without a commitment and involuntary
medications order, [she] would stop treatment and
decompensate. She continues to be treated with a long-
acting injection, due to her lack of insight and need for
medication.

¶16 The circuit court concluded that the County had met its burden of
proof with regard to an extension of G.M.M.’s commitment, citing the testimony
and other evidence concerning her delusions, prior aggressive behavior, lack of
insight, and concern about the possibility she would injure others in the future.
The court concluded that the County had proven dangerousness under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(am), which linked to the third standard for dangerousness,
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.c. Based upon these conclusions, the court ordered that G.M.M.’s
commitment and medication orders be extended by twelve months.

DISCUSSION

¶17 This court’s review of the circuit court’s decision presents a mixed
question of law and fact. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶24. We will uphold a circuit
court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but whether the facts
satisfy the statutory requirements for recommitment is a question of law that we
review independently. Id., ¶¶24-25.

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Mental Illness

¶18 G.M.M. first contends that the County did not establish by clear and
convincing evidence that she is mentally ill. She argues that VerWert, the
County’s principal witness on this issue, did not have sufficient information to
diagnose her with schizophrenia because he relied only on the County’s report and
his conversations with G.M.M. and her sister. She faults VerWert for not
“properly” assessing her according to the criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM)4 and cites the lack of any other doctor’s assessment of her medical
condition in the record.

¶19 These criticisms are not enough to show that the County failed to
carry its burden. Whether a person has a mental illness under WIS. STAT. ch. 51
does not turn on whether the person satisfies the criteria for a particular mental
disorder set forth in the DSM. Our supreme court has explained that the definition
of “mental illness” in WIS. STAT. ch. 51 “serve[s] a legal, not medical, function,”
State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 305, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), and G.M.M. cites no
legal authority for the proposition that the County must present evidence that an
individual satisfies the diagnostic criteria listed in the DSM for a specific disorder
to show the individual is “mentally ill” under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)1.

¶20 Under Wisconsin law, the term “[m]ental illness” is defined in
relevant part as “a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation,
or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize
reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.” WIS. STAT.

4
The DSM, currently in its fifth edition, is “the primary tool of clinical diagnosis in the
psychiatric field.” State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 305, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).

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No. 2022AP1207

§ 51.01(13)(b). VerWert testified that G.M.M. met both criteria embedded in this
definition, and sufficient information in the record supports his conclusions.

¶21 VerWert identified G.M.M.’s mental illness as schizophrenia, a
substantial disorder of thought “that causes her moods to be very anxious and
depressed as well.” Before testifying, VerWert spoke with G.M.M. and the sister
with whom she lived and reviewed the County’s report in support of its extension
request and unspecified “collateral records” and “information.” It is apparent that
he also drew on his expertise as a licensed psychologist (to which G.M.M.
stipulated) and his prior experience with persons with schizophrenia.5 In addition,
VerWert testified that he “certainly looked” at the DSM and emphasized that
G.M.M.’s delusional thoughts were one of the manual’s criteria for schizophrenia.

¶22 VerWert explained that G.M.M.’s thoughts are substantially
disordered because she has delusions that make her think she is in physical danger
and that her family members are not who they appear to be. He explained that
these delusional thoughts “cause[] her moods to be very anxious and depressed as
well.” Some of these delusions occurred before G.M.M.’s initial commitment, but
VerWert also testified that she continued to express them during his evaluation,
which occurred months after her initial commitment began. The County’s report
in support of recommitment also stated that G.M.M. “continued to express some
paranoid delusions” about threats to her physical health after she began receiving
medication.

5
VerWert confirmed that these sources of information are commonly relied upon by
persons in his field.

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No. 2022AP1207

¶23 VerWert also confirmed, in response to the County’s questions, that
G.M.M.’s disorder grossly impaired her judgment, behavior, and ability to
recognize reality, and “participate in the ordinary affairs of life.”6 He explained
that G.M.M.’s delusional thinking that “her real[i]ty is hers and she has the right to
it” causes her to lack insight into her mental illness, which in turn prevents her
from exercising sound judgment about whether she needs medication. The
County’s report provides additional evidence of impairment, noting that G.M.M.
“has continued to express delusional beliefs that she will contract infections from
going outside.” Finally, VerWert noted in his report that her family continues to
provide her housing, food, and clothing because she is unable to “hold down a job
… or to maintain her own apartment.”

¶24 No Wisconsin law to which G.M.M. has directed this court required
VerWert to consult other diagnoses, review G.M.M.’s medical records, or perform
a full diagnostic evaluation consistent with the DSM before determining that her
condition meets the definition of “mental illness” under WIS. STAT. ch. 51. Nor
does the fact that VerWert responded in the affirmative to questions phrased in the
words of the definition of that statutory term render his opinions insufficient. That
pattern of questions and answers is the nature of these types of cases and serves an
important purpose: ensuring, by reference to the statutory language, that an
individual is not committed unlawfully. See Outagamie County v. Melanie L.,
2013 WI 67, ¶91, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607 (reversing commitment order
where expert did not use statutory terminology). This court is convinced from
VerWert’s testimony that he did not merely parrot the statutory definition, but

6
VerWert confirmed that he held these opinions to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty.

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No. 2022AP1207

rather that his opinion regarding G.M.M.’s mental illness was grounded in the
facts.

Dangerousness

¶25 G.M.M. next argues that the County did not meet its burden of proof
with respect to the element of dangerousness. As she notes, the County sought to
establish dangerousness under the third standard, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., and
the recommitment standard, § 51.20(1)(am). “Under those two provisions, the
County’s burden was to show a substantial likelihood, based on [G.M.M.’s]
treatment history, that if treatment were withdrawn [s]he would again face ‘a
substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to [herself or other
individuals]’ and that there is either no ‘reasonable provision for [her] protection
... available in the community’ or that [G.M.M.] would not, to a ‘reasonable
probability,’ ‘avail [herself] ... of these services.’” See Sauk County v. S.A.M.,
2022 WI 46, ¶32, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162 (omissions in original;
quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.c., (1)(am)). G.M.M. challenges the County’s evidence on
three specific grounds.

¶26 First, she contends VerWert “improperly equated delusional
behavior with dangerousness” and analogizes her case to a recent unpublished, but
authored, decision of this court, Winnebago County v. L.F.-G., No. 2019AP2010,
unpublished slip op. (WI App May 20, 2020).7 There, this court reversed a
recommitment order after concluding that the testifying doctor did not establish

7
Though unpublished, Winnebago County v. L.F.-G., No. 2019AP2010, unpublished
slip op. (WI App May 20, 2020), may be cited for persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(3)(b).

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No. 2022AP1207

that L.F.-G. was dangerous. Id., ¶5. Specifically, we determined that the doctor
had established that L.F.-G. “would be a proper subject for treatment” if her
treatment stopped, but had not shown how returning to her pre-commitment
“‘acutely psychotic’ state would impact her behavior such that there is a
substantial likelihood that she would be currently dangerous … if treatment was
withdrawn.” Id., ¶7.

¶27 The present case is materially distinguishable from L.F.-G.
VerWert’s testimony and other evidence established what was missing in
L.F.-G.—a substantial likelihood that G.M.M. would engage in behavior that
posed a danger to herself or others if treatment were withdrawn. VerWert did not
merely opine that G.M.M. would be dangerous if treatment were withdrawn
because she would experience delusional thoughts. Instead, he connected those
thoughts to past behavior that posed a threat of physical harm to her sister. His
report and the County’s report recount how G.M.M.’s delusional thoughts led her
to act in an increasingly erratic, disruptive, and ultimately aggressive manner in
the days leading up to her initial commitment. Reliance on this past behavior was
appropriate. See Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶13, 393 Wis. 2d
511, 947 N.W.2d 761 (“Dangerousness in an extension proceeding can and often
must be based on the individual’s precommitment behavior, coupled with an
expert’s informed opinions and predictions[.]”).

¶28 VerWert also provided evidence about G.M.M.’s current status and
potential to again become physically aggressive if she stopped receiving
medication. He testified that G.M.M. “still doesn’t think she has a mental illness,”
and his report indicates that G.M.M. told him that the medication she was
receiving was not helpful and was in fact harming her. He also repeatedly
referenced a concern voiced by G.M.M.’s sister that her aggressive behavior

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No. 2022AP1207

would return and prevent her family from continuing to care for her. The
County’s other witness, Weber, testified that G.M.M. likely would not continue to
take medication without a court order and expressed a similar concern “that she
would become aggressive at the home again with her siblings” if she stopped
taking medication. In discussing both what occurred before G.M.M. began
involuntary medication and what might occur if it were to stop, the witnesses went
beyond equating dangerousness to the mere existence of delusional thought and
explained that the delusions had, and likely would, lead to behavior that posed “a
substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to [G.M.M.] or other
individuals. See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.c.

¶29 Next, G.M.M. argues that the County did not present evidence that
support is unavailable to G.M.M. in the community. Under S.A.M., the County
must show either that reasonable provision for the individual’s protection is not
available in the community or that it is not reasonably probable that the individual
will take advantage of such services. S.A.M., 402 Wis. 2d 379, ¶32. The evidence
sufficiently establishes the latter point. VerWert testified that G.M.M. does not
think she has a mental illness and would not voluntarily take medication. Weber
likewise testified that G.M.M. “has made it known that she is only compliant due
to her court order,” that she continues to experience delusions, and that she would
not “remain medication compliant without the court order.” G.M.M. did not
dispute either witness on these points. The factfinder could reasonably infer from
this evidence a reasonable probability that if protective measures were available to
G.M.M. in the community, she would not avail herself of them.

¶30 G.M.M.’s third argument is that the County improperly relied on her
supposed “lack of insight” into her mental illness as a reason to find her
dangerous. She argues that an individual’s lack of insight into his or her mental

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No. 2022AP1207

illness and need for treatment is “not nearly enough” to establish dangerousness.
This is correct, so far as it goes. The evidence presented by the County, however,
went beyond showing that G.M.M. does not recognize that she has a mental illness
and needs medication to treat its symptoms. As recounted above, the testimony
and reports sufficiently proved that G.M.M. is dangerous under the third standard
via the WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) recommitment alternative.

Findings Required by D.J.W.

¶31 Lastly, G.M.M. contends that the circuit court did not make the
factual findings required under D.J.W. In that case, our supreme court directed
“circuit courts in recommitment proceedings … to make specific factual findings
with reference to the subdivision paragraph of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on
which the recommitment is based.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶3. The court
imposed this requirement to “provide[] clarity and extra protection to patients
regarding the underlying basis for a recommitment” and “clarify issues raised on
appeal of recommitment orders and ensure the soundness of judicial decision
making.” Id., ¶¶42, 44.

¶32 Here, the proceedings in the circuit court satisfied the purposes
underlying the D.J.W. directive. In its recommitment petition, the County sought
to extend G.M.M.’s commitment under the recommitment alternative,
§ 51.20(1)(am). VerWert testified as to the elements for commitment under the
third standard and § 51.20(1)(am), and the County cited those standards in its
closing argument. G.M.M. therefore knew which dangerousness standard the
County sought to extend her commitment under. In addition, the circuit court
found G.M.M. to be mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous
under the third standard and, as detailed above, explained the factual basis for its

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findings.8 The parties knew which statutory standards were being applied, and the
court’s ruling informs this court which standard it applied and its reasons for doing
so.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

8
The County also invoked the fourth standard for dangerousness, WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.d., but the circuit court did not find that standard applicable.

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18