Tiberiu Klein v. Jamie Louise Padgett

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 19, 2022
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP2167 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV4974

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

TIBERIU KLEIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

JAMIE LOUISE PADGETT, WINTERS SALZETTA OBRIEN AND RICHARDSON,
ISBA MUTUAL INSURANCE, DAVID ALAN NOVOSELSKY, UNKNOWN
INSURANCE OF DAVID NOVOSELSKY AND UNKNOWN INSURANCE OF JAIME
PADGETT,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
CARL ASHLEY, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded
with directions.

Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Dugan, J.

¶1 BRASH, C.J. Tiberiu Klein, pro se, appeals an order of the trial court
dismissing with prejudice all of his claims against multiple defendants, as well as
No. 2019AP2167

an order for sanctions which limits his ability to commence future litigation against
the defendants in any Wisconsin court without first obtaining leave of the court to
file the action.

¶2 For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court’s order except
with regard to the claims against defendant Jaime Louise Padgett, which we
conclude should have been dismissed on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction.
We therefore reverse and remand that portion of this matter for further findings by
the court, as explained in this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶3 The origins of this case date back to 2002 with the death of Klein’s
wife, Claudia Zvunca, who was struck and killed by a Greyhound bus in Colorado.
There have been over a dozen lawsuits and numerous appeals filed in various state
and federal courts relating to the accident, as well as disputes that arose among the
interested parties. Those parties include the Estate of Claudia Zvunca; Cristina
Zvunca, Claudia’s daughter; Klein; and several attorneys who represented those
parties at various times. Although difficult to discern from the amended complaint,
the basis for the case that underlies this appeal appears to be associated with several
actions relating to the accident that were filed in Illinois with the Cook County
Circuit Court.1 These actions resulted in extensive litigation, including disputes
between Klein and Cristina over the administration of the Estate.

1
Klein was apparently at least a part-time resident of Illinois when the Cook County cases
were filed. Furthermore, in both his complaint and amended complaint for this action, he lists his
home address as Illinois.

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¶4 The defendants in this case were involved in those Cook County
actions—at least allegedly—in some manner:

 David Alan Novoselsky, an attorney licensed in Illinois at the time,
who was retained by Klein in 2008, but also represented Cristina and
the Estate at various times;

 Padgett, an attorney licensed in Illinois, along with her former firm
Winters Salzetta O’Brien and Richardson (WSOR),2 who was hired
by Cristina in June 2014 to represent the Estate after Klein was
removed as the co-administrator of the Estate; and

 ISBA Mutual Insurance (which notes its correct entity name as Illinois
State Bar Association Mutual Insurance Company), which asserts that
Klein erroneously believes that it provided malpractice insurance to
an unidentified defendant.

¶5 As relevant to this appeal, an action relating to Klein’s wife’s accident
was filed in Cook County in 2007—which, as noted by the trial court in this case,
stemmed from an underlying action filed in 2004—seeking recovery on various
claims, including wrongful death. Another related action was filed in Cook County
in 2014, and named Greyhound, as well as “most of the attorneys and legal
representatives” involved in the earlier litigation, including Novoselsky, as
defendants.

¶6 However, Novoselsky, who is a resident of Wisconsin, filed
bankruptcy in July 2014 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern

2
Winters Salzetta O’Brien and Richardson was named as a defendant in Klein’s original
complaint, but were omitted from his amended complaint.

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District of Wisconsin. An automatic bankruptcy stay was applied to cases in which
Novoselsky was named a defendant, including the 2014 Cook County case.

¶7 In his debtor’s schedules of property for the bankruptcy, Novoselsky
included several claims relating to the Cook County cases, including a claim for
$300,000 in unpaid legal fees against the Estate. As part of that proceeding, Klein
filed a proof of claim in Novoselsky’s bankruptcy in January 2016 for $6 million.

¶8 Sometime in February or early March 2016, Cristina moved to dismiss
the 2014 Cook County case against all defendants, including Novoselsky, with
prejudice. Furthermore, most of Novoselsky’s claims relating to the Cook County
cases were abandoned by the trustee in bankruptcy after determining that they had
no value. Klein attempted to pursue those claims in a derivative action on behalf of
the bankruptcy estate, but the bankruptcy court determined that he did not have
standing to do so.

¶9 A multi-million dollar settlement for the wrongful death claim in the
2007 Cook County case was approved by an Illinois probate court in October 2016.
Klein was a beneficiary to the settlement, but at that point was not a party to the
action.3 Klein challenged the settlement with numerous motions, including a motion
to remove the matter to federal court. His motions were all denied.

¶10 Klein then filed the action underlying this appeal in June 2018.4 He
alleged numerous tort claims such as fraud and conspiracy against the various

3
Klein had previously disclaimed his wrongful death claim in the 2007 Cook County case
when he filed for bankruptcy.
4
Klein also filed another action in 2019 in Milwaukee County against Novoselsky,
Padgett, Padgett’s counsel in this matter and their insurer. Although consolidated with this matter,
the trial court indicated that the 2019 case would have a separate judgment, and it is not part of this
appeal.

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defendants, apparently on the belief that the 2014 Cook County case had actually
been settled through the efforts of Padgett and Novoselsky, instead of being
dismissed. The defendants responded by either filing answers or motions to dismiss.
The trial court ultimately dismissed all the claims against all of the defendants on
the merits.

¶11 Additionally, the trial court determined that Klein’s “egregious
conduct,” consisting of his excessive filings and disregard of court orders, warranted
the dismissal of the action with prejudice. Furthermore, the court issued an order
restricting Klein from filing any further actions in any circuit court in Wisconsin
against the defendants in this action without first obtaining leave to file from the
court.5 This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶12 As noted above, the allegations in Klein’s complaints in this action
are very difficult to ascertain and understand. His briefs on appeal are equally
convoluted. He generally does not present any cogent arguments; rather, his briefs
are rife with conspiracy theories based on conjecture and speculation, and his legal
theories are “supported” by citations that either are taken out of context or generally
do not have any recognizable relevance.

¶13 Although we liberally construe filings by pro se litigants, see bin-
Rilla v. Israel, 113 Wis. 2d 514, 520, 335 N.W.2d 384 (1983), “[a] party must do
more than simply toss a bunch of concepts into the air with the hope that either the

5
The order also requires Klein to obtain leave of the court to file any related actions against
WSOR; Allied World Insurance Company; Thomas Terwilliger and Terwilliger, Wakeen,
Piehler & Conway, S.C., Padgett’s local counsel in this matter; Richard VanSwol, counsel for
Padgett admitted pro hac vice in this matter; or “any of their employees, or shareholders arising
from representation in opposition or support of Mr. Klein[.]”

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trial court or the opposing party will arrange them into viable and fact-supported
legal theories,” see State v. Jackson, 229 Wis. 2d 328, 337, 600 N.W.2d 39 (Ct.
App. 1999). Thus, to the extent that we address the merits of this appeal, we rely
on our review of the record, including the trial court’s analysis of the issues.

Claims against Padgett

¶14 We first address the claims against Padgett, with our analysis focusing
on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Padgett argues that Wisconsin courts have no
personal jurisdiction over her in this matter. In fact, Padgett raised this issue to the
trial court in her motions to dismiss both the complaint and the amended complaint,
but the court did not address it. Furthermore, the first issue Klein presents on appeal
is that the trial court erred by not granting his motion to voluntarily dismiss the
claims against Padgett—as well as ISBA—for lack of personal jurisdiction.

¶15 Padgett’s personal jurisdiction argument is based on the provisions of
WIS. STAT. § 801.05 (2019-20),6 the long-arm statute for non-resident defendants.
The long-arm statute grants the courts personal jurisdiction

[i]n any action whether arising within or without this state,
against a defendant who when the action is commenced:

(a) Is a natural person present within this state when
served; or

(b) Is a natural person domiciled within this state; or

(c) Is a domestic corporation or limited liability
company; or

6
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version, unless otherwise
noted.

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(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated
activities within this state, whether such activities are wholly
interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.

Sec. 801.05(1). “Whether there is personal jurisdiction under Wisconsin’s long-arm
statute is a question of law that we review independently.” Rasmussen v. General
Motors Corp., 2011 WI 52, ¶14, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623. The burden is on
the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. FL Hunts, LLC v.
Wheeler, 2010 WI App 10, ¶7, 322 Wis. 2d 738, 780 N.W.2d 529.

¶16 Padgett asserts that none of the means for establishing jurisdiction
under the long-arm statute are applicable to her, and the record supports that
assertion. In fact, as noted above, Klein essentially concedes that there is no
personal jurisdiction over Padgett in this action.

¶17 Because this issue was not addressed by the trial court, there are no
factual findings relating to this issue for us to review. “Ordinarily the court of
appeals is not authorized to make findings of fact.” Pavlic v. Woodrum, 169
Wis. 2d 585, 592, 486 N.W.2d 533 (Ct. App. 1992). However, “where there is no
conflicting evidence or only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the
evidence, the drawing of that inference is a question of law.” Id. We conclude here
that the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence in the record
is that the trial court had no personal jurisdiction over Padgett in this matter. See id.

¶18 “WISCONSIN STAT. § 801.05(1)(d) plainly requires the [trial] court to
analyze a defendant’s contacts at the time the action is commenced.” FL Hunts,
LLC, 322 Wis. 2d 738, ¶11. In failing to do that here, the trial court erred. Not only
did the trial court fail to consider personal jurisdiction over Padgett when she raised
the issue in her motions to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint in
October 2018 and November 2018, respectively, it also failed to consider Klein’s

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motion to voluntarily dismiss his claims against Padgett on the ground of lack of
personal jurisdiction, which he filed in August 2019.

¶19 This is problematic as it relates to our review of the claims against
Padgett on appeal, in particular because Padgett filed a motion for costs, fees, and
attorneys’ fees in this appeal, contending that it is frivolous. She filed a similar
motion in the trial court but, again, the trial court did not address it. These motions
are interrelated, in that the court’s failure to consider personal jurisdiction regarding
Padgett when it was raised in her motions to dismiss, or at the time Klein filed his
motion to voluntarily dismiss the claims against Padgett, may in turn have affected
the amount of costs, fees, and attorneys’ fees that Padgett was forced to incur, not
only at the trial court level, but also in defending this appeal.

¶20 The absence of findings by the trial court relating to the personal
jurisdiction issue renders us unable to rule on Padgett’s motion seeking costs, fees,
and attorneys’ fees for this appeal, because we cannot determine whether Klein
raised a meritorious issue on appeal regarding the trial court’s resolution—or lack
thereof—of his motion for voluntary dismissal. To explain, an appeal may be
deemed frivolous if it “was filed, used or continued in bad faith, solely for purposes
of harassing or maliciously injuring another,” or “[t]he party … knew, or should
have known, that the appeal or cross-appeal was without any reasonable basis in law
or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.” WIS. STAT. § 809.25(3)(c). However,
Klein appears to have recognized that there was an issue with personal jurisdiction
during the proceedings at the trial court when he filed his motion to voluntarily
dismiss the claims against Padgett. This prompts the question of whether Klein
raised a meritorious issue on appeal of whether the trial court erred in failing to
consider that motion. Therefore, findings by the trial court regarding that motion

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are necessary for the resolution of Padgett’s motion for costs, fees, and attorneys’
fees on appeal.

¶21 Moreover, we note that while the claims against Padgett were
dismissed with prejudice on the merits, Klein’s motion for voluntary dismissal
requested dismissal without prejudice. Thus, although we generally may affirm the
decision of the trial court if it “reaches the correct result based on erroneous
reasoning,” see Bence v. Spinato, 196 Wis. 2d 398, 417, 538 N.W.2d 614 (Ct.
App. 1995), the lack of consideration of his motion or findings on the personal
jurisdiction issue by the trial court prevents us from doing so in this case.

¶22 We therefore reverse and remand this matter for findings with regard
to the personal jurisdiction issue relating to Padgett. These findings should include
whether Padgett is entitled to costs, fees, and attorneys’ fees, and the amount to be
awarded, if applicable, which in turn will depend on the trial court’s determination
of the appropriate time frame for dismissal—that is, at what point during the
proceedings the claims against Padgett should have been dismissed: in response to
Klein’s motion to voluntarily dismiss his claims against Padgett; or earlier in the
proceedings, when Padgett first raised the issue of personal jurisdiction in her
motions to dismiss. Relatedly, the findings should also include an analysis of
whether Padgett’s claims remain dismissed with prejudice, or if they are dismissed
without prejudice, in light of the fact that the ground for dismissal is now lack of
personal jurisdiction.

Claims against ISBA

¶23 Similarly, Klein suggests that there is no personal jurisdiction over
ISBA either, as it is also an “out[-]of[-]state defendant[].” However, ISBA’s
argument, both to the trial court and on appeal, instead focuses on the insurance

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policies it has—or has not—issued to the parties in this action. As found by the trial
court, ISBA established that it had never insured Padgett; that although at one point
Novoselsky had a policy through ISBA, that policy expired January 1, 2008, and is
outside of the 2010-2013 time frame for which Klein alleges wrongdoing by
Novoselsky in his complaint; and that it had never insured WSOR, although it had
previously issued a policy to a different firm—Winters Enright Salzetta O’Brien—
but that policy had expired on July 22, 2007. In short, ISBA had no insurance
policies in effect for any interested parties during the relevant time frame for this
action.7

¶24 Furthermore, ISBA cites to WIS. STAT. § 632.24, the direct action
statute. The direct action statute “predicates the liability to which an insurer is
exposed on the liability of the insured; the right of action against the insurer exists
only to the same extent it exists against the insured for his negligence.” Biggart v.
Barstad, 182 Wis. 2d 421, 428, 513 N.W.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1994). Moreover, the
direct action statute “appl[ies] to liability insurance policies delivered or issued for
delivery outside Wisconsin, so long as the ‘accident, injury or negligence occurred
in this state.’” Casper v. American Int’l S. Ins. Co., 2011 WI 81, ¶72, 336 Wis. 2d
267, 800 N.W.2d 880 (citation omitted).

¶25 ISBA filed a motion for summary judgment with the trial court, which
was granted. The court found that ISBA had no effective policies with any of the
parties during the time frame relating to Klein’s allegations, and further, because
none of the injuries alleged by Klein occurred in Wisconsin, Klein cannot bring a

7
Even if there was an error on Klein’s part regarding the firm’s name in his initial
complaint, Klein eliminated WSOR as a party in his amended complaint, and did not name any
other law firm.

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direct action against ISBA. Therefore, the court determined that Klein’s claims
against ISBA fail as a matter of law.

¶26 We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using
the same standard; that is, summary judgment should be granted if there is “no
genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Langridge, 2004 WI 113,
¶12, 275 Wis. 2d 35, 683 N.W.2d 75.

¶27 Klein argues that the “evidence” he submitted with regard to ISBA—
several cases from Illinois involving other attorneys who are not named in this
action, but who he contends were involved in the 2014 Cook County case—supports
his allegations against ISBA. On the contrary, these cases do not support Klein’s
claims, as they involve attorneys and firms other than those named in this action.
See Biggart, 182 Wis. 2d at 428. Furthermore, Klein may not bring a direct action
against ISBA because his claims do not involved any alleged injury that occurred in
Wisconsin. See Casper, 336 Wis. 2d 267, ¶72. Therefore, Klein’s claims against
ISBA fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of ISBA.

Claims against Novoselsky

¶28 Personal jurisdiction is not at issue for the claims against Novoselsky
due to his residency in Wisconsin; indeed, his bankruptcy was filed here. Rather,
as a result of the seemingly endless litigation in Illinois with regard to this matter,
the trial court rejected most of Klein’s claims against Novoselsky on the basis of

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claim preclusion.8 Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, “a final judgment is
conclusive in all subsequent actions between the same parties [or their privies] as to
all matters which were litigated or which might have been litigated in the former
proceedings.” Northern States Power Co. v. Bugher, 189 Wis. 2d 541, 550, 525
N.W.2d 723 (1995) (citations omitted). This doctrine is “designed to draw a line
between the meritorious claim on the one hand and the vexatious, repetitious and
needless claim on the other hand.” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]hether claim
preclusion applies under a given factual scenario is a question of law” that this court
reviews de novo. Id. at 551.

¶29 In order to apply claim preclusion to the present case, three factors
must be met: “(1) an identity between the parties or their privies in the prior and
present suits; (2) an identity between the causes of action in the two suits; and, (3) a
final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. In our review
of the convoluted history behind this case, along with the vague and conclusory
allegations of Klein in his complaint, we conclude that the elements of claim
preclusion have been met. Indeed, the application of claim preclusion to these
claims serves the purpose of precluding further litigation of the “vexatious,
repetitious and needless” claims presented by Klein here. See id. at 550 (citation
omitted).

¶30 The two claims against Novoselsky that were not dismissed by the
trial court on the basis of claim preclusion—a claim of civil assault and a claim of

8
For these claims, as well as some claims against the other defendants, the trial court
employed the Illinois statute of limitations in its reasoning for dismissing the claims; however, with
our conclusions in this opinion, we do not reach an analysis of that reasoning. See Maryland Arms
Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (stating that an appellate
court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds). Additionally, the trial court stated
in its written decision that it would address issue preclusion with regard to its dismissal of some of
the claims, but no discussion of issue preclusion was included in that decision.

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contingent liability—were dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. “The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is
to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215
Wis. 2d 370, 378, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998). “Whether a complaint properly pleads
a cause of action is a question of law” which we review independently. Id.

¶31 Klein’s allegations relating to these two claims do not contain any
facts to support these claims. First, with regard to the civil assault claim, an assault
occurs if (1) the defendant “intended to cause physical harm” to the plaintiff; and
(2) the defendant acted to cause the plaintiff to reasonably believe that the defendant
had “the present intent and ability to harm” the plaintiff. WIS JI—CIVIL 2004.
According to Klein’s complaint, during the incident when the alleged assault
occurred, Novoselsky was not even present.

¶32 With regard to the claim for contingent liability, the trial court
describes this claim as more of “an instruction” regarding any potential future
payments that may be ordered as a result of valid claims by Klein or Cristina relating
to this matter. Klein’s allegations for this claim are rambling and essentially
incoherent, and we can discern no facts to support the claim. Therefore, we
conclude that he has failed to state a claim for these two causes of action, see
Hermann, 215 Wis. 2d at 378, and thus they were properly dismissed by the trial
court.

Order for Sanctions and Dismissal with Prejudice

¶33 Presumably, Klein filed this action in Wisconsin—adding to the
jurisdictions in which he has commenced a lawsuit relating to his wife’s accident
and the ensuing litigation—because Novoselsky filed his bankruptcy action here.
However, we note that the accident and all of the related litigation—including the

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Cook County cases from which the allegations in this case seem to originate—all
occurred elsewhere. We further observe that Klein has been prohibited from filing
any additional lawsuits in Illinois regarding this matter due to the “frivolous and
repetitious” nature of his previous filings, as well as being admonished by the
bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin for his repetitious filings
against Novoselsky in that court.

¶34 In this appeal, Klein also challenges the order issued by the trial court
that restricts him from filing any further actions in Wisconsin against the defendants
named in this action without first obtaining leave of the court. This order was issued
by the trial court as a sanction for Klein’s “egregious conduct” in litigating this case.
This conduct as described by the court was also the basis for the court’s dismissal
of all Klein’s claims with prejudice.

¶35 The trial court’s description of Klein’s egregious conduct included his
excessive filings, which involved “more than one hundred pages of other motions,
affidavits, responses to objections to his motions, and objections to filings by other
defendants, as well as over four hundred pages of exhibits.” The court also noted
Klein’s “flagrant disregard for court procedure and court orders in this case,” which
it found to be “extreme, substantial, and persistent.” The court further described
Klein’s conduct and its consequences this way in its decision:

Klein’s actions in this lawsuit constitute egregious
violation of court orders and extreme interference with the
orderly administration of justice. Klein does not wait for
motions to be evaluated and decisions to be rendered; he
instead continuously files more motions, exhibits, and other
documents. Klein does not contain his allegations to well-
pled facts or the record; he instead operates under a
freewheeling, no-holds barred pattern of delay and
distraction. Klein has not once, but twice, filed additional
actions in an attempt to stay or slow the proceedings in the
2018 case before this [c]ourt. When confronted with
opposing legal arguments, Klein responds with mere

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allegations and bare conclusions rather than craft coherent
counter legal arguments. Klein stymies attempts to resolve
his legal claims through his own actions.

¶36 Whether to impose sanctions on a party, and determining the sanction
to be imposed, are matters that are within the trial court’s discretion. Bettendorf v.
Microsoft Corp., 2010 WI App 13, ¶15, 323 Wis. 2d 137, 779 N.W.2d 34. We will
uphold such a decision if the trial court “‘examined the relevant facts, applied a
proper standard of law, and reached a reasonable conclusion.’” Id. (citation
omitted).

¶37 Dismissal with prejudice is a “drastic sanction” which should be
utilized by the trial court “only on finding egregious conduct or bad faith.”
Haselow v. Gauthier, 212 Wis. 2d 580, 591, 569 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1997). In
fact, “Wisconsin courts have repeatedly emphasized that dismissals with prejudice
are most appropriate in cases of misconduct or inexcusable neglect, or where the
claims are unlikely to succeed.” Id.

¶38 Similarly, with regard to the trial court’s order limiting Klein’s ability
to file additional actions in this matter, “[w]e cannot unduly deny a party access to
the judicial system.” Minniecheske v. Griesbach, 161 Wis. 2d 743, 749, 468
N.W.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1991). However, “while persons have a constitutional right
to access to the courts, that right is neither absolute nor unconditional.” Village of
Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 211 Wis. 2d 777, 785, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997).
For example, “[a] court faced with a litigant engaged in a pattern of frivolous
litigation has the authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on
that litigant’s access to the court.” Id. (citation omitted). This is because
“[f]rivolous actions hinder a court’s ability to function efficiently and effectively
and to fairly administer justice to litigants who have not brought frivolous actions.”

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Puchner v. Hepperla, 2001 WI App 50, ¶7, 241 Wis. 2d 545, 625 N.W.2d 609.
Therefore, a court “may exercise its inherent power to ensure that it ‘functions
efficiently and effectively to provide the fair administration of justice,’ and to
control its docket with economy of time and effort.” Id. (citations omitted).
Without this potential consequence, a litigant who engages in this conduct “may be
undeterred from bringing frivolous litigation.” Id.

¶39 The record supports the trial court’s findings regarding the egregious
nature of Klein’s conduct. Its imposition of both sanctions is further bolstered by
the fact that the Illinois courts have previously placed a similar restriction on Klein
regarding the commencement of additional litigation in this matter, as well as by the
admonishment he received from the bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin for his repetitious filings against Novoselsky there.

¶40 Still, Klein argues that the extent of the order—requiring him to seek
leave of the court in order to file an action in any Wisconsin court—is excessive.
However, the sanction is “narrowly tailored” to matters involving a group of
respondents against whom Klein has launched a pattern of serial litigation. See
Minniecheske, 161 Wis. 2d at 749; see also Puchner, 241 Wis. 2d 545, ¶9.
Additionally, the restriction on access simply requires Klein to obtain approval of
the court in which he wishes to make the filing, which basically means that Klein is
free to file any new and nonvexatious litigation. This keeps the “statewide”
limitation from being too burdensome. Furthermore, Klein has demonstrated that
he will not hesitate to visit other forums, a factor that was also considered by the
trial court.

¶41 Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion when it imposed the sanctions in this matter—dismissing the

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claims with prejudice9 and issuing the order imposing restrictions on Klein’s filing
of further actions.

Conclusion

¶42 In sum, we reverse and remand to the trial court the matter of the
claims against Padgett, with instructions to dismiss the claims against her for lack
of jurisdiction, and to make findings with regard to whether she is entitled to costs,
fees, and attorneys’ fees; the amount to be awarded, if applicable, based on the
court’s determination of the appropriate time frame for dismissal; and for a
determination of whether the claims against her are dismissed with or without
prejudice. We affirm the trial court’s order with regard to the other defendants.

By the Court.—Order affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause
remanded with directions.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

9
Except with regard to the claims against Padgett, as explained in the instructions on
remand.

17