State v. Chelsea Jo Howell

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 4, 2021
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP212-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF100

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

CHELSEA JO HOWELL,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Crawford County:
LYNN M. RIDER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Graham, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2020AP212-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Chelsea Jo Howell appeals a judgment of
conviction. Howell argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s
guilty verdict for possession of methamphetamine. More specifically, Howell
argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to reasonably infer that she
possessed the methamphetamine knowingly, as is required for a finding of guilt.
We affirm.

Background

¶2 The possession charge against Howell arose out of a traffic stop
involving Howell and Howell’s friend, who was driving Howell’s vehicle. The
police officer who conducted the stop testified at trial, and so did Howell.

¶3 The officer testified that, after initiating the stop and upon speaking
with Howell’s friend, he could detect an odor of raw marijuana coming from the
vehicle. Both Howell and her friend denied that there was a smell, and they also
both denied that there was marijuana in the vehicle. The officer conducted a
search of the vehicle and found a medical marijuana container in the center
console that contained marijuana “shake.” Additionally, the officer found
marijuana shake in the back of the vehicle. The officer called a “K9” officer to the
scene, and the drug-sniffing dog provided a positive alert for the odor of narcotics
in the vehicle.

¶4 Upon further search of the vehicle, the officer located a purse on the
floor near the seat where Howell had been sitting. Inside the purse, the officer
found two small plastic containers. He opened the containers and observed a
white crystalized substance that was lining the inside. The amount was very small
but enough for the officer to collect and conduct a field test on the substance.
Based on his training and experience, the officer suspected the substance was

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No. 2020AP212-CR

indicative of crystal methamphetamine, and the field test yielded a positive result
for the drug.1

¶5 The officer questioned Howell about the containers in the purse. He
asked what was in them, and Howell said she had “no idea.” He then asked what
the containers would test positive for, and Howell said “I don’t know.” She told
the officer that the purse was a new purse that she got from a friend or at a garage
sale.

¶6 When Howell testified, she admitted that she had put the containers
in her purse and that the story she told the officer about getting the purse at a
garage sale was false. Howell testified that she “freaked … out” when the officer
informed her there were drugs in the containers and she “didn’t want to get
anybody in trouble,” so she said the first thing that popped into her head.

¶7 Howell continued to maintain that she was unaware of any drugs in
the containers, testifying that she thought they were empty. She testified that she
found the containers in her vehicle after loaning the vehicle to her friend on a
long-term basis. Howell stated that her friend had returned the vehicle earlier in
the day on the same day they were stopped. She said that she found the containers
while cleaning out the vehicle, and that she put them in her purse because she
thought she could use them for medications. Howell stated that she did not open
the containers, and that she believed they were empty based on shaking them.

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State Crime Lab testing later confirmed that the substance in the containers was
positive for methamphetamine.

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No. 2020AP212-CR

Discussion

¶8 An appellate court reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to
support a conviction “may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact
unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, is so
lacking in probative value and force that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d
493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). “If any possibility exists that the trier of fact
could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to
find the requisite guilt, an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it
believes that the trier of fact should not have found guilt based on the evidence
before it.” Id.

¶9 “[N]o minimum quantity of a controlled substance is necessary to
sustain a conviction for possession.” Id. at 508. “However, to convict an
individual of possession of a controlled substance, the state must prove not only
that the defendant was in possession of a dangerous drug but also that the
defendant knew or believed that he or she was.” Id.

¶10 Howell does not dispute that she was in possession of the
methamphetamine in the containers. She contends only that the evidence was
insufficient to show that she knew or believed that she was. Howell asserts that it
was “undisputed” that she found the containers in her vehicle after loaning it to her
friend, that she did not open the containers before placing them in her purse, and
that she believed the containers were empty. Howell contends that the State failed
to provide any evidence showing that she knew that the containers contained
methamphetamine. We disagree.

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No. 2020AP212-CR

¶11 “[K]nowledge or belief may be shown circumstantially by conduct,
directly by admission, or indirectly by contradictory statements from which guilt
may be inferred.” State v. Trimbell, 64 Wis. 2d 379, 384-85, 219 N.W.2d 369
(1974). Similarly, as the jury was instructed, knowledge may be found “from the
[d]efendant’s acts, words or statements, if any, and from all the facts and
circumstances in this case bearing upon knowledge or belief.” See WIS JI—
CRIMINAL 6030.

¶12 Having considered the evidence here, we conclude that the jury
could reasonably infer based on all of the facts and circumstances that Howell
knew that she was in possession of methamphetamine. The containers were in
Howell’s purse, and the officer’s testimony established that they contained a very
small but readily observable amount of the drug. Further, Howell’s false story to
the officer regarding her purse supported an inference of guilty knowledge
regarding the contents of the containers inside. Given this evidence and the other
evidence described, the jury could reasonably infer that Howell knew what was in
the containers. The jury was free to reject Howell’s testimony to the contrary. 2

¶13 Howell argues that, although her false story about her purse may
support a permissible inference of guilty knowledge, the false story is insufficient
standing alone to prove knowledge. She points to several cases as support for this
argument. For example, the court in State v. Kreuser, 91 Wis. 2d 242, 280
N.W.2d 270 (1979), stated:

2
The parties dispute whether the facts here are more like the facts in State v. Poellinger,
153 Wis. 2d 493, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), in which a possession conviction was upheld, or
instead more like the facts in Kabat v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 224, 251 N.W.2d 38 (1977), in which a
possession conviction was overturned. We are not persuaded that the facts of Howell’s case are
so similar to those in either Poellinger or Kabat as to make either case dispositive.

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No. 2020AP212-CR

[T]here is a permissible inference that the untruth of the
defendant’s story as to how he acquired the vehicle shows
his guilty knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. Edwards
v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 249, 174 N.W.2d 269 (1970). To be
sure, this negative inference will not carry the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt establishing the element
of guilty knowledge. Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 233
N.W.2d 420 (1975). However, it will support an inference
of guilt in combination with other inferences drawn from
other facts.

Id. at 249; see also Stewart v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 185, 194-95, 265 N.W.2d 489
(1978) (fabrication of alibi did not support conviction without other proof of
guilt); Edwards, 46 Wis. 2d at 252-53 (refusal to reveal to police how a vehicle
was obtained did not, standing alone, provide sufficient proof of defendant’s
knowledge that vehicle was stolen).

¶14 Relying on these cases, Howell argues that any negative inference
the jury could draw from her false story regarding her purse is unsupported by
other evidence. We disagree.

¶15 As we have explained, the jury heard other evidence to support a
finding of knowledge, including the unrefuted evidence that the containers in
Howell’s purse contained a visible amount of methamphetamine. Although the
amount was very small, it was enough for the officer to visually identify and field
test. Further, apart from Howell’s false story regarding her purse, the jury heard
other evidence that bore on Howell’s credibility, including the officer’s testimony
that he smelled and found marijuana in Howell’s vehicle while Howell denied the
smell or presence of marijuana.

¶16 In sum, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the evidence
was sufficient to support Howell’s conviction.

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No. 2020AP212-CR

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5. (2017-18).

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