Rachael Warrington v. City of Prairie du Chien

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 7, 2019
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2019AP95 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV47

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

RACHAEL WARRINGTON AND KURT
WARRINGTON, JR., PARENTS OF K. W.,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE ESTATE OF K. W.,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

THE NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL COUNCIL
OF CARPENTERS HEALTH FUND,

INVOLUNTARY-PLAINTIFF,

V.

CITY OF PRAIRIE DU CHIEN, PRAIRIE DU CHIEN
AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT AND EMPLOYERS
MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
No. 2019AP95

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Crawford County:
CRAIG R. DAY, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Fitzpatrick, P.J., Blanchard and Graham, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Rachel and Kurt Warrington, individually and as
the personal representatives of their son K.W.’s estate, appeal the circuit court
order that dismissed their negligence claims against the City of Prairie du Chien
and the Prairie du Chien Area School District. The Warringtons contend that the
circuit court erred by applying the recreational immunity statute to conclude that
the Warringtons failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We
agree with the circuit court that the statute applies and, therefore, we affirm the
circuit court’s dismissal order.1

¶2 We review de novo whether the Warringtons’ complaint states a
claim, accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint. See Atkinson v.
Everbrite, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 724, 727, 592 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999). Whether
the recreational immunity statute applies to a given set of facts is likewise a
question of law we review de novo. See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Paper
Recycling of La Crosse, 2001 WI 64, ¶9, 244 Wis. 2d 290, 627 N.W.2d 527.

1
As an alternative basis for dismissing the Warringtons’ claims against the School
District, the circuit court concluded that the Warringtons failed to properly serve the School
District with their summons and complaint. We do not address this alternative basis for
dismissing those claims.

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No. 2019AP95

¶3 According to the Warringtons’ complaint, four-year-old K.W. was
brought by his grandparents to the Prairie du Chien pool to attend a swimming
lesson for “non-swimmers.” The lesson was supervised, instructed, and
lifeguarded by City and School District staff. During the lesson, the staff lost
track of K.W. and did not realize that he was missing until the lesson was nearly
over. K.W. was found face down and unconscious in four feet of water. It was
estimated that he had been submerged for five to ten minutes before he was found.
K.W. later died.

¶4 The parties dispute whether, based on these alleged facts, the City
and School District are immune from liability under paragraph (2)(b) of the
recreational immunity statute. That provision states that “no owner … is liable for
the death of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a
recreational activity on the owner’s property.” See WIS. STAT. § 895.52(2)(b)
(2017-18).2

¶5 The Warringtons’ sole argument against the application of this
statutory provision is that K.W. was not engaging in a recreational activity. The
Warringtons concede that swimming and receiving instruction in swimming both
qualify as “recreational activity” under the statutory definition. See WIS. STAT.
§ 895.52(1)(g) (defining “[r]ecreational activity” as including “water sports” and

2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
noted. We cite the current version for ease of reference. The recreational immunity statute has
not changed since the time of the events that led to K.W.’s death.

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No. 2019AP95

as including “instruction in” a recreational activity).3 The Warringtons argue,
however, that K.W. was not engaging in either of these activities when he
sustained his fatal injuries. According to the Warringtons, K.W. could not have
been swimming when he was injured because he was a “non-swimmer,” and K.W.
was not receiving instruction in swimming when he was injured because the pool
staff had lost track of him.

¶6 Putting aside whether K.W. was engaging in swimming, we
conclude that the statute applies because K.W. was engaging in “instruction in”
swimming. The Warringtons’ argument to the contrary views K.W.’s instruction
in recreational activity moment by moment, isolating the time of injury and the
moments leading up to the injury from the overarching activity in which K.W. was
engaged. The Warringtons point to no statutory language or other authority that
supports such a restrictive construction of the statute. Further, the Warringtons’
argument runs contrary to the legislature’s directive that the statute “‘should be
liberally construed in favor of property owners to protect them from liability.’”

3
WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.52(1)(g) defines “[r]ecreational activity” as follows:

“Recreational activity” means any outdoor activity
undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure,
including practice or instruction in any such activity.
“Recreational activity” includes hunting, fishing, trapping,
camping, picnicking, exploring caves, nature study, bicycling,
horseback riding, bird-watching, motorcycling, operating an all-
terrain vehicle or utility terrain vehicle, operating a vehicle, as
defined in s. 340.01(74), on a road designated under s. 23.115,
recreational aviation, ballooning, hang gliding, hiking,
tobogganing, sledding, sleigh riding, snowmobiling, skiing,
skating, water sports, sight-seeing, rock-climbing, cutting or
removing wood, climbing observation towers, animal training,
harvesting the products of nature, participating in an agricultural
tourism activity, sport shooting and any other outdoor sport,
game or educational activity.

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No. 2019AP95

See Wilmet v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 WI App 16, ¶13, 374 Wis. 2d 413, 893
N.W.2d 251 (quoting the act that created the current statute).

¶7 The circuit court, in its oral ruling, aptly explained why the
Warringtons’ construction of the statute is at odds with this directive and
unreasonably restrictive:

You look to the purpose of the use, recreational immunity
is to be liberally construed in favor of immunity …. And
just universally it is, from this Court’s reading of the law,
painting with too fine of a brush to parse the words of the
recreational immunity statute that finely.

….

If you … start down that path of receiving
instruction—when do you start receiving instruction and
when do you stop receiving instruction, I don’t know where
it logically would ever end. If we were to try to slice it that
thinly, then if a supervisor was not directly engaged
physically with you are you receiving instruction? If the
supervisor were not directly verbally engaged, are you
receiving instruction? If the supervisor is talking to the
whole group but not looking at you, are you receiving
instruction?

I can envision just all kinds of ways that this gets
complicated in a fashion that does not advance the overall
goal of recreational immunity. The fact that this fact
situation … speaks of a lack of due care makes no
difference. That’s the whole point of immunity. It’s not
that you’re not negligent; it’s that you are negligent but you
are not liable based upon a grant of statutory immunity.

We agree with the circuit court’s analysis.

¶8 Our conclusion that the recreational immunity statute applies here is
bolstered by Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 468 N.W.2d 775 (Ct.
App. 1991). For the reasons we now explain, Stann is, if not controlling, at least
supportive of our conclusion.

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No. 2019AP95

¶9 In Stann, a three-year-old girl died as a result of a drowning incident
at a county beach after the girl had apparently wandered away from her mother.
See id. at 812. In suing the county, the girl’s parents alleged that lifeguards failed
to take appropriate action upon being informed that the girl was missing. Id. at
812-13. The girl’s parents in Stann contended that a child of such young age who
wanders off cannot be said to be engaging in recreational activity within the
meaning of the statute. See id. at 821. This court disagreed and concluded that
what mattered instead was the undisputed fact that the girl’s mother “brought [her]
to the … beach in order to use and enjoy the recreational aspects of the site.” See
id. at 823. Therefore, the court concluded, the girl’s “presence at the … beach was
for purposes of her engaging in recreational activity as contemplated pursuant to
sec. 895.52.” Id.

¶10 Here, it is undisputed that K.W. was brought to the pool for a
recreational activity—his swim lesson. We would conclude that Stann is
controlling except that the court in Stann was addressing paragraph (2)(a) of the
recreational immunity statute, a different provision than the one the parties dispute
here, and the City expressly disclaims any reliance on sub. (2)(a) as a basis for its
motion to dismiss. See id. at 819. Under paragraph (2)(a), a property owner owes
no duty to keep the property safe for recreational activities to a person who “enters
the owner’s property to engage in a recreational activity.” See WIS. STAT.
§ 895.52(2)(a) (emphasis added). Here, the parties dispute the applicability of
paragraph (2)(b), which does not contain similar “enters … to” language. Rather,
as already noted, paragraph (2)(b) immunizes property owners from liability for

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No. 2019AP95

harm caused by a person “engaging in a recreational activity on the owner’s
property.” See § 895.52(2)(b).4

¶11 Based on the court’s discussion in Stann, we are uncertain to what
extent the court’s focus on the reason for entering property was dependent on the
“enters … to” language in paragraph (2)(a). See Stann, 161 Wis. 2d at 819-23.
To the extent that the court in Stann was relying on that language, Stann may not
be controlling here in the absence of similar language in paragraph (2)(b).
However, a determination that the recreational immunity statute applies here is
consistent with Stann, whereas concluding that the statute does not apply here
may be inconsistent with Stann. Accordingly, Stann supports our conclusion that
the recreational immunity statute applies in this case.

¶12 We turn finally to the Warringtons’ reliance on a different case,
Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin, 2019 WI 2, 385 Wis. 2d 86, 921 N.W.2d 714.
4
WISCONSIN STAT. § 895.52(2) provides, in full:

(2) No duty; immunity from liability. (a) Except as
provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and no officer, employee
or agent of an owner owes to any person who enters the owner's
property to engage in a recreational activity:

1. A duty to keep the property safe for recreational
activities.

2. A duty to inspect the property, except as provided
under s. 23.115(2).

3. A duty to give warning of an unsafe condition, use or
activity on the property.

(b) Except as provided in subs. (3) to (6), no owner and
no officer, employee or agent of an owner is liable for the death
of, any injury to, or any death or injury caused by, a person
engaging in a recreational activity on the owner’s property or for
any death or injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal.

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No. 2019AP95

We need not discuss the factual details of Engelhardt. It is enough to point out
that Engelhardt involves the known danger exception to governmental immunity
under WIS. STAT. § 893.80(4), and that the Warringtons do not contend that there
is a comparable exception under the recreational immunity statute. See
Engelhardt, 385 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶3-7. Thus, the Warringtons’ reliance on
Engelhardt is misplaced and not persuasive.

¶13 In sum, for the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court order
dismissing the Warringtons’ claims.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5.

8