Robin Zahran v. Jon R. Pinkert

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215
P.O. BOX 1688
MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688
Telephone (608) 266-1880
TTY: (800) 947-3529
Facsimile (608) 267-0640
Web Site: www.wicourts.gov
DISTRICT III
September 29, 2026
To:
Hon. Troy L. Nielsen
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
Connie DeFere
Clerk of Circuit Court
Door County Courthouse
Electronic Notice
Zachary Buchta
Electronic Notice
Amy Sullivan
Electronic Notice
Karen Zahran
Electronic Notice
Robin Zahran
5457 Bayshore Drive
Sturgeon Bay, WI 54235
Jennifer C. Hobart
Electronic Notice
Robin Zahran
Electronic Notice
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
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2025AP987
Karen Zahran v. Christine Rademacher (L. C. No. 2020CV46)
Robin Zahran v. Jon R. Pinkert (L. C. No. 2022CV144)
Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or
authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Robin Zahran, pro se, appeals from judgments awarding attorney fees in the total amount
of $45,555.75 to Pinkert Law Firm LLP and its clients, Christine Rademacher, Ruth
Rademacher, and Greg Seitz. The judgments were entered following remands from this court
for: (1) a redetermination of the amount of actual attorney fees awarded as a sanction against
Zahran for overlitigation and ad hominem attacks Zahran made during the course of a lawsuit

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arising from a real estate transaction between Zahran and his wife on one side and Pinkert’s
clients on the other; and (2) a determination of the amount of attorney fees reasonably incurred
by Pinkert and its clients in defending a frivolous defamation lawsuit by Zahran related to
assertions Pinkert made in support of the sanctions award in the real estate lawsuit. Based upon
our review of the briefs and record, we conclude at conference that this case is appropriate for
summary disposition. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21 (2023-24). We affirm both awards.
Having been addressed in prior appeals, neither the merits of the underlying lawsuits nor
the determinations that sanctions were warranted are before us in these consolidated appeals.
Rather, the questions now presented are whether: (1) the circuit court demonstrated bias against
Zahran during the hearing on remand; and (2) the court violated Zahran’s due process rights by
denying him the opportunity to present an expert witness on the reasonableness of the attorney
fees or to cross-examine the two attorneys who submitted billing statements for their fees.
A litigant has a due process right to an impartial tribunal. State v. Goodson, 2009 WI
App 107, ¶8, 320 Wis. 2d 166, 771 N.W.2d 385. In analyzing a claim of judicial bias, we begin
with the presumption that a judge is fair, impartial, and capable of ignoring any biasing
influences. State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶20, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114. To
overcome that presumption, a party must demonstrate the objective1 existence of “actual bias”
(i.e., that the judge in fact treated the party unfairly) or the “appearance of bias” (i.e., that there
are circumstances present under which “a reasonable person—taking into consideration human
1 Although a judge may also be subjectively biased, that is a determination that can be made only
by the judge, and it is therefore not subject to appellate review. State v. McBride, 187 Wis. 2d 409,
415-16, 523 N.W.2d 106 (Ct. App. 1994).

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psychological tendencies and weaknesses—[would conclude] that the average judge could not be
trusted to ‘hold the balance nice, clear and true’”). Id., ¶¶20-24. Opinions formed by a judge
based upon facts introduced or events occurring during the course of a current or prior
proceeding involving a party do not constitute the basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they
display “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
State v. Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, ¶36, 295 Wis. 2d 801, 722 N.W.2d 136 (citation omitted);
see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a … partiality motion.”). We will independently determine, as a
question of law, whether a judge has failed to act impartially. State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84,
¶23, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772.
Here, Zahran clams that the circuit court judge treated him unfairly at the remand
hearing,2 demonstrating actual bias against him, by: (1) determining the amounts of the attorney
fee awards without taking evidence; (2) characterizing Zahran’s filings as so voluminous as to be
“impossible … to keep … straight” and as requiring extra time, effort, and research to respond to
due to their “challenging” nature; and (3) ordering Zahran to leave the hearing.
First, due process requires that a circuit court provide a litigant with a fair opportunity to
challenge the calculation or reasonableness of a claim for attorney fees with counter-affidavits or
arguments. Lucareli v. Vilas County, 2000 WI App 157, ¶11, 238 Wis. 2d 84, 616 N.W.2d 153.
No evidentiary hearing is required, however, if a litigant who has been afforded such an
2 To the extent that Zahran also contends that the circuit court’s rulings on the merits of his
underlying cases or its imposition of sanctions demonstrate bias, those arguments are defeated by this
court’s decisions in Zahran’s prior appeals, and we will not address them further.

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opportunity fails to create a material issue of fact.3 Id., ¶12. Given a court’s inherent expertise
in evaluating the reasonableness of attorney fees, an itemized bill from counsel submitted by
affidavit generally provides a sufficient evidentiary basis to evaluate a claim of attorney fees. Id.
Here, Zahran did not provide anything in his prehearing submissions or his argument to
the circuit court that created a material issue of fact as to the calculation or reasonableness of the
amount of attorney fees claimed by Pinkert and its clients. In particular, although Zahran
questioned whether the hourly rate charged by counsel exceeded the local standard, he did not
identify an expert witness or provide an affidavit with any other evidence of a different rate.
Additionally, this court had already affirmed an award of actual attorney fees incurred by
Pinkert’s clients for everything except responding to the motion for summary judgment in the
real estate case. By the time of the hearing, the claimed amount had appropriately increased to
account for time spent on the appeal and following remand. While Zahran questioned the
reasonableness of the amount of time counsel spent on the cases, he did not make a factual
challenge to the number of hours counsel actually expended. Thus, the court was left to make
discretionary determinations as to the reasonableness of the actual fees incurred, not factual
determinations as to how much time was spent. The court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary
hearing was therefore based upon its review of the parties’ submissions, and it was not unfair to
Zahran.
Second, and likewise, the circuit court’s characterizations of Zahran’s filings were not
based upon any personal animus toward Zahran, but rather upon the court’s review of those
3 Zahran’s assertion that this court ordered the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing
misstates the scope of our remand.

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filings. Such a review was not only appropriate, but highly relevant to the court’s determination
regarding whether the number of hours counsel spent responding to Zahran’s filings was
reasonable. Our own review of Zahran’s filings confirms that they can be difficult to follow and
take time to address because Zahran frequently asserts propositions that are not fully supported
by the record or the legal authorities he cites.
Third, the record shows that the circuit court warned Zahran that it would order him to be
removed and would finish the hearing without him if Zahran continued to speak out of turn.
Zahran then stated, “That would be fine.” The court responded, “Then leave,” and Zahran left
without any escort from the bailiff. Disruptive conduct constitutes a forfeiture or waiver by
conduct of a litigant’s right to be present. State v. Washington, 2018 WI 3, ¶27, 379 Wis. 2d 58,
905 N.W.2d 380. The court therefore properly acted within its discretion to maintain order in its
courtroom by threatening to expel Zahran based upon his behavior.
In sum, we conclude that Zahran has failed to overcome the presumption that the circuit
court acted impartially when it decided the matter without an evidentiary hearing, drew
conclusions about how much time it would take to respond to Zahran’s pro se submissions, or
warned Zahran that he would be removed from the hearing if he continued speaking out of turn.
Zahran’s additional claim that he was denied his due process right to present and cross-examine
witnesses is controlled by our conclusion above that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
in the first place.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED that the judgments are summarily affirmed. WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21
(2023-24).

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals