State v. Adam J. Vicory

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WISCONSIN
COURT
PEALS *XX
OF APPE
OFFICE OF THE CLERK WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS
110 EAST MAIN STREET, SUITE 215 P.O. Box 1688 MADISON, WISCONSIN 53701-1688 Telephone (608) 266-1880 TTY: (800) 947-3529 Facsimile (608) 267-0640 Web Site: www.wicourts.gov DISTRICT II
October 21, 2026
To:
Hon. Estee Elizabeth Scholtz
Circuit Court Judge
Electronic Notice
Michele Jacobs
Clerk of Circuit Court
Walworth County Courthouse
Electronic Notice
Michael J. Conway Electronic Notice
Jacob Wise Electronic Notice
You are hereby notified that the Court has entered the following opinion and order:
2025AP1590-CR State of Wisconsin v. Adam J. Vicory (L.C. #2021CF428)
Before Lazar, P.J., Grogan, and LoCoco, JJ.
Summary disposition orders may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Adam J. Vicory appeals from a circuit court judgment of conviction and order denying his postconviction motion for resentencing. Based upon our review of the briefs and Record, we conclude at conference that this case is appropriate for summary disposition. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21 (2023-24).1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
Vicory was convicted, following a jury trial, of exposing his genitals to a child (an 8- year-old girl) as a repeat offender. The State charged Vicory as a repeater due to his 2016
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

No. 2025AP1590-CR
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conviction, which included two counts of exposing his genitals to a child (two 13-year-old girls).
While Vicory had received probation for the earlier conviction, the circuit court in this case
sentenced Vicory to the maximum authorized by law: 5.5 years of initial confinement and
2 years of extended supervision. This sentence tracked the recommendation of both the State
and the author of Vicory’s presentence investigation report.
Vicory filed a postconviction motion for sentence modification, arguing his sentence was
unduly harsh and unconscionable. He attached a statistical report suggesting that “no other
defendant had been sentenced as harshly … as Mr. Vicory by this judge or in Walworth County
for the same crime.” The postconviction court denied the motion, and Vicory appeals.
We review a circuit court’s sentencing decision, as well as its conclusion that its sentence
was not unduly harsh and unconscionable, for an erroneous exercise of discretion. See, e.g.,
State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197; State v. Grindemann,
2002 WI App 106, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507. An erroneous exercise of discretion
will be found in this context “only where the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment
of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.”
Grindemann, 255 Wis. 2d 632, ¶31 (quoting Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d
457 (1975)).
Vicory correctly concedes that there “is no requirement that defendants convicted of
committing similar crimes must receive equal or similar sentences.” State v. Lechner, 217
Wis. 2d 392, 427, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998); see McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 271, 182
N.W.2d 512 (1971) (“It is not the philosophy of modern criminal law that the punishment fit the

No. 2025AP1590-CR
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crime alone and that for every violation of [a] particular statute there be an identical sanction.”).
“Imposing such a requirement would ignore the particular mitigating and aggravating factors in
each case.” Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d at 427. Therefore, the mere fact that Vicory received a
harsher sentence than others convicted of the same crime does not mean Vicory’s sentence is
unduly harsh or unconscionable. See also McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 275 (“[T]he legislature
intended that maximum sentences were to be reserved for a more aggravated breach of the
statutes, and probation or lighter sentences were to be used in cases where the protection of
society and the rehabilitation of the criminal did not require a maximum or near maximum
sentence.”).
Instead, Vicory appears to argue only that the circuit court failed to link Vicory’s
maximum sentence to relevant aggravating factors. We disagree. Most obviously, the court
expressed concern over the fact that Vicory had victimized other children in the same way as
occurred in this case yet had not learned his lesson from his prior conviction and term of
probation. The court also noted Vicory’s disturbing lack of remorse, his attempt to excuse his
own conduct, the effect his crime had on the victim, and the need to deter crimes against
children. It concluded a long term of confinement was appropriate to ensure the protection of the
victim and the public as well as Vicory’s own rehabilitation. Vicory’s statistics do not account
for any of these considerations—in particular, his unusual dangerousness—which were largely
individualized and provide ample reason for his comparatively lengthy sentence. In sum, we

No. 2025AP1590-CR
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agree with the State that the circuit court’s imposition of a maximum sentence under these
circumstances was not unduly harsh or unconscionable.2
Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that the judgment and order of the circuit court are summarily affirmed.
See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.21.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this summary disposition order will not be published.
Samuel A. Christensen
Clerk of Court of Appeals
2 Vicory argues that portions of the circuit court’s discussion of aggravating factors related solely
to its choice of prison over probation. Vicory’s request that we read the transcript in the narrowest
possible way is inconsistent with our obligation to “search the record to determine whether in the exercise
of proper discretion the sentence imposed can be sustained.” See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 282,
182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). In any event, we disagree with Vicory’s interpretation of the circuit court’s
sentencing decision. Notably, the court began its assessment of relevant sentencing factors by
acknowledging “that the sentence called for in each case must be the minimum amount of custody, not the
maximum amount of custody, consistent with [sentencing] goals” and explaining that its consideration of
those factors would guide its determination.

No. 2025AP1590-CR
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