In Re The Parentage Of V.lc-p. Chad Clark, Appellant V. Elizabeth Page, Respondent

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Parentage of 	)
V.L.C-P.,
A Minor Child. 	)
CHAD CLARK,
\/
Appellant, 	)
V.
ELIZABETH PAGE j 	/
Respondent. 	)
NO. 69250-0-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	March 3, 2014
Leach, 	C.J. — Chad Clark 	appeals orders providing 	for the care and
support of his daughter, V.L.C-P. 	Because his briefs and the incomplete record
on appeal are substantial obstacles to our review of his appeal and 	for the
additional reasons set forth below, we affirm.
FACTS
Clark had a brief relationship with Elizabeth Page in 2008. 	On June 12,
2009, 	Page gave birth to a daughter, V.L.C-P. 	In 	proceedings to establish
parentage, the trial court found Clark was V.L.C-P.'s father. 	Clark then filed a
petition for a parenting plan.
After 	a 	three-day 	trial 	in 	November 	2011, 	the 	trial 	court 	made 	a
comprehensive oral ruling on November 17. 	On August 3, 2012, the trial court

No. 69250-0-1 / 2
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on petition for parenting plan and
child support order and an order of child support. 	On October 26, 2012, the trial
court entered a parenting plan. 	The trial court ordered that the child would reside
a majority of the time with Page but allowed for time with Clark on alternating
weekends and certain alternating weekdays. 	The court also imputed income to
Clark and ordered him to pay child support.
Clark appeals.
ANALYSIS
The law does not distinguish between litigants who elect to proceed pro se
and those who seek assistance of counsel.1 	Both must comply with applicable
procedural rules, and failure to do so may preclude review.2 	This court generally
will 	not 	consider 	arguments 	that 	are 	unsupported 	by 	pertinent 	authority,
references to the record, or meaningful analysis.3 	Also, the appellant has the
burden to provide a record sufficient to review the issues raised on appeal.4
With few exceptions, Clark has failed to comply with these requirements.
He has not provided any transcripts of the three-day trial and has designated no
1 In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).
2 Olson, 69 Wn. App. at 626; State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452,
969P.2d501 (1999).
3 Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d
549 (1992) (arguments not supported by authority); State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6,
15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990) (insufficient argument); Saunders v. Lloyd's of London.
113 Wn.2d 330, 	345, 779 	P.2d 249 (1989) (issues unsupported by adequate
argument and authority); State v. Camarillo, 54 Wn. App. 821, 829, 776 P.2d 176
(1989) (no references to the record), affd, 115 Wn.2d 60, 794 P.2d 850 (1990);
RAP 10.3(a).
4 Story v. Shelter Bay Co., 52 Wn. App. 334, 345, 760 P.2d 368 (1988).

No. 69250-0-1 / 3
trial exhibits for review. 	Instead, he has provided transcripts of the trial court's
oral ruling and four additional hearings regarding the presentation and approval
of the final written orders. 	He lists 28 assignments of error, the majority of which
highlight alleged inconsistencies between the trial court's oral statements and the
final 	written 	orders. 	Clark's 	briefing 	contains 	limited 	citation 	to 	authority,
inaccurate 	interpretations 	of 	the 	applicable 	standards 	of 	review, 	and 	no
meaningful 	legal 	analysis. 	In 	sum, 	these 	deficiencies 	present 	substantial
obstacles to our consideration of Clark's appeal. 	Nevertheless, to the extent
possible, we address the essence of his claims.
Clark challenges the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the support
order, and the parenting plan. 	We review the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions 	of 	law to 	determine whether substantial 	evidence 	supports the
findings and, if so, whether the findings support the trial court's conclusions.5 We
review a trial court's decisions on an order of child support and on the provisions
of a parenting plan for an abuse of discretion.6 	A trial court abuses its discretion
if the decision 	rests on unreasonable or untenable 	grounds.7 	A trial 	court
necessarily abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the
law or involves application of an incorrect legal analysis.8
5 Sunnvside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Dickie, 111 Wn. App. 209, 214, 43
P.3d 1277 (2002).
6 State ex rel. M.M.G. v. Graham, 159 Wn.2d 623, 632, 152 P.3d 1005
(2007); In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).
7 Graham, 159 Wn.2d at 633.
8Dixv. ICTGrp., Inc., 160 Wn.2d 826, 833, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007).

No. 69250-0-1 / 4
Clark challenges findings of fact describing (1) his relationship with Page,
(2) Page as V.L.C-P.'s preferred caregiver, (3) the existence and sources of
conflict between Clark and Page, (4) V.L.C-P.'s difficulties with transitions from
visits, and (5) the need for increases in Clark's time with V.L.C-P. to be based on
her development and age. 	Clark argues that these findings are not supported by
substantial evidence and that the trial court ignored the contrary evidence that he
presented at trial. 	But in order to properly challenge findings of fact on appeal,
Clark must demonstrate "why specific findings of the trial court are not supported
by the evidence and 	[must] 	cite to the 	record 	to support that argument."9
Because Clark has failed to provide a record of the evidence presented at trial
and to properly support his claims of error with argument based on evidence in
the trial record, the challenged findings must be treated as verities.
Clark also assigns error to a finding referring to a parenting plan "signed
by the court on 6-29-12." 	No parenting plan entered on June 29, 2012, appears
in the record before this court.10 	But Clark fails to identify any authority justifying
his requested relief of reversal for what appears to be a clerical error. 	Clark also
challenges 	the 	statement 	in 112.10(2) 	that 	"Clark 	filed 	a 	contempt 	motion,
concerning 	make 	up 	[sic] time 	and 	did 	not 	prevail." 	He 	has 	provided 	the
contempt order and argues that he 	prevailed 	because Page was ordered to
9 In re Estate of Lint, 135 Wn.2d 518, 532, 957 P.2d 755 (1998); In re
Estate of Palmer, 145 Wn. App. 249, 264-65, 187 P.3d 758 (2008).
10 Clark has assigned error to the court's final parenting plan entered on
October 26, 2012.
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No. 69250-0-1 / 5
provide makeup time. 	But the order also indicates that the trial court found that
Page was not in contempt. Again, Clark fails to articulate any grounds for relief.
Next, Clark challenges the court's conclusions that (1) a parenting plan
consistent with Whatcom County Residential Guidelines should be entered, (2)
the plan will address the high level of parental conflict, and (3) the court should
adopt the child support worksheet reflecting the incomes of the parties and enter
a final child support order. 	Clark contends that the final parenting plan is not
consistent with the guidelines and does not address conflict or provide him with a
remedy for conflict caused by Page and that the support worksheet does not
reflect his actual income and creates a severe strain on his financial position.
But Clark misapprehends the conclusions. 	Based on its findings of fact, the court
properly concluded that a parenting plan and support order should be entered.
Clark's dissatisfaction with the orders ultimately entered does not establish error
in the identified conclusions of law.
Assigning error to the child support order, 	Clark 	claims the trial court
improperly (1) imputed income and listed it on the wrong line of the worksheet;
(2) considered his rental income and failed to consider his mortgage expenses;
(3) delayed setting the new lower transfer payment between November 2011 and
June 2012, 	resulting 	in overpayment; 	(4) failed 	to 	resolve the dispute 	over
postsecondary educational support rather than reserving the right to request it;
and (5) ordered Clark to pay a proportional share of day-care and educational
expenses not included in the transfer payment. 	Again, because Clark has not

No. 69250-0-1 / 6
provided a record of the evidence considered by the court at trial, he fails to
establish any abuse of discretion in the trial court's determinations in the child
support order.11
Similarly, Clark claims the trial court abused its discretion in the parenting
plan by (1) eliminating weekly contact by imposing alternating weekend and
weekday visits, contrary to the best interests of the child; (2) contradicting oral
rulings regarding adjustments for work schedules and vacation and Christmas
schedules; and (3) adopting language proposed by Page without explicit rulings
on 	certain 	matters such 	as a 	two-week 	limit on 	arranging 	makeup time for
schedule changes. 	Clark makes clear his disagreement with the trial court's
exercise of its discretion when it determined various details of the parenting plan.
But Clark fails 	to 	offer any 	relevant 	authority 	or 	cogent 	legal 	analysis 	to
demonstrate any abuse of that discretion. 	And Clark cannot establish error by
relying on his own interpretations of the trial court's oral rulings. 	An oral decision
by a trial court is not the same as a judgment; the court is free to change its
determinations 	until 	formal 	judgment 	is 	entered.12 	Clark 	fails 	to 	establish
reversible error in the orders he challenges.
11 	Given 	Clark's admission that he was not working full time and was
receiving rent from 	roommates, it appears that the trial court had grounds to
impute income and include rent. 	See RCW 26.19.071 (3)(u) (rent included in
gross monthly income); 	RCW 26.19.071(6) 	(court shall 	impute income when
parent is voluntarily underemployed).
12 Earl v. Geftax, 43 Wn.2d 529, 530, 262 P.2d 183 (1953); Fosbre v.
State, 70 Wn.2d 578, 584, 424 P.2d 901 (1967).
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No. 69250-0-1 / 7
Page requests an award of attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140. 	But the
plain language of chapter 26.09 RCW applies to the "dissolution of marriage."13
Because Clark and Page were not married, Page is not entitled to an award of
fees under RCW 26.09.140. 	Although a court may "order that all or a portion of a
party's reasonable attorney's fees be paid by another party" in a parentage action
under RCW 26.26.140, we exercise our discretion and deny Page's request for
fees in this case.14
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
13 See, e.g., 	Foster v. Thilges. 61 Wn. App. 880, 887-88, 812 P.2d 523
(1991) (parties to committed intimate relationships are not entitled to fees under
RCW 26.09.140 because statute grants attorney fees only where there has been
marital relationship between the parties).
14 RCW 26.26.140: In re Parentage of Q.A.L., 146 Wn. App. 631, 638, 191
P.3d 934 (2008).