State Of Washington, Respondent V. Kyron Deshawn Brisbon, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
KYRON D. BRISBON,
Appellant.
No. 71927-1-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: June 1,2015
Trickey, J. — A jury convicted Kyron Brisbon of one count of theft in the first
degree. 	His conviction was based on a series of checks he wrote from one overdrawn
bank account and deposited into a second account.
Brisbon contends that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by admitting as a
demonstrative exhibit a chart that described 	five 	listed deposits as "Check Fraud."
However, Brisbon waived the claim of error by failing to object to the language in the
exhibit. 	In addition, the trial court directed the parties to redact the document and
expressly instructed the jury to disregard the "Check Fraud" entry. 	Brisbon's counsel
also 	lessened 	the prejudicial 	impact 	through 	her 	cross-examination 	of 	the bank
employee who 	prepared 	the exhibit. 	Brisbon fails 	to establish 	that 	his 	counsel's
representation was constitutionally inadequate. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Kyron Brisbon with theft in the first degree. 	The charge was
based on the allegation that during a one-month period in 2010, Brisbon caused a loss
to the Bank of America by depositing five checks drawn from one Bank of America
account into another Bank of America account. 	Brisbon owned both accounts. 	After

No. 71927-1-1/2
each deposit, although each check was later returned for insufficient funds, Brisbon was
able to access and use funds credited to his account.
At trial, the State presented the testimony of two witnesses: Bank of America
Fraud Investigator Dana Parks, and Detective Stacy Litsjo, who later investigated the
case on behalf of the Seattle Police Department's Fraud Unit.
Parks initially investigated the 2010 activity on Brisbon's accounts. She compiled
documents, including Brisbon's customer profile, bank statements for both accounts,
copies of the five checks returned for insufficient funds, and surveillance photographs
taken from the Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) where the deposits occurred. 	Parks
also created a spreadsheet listing the details of each deposit.1 	The spreadsheet lists
the check number, dollar amount of each check, time and date of deposit, and deposit
location. 	Under the column heading "Type of Loss," the document includes a single
entry, stating "Check Fraud."2
Parks 	testified 	about 	the 	bank's 	policies 	and 	procedures 	and 	the 	specific
transactions that occurred within the charging period. 	She explained that one type of
check fraud she frequently investigates occurs when a person deposits a "worthless"
check—meaning a check that is not backed by sufficient funds or is later returned for
some other reason—and then uses funds credited to the account based on the deposit,
causing overdraft. 	Parks testified when a check is deposited into a Bank of America
account, if the originating account is also a Bank of America account, it takes between
two to four days for the bank to discover that the deposited check is not backed by
1 Before trial, Brisbon objected to admission of the spreadsheet on the basis that it was not a
business record. 	After the State clarified that 	it was 	seeking to admit the document for
illustrative purposes only, the court overruled the objection, but directed the State to change the
phrase "date and time of crime" to "date and time." 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 54-55.
2 Exhibit (Ex.) 13.

No. 71927-1-1/3
sufficient funds. 	Parks also described the fees associated with returned checks and
overdraft as well as the automatic notices that are generated each time a check is
returned for insufficient funds, 	when an account is overdrawn, 	and when, 	after an
account is overdrawn for 90 days, the bank intends to close an account.
According to Parks's testimony and the bank records, the following five checks
payable to Brisbon were deposited into Brisbon's account between May 29 and June
28, 2010 at the same Seattle location: 	(1) a check for $950 on May 29, (2) a check for
$950 on June 1, (3) a check for $6,000 on June 20, (4) a check for $950 also on June
20, and (5) a check for $8,000 on June 28. 	The total amount of the checks was
$16,850. 	The five checks were drawn from an account that had a negative balance at
the time of the deposits. 	Parks testified that the loss to the bank, excluding overdraft
fees and fees imposed for the returned checks, was approximately $5,400.
During 	Parks's 	testimony, 	the State 	introduced 	Exhibit 	5, the spreadsheet
summarizing the five deposits. After the State published the exhibit and Parks began to
testify about the details of the first deposit, the court interrupted the testimony and, sua
sponte, instructed the jury "not to consider the type of loss as check fraud."3 	The Court
further stated:
It will be the jurors' not anybody else's opinion as to whether any crime
occurred. 	And I'm sorry that I hadn't noticed that. 	But the jury absolutely
is not to consider that. 	It will 	be 	your decision 	after 	hearing 	all the
evidence whether.. . any crime occurred[.]"[4]
The prosecutor deleted the phrase "Check Fraud" from the document.5
3 2 RP at 200.
4 2 RP at 200.
5 RP at 200. For purposes of making a record, the court admitted an unredacted version of the
spreadsheet as a separate exhibit.

No. 71927-1-1/4
Following Parks's investigation, the bank reported the suspicious transactions to
the Seattle Police Department's Fraud Unit. 	Detective Litsjo testified that in November
2012, more than two years after the transactions at issue, she called the telephone
number listed for Brisbon on the bank records. 	The male who answered identified
himself as Brisbon. 	The detective told Brisbon she was investigating a report from the
Bank of America that several "bad checks" had been deposited into his account.6 At
first, 	Brisbon said the detective "had the wrong person."7 	Then, after the detective
explained that she had surveillance video from 	the ATMs, 	Brisbon 	said it was a
"misunderstanding," that he had written checks from the wrong checkbook, and that he
was working with the bank to resolve the issue.8 	He said the bank was supposed to
send him some forms, but before the forms arrived he left the country. When asked for
details about this, Brisbon explained that he was 	in 	Canada and 	Houston, Texas
between September 2011 	and February 2012. 	Brisbon told 	the detective that he
planned to stop by the bank to repay the money that day, but declined the detective's
request to speak to her in person because he had a job interview.
Based on the testimony and documentary evidence, the jury convicted Brisbon
as charged. 	The court imposed 	a 23-day term of confinement and converted the
confinement to community service hours. 	Brisbon appeals.
6 2 RP at 122.
7 2 RP at 122.
8 2 RP at 123.

No. 71927-1-1/5
ANALYSIS
Improper Opinion Testimony
For the first time on appeal, Brisbon contends that the court's admission of the
spreadsheet exhibit which described the bank's losses as "Check Fraud" compromised
his right to a fair trial.
Although it is improper for a witness to offer an opinion on the defendant's guilt or
veracity, an appellate court nevertheless will generally decline to review a claim of error
raised for the first time on appeal. 	RAP 2.5(a). 	A limited exception exists if the
defendant can show that the error was a manifest constitutional error affecting his or her
constitutional rights. 	RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d
125(2007).
"Manifest error" in this context requires an "explicit or almost explicit" witness
statement on 	the "ultimate issue of fact." 	Kirkman, 	159 Wn.2d 	at 936. 	And 	the
admission of impermissible opinion testimony does not cause actual prejudice and is
not manifest within the meaning of RAP 2.5(a)(3) if the trial court properly instructs the
jury. 	For instance, in Kirkman and in State v. Montgomery, the defendants were not
prejudiced by allegedly improper opinion testimony because "the jury was properly
instructed that jurors 'are the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses' and that jurors
'are not bound' by expert witness opinions." 	Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577, 595-96, 183
P.3d 267 (2008) (quoting Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 937).
Parks's description of the type of loss as 	"Check Fraud" is not an 	opinion
regarding veracity. 	Arguably, it is not an opinion that Brisbon was guilty of the charged
crime. 	Parks's description of the type of loss did not encompass an opinion as to

No. 71927-1-1/6
whether Brisbon 	wrote the 	checks, 	made the deposits, 	or 	knew 	the funds 	in the
originating account were insufficient to cover the checks. 	In using the phrase "Check
Fraud," 	Parks 	expressed 	no opinion 	as 	to whether 	Brisbon was 	the 	person 	who
withdrew funds or made debit purchases. 	Parks's statement was not an explicit or
almost explicit opinion that Brisbon intended to deprive the bank of property and was
guilty of theft.
But even ifwe assume that the spreadsheet entry amounted to an impermissible
opinion on Brisbon's guilt, there was no actual prejudice in light of the instructions. 	As
in Kirkman and Montgomery, the jurors were instructed that they are the "sole judges of
the credibility" of the witnesses and the "sole judges of the value or weight" of the
evidence.9 	The jury was also instructed that it is not "required to accept" the opinion of
any 	expert.10 	In 	addition 	to these 	instructions, 	the trial 	court 	specifically 	and
emphatically 	instructed 	the jury to 	disregard 	Parks's 	assertion 	that "Check 	Fraud"
occurred in making its decision as to whether Brisbon committed the charged theft.
Given 	the explicit 	instructions, 	there 	was 	no 	actual 	or practical 	and 	identifiable
consequences to Brisbon's trial justifying an exception to RAP 2.5(a)'s preservation
requirement. 	Brisbon fails 	to show that the court's 	admission 	of the unredacted
spreadsheet for demonstrative purposes was a manifest constitutional error that may be
raised for the first time on appeal.
9 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 32.
10 CP at 46.

No. 71927-1-1/7
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In the alternative, Brisbon claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
because counsel (1) did not object or move to redact the illustrative exhibit and (2) did
not move for a mistrial after the unredacted exhibit was published to the jury.
To establish a 	claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 	a 	defendant must
demonstrate 	that 	counsel's 	performance 	was 	deficient 	and 	that 	the 	deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Nichols, 161 Wn.2d 1, 8, 162 P.3d 1122
(2007). 	Deficient performance is that which falls "below an objective standard of
reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances." 	State v. McFarland,
127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). 	To establish prejudice, a defendant
must show by "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." 	Nichols, 161 Wn.2d at 8. 	If a
party fails to satisfy either the deficiency or the prejudice prong, a reviewing court need
not consider the other. State v. Foster, 140 Wn. App. 266, 273, 166 P.3d 726 (2007).
Brisbon cannot establish a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have
been different 	had counsel 	objected 	or moved 	to redact the exhibit. 	First, 	the
admissible testimony already established that the bank investigated Brisbon's banking
activity and, based on its investigation, referred the matter to the police. 	So, even if the
jurors had 	not briefly viewed the unredacted 	exhibit, 	it was obvious that the 	bank
believed that unlawful activity had occurred. 	Second, as explained, when Parks began
to testify about the exhibit, before counsel or Parks mentioned the "Check Fraud" entry,
the court itself directed the parties to redact the spreadsheet. 	The trial court then

No. 71927-1-1/8
promptly instructed the jury to ignore the language. 	We presume the jury follows the
instructions of the court. 	Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 928.
Brisbon also fails to demonstrate any likelihood that the trial court would have
granted a motion for a mistrial or that making such a motion was the only objectively
reasonable strategic response. 	Defense counsel explored Parks's conclusion of fraud
on cross-examination. 	This testimony made it clear that Parks employed a broad
definition of fraud and identified the loss as fraud merely because the deposited checks
were returned for insufficient funds and 	led to overdraft after the bank deducted the
previously 	credited 	funds. 	Counsel's 	approach 	to 	minimize 	the 	impact 	of 	the
spreadsheet entry was a reasonable trial 	strategy that will 	not support a claim of
ineffective assistance. 	See State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 32-33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011)
(legitimate trial strategy cannot form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel), cert, denied, 	U.S. 	, 135 S. Ct. 153, 190 L Ed. 112 (2014).
Brisbon was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to object or move to redact the
exhibit. 	The failure to move for a mistrial in these circumstances was not deficient.
Brisbon's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
Affirmed.
iVrCfo^	JL\r\
8
Iflo^Q^ 	,~^ c-r
WE CONCUR: 	-