Mark Haffner, Appellant V. Ivar R. Alm Et Al, Respondents

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

MARK W. HAFFNER, an individual, )
) No. 70494-0-I
Appellant, )
) DIVISION ONE
V. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
IVAR RONALD ALM and JANE DOE _)
ALM, a married community, )
)

Respondents, )

)

and )

)

CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN, an individual, )
)
)

Defendant. FILED: January 20, 2015

TRICKEY, J. — Abandonment is a complete defense to conversion. Here, the
evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff had left construction equipment on the
defendant's property for several years and failed to respond to multiple requests to
remove the equipment. The defendant's disposal of the abandoned equipment did not
constitute conversion. The trial court is affirmed.

FACTS

in 2003, Mark Haffner performed some cleanup work on Ivar Alm’s farm in
exchange for storage of some equipment: two TD-25 bulldozers, 70,000 pounds each, a
John Deere 450C, and an equipment trailer. Haffner testified that he had planned to
remove one of the engines from the bulldozers and switch it out with the other. Alm
repeatedly requested Haffner to remove the equipment, but Haffner failed to do so. The

construction equipment remained on Alm’s property for approximately five years.

No. 70494-0-1 / 2
In 2008, 	Haffner sued 	Aim 	in small 	claims 	court 	for extra 	work that 	was
performed on the property and rental of the bulldozer. 	Aim counterclaimed for rent of
$200.00 a month, which Haffner agreed to in order to have time to fix the bulldozers. At
the time of the small claims action, the equipment was no longer on Aim's property.
Haffner claimed that the equipment had been stolen. 	The district court awarded neither
party any money, ruling that the claims offset one another.
Aim had the bulldozers removed from his property. 	Some of this removal was
accomplished before the small claims action. 	Haffner sued Aim for conversion of his
bulldozers and loss of income, requesting monetary damages in excess of $200,000.00.
After a bench trial, the court found that Haffner had 	been given multiple notices to
remove the bulldozers, but failed to do so. 	The trial court found Haffner's testimony
unpersuasive. 	Additionally, the court found that the district court's ruling as to the work
claims was res judicata. 	Finding no merit to the remaining conversion claim, the trial
court denied all claims. 	Haffner appeals.
ANALYSIS
We review a 	bench trial where the trial court has evaluated the evidence to
determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and
whether those 	findings 	support 	the 	court's 	conclusions of 	law. 	Standing 	Rock
Homeowners 	Ass'n 	v. 	Misich. 	106 Wn. App. 231, 	242-43, 	23 	P.3d 	520 	(2001).
Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of its truth.
Hegwine v. Lonaview Fibre Co.. Inc.. 132 Wn. App. 546, 555-56, 132 P.3d 789 (2006),
aff'd 162 Wn.2d 340, 172 P.3d 688 (2007). 	Evidence may be substantial even if there
are other reasonable interpretations of the evidence. 	Sherrell v. Selfors. 73 Wn. App.

No. 70494-0-1 / 3
596, 600-01, 	871 	P.2d 	168 (1994). 	Appellate 	courts 	defer 	to the 	trial 	court's
determinations 	on 	the 	persuasiveness 	of 	the 	evidence, 	witness 	credibility, 	and
conflicting testimony. 	Snvder v. Havnes. 152 Wn. App. 774, 779, 217 P.3d 787 (2009).
We will 	not disturb 	a 	trial court's 	ruling 	if substantial, 	though 	conflicting, 	evidence
supports its findings of facts. 	Merriman v. Cokelev, 168 Wn.2d 627, 631, 230 P.3d 162
(2010).
Conversion has its roots in the common law action of trover. Alhadeff v. Meridian
on 	Bainbridge 	Island. 	LLC, 167 Wn.2d 	601, 	619, 	220 	P.3d 	1214 (2009). 	Trover
'"redressed an interference with one's interest in a chattel that was substantial enough
to justify compelling 	the wrongdoer to pay for 	it as 	in 	a forced 	sale.'" 	Potter v.
Washington State Patrol. 165 Wn.2d 67, 78, 196 P.3d 691 (2008) (quoting lolesias v.
United States. 848 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Abandonment of property by the owner is a complete defense to an action for
conversion. 	Jones v. Jacobson 45 Wn.2d 265, 267, 273 P.2d 979 (1954); Lowe v.
Rowe. 173 Wn. App. 253, 263, 294 P.3d 6 (2012), review denied, 177 Wn.2d 1018, 304
P.3d 114 (2013). 	This court has upheld trial court determinations of abandonment
where a property owner with notice of the need to retrieve properly failed to do so in a
timely manner even while claiming the property as his own. 	See, e.g., Excelsior Mortg.
Eouitv Fund II. 	LLC v. Schroeder, 	171 Wn. App. 333, 287 	P.3d 21 (2012), review
denied, 177 Wn.2d 1005, 300 P.3d 416 (2013); Quinn v. Cherry Lane Auto Plaza, Inc.,
153 Wn. App. 710, 225 P.3d 266 (2009).
The facts here are analogous to those in Lowe. 	There, the defendant stored
several personal vehicles on his uncle's property that was sold by the estate. 	The

No. 70494-0-1 / 4
estate requested Lowe remove the vehicles within 30 days because of the pending sale.
Lowe failed 	to do 	so. 	When the 30 days expired, the 	new owner gave Lowe an
additional two weeks to retrieve the vehicles. 	Lowe retrieved and removed some of the
vehicles, but left several on the property. 	The owner then had those vehicles crushed
and removed from the property. 	Lowe, 173 Wn. App. at 256. 	The trial court concluded
that the three and a half month time frame allotted Lowe was sufficient time to remove
all of the vehicles. 	In upholding the trial court, the appellate court noted that although
the "evidence may indicate he did not intend to abandon the property, it [did] not answer
the question 	of whether he 	had 	already done so 	by his dilatory actions over the
summer." 	Lowe, 173 Wn. App. at 263.
Similarly, here, Haffner argues that he did not abandon the bulldozers because
he continued to work on them until he was prevented from doing so. 	The trial court
found that Haffner was given multiple notices to remove the equipment, but failed to do
so in a timely manner. 	Leaving the equipment on the property constituted a continued
trespass. 	Aim gave sufficient notice even seeking out Haffner's brother to speak to
Haffner about removing the equipment. 	The trial court specifically found Haffner's
contention 	that 	he 	was 	prevented from entering 	the 	property to 	be 	without merit.
Haffner's 	choice 	to 	sporadically 	work 	on 	the 	equipment, 	rather 	than 	remove 	it,
constituted an abandonment.
Haffner's bulldozers could be seen from the house's windows and were an eye
sore. 	Aim gave Haffner ample opportunity to remove the equipment and he chose not
do so. 	There was no evidence that more time was needed or that some other factor

No. 70494-0-1 / 5
was 	present to prevent removal. 	This was a course of conduct that occurred over
years.
Haffner misconstrues the trial court's holding on res judicata. 	The trial court
correctly held that the matter was res judicata as to any work claims. 	It decided the
conversion claim based on the evidence heard during the three-day bench trial.
Haffner also 	argues that the 	trial court failed to 	issue findings of fact 	and
conclusions of law. 	But when Aim submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law, Haffner objected, claiming that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to enter
the findings. 	The trial court then 	entered an 	order stating that 	it determined 	that
additional findings were not necessary unless required by this court. 	Having stopped
the trial court from entering formal findings of fact and conclusions of law, 	Haffner
cannot now argue that it was error to not file such findings.
Additionally, CR 52(a)(4) provides that if a written memorandum of decision is
filed, it is sufficient if formal findings of fact and conclusions of law are included. 	See
also Steinmetz v. Call Realty. Inc.. 107 Wn. App. 307, 23 P.3d 1115 (2001). 	Here, the
trial court made specific findings supported by its rationale in its letter ruling. 	While the
better course of conduct in this instance would have been to enter the findings of fact
submitted by the defendant (assuming such findings reflected those already issued in
the court), it is clear by its order that the trial court considered its letter ruling to be the
findings of fact and conclusions of law.1
1This court has accepted findings of fact entered subsequent to the filing of an appeal. So long
as such findings are not tailored to meet the issues on appeal, such entry is appropriate and no
prejudice will be inferred therefrom. State v. Head, 136 Wn.2d 619, 625, 964 P.2d 1187 (1998).

No. 70494-0-1/6

Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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