State Of Washington, Respondent V Seth D. Weathers, Appellant

59712-8Washctapp24 mars 2026

Texte intégral

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59712-8-II
Respondent,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
SETH D. WEATHERS,
Appellant.
PRICE, J. — Seth D. Weathers appeals his conviction for second degree assault, arguing
that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.1 We affirm.
FACTS
On December 19, 2023, the State charged Weathers with second degree assault with a
firearm enhancement and drive-by shooting. Jessica Parks was identified as the victim of the
second degree assault.
Jessica2 testified at trial. Jessica explained that she had moved back onto her parents’
property on Finn Hall Road after retiring from the Navy. At that point, she was working with
horses on the property. Jessica described Finn Hall Road as having a lot of bed and breakfasts on
1 Weathers was also convicted of drive-by shooting. Weathers does not challenge his drive-by
shooting conviction.
2 Because Jessica and her father, Samuel Parks share the same last name, we use their first names
for clarity. We intend no disrespect.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 24, 2026
No. 59712-8-II
2
the “water side” of the road and a lot of family homes and horse farms on the “mountain side” of
the road. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 172.
On the afternoon of December 15, 2023, Jessica and her father, Samuel Parks, were riding
horses along Finn Hall Road when Jessica heard a vehicle approaching behind them. They moved
the horses to the side of the road, and Jessica called her dog off the road. Jessica testified that the
vehicle was approaching “at a very high rate of speed.” VRP at 173. When there was no indication
that the driver was slowing down, Jessica became concerned that the driver did not see them or the
animals. Jessica and Samuel both began waving at the driver to slow down. Still, the vehicle did
not slow down, so Samuel “ended up throwing his hat” as the vehicle passed. VRP at 174. After
checking on her dog, Jessica looked up to try to see a license plate number for the vehicle. Then
Jessica saw a muzzle flash and heard three gunshots. Jessica estimated the vehicle was 200 to 300
feet away when the shots were fired.
Jessica testified that she saw the muzzle flash pointed straight out the window, rather than
up:
I saw—well, a muzzle flash, you know the fire that comes from when you fire a
weapon. And I saw it in a perpendicular position, not a raised position, which
means that either the person was shooting out the window or back or forward for
that matter. But it was not like this. It was like this, and I saw it outside the window.
So I saw the muzzle flash. It wasn’t in the cab, I was able to see it. So it had to
have been close to or just outside the window.
. . . .
It was not pointed up, it was pointed out, or back, or forward, just not up.
VRP at 175. Jessica testified that hearing the shots made her afraid, stating that she was “[t]errified
that somebody was gonna get hit. . . . Whether it be [her] and [her] dad, or one of the horses at the
farm . . . .” VRP at 176. Jessica was also concerned for the safety of their neighbor, Shelby
No. 59712-8-II
3
Vaughan, who owned the horse farm on that part of the road. So Jessica and Samuel went to check
on her.
On cross-examination, Jessica further explained her feelings about the incident:
Yes. So, after the—initial terror of, you know, like not knowing if anything was
gonna get hurt, then I became angry because it was—it was—that initial like I want
to go after, like I wanted to chase him down with my horse but that was [not] gonna
happen either. And so I didn’t, obviously. So, I just made sure my dad was fine,
my dog was fine, and the horses were fine, and the neighbor was fine. So my anger
was at the irrational behavior of somebody that we don’t know and didn’t know
why they were shooting a gun on the road.
VRP at 182. Jessica admitted that she did not know “if they were shooting at [her] or just firing it
off.” VRP at 184.
Samuel also testified and described the incident consistently with Jessica’s testimony.
When asked what his initial reaction was to hearing the gunshots, Samuel replied, “Well, total
surprise. But just oh, my gosh, you know, how—how could this happen and you’re—it’s
upsetting, to say the least.” VRP at 253. After the shots, Samuel checked on Jessica and then they
went together to check on Vaughn. Again, Samuel testified that it “was pretty—pretty scary . . . .”
VRP at 255.
Vaughn testified that she was on her horse farm unloading her truck when she heard
gunshots. Later, Vaughn was able to review security video from cameras on her property, which
partially showed the incident.
Using Vaughn’s security video, law enforcement was able to locate the vehicle from the
incident the next day. Deputy Cody Brooks testified that he stopped the vehicle and detained the
driver. The driver was identified as Weathers. Deputy Brooks recovered a loaded pistol from a
holster on Weathers’ right hip.
No. 59712-8-II
4
The jury found Weathers guilty of second degree assault while armed with a firearm and
drive-by shooting. The trial court imposed a standard range sentence of 30 months’ confinement
with a 36-month firearm enhancement for a total term of 66 months’ confinement.
Weathers appeals.
ANALYSIS
Weathers argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second
degree assault. We disagree.
In claiming insufficient evidence, the defendant admits the truth of the State’s evidence
and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. State v. Roberts, 5 Wn.3d 222,
237, 572 P.3d 1191 (2025). Reasonable inferences are drawn in the State’s favor. Id. A conviction
will be upheld if any rational jury could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. Id. “We defer to the trier of
fact for purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and persuasiveness of the evidence.” Id.
Under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c), a person is guilty of second degree assault if they assault
another with a deadly weapon. A person may commit an assault by either attempting to cause
bodily injury by unlawful force or an attempt to cause fear and apprehension of such an injury.
See In re Pers. Restraint of Arnsten, 2 Wn.3d 716, 724-25, 543 P.3d 821 (2024). “ ‘[A]ssault by
attempt to cause fear and apprehension of injury requires specific intent to create reasonable fear
and apprehension of bodily injury.’ ” Id. at 725 (quoting State v. Eastmond, 129 Wn.2d 497, 500,
919 P.2d 577 (1996)). Further, the act must in fact create in the victim a reasonable apprehension
and imminent fear of bodily injury, even if the defendant did not intend to inflict bodily injury. Id.
No. 59712-8-II
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Weathers does not dispute that he fired the shots from his vehicle. But he argues that the
evidence was insufficient on two elements of the crime. Weathers argues that there was no
evidence that he intended to create an apprehension and fear of bodily injury in Jessica. And
Weathers argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that Jessica actually had a reasonable
apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury for herself, as opposed to any person or animal
in the surrounding area.
We are not persuaded that there was insufficient evidence on either element. First, because
Weathers fired the shots nearly immediately after passing Jessica and Samuel and because the area
was surrounded by nothing but family homes, horse farms, and bed and breakfasts, it was
reasonable to infer that Weathers’ actions were in response to, and thus, intended to be directed at
Samuel and Jessica. Moreover, there is no reasonable inference to the contrary under these facts;
that is, the only reasonable inference from firing a gun in this situation is that Weathers had the
intent to create apprehension and fear of bodily harm. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence
for the jury to infer that Weathers intended to create a reasonable apprehension and fear of bodily
harm in Jessica and Samuel (even if the State only charged one count of second degree assault
identifying Jessica as the victim).
Second, sufficient evidence supports Jessica’s reasonable apprehension and fear of bodily
injury. Jessica clearly testified that she was “terrified” when she heard the gunshots because
someone, including herself, could have been shot. She also described on cross-examination that
she was angry, but only after her “initial terror” at hearing the shots. Jessica’s testimony
demonstrates that she had an apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury from being shot
herself (even if she was also simultaneously fearful that Samuel, Vaughn, or the animals could
No. 59712-8-II
6
also have been shot). A reasonable juror could find that this apprehension and fear was reasonable
because Jessica was unable to see specifically where Weathers was firing the weapon—at the time
of the gunshots, she had no way to know whether or not Weathers was firing directly at her. Thus,
construing all of the evidence and inferences in favor of the State, there was sufficient evidence to
prove that by firing his gun out the window of his vehicle, Weathers did in fact cause Jessica to
feel a reasonable apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury.
CONCLUSION
Sufficient evidence supports Weathers’ conviction for second degree assault. Accordingly,
we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
CRUSER, C.J.
LEE, J.

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