Shanta Steger, Appellant/cross-respondent V. Janice Turner, Et Al., Respondent/cross-appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SHANTA STEGER,
Appellant/Cross Respondent,
v.
JANICE TURNER,
Respondent/Cross Appellant,
DONALD LUCE,
Defendant.
No. 75647-8-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: November 7, 2016
Appelwick, J. — This case involves the nature of strict compliance with
RCW 46.64.040's requirements for substituted service. 	Steger signed and served
the required declaration of compliance with the substituted service statute, but it
was not dated. 	The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of effective service. 	On
these facts, Steger's substantial compliance with the declaration statute did not
result in a failure of strict compliance with the substituted service statute. 	We
reverse and remand for trial.

No. 75647-8-1/2
FACTS
Shanta Steger and Janice Turner were involved in a car accident on July
20, 2012. 	On July 14, 2015, Steger filed a complaint for damages and personal
injuries against Turner.1
Between July 18, 2015 and August 9, 2015, Steger attempted to serve
Turner a total of 10 times. None of these attempts was successful. Steger resorted
to 	substituted 	service 	under 	RCW 46.64.040. 	She sent the summons 	and
complaint to the secretary of state. 	Steger also sent the summons, complaint,
notice of service on the secretary of state, declaration of compliance, and affidavit
of due diligence to Turner by certified mail, return receipt requested. 	Turner's
husband signed the return receipt on August 26, 2015.
On November 6, 2015, Turner moved for summary judgment. 	She alleged
that the case should be dismissed, 	because the statute of limitations expired
before the case was commenced. She asserted this was so, because Steger failed
to properly serve her.
The trial court granted summaryjudgment on the basis that Steger failed to
properly execute and serve the affidavit of compliance. 	Steger's declaration of
compliance was not dated. 	The court concluded that without the date, the
declaration did not qualify as a sworn statement. 	And, without the affidavit of
1On August 14, 2015, Steger amended the complaint to add Donald Luce
as a defendant. 	Luce is not a party on appeal.

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compliance, Steger had failed to serve Turner, so her suit was not commenced
within the statute of limitations. Steger appeals.2
DISCUSSION
Steger asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint for lack
of proper service. 	She urges us to adopt a practical solution rather than dismiss
the case on a technicality.
For a court to obtain jurisdiction over a party, there must be proper service
of the summons and complaint. 	Heinziq v. Hwang, 189 Wn. App. 304, 310, 354
P.3d 943 (2015), review denied. 184 Wn.2d 1036, 379 P.3d 952 (2016). We review
de novo whether service of process was proper. 	Id.
Washington's 	nonresident 	motorist 	act, 	RCW 	46.64.040, 	permits
substituted service on the Washington secretary of state when the person to be
served does not reside in or cannot be found within Washington. 	It provides, in
part,
Likewise each resident of this state who, while operating a motor
vehicle 	on the 	public highways of this 	state, 	is involved in any
accident, collision, or liability and thereafter at any time within the
following three years cannot, after a due and diligent search, be
found in this state appoints the secretary of state of the state of
Washington as his or her lawful attorney for service of summons as
provided in this section for nonresidents. 	Service of such summons
or process shall be made by leaving two copies thereof with a fee
established by the secretary of state by rule with the secretary of
state of the state of Washington, or at the secretary of state's office,
and such service shall be sufficient and valid personal service upon
said resident or nonresident: PROVIDED, That notice of such service
and a copy of the summons or process is forthwith sent by registered
mail with return receipt requested, by plaintiffto the defendant at the
last known address of the said defendant, and the plaintiffs affidavit
2 Turner filed a cross appeal due to the trial court's denial of her other
theories to support summary judgment.

No. 75647-8-1/4
Id.
of compliance herewith are appended to the process, together with
the affidavit of the plaintiffs attorney that the attorney has with due
diligence attempted to serve personal process upon the defendant
at all addresses known to him or her of defendant and further listing
in his or her affidavit the addresses at which he or she attempted to
have process served. However, if process is forwarded by registered
mail and defendant's endorsed receipt is received and entered as a
part of the return of process then the foregoing affidavit of plaintiffs
attorney 	need 	only 	show that the 	defendant 	received 	personal
delivery by mail.
RCW 46.64.040 specifies the procedure that must be followed when serving
the secretary of state. The plaintiff must either personally serve the defendant with
the 	summons 	and 	notice 	of service 	on 	the 	secretary of state, 	or 	send 	the
documents by registered mail to the defendant's last known address, with return
receipt requested. 	Heinzig. 189 Wn. App. at 312. 	The plaintiff must also attach
the plaintiff's signed affidavit of compliance and the plaintiff's attorney's affidavit of
due diligence that certifies attempts were made to serve the defendant personally.
id,
Washington courts have determined that strict procedural compliance with
RCW 46.64.040 is necessary. 	Heinzig. 189 Wn. App. at 311; Keithlv v. Sanders.
170 Wn. App. 683, 687-88, 285 P.3d 225 (2012). 	If the plaintiff fails to adhere to
the statute's procedures for notifying the defendant that process has been served
on the secretary of state, service is rendered a nullity. 	Heinzig. 189 Wn. App. at
312; see Omaits v. Raber. 56 Wn. App. 668, 670, 785 P.2d 462 (1990).
Here, Steger complied with 	RCW 46.64.040. 	She first made due and
diligent attempts to personally serve Turner. Process servers attempted to serve
Turner at the address listed in the accident report on 10 separate occasions. 	At

No. 75647-8-1/5
times varying from 8:21 a.m. to 6:27 p.m., they knocked on the door, but received
no response. 	While Turner argues that 10 attempts at service were insufficient,
we disagree. 	Due diligence under RCW 46.64.040 means that the plaintiff must
make honest and reasonable efforts to locate the defendant. 	Martin v. Triol. 121
Wn.2d 135, 150, 847 P.2d 471 (1993). 	We conclude that Steger's attempts to
serve Turner met this threshold.
After these unsuccessful attempts at 	personal service, Steger followed
RCW 46.64.040's steps for substituted service on the secretary of state.3 She sent
the summons, complaint, and notice of service on the secretary of state to Turner's
last known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 	She included her
declaration of compliance. 	She also included 	her attorney's affidavit of due
diligence.
Thus, we must decide whether a declaration that is not in strict compliance
with 	the 	declaration 	statute, 	RCW 	9A.72.085, 	strictly 	complies 	with 	RCW
46.64.040. 	Under RCW 9A.72.085(1), an unsworn statement such as the one
Steger provided can be used in place of a sworn statement if certain requirements
3 Turner argues that under Clay v. Portik, 84 Wn. App. 553, 929 P.2d 1132
(1997), Steger was also required to file an affidavit of compliance and an affidavit
of due diligence with the court. She argues that Steger's failure to do so constitutes
an independent basis for dismissal.
This court stated in Clay that a plaintiff must file an affidavit of compliance
and an affidavit of due diligence with the court to perfect service of process under
RCW 46.64.040. 	84 Wn. App. at 559. 	But, we have since held that the statute
does not require a plaintiff to file an affidavit of compliance with the court. 	James
v. McMurrv. 195 Wn. App. 144, 154, 380 P.3d 591 (2016). We apply the language
of the statute and conclude that Steger was not required to file an affidavit of
compliance or affidavit of due diligence with the trial court.

No. 75647-8-1/6
are met. 	The unsworn statement must: (1) state that it is certified or declared to
be true under penalty of perjury, (2) be subscribed by the person, (3) state the date
and place of execution, and (4) state that it is certified or declared under the laws
of the state of Washington. 	Id.
Turner alleges that Steger's signed statement of compliance fails to meet
these requirements, because it is not dated. 	But, Turner does not challenge the
substance of the declaration. She does not contend that the facts related to mailing
are false. 	And, she admits that she received the summons, complaint, notice of
service on the secretary of state, declaration, and affidavit of due diligence. There
is no question that she received the documents before the statute of limitations
expired, as her husband signed the return receipt for these documents on August
26, 2015. Steger signed the declaration and certified under penalty of perjury that
its contents were true. 	And, the declaration was included in the documents that
Steger mailed to Turneron August 18, 2015. Therefore, the declaration must have
been executed on or about August 18, 2015, the mailing date. With these facts in
mind, the lack of a date on the declaration is not a failure to follow the procedure
of RCW 46.64.040.
We have previously held that substantial compliance with RCW 9A.72.085
may be adequate. See Johnson v. King County. 148 Wn. App. 220, 225, 229, 230,
198 P.3d 546 (2009) (holding that strict compliance with the requirements for
unsworn statements is not a condition precedent to complying with the claim filing
statute); Maniusv. Boyd. 111 Wn. App. 764, 766, 780,47 P.3d 145 (2002) (holding
there was sufficient proof of service by mail of a postarbitration request for a trial

No. 75647-8-1/7
de novo, where the certificate of service did not include the place of signing). The
failure to comply with RCW 9A.72.085—the absence of the date of signing—would
not render the penalty of perjury provision of the declaration statute ineffectual on
these facts. 	Accordingly, the signed declaration substantially complied with the
declaration statute.
We conclude that Steger's technical defect in the declaration does not result
in a service defect under RCW 46.64.040. 	Therefore, the trial court erred in
dismissing Steger's suit due to insufficient service of process.
We reverse and remand for trial.
WE CONCUR:
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