Lori S. Haskell, App. vs. Byers & Anderson, Inc. Et Ano, Resps.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
LORI S. HASKELL,
Appellant,
v.
BYERS & ANDERSON, INC., and
LAUREL TERRY, Certified Court
Reporter,
Respondents.
NO. 67907-4-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	March 25, 2013
Leach, C.J. — Lori Haskell appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of
her claims against a court reporting agency, Byers & Anderson (B&A). 	Haskell
alleges that B&A refused to provide a copy of a deposition transcript to her on the
same terms it provided a 	copy to opposing counsel. 	In her complaint, she
asserted claims for violations of the state statute and regulations governing court
reporters, various intentional torts, breach of a fiduciary duty, and violations of
the Consumer Protection Act, ch. 19.86 RCW. 	Because the record demonstrates
that genuine issues of material fact exist about the terms of B&A's policy and its
application, we reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand to the trial
court.

NO. 67907-4-1 / 2
FACTS
Appellant Lori Haskell represented the plaintiff in an underinsured motorist
claim against Farmers Insurance Company. 	Farmers scheduled the deposition
of the plaintiff and contracted with B&A to report the deposition. 	Laurel Terry, an
independent court reporter affiliated with B&A, provided the reporting service. 	At
the end of the deposition, Farmers' attorney requested that the deposition be
transcribed 	and 	ordered 	a copy of the transcript. 	Haskell also requested 	a
transcript copy. 	Terry asked Haskell to complete a transcript order/credit card
authorization form. 	When Haskell asked why she had to sign anything when the
Farmers' attorney did not, Terry explained that B&A required sole practitioners
and some small firms to complete a preauthorization form. 	Haskell refused to
sign any "contract" because of her status as a sole practitioner. 	Terry notified
B&A's billing manager that she had not received the completed form and asked
her to follow up with Haskell.
B&A e-mailed Farmers the transcript on May 5, 2011.1 	On May 5, B&A
sent Haskell a letter informing her that it had served the transcript on Farmers
and that she and her client had 30 days to come to B&A's offices to review the
transcript. 	B&A's billing manager, Meagan Barron, also called Haskell's office
1 Farmers' attorney worked 	for 	a 	law firm 	with 	more than ten years'
positive payment history with B&A. 	In accordance with its stated policy, B&A
provided him with the transcript, along with an invoice payable in 30 days.
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NO. 67907-4-1 / 3
and left a message trying to get payment authorization to release a transcript
copy to Haskell. 	Haskell, who was out of the office for several days, did not
receive the messages until May 10. 	She called B&A to ask why they had not
sent her the transcript. 	Barron informed her that she needed to "promise to pay"
for the copy. 	Haskell refused to give such verbal assurance.2 	She also mailed a
demand letter to B&A's Seattle satellite office, threatening further legal action if
B&A 	did 	not release the transcript.3 	On May 	17, after several additional
unsuccessful attempts to speak with Haskell in person, the manager of B&A's
Seattle and Tacoma offices, Jennifer Anderson, waived the company's "promise
to pay" policy and e-mailed Haskell a copy of the transcript.4 	That afternoon,
Haskell filed this lawsuit against B&A.5
B&A moved for summary judgment dismissing Haskell's claims. 	The trial
court 	granted 	the 	motion, 	deciding 	that 	B&A's 	policy 	did 	not 	violate 	an
2 The record indicates that this conversation ended with Haskell yelling
and hanging up on Barron.
3 B&A operates primarily out of its Tacoma office. 	Thus, it did not see this
letter until May 17, when someone picked up the mail from the Seattle office.
4 In her appellate briefing, Haskell repeatedly complains that Barron did
not have an invoice prepared and that she did not know what the cost of the
transcript would be. 	However, the record contains no indication that Haskell ever
explained that she based her refusal to provide even a verbal promise to pay
upon not knowing the amount charged.
5 Haskell also moved for a temporary restraining order to force B&A to
provide the transcript. 	The court commissioner denied the motion, noting that
Haskell's injury was self-inflicted by her refusal to pay for the transcript and that
B&A could follow whatever payment policies it chose.
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NO. 67907-4-1 / 4
administrative regulation requiring court reporters to provide their services on
"equal terms" to all parties. 	Haskell appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review summary judgment orders de novo.6 	A trial court may grant
summary judgment only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7 	When reviewing a
summary judgment order, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court,
considering the facts and all reasonable inferences from the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.8 	We may affirm a trial court's grant of
summary judgment on any basis supported by the record.9
ANALYSIS
Haskell complains that B&A did not provide its services to the parties on
"equal terms" as required by state regulations applicable to court reporters. 	She
alleges that B&A refused to invoice her for a copy ofthe deposition transcript and
that it provided the transcript to Farmers' attorney without contemporaneously
notifying her that the transcript was available.
6 Hadlev v. Maxwell, 144 Wn.2d 306, 310-11, 27 P.3d 600 (2001).
7 CR 56(c).
8 Right-Price 	Recreation. 	LLC 	v. Connells 	Prairie Cmtv. 	Council, 	146
Wn.2d 370, 381, 46 P.3d 789 (2002).
9 Steinbock v. Ferry County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 165 Wn. App. 479, 485,
269 P.3d 275 (2011).
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NO. 67907-4-1 / 5
WAC 	308-14-130 	requires 	"[a]ll 	certified 	court 	reporters 	(CCR)
shall. . . [o]ffer arrangements on a case concerning court reporting services or
fees to all parties on equal terms." 	(Emphasis added.) 	Haskell contends that
B&A's practice of requiring some attorneys to prepay for transcript copies while
providing direct billing for others violates this standard.
B&A claims that its payment policy is a legitimate business practice that it
applies 	equally 	to 	all 	attorneys 	to 	better 	assure 	timely 	payment. 	Jennifer
Anderson has been an owner and principal of B&A since it was established in
1980. 	According to Anderson, while the firm once provided transcripts to any
party who requested them via COD 	payment or billing invoice, B&A chose to
adopt a 	new 	policy 	to 	assure 	its 	court 	reporters 	actually got 	paid 	for their
services. 	When it made this change, attorneys who had an ongoing relationship
with 	B&A or 	an 	established 	positive 	payment 	history would 	remain 	on 	the
company's direct billing list. Attorneys who had not worked with B&A in the past
or did not have an established positive payment history would be required to
provide some guarantee of payment before receiving the transcript.
Haskell 	presented 	evidence 	that 	B&A 	applies 	its 	credit 	policy 	in 	a
discriminatory 	fashion, 	requiring 	different 	payment 	arrangements 	with 	sole
practitioners. 	In her 	declaration, 	Haskell stated 	that Terry told her 	Haskell
needed to sign the requested form because she was a sole practitioner. 	Terry
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NO. 67907-4-1 / 6
admits, "I did make reference to the fact that Haskell was a sole practitioner."
One can infer from the descriptions of their conversation provided by Haskell and
Terry that Terry had no knowledge of Haskell's prior history with B&A and made
no inquiry of Haskell about any prior history with B&A before determining that she
was a sole practitioner and requesting credit card information. 	For purposes of
opposing summary judgment, Haskell is entitled to these inferences. 	These facts
and inferences create a sufficient factual dispute about the terms of B&A's credit
policy and its application to require a trial.
Haskell requests attorney fees for this appeal. 	However, her request for
prevailing 	party 	attorney 	fees 	is 	premature. 	The 	identity 	of the 	ultimately
prevailing party cannot be determined at this time.
CONCLUSION
Because Haskell raised genuine issues of material fact about the terms of
B&A's policies for provision of court reporting services and their application to
sole practitioners, we reverse and remand.
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WE CONCUR:
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