State Of Washington, Respoondent V. O.c.v., Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
OMAR CRUZ VILLASENOR,
DOB: 06/03/1999,
Appellant.
No. 	74254-0-I 	:r
DIVISION ONE 	1
UNPUBLISHED OPINION:
FILED: January 17, 2017
TRICKEY, 	J. 	- 	Omar Cruz Villasenor appeals 	from 	the 	juvenile 	court's
adjudication 	of guilt for one 	count of child 	molestation 	in 	the first degree. 	He
contends that the court violated his right to due process by denying his request for
discovery of Child Protective Services records or for in camera review. 	Because
Cruz Villasenor failed 	to make 	a 	particularized 	showing 	that the records 	likely
contained information useful to the defense, the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying his request. 	We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Cruz Villasenor with one count of child molestation in the
first degree, allegedly committed between June 1, and July 31, 2012, when Cruz
Villasenor was 12 or 13 years old. 	The complaining witness, J.S., was 7 years old
during the charging period.
J.S. and his mother lived with Cruz Villasenor's family for a few months during
the charging period. 	J.S. testified that on one occasion, he was in a bedroom, along
with 	Cruz 	Villasenor 	and 	Cruz 	Villasenor's 	two 	brothers. 	When 	asked what

No. 74254-0-1 / 2
happened, J.S. replied, "I think it's called S-E-X."1 	J.S. explained that both he and
Cruz Villasenor had their pants "pulled down"2 and he saw Cruz Villasenor's penis as
he was "putting it in my bottom."3 	J.S. testified that Cruz Villasenor "pushed it back
and forth"4 and that it felt "weird."5 J.S. also recalled that just before Cruz Villasenor's
assault, Cruz Villasenor's two brothers did the "[s]ame thing" and "[p]ut their penis in
[J.S.'s] rear end."6
J.S. recalled that on one occasion, Cruz Villasenor's mother came into the
room while he and Cruz Villasenor had their pants down. 	Cruz Villasenor's mother
denied that she ever found J.S. with his pants down.
J.S.'s mother testified that after she and J.S. moved out of Cruz Villasenor's
house, J.S. became "very introspective" and "sad."7 	J.S. would not tell his mother
what was bothering 	him. 	J.S. eventually told 	his father about Cruz Villasenor's
assault. J.S.'s mother spoke to a detective after she learned of the assault.
On May 7, 2013, J.S.'s mother took him to the emergency room of Seattle
Children's Hospital. 	J.S.'s counselor had recommended the visit because J.S. was
experiencing behavior problems. 	The records of the visit, which were disclosed to
the 	defense 	during 	discovery, 	referred 	to a 	mental 	health 	evaluation 	that 	J.S.
received at Children's Hospital on April 17, 2013.
1 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Oct. 13, 2015) at 57.
2RP(Oct. 13, 2015) at 58.
3RP(Oct. 13, 2015) at 59.
4RP(Oct. 13, 2015) at 62.
5RP(Oct. 13, 2015) at 62.
6RP(Oct. 13, 2015) at 65.
7RP(Oct. 13, 2015) at 82.

No. 74254-0-1 / 3
On May 21, 2013, J.S. spoke with Gina Coslett, a child interview specialist, at
Dawson Place Child Advocacy Center. 	During the video recorded interview, J.S.
repeated his allegations against Cruz Villasenor and Cruz Villasenor's two brothers,
explaining that it happened on two days. 	J.S. said that Cruz Villasenor threatened to
hit him if he ever told anyone. 	J.S. also told Coslett that his father used to hit him
with a belt, but that he had not seen his father since he was 5 years old. J.S. said his
mother hits him with a hanger and had caused his lip to bleed when he was 6 years
old.
On 	June 	26, 	2013, 	J.S. 	told 	Paula 	Newman-Skomski, 	a 	forensic 	nurse
examiner, that Cruz Villasenor and his two brothers "touched [J.S.'s] bottom . . . [w]ith
their penises."8 	J.S. said that all three boys had assaulted him at once, that it had
hurt, and that it happened two times. 	Newman-Skomski found no evidence of trauma
in J.S.'s rectal area.
After analyzing the factors set forth in State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 691 P.2d
197 (1984), the court found that J.S.'s statements to his mother, to the child interview
specialist, and to the forensic nurse examiner were admissible as child hearsay. 	See
also RCW9A.44.120.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Cruz Villasenor guilty as charged.
The court imposed a standard range disposition of 15 to 36 weeks confinement.
Cruz Villasenor appeals.
RP(Oct. 13, 2015) at 113-14.

No. 74254-0-1 / 4
ANALYSIS
Cruz Villasenor contends that the juvenile court violated his due process rights
when 	it refused to 	review Child 	Protective Services (CPS) 	records 	involving 	his
allegations of parental physical abuse. 	He argues that the records were "reasonably
likely"9 to contain evidence relevant both to J.S.'s credibility and to the admissibility of
J.S.'s child hearsay statements and that the matter must be remanded to the trial
court for in camera review.
On 	December 	30, 	2014, 	counsel 	for 	Cruz 	Villasenor 	moved 	to 	compel
disclosure of J.S.'s mental health evaluation at Children's Hospital on April 17, 2013.
The 	evaluation 	was 	mentioned 	in the 	medical 	records 	of 	J.S.'s 	May 	7, 	2013
appointment at Children's Hospital. 	The State provided the May 7 medical records
during discovery, but neither the State nor the defense had seen the records of the
April evaluation. 	Cruz Villasenor argued that because the April evaluation occurred
about two weeks before J.S.'s disclosure of the alleged sexual abuse to his mother,
the 	records likely 	included 	relevant 	material 	about his diagnosis and 	possible
medications that would be relevant to his "credibility and memory."10
Defense counsel also asserted that CPS was statutorily obligated under RCW
26.44.030 to investigate the allegations of physical abuse that J.S. raised during the
video recorded interview with Gina Coslett on May 21, 2013 at Dawson Place Child
Advocacy Center. 	Counsel suggested that the resulting CPS records "may include
interviews and reports related to whether his allegations were found to be credible or
9 Br. of Appellant at 11.
10 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 94.

No. 74254-0-1 / 5
not."11 	Counsel acknowledged, however, that "it is unknown if [J.S.] was interviewed
by CPS and what statements may have been made that relate to this case or to his
credibility in general."12
After considering the parties' arguments, the court agreed that the defense
had established the materiality of the April 2013 mental health evaluation records.
After conducting an in camera review, the court found that the records did not satisfy
the disclosure standards of CrR 4.7 and declined to release them.
The court also agreed with Cruz Villasenor that under RCW 26.44.030, J.S.'s
disclosure of parental physical abuse during the May 21 interview likely triggered a
mandatory report to law enforcement or to CPS:
The Defense [premise], and I think it's sound, is that when the
child 	was 	interviewed 	at 	Dawson 	Place 	. 	. 	. 	and 	made 	certain
disclosures, ones that pertained to the child's parents, that a mandatory
report was made either to law enforcement or to CPS, which is - 	is
what's permitted under the statute, and that one of those two entities
took action. It's evident from the briefing that law enforcement followed
up with the mom, and that information has been made as part of the
discovery. 	It's available to the parties. I don't perceive any information
available on the record before me to infer that in a CPS investigation
was either done or was required by law.[13]
Defense counsel acknowledged that she would not characterize the record
any differently than the court. 	Counsel then handed the court a letter that she had
just received in response to her subpoena duces tecum to the Department of Social
and Health Services (DSHS) for all records relating to J.S. from 2012 through 2014.
11 CPat94.
12 CP at 94.
13RP(Jan. 9, 2015) at 14-15

No. 74254-0-1 / 6
In the letter, the assistant attorney general explained that the records were currently
exempt from release because of "an ongoing CPS investigation."14
The court found that given the broad time period of the defense request and
the bare reference to an "ongoing CPS investigation," the letter did not provide any
specific information about the investigation. 	The court concluded that the defense
had failed to satisfy the "materiality threshold"15 and denied the motion to release the
CPS records. 	But the denial was without prejudice, and the court advised defense
counsel that it would 	reconsider should additional 	information 	become available.
During the 10 months remaining before trial began, defense counsel did not attempt
to raise the issue of the CPS records.
A criminal defendant 	has 	a 	due 	process 	right to 	review 	confidential 	or
privileged material under certain circumstances. 	See CrR 4.7(e); Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie. 480 U.S. 39, 58 n.15, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987). 	In order to
justify in camera review of records that are deemed confidential or privileged by
statute, "[the] defendant must make a particularized factual showing that information
useful to the defense is likely to be found in the records." 	State v. Kalakoskv, 121
Wn.2d 525, 550, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993); see also State v. Gregory. 158 Wn. 2d 759,
791, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (defendant must make a "'plausible showing'" that the
information will be 	both material 	and 	favorable to the defense (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102
S. Ct. 3440, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1193 (1982W. overruled on other grounds by State v. W.R.,
14 Ex. 1.
15RP(Jan. 9, 2015) at 17.

No. 74254-0-1 / 7
181 Wn.2d 757, 	336 P.3d 	1134 (2014). 	Evidence is material only if there is a
reasonable probability that it would affect the trial's outcome. 	Gregory. 158 Wn.2d at
791. 	We review the trial court's decision whether to conduct an in camera review of
privileged records for an abuse of discretion. Kalakoskv. 121 Wn.2d at 550.
In Kalakoskv. the 	defendant 	sought 	in camera 	review of a 	rape 	victim's
counseling notes based solely on the assertion that the "'notes may contain details
which 	may exculpate 	the 	accused 	or otherwise 	be 	helpful 	to the 	defense.'"
Kalakoskv. 	121 	Wn.2d at 	544. 	Our Supreme 	Court affirmed 	the 	trial 	court's
determination that the request did not constitute a sufficiently particularized showing
that the records likely contained material relevant to the defense. 	Kalakoskv. 121
Wn.2d at 549.
In State v. Diemel. 81 Wn. App. 464, 914 P.2d 779 (1996), the defense moved
for in camera review of a rape victim's counseling records, arguing that she might
have 	told 	her 	counselor 	details about 	the 	incident 	that 	would 	undermine 	her
credibility. 	Relying on Kalakoskv. this court concluded that the request failed to make
the necessary "particularized factual showing":
A claim that privileged files might lead to other evidence or may contain
information critical to the defense is not sufficient to compel a court to
make an in camera inspection.
Diemel. 81 Wn. App. at 469.
Cruz Villasenor relies primarily on State v. Gregory, in which our Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's denial of in camera review in a prosecution for rape in
the first degree. 	In Gregory, the defendant claimed that he paid the alleged victim for
consensual sex. 	Based on the victim's 	prior conviction for prostitution 	and her

No. 74254-0-1 / 8
acknowledged 	involvement 	in dependency 	proceedings 	around 	the 	time 	of the
alleged offense, the defendant requested an 	in camera review of the dependency
records. 	The defendant argued that the records might show that the victim, contrary
to her assertions, was continuing her prostitution activities.
Our 	Supreme 	Court 	agreed 	that 	evidence 	of 	"recent, 	factually 	similar
prostitution" would be reasonably likely to affect the outcome of the trial and that
DSHS would have addressed the issue in the dependency proceeding if it was aware
of any such activity. Gregory. 	158 Wn.2d at 794. 	Noting that the evidence also
indicated that at least one dependency proceeding was active at the time of the
alleged rape, the court concluded that the defendant had made a
more concrete connection [than the defendant in Diemel] between his
theory of the case and what he expected to find in the dependency files,
i.e., it was reasonable to believe that if [the victim] was still engaging in
prostitution 	in 	1998, 	evidence 	of that would 	be 	reflected 	in 	the
dependency files and, if so, the reports contained therein could reveal
potential witnesses.
Gregory. 158 Wn.2d at 795 n.15.
Here, counsel for Cruz Villasenor expressly acknowledged that there was no
specific evidence in the record that J.S.'s disclosure of parental physical abuse
resulted in a CPS investigation, much less that J.S. made statements that would
have been exculpatory or otherwise helpful to the defense. 	As the juvenile court
observed, the letter from 	the assistant attorney general 	provided 	no 	meaningful
information about the nature of the "ongoing" CPS investigation. 	The defendant's
suggestion that J.S.'s statements during the possible investigation might be material

No. 74254-0-1 / 9
and exculpatory was therefore highly speculative. 	Unlike the defendant in Gregory.
Cruz Villasenor failed to make a particularized showing or identify a plausible defense
theory suggesting that the records of a CPS investigation contained evidence—or
would lead to evidence—material and favorable to the defense. 	The court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Cruz Villasenor's motion for in camera review.
At Cruz Villasenor's request, we have independently reviewed the records of
J.S.'s April 2013 mental health evaluation. 	We agree with the juvenile court that the
records contain no potentially exculpatory information. 	Accordingly, the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion by not releasing the documents to the defense. 	See
Casal. 103 Wn.2d 812, 822-23, 699 P.2d 1234 (1985).
Affirmed.
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WE CONCUR:
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