State Of Washington, Respondent V. Michael S. Williams, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL STADDEN WILLIAMS,
Appellant.
No. 75238-3-1
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: August 1,2016
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Leach, J. — Michael S. Williams appeals the trial court's imposition of££) 	g<
legal financial obligations (LFOs) as part of his judgment and sentence. 	He
challenges the trial court's authority to convert a $1,000 mandatory drug fine into
assessments of $500 to the Clallam County Drug Court and $500 to the drug
enforcement fund of Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enforcement Team (OPNET)
without an enabling statute. 	Also, he challenges a discretionary LFO, claiming
that the trial court did not inquire sufficiently into his present or future ability to
pay.
The State concedes that the trial 	court had 	no 	authority to 	convert a
mandatory drug fine into assessments to the drug court and OPNET. 	The State
contends that Williams did not properly object to the discretionary LFO and thus
may not raise the issue on appeal. 	Because this court has discretion to review
an issue raised for the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a), and consistent with
State v. Blazina.1 we review this challenge. 	We conclude that the trial court did
182 Wn.2d 827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015).

No. 75238-3-1 / 2
not sufficiently inquire into Williams's present or future ability to pay as required
by statute. We reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Background
Williams 	stole 	food 	from 	a 	Walmart 	store. 	When 	loss 	prevention
personnel confronted him in the store's parking lot, he threw the items back in the
store, pushed past the Walmart personnel, and ran. 	Police found him, arrested
him, and, at the police station, discovered a glass vial containing heroin in his
pocket. 	The State charged Williams with assault in the fourth degree, theft in the
third degree, and possession of a controlled substance. 	The State moved to
dismiss the assault and theft charges, and Williams pleaded guilty to possession.
The State recommended 	LFOs, 	including 	a $1,000 drug fine 	reflected in the
statement on plea of guilty.
At 	Williams's 	sentencing, 	the 	trial 	court 	asked 	about 	Williams's
employment status. 	The trial court 	imposed 	LFOs and 	a 	30-day sentence
converted into a 240-hour community service obligation. 	The LFOs included a
$500 	victim assessment, 	a 	$200 	criminal 	filing 	fee, 	a 	$500 	court-appointed
attorney 	recoupment 	fee, 	a 	$100 	DNA 	(deoxyribonucleic 	acid) 	fee, 	and
assessments of $500 to the drug court and $500 to OPNET. 	The trial court did
not 	include the $1,000 drug fine 	recommended by the State. 	The court set
monthly payments at $40.

No. 75238-3-1 / 3
Williams objected to 	the assessments to 	the drug 	court and 	OPNET.
Counsel asked the trial court if it had made a finding that Williams was indigent
and if it had waived the $1,000 drug fine. 	The trial court responded that it was
not waiving the drug fine but was instead splitting the $1,000 drug fine between
the drug court and OPNET. 	It acknowledged that it had no statutory basis to do
so but noted that this practice was common.
Williams appeals.
Analysis
Williams first asks this court to vacate the assessments for the drug court
and 	OPNET. 	A court may impose LFOs only where statute permits.2 	RCW
9.94A.760(1) generally authorizes a court to impose LFOs as part of a felony
sentence. 	And RCW 9.94A.030(31) permits the trial court to impose LFOs for
county or interlocal drug funds. 	But this fee can be imposed only for a drug-
related crime and commensurate with the costs of investigation.3
The 	State 	concedes 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	had 	no 	authority 	to 	order
contributions 	to 	the 	drug 	court 	and 	OPNET. 	But 	it argues 	that Williams's
sentence must be corrected by vacating the two improper assessments and then
imposing a $1,000 drug fine required by statute.
RCW 69.50.430(1) 	requires that "[ejvery adult offender convicted of a
felony 	violation 	of 	RCW... 69.50.4013... must 	be 	fined 	one 	thousand
2 State v. Hathaway. 161 Wn. App. 634, 653, 251 P.3d 253 (2011).
3 State v. Hunter. 102 Wn. App. 630, 640, 9 P.3d 872 (2000).

No. 75238-3-1 / 4
dollars.... [ujnless the court finds the adult offender to be indigent." 	A court
must impose this mandatory LFO unless it finds that the defendant is indigent.4
Thus, on remand, the trial court must vacate the two improper assessments and
determine if Williams is indigent. 	If he is not, 	it must impose the mandatory
$1,000 drug fine required by statute.
Williams next challenges the discretionary LFO imposed by the trial court.
He claims that the trial court failed to properly assess his present or future ability
to pay this LFO as required by statute.
The State argues that under RAP 2.5(a), Williams's failure to object to this
LFO prevents him from 	raising this 	issue on 	appeal. 	That rule states, "The
appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in
the trial court." 	But an appellate court may review an issue raised for the first
time on appeal.5 	Here, 	we exercise our discretion to review Williams's claim
consistent 	with 	Blazina, 	which 	"found 	ample 	and 	increasing 	evidence 	that
unpayable 	LFOs 	'imposed 	against 	indigent 	defendants' 	imposed 	significant
burdens on offenders and our community."6
The State correctly notes that the trial court has 	no discretion about
imposing LFOs required by statute,7 such as the $500 victim assessment fee,8
4 State v. Mayer, 120 Wn. App. 720, 725-26, 86 P.3d 217 (2004).
5 Blazina. 182 Wn.2d at 834-35.
6 State v. Duncan. 185 Wn.2d 430, 437 	P.3d 	(2016) (quoting
Blazina. 182 Wn.2d at 835).
7 See State v. Shelton, No. 72848-2-I, 2016 WL 3461164, at *4 (Wash. Ct.
App. June 20, 2016).
8RCW7.68.035(1)(a).

No. 75238-3-1 / 5
the $200 criminal filing fee,9 and the $100 DNA collection fee.10 	Thus, the only
LFO Williams may challenge is the discretionary $500 court-appointed attorney
recoupment fee authorized by RCW 9.94A.760.11
RCW 	10.01.160(3) 	requires a 	trial court to 	inquire into a 	defendant's
current and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs:
The court shall 	not order a 	defendant to 	pay costs 	unless the
defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount
and method of payment of costs, the court shall take account of the
financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden
that payment of costs will impose.
This provision requires the trial court to
do 	more 	than 	sign 	a 	judgment 	and 	sentence 	with 	boilerplate
language stating that it engaged in the required inquiry. 	The record
must reflect that the trial court made an individualized inquiry into
the defendant's current and future ability to pay. 	Within this inquiry,
the court must also consider important factors, as amici suggest,
such 	as 	incarceration 	and 	a 	defendant's 	other debts, 	including
restitution, when determining a defendant's ability to pay.[12]
Here, the trial court asked Williams about where and how long 	he had
been employed. 	Williams responded that he worked for a plumbing business,
had been there several months, and was seeking a training card to help him get
an apprenticeship.
Williams argues that the trial court made an insufficient inquiry because it
did not ask how much money Williams expected to make, his other expenses
9RCW36.18.020(2)(h).
10 RCW 43.43.7541.
11 See State v. Malone. 193 Wn. App. 762, 764, 	P.3d 	(2016)
(listed 	the 	court-appointed 	attorney 	recoupment 	as 	a 	discretionary 	financial
obligation).
12 Blazina, 182 Wn.2d at 838.

No. 75238-3-1 / 6
and debt obligations, if he had savings, or other relevant questions. 	Nor did the
trial court check the box in section 2.5 of its judgment and sentence, confirming
that it had reviewed Williams's present and future ability to pay. 	Without any
inquiry into Williams's debt obligations, as specifically required by Blazina. the
trial court did not make an adequate, individualized inquiry into Williams's present
and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs. 	It thus failed to comply with RCW
10.01.160(3).
Conclusion
Because the trial court improperly imposed an assessment on Williams of
$500 to the drug court and $500 to OPNET, we remand for the court to vacate
these assessments and determine if Williams is indigent. 	It shall also properly
inquire into Williams's present and future ability to pay the discretionary LFO.
After doing this, the trial court shall sentence Williams consistent with its findings.
We reverse and remand for sentencing consistent with this opinion.
JLJ?S 	y
WE CONCUR:
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