Ashley E. Burks, Respondent V Trent P. Nelson, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 57672-4-II
ASHLEY ELIZABETH BURKS,
Respondent,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
TRENT NELSON,
Appellant.
PRICE, J. — Trent Nelson appeals the superior court’s order finding him in contempt for
violating a protective order in his dissolution case with his ex-spouse, Ashley Burks.
The dissolution of Nelson and Burks’ marriage was apparently acrimonious. Due to
allegations of Nelson misusing Burks’ financial information, the superior court issued a protective
order to prevent the dissemination of her financial information. The protective order relied on
Nelson’s attorney, Rebekah Young, to monitor Nelson’s access to the financial materials. But
when Young later withdrew from Nelson’s representation, the superior court issued an amended
protective order that changed the procedures for protecting Burks’ financial information.
At some point, Burks believed that both Nelson and Young had violated the original and
amended protective orders. The superior court agreed with Burks, found Nelson and Young in
contempt, and ordered them to pay Burks’ attorney fees for bringing her contempt motion. Both
Nelson and Young separately appeal.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
March 19, 2024

No. 57672-4-II
2
In this appeal, Nelson argues that his conduct did not violate the superior court’s protective
orders.1 Nelson also argues that even if his conduct did violate the protective order, Burks’ motion
was moot and he was not afforded the appropriate due process for the type of contempt Burks
requested.
We reverse and hold that the superior court abused its discretion when it concluded that
Nelson’s conduct violated the superior court’s protective orders.
FACTS
I. PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Burks initiated divorce proceedings to dissolve her marriage with Nelson in September
2021. Nelson retained Young to represent him.
The dissolution proceedings did not go smoothly. Burks was a local business person, and
she became concerned that Nelson might misuse her business-related financial information
disclosed during discovery. In February 2022, Burks moved for a protective order “prohibiting
[Nelson] from using any information received through [] discovery for any other purpose than this
proceeding” and that those materials be marked confidential. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 38.
In March, the superior court granted the motion and imposed a protective order. The March
protective order required that materials designated as “ ‘Confidential’ ” (including business
records like tax returns, bank records, and client and shareholder lists) “only be provided to a third
party such as an expert witness or consultant or any other legitimate litigation support personnel.”
1 Young’s appeal of the superior court’s contempt order is the subject of a separate, linked appeal
before us (No. 57679-1-II).

No. 57672-4-II
3
CP at 107-08 (emphasis added). The superior court also defined “legitimate” and described the
procedure Nelson could use to access the confidential materials:
“Legitimate” is defined as lawyers, staff for the lawyers and consulting experts.
Business records or confidential information described herein shall not be provided
to Respondent. Respondent may view confidential materials in the presence of his
attorneys at their office and shall not take images.
CP at 108 (emphasis added). After the March protective order was in place and while she was still
representing Nelson, Young was always with Nelson while he viewed the confidential materials.
But later that same month, Young and her law firm withdrew from representing Nelson.
As a result of the loss of his lawyer, Nelson moved, pro se, to amend the March protective order.
Nelson contended he needed an alternative method to view the confidential materials now that his
former lawyer was no longer available to monitor his review of Burks’ confidential materials. He
requested an amendment to the procedure (italicized above), explaining,
Removal of this clause is necessary now that I am proceeding with my case pro se.
I no longer have attorneys, and thus, no means of access to Petitioner’s discovery
information. Without access to Petitioner’s discovery information, I am unable
to conduct complete a [sic] thorough evaluation of Ms. Burks’ discovery
responses and our community assets.
CP at 110.
Burks objected to Nelson’s motion and advocated for a “special master to hold the
discovery for [Nelson].” CP at 546.
In April, the superior court considered the motion to amend the March protective order.
The superior court rejected Burks’ request for a special master, but it agreed to modify the
protective order. The superior court explained,
My options are right now I do nothing or it stays the same. I modify it in some
respect, which I may be inclined to modify in one limited respect, to tell you that
you could view the documents that have been produced at your lawyer’s office.

No. 57672-4-II
4
And if that requires you to pay for the time to do so, then you do that. Or you can,
similarly, review the documents at [Burks’ attorney’s] office in her conference
room without taking copies of images. You can then take handwritten notes to do
your compilations. For that matter, you can bring your laptop and create an Excel
spreadsheet, without getting the actual hard copies for purposes of any reason,
including losing control of the instruments that may be potentially disclosed to third
parties, inadvertently or not.
Also, to the extent that you retain a person that is qualified under Evidence Rule
700 series -- in other words, somebody that the Court would qualify as an expert,
typically, if somebody with an accounting degree would like to evaluate the
businesses or come to a book value, I will -- I’m inclined to modify the protective
order and say that individual signs a verification that says that they will abide by
the Court’s protective order with consequences if they don’t, including that of
sanctions, that individual may have direct access to copies as well.
But I’m not going to modify it to allow unfettered access. I’m not going to modify
the protective order. I will simply indicate that I would encourage you to re-think
whether you should -- re-think the possibility of hiring counsel to be of some
assistance. I appreciate that things are getting expensive, especially if you’ve paid
$100,000 in a case such as this. I appreciate that concern. It’s a concern that I hear
often.
CP at 550-51 (emphasis added).
Nelson asked for clarification of where he could access the confidential materials and what
notes he could take, and the following colloquy took place:
MR. NELSON: Before we move on, can I just seek some clarity on that -- you’ve
mentioned that I can bring in my laptop if I need to transcribe and enter summary
tables.
THE COURT: Yes. You may create your own notes. You may not take images.
MR. NELSON: Okay.
THE COURT: You may not take screenshots. You may review and digest the
information that has been presented. You may take -- you may then take your notes
and put them on a laptop. You may take handwritten notes in anticipation for
preparation for your trial.

No. 57672-4-II
5
MR. NELSON: I would be more than willing to do that at my prior attorney’s
office. They would probably allow me to do that without a significant charge. I
think the way that it was currently written is that I actually had a notepad -- they
gave me a little notepad, and the notepad had to stay at the attorney’s office. . . . I
can’t do anything with that. If we were able to adjust that --
THE COURT: Your notes -- well, I will tell you this, that if I find -- I will warn
you that if I find that you have read a bank statement and you go out on April 3rd,
2022 and say she deposited “X” or she spent “Y” and that’s disseminated to third
parties, that violates my protective order.
In order to prepare for the trial, I’m allowing you to take notes and create your
spreadsheet and the only audience will be me or a retained expert or a lawyer that
represents you or [Burks’ attorney].
CP at 552-53.
On April 22, 2022, the superior court entered its amended protective order. The April
amended protective order was handwritten and short; it stated that the original March protective
order would remain in full effect, except that:
Any CPA or business evaluation expert may receive confidential documents so long
as they sign the protective order and agree to be held responsible for any violations
thereof.
Mr. Nelson may view these documents in his prior attorney[’]s office or in [Burks’
attorney’s] office but shall not take images of any kind (screenshot, photo, video)
but he may take notes. Notes taken by Mr. Nelson shall be treated as confidential
information and shall not be disseminated to third parties outside of attorneys of
record, business valuation experts, CPA’s or the court.
CP at 159-60.
II. NELSON’S FILE ACCESS AFTER THE APRIL AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER
After Young consulted with her colleagues on how to best abide by the two protective
orders—the original March protective order and the April amended protective order—she stressed

No. 57672-4-II
6
to Nelson the importance of strictly following the orders and reminded Nelson multiple times about
the requirements.
Nelson began viewing the materials at Young’s office, although she was not usually in the
room with him. Nelson initially used a computer provided by the law firm to view electronic
versions of the materials. Young did not impose any procedures that would have prevented Nelson
from copying Burks’ confidential materials; Young merely relied on Nelson’s word that he was
not copying the materials in violation of the protective orders.
In May, Nelson hired a financial expert to assist in his case. To prepare documents for his
expert, Nelson wished to use software programs that were not available on the office computers
he previously used. So, thereafter, Nelson brought his personal laptop to Young’s office and, with
Young’s cooperation, began to access Burks’ financial information from a USB drive. Each time
Nelson visited Young’s office, he would receive the USB drive from Young and return it to her
when he left.
Nelson used a software program on his laptop which created a spreadsheet from the
financial materials. The data was extracted from documents on the USB drive, raw data was
temporarily stored within the software’s “transient memory” in a form that was not viewable, and
the software created spreadsheets from the raw data. 2 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 59. The
spreadsheets were then saved directly to the USB drive, not Nelson’s personal laptop. At that
point, the software closed automatically and erased all transiently-saved data. When the process
was completed, Nelson uploaded the spreadsheets created by the software directly from the USB
drive to a private, online file-sharing drive that only his financial expert could access. Once the

No. 57672-4-II
7
files were uploaded for the expert, they were not available on the online file-sharing drive for
Nelson to view or access.2
Nelson spent about 185 hours at Young’s office during his review of the materials.
Although Young was not in the same room with Nelson, she was always present at the office when
he was there.
III. CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
In July 2022, after receiving information about what Nelson was doing in his review of her
financial information, Burks filed a motion for contempt against Nelson and Young for violating
the two protective orders. Burks alleged that the process of uploading confidential materials to
Nelson’s personal laptop and, from there, uploading those materials to an online file-sharing drive
for his financial expert’s review was a violation. Burks contended that the confidential materials
were effectively copied when Nelson prepared spreadsheets of the data using the software and
were, thereafter, freely available to him.3
On September 9, the superior court held an evidentiary hearing on the contempt motion.
Both Nelson and Young testified consistently with the facts above. Nelson further explained that
he never saved any materials to his personal laptop or a file-sharing drive that he could have
thereafter accessed.
2 We acknowledge that this description of the process is derived solely from Nelson’s testimony.
But the record contains nothing that refutes this description.
3 Burks also alleged that Young was in contempt because she did not directly supervise Nelson’s
review of the confidential materials.

No. 57672-4-II
8
Two months after the evidentiary hearing, the superior court gave an oral ruling on Burks’
motion, finding both Nelson and Young in contempt. The superior court explained that although
Nelson wanted to remove the requirement that he could only view materials in “the presence of
his attorneys” after Young withdrew, the superior court believed that requirement was still in place
from the original March protective order. 3 VRP at 111. However, the superior court explained
that the April amended order did allow for additional note-taking abilities for Nelson, stating,
Ultimately, the Court did not modify the aforementioned restrictions in the
protective order, but did allow Mr. Nelson to take notes and, from those notes,
create a spreadsheet to assist him in preparing his case.
3 VRP at 113. The superior court also believed the amended order was clear about how Nelson
should review the confidential materials and, critically, concluded that Nelson’s review process
violated the order:
While the April 22, 2022 order is clear in all respects, the Court’s verbal comments
supplemented and were consistent with that order. In particular, the Court
unambiguously stated: “You may create your own notes. You may not take images.
You may not take screenshots. You may review and digest the information that has
been presented. You may take handwritten notes in anticipation of preparation for
trial.”
And later in the same colloquy, the Court again stated: “In order to prepare for trial,
I’m allowing you to take notes and create your spreadsheet. . .”
Now, based upon the undisputed testimony and evidence at the hearing, the Court
has learned that Mr. Nelson was provided a thumb drive by Ms. Young containing
the confidential information; that he took possession of the thumb drive and
inserted the data from it onto his personal laptop computer; he cut and pasted the data
and created a spreadsheet that was ultimately utilized in assisting his retained expert
. . . and in his presentation of the case.
3 VRP at 113-14 (alternation in original).
Later, the superior court issued its written order, which largely restated its oral ruling. The
order stated, in relevant part,

No. 57672-4-II
9
5. After her withdrawal as counsel, Ms. Young no longer supervised Mr. Nelson[’s]
review of confidential information.
6. Rather, Ms. Young provided Mr. Nelson with an unencrypted thumb drive with
confidential documents for his unsupervised review in her office, which is no
different than giving him hard copies except that it might be more readily available
to disseminate.
7. Mr. Nelson is a computer expert, and his transference of the data from the thumb
drive to his computer to copy the data to a spreadsheet was intentional, and it defied
the Court’s restrictive measures, which did not . . . contemplate, nor did it ever
authorize this procedure used as a means to review and copying the data, the
confidential information. Rather, the court authorized separate notes and from
those separate notes, the creation of a spreadsheet.
. . . .
10. Ms. Young and Mr. Nelson are in contempt of the March 16, 2022 Protective
Order as well as the April 8, 2022 Order.
CP at 622-23 (emphasis added).
Nelson appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. CONTEMPT FINDING WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Nelson argues that the superior court abused its discretion by finding him in contempt
because his actions did not clearly violate the protective order. We agree.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
We review the superior court’s decision on a contempt motion for an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Moreman v. Butcher, 126 Wn.2d 36, 40, 891 P.2d 725 (1995). An “abuse of discretion”
is present if there is a clear showing that exercise of discretion was manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds or reasons. Id.

No. 57672-4-II
10
A court cannot hold a person in contempt for disobeying an order unless the facts constitute
a “plain violation of the order.” Johnston v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 96 Wn.2d 708, 713,
638 P.2d 1201 (1982). In contempt proceedings, courts strictly construe the language of the order
that is the basis for the contempt motion in favor of an alleged contemnor. Graves v. Duerden, 51
Wn. App. 642, 647, 754 P.2d 1027 (1988); Dep’t of Ecology v. Tiger Oil Corp., 166 Wn. App.
720, 768, 271 P.3d 331 (2012). “The purpose for this rule is to protect persons from contempt
proceedings based on violation of judicial decrees that are unclear or ambiguous, or that fail to
explain precisely what must be done.” Graves, 51 Wn. App. at 647-48.
B. APPLICATION
Nelson argues the superior court abused its discretion because, when strictly construing the
language of the protective orders, Nelson’s actions did not violate the orders. Nelson contends his
creation of the spreadsheet was authorized and he did not transfer usable documents to his personal
computer. He argues that his review process and the creation of the spreadsheets were narrowly
designed to meet the specific language of the protective orders.
We analyze Nelson’s position in four steps. First, we restate the precise language of the
two protective orders. Second, we briefly restate and review the superior court’s contempt order
rationale to discern how it interpreted the language of its protective orders. Third, we apply a strict
construction in favor of Nelson to the language of the protective orders to determine what was
clearly prohibited and whether those prohibitions comported with the superior court’s
expectations. Finally, we compare those prohibitions of the orders (when strictly construed) with
Nelson’s conduct to determine whether he “plain[ly]” violated the orders. See Johnston, 96 Wn.2d
at 713.

No. 57672-4-II
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1. Protective Orders’ Language
We begin with a close reading of the superior court’s two protective orders. The original
March protective order, entered when Nelson was represented by Young, allowed him to view the
confidential materials “in the presence of his attorneys at their office” and essentially prevented
him from making copies that would allow him to take the materials with him upon leaving. CP at
108. The specific language read:
Business records or confidential information described herein shall not be provided
to Respondent. Respondent may view confidential materials in the presence of his
attorneys at their office and shall not take images.
CP at 108 (emphasis added). The short April amended protective order stated that the March
protective order “shall remain in full force and effect,” except it provided that Nelson could view
the materials “in his prior attorney[’]s office” and take notes. CP at 159-60. The specific language
of the April amended protective order read:
Mr. Nelson may view these documents in his prior attorney[’]s office or in [Burks’
attorney’s] office but shall not take images of any kind (screenshot, photo, video)
but he may take notes. Notes taken by Mr. Nelson shall be treated as confidential
information and shall not be disseminated to third parties outside of attorneys of
record, business valuation experts, CPA’s or the court.
CP at 159-60 (emphasis added). And the superior court orally explained that under the amended
protective order, Nelson would be allowed to create a spreadsheet:
In order to prepare for the trial, I’m allowing you to take notes and create your
spreadsheet and the only audience will be me or a retained expert or a lawyer that
represents you or [Burks’ attorney].
CP at 553.

No. 57672-4-II
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2. Superior Court’s Decision on Contempt
With this language in place, the superior court was apparently convinced that Nelson’s
electronic, unsupervised review of the materials violated the orders. The superior court also
appeared to focus on Nelson’s method for creating his spreadsheet. The superior court’s written
contempt order explained,
6. . . . Ms. Young provided Mr. Nelson with an unencrypted thumb drive with
confidential documents for his unsupervised review in her office, which is no
different than giving him hard copies except that it might be more readily available
to disseminate.
7. Mr. Nelson is a computer expert, and his transference of the data from the thumb
drive to his computer to copy the data to a spreadsheet was intentional, and it defied
the Court’s restrictive measures, which did not . . . contemplate, nor did it ever
authorize this procedure used as a means to review and copying the data, the
confidential information. Rather, the court authorized separate notes and from
those separate notes, the creation of a spreadsheet.
CP at 622 (emphasis added).
The superior court appeared to believe that the spreadsheet was only authorized to be
created from handwritten notes Nelson personally created, not using software on his personal
computer, and that Nelson was not allowed to view the materials unsupervised. Thus, the superior
court determined that Nelson’s review method and spreadsheet creation violated the March
protective order and the April amended protective order.
3. Construction of the Protective Orders
But contempt must be supported by strict construction of court orders in favor of alleged
potential contemnors. See Graves, 51 Wn. App. at 647; Tiger Oil Corp., 166 Wn. App. at 768.
Although the superior court characterized one of the orders as “clear in all respects,” the two

No. 57672-4-II
13
protective orders collectively did not, on their faces, match the superior court’s expectations.
3 VRP at 113.
The original March protective order prohibited Nelson from reviewing the materials
outside the “presence” of his attorneys and from taking “images” of any materials. CP at 108
(“Respondent may view confidential materials in the presence of his attorneys at their office and
shall not take images.”). The order did not specify what form Nelson must view the materials in
(electronic or printed copies), nor did it specify how Nelson must take notes. The April amended
order reiterated the requirement that Nelson could not make copies or take images (“Mr.
Nelson . . . shall not take images of any kind (screenshot, photo, video) . . . .”), but it, too, was
silent about what form of document viewing Nelson was required to use. CP at 160.
As for notetaking, the April amended order permitted Nelson to “take notes,” but it
contained no limitation on the form of which the notes must have been taken—there was no
reference to electronic or handwritten notes. The only specific requirement relevant to Nelson’s
notetaking was that he was prohibited from sending any confidential materials or notes to third
parties other than his hired experts. CP at 159-60 (“Notes taken by Mr. Nelson shall be treated as
confidential information and shall not be disseminated to third parties . . . .”).
The April amended order made no mention of “spreadsheets,” but the superior court’s oral
comments showed the superior court expected spreadsheets to be permitted. The superior court
explained that Nelson would be permitted to create a spreadsheet, specifically stating Nelson could
“take notes and create [his] spreadsheet.” CP at 553. But, again, there was no specificity about
the form permitted for the spreadsheets or how it must be created.

No. 57672-4-II
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Finally, regarding being unsupervised, the April amended order shifted the requirement
from the original March protective order that Nelson review the materials in the “presence” of his
attorneys to just being “in his prior attorney[’]s office.” CP at 160 (“Nelson may view these
materials in his prior attorney[’]s office or in [Burks’ attorney’s] office . . . .”).
Thus, when properly construed strictly in favor of Nelson, the language of the two
protective orders did not reflect the expansive prohibitions that were applied by the superior court
in its contempt order. See Graves, 51 Wn. App. at 647-48 (alleged contemnors are protected from
contempt proceedings based on orders that are “unclear or ambiguous, or that fail to explain
precisely what must be done”); Tiger Oil Corp., 166 Wn. App. at 768 (order must be construed in
favor of the alleged contemnor).
4. Nelson’s Actions Did Not Violate the Protective Orders
As our last step, we compare Nelson’s review and spreadsheet-creating process with the
prohibitions of the two protective orders (strictly construed). After the imposition of the April
amended protective order, Nelson could not copy “images” but could take notes and create
spreadsheets and share those spreadsheets with an expert; nothing dictated the method of the note-
taking or form of the spreadsheets. Nelson was required to be located in his former attorney’s
office; nothing required Young to be in the room with Nelson. Thus, Nelson’s conduct complied
with these prohibitions—he only viewed the confidential materials at Young’s office, and never
saved copies or images of the materials to his personal computer or any file-sharing drives that he
would be able to access later.
It is true that Nelson’s creation of spreadsheets using the software located on his computer
pushed the boundaries of what was permitted on the face of the protective orders. But even these

No. 57672-4-II
15
spreadsheets fell short of violating the protective orders (strictly construed). Nelson’s software
created the spreadsheets by using the data from documents on the USB drive, extracting the data,
temporarily, transiently storing it in a raw form—not in a usable form that Nelson could view—
and terminating the data upon creation of the final spreadsheet product. That spreadsheet was then
saved directly on the USB drive. Thus, no “image” was ever stored on Nelson’s personal laptop.
The only data was raw data that was not usable and whose presence was merely temporary; this
raw data was not akin to taking an image for use outside of Young’s office at a later time.
Thereafter, Nelson uploaded his spreadsheet to a file-sharing drive for his expert. The
spreadsheet was uploaded directly from the USB drive and only the expert could access the
spreadsheets after they were uploaded; Nelson had no further access to the spreadsheet after
uploading the spreadsheet and leaving Young’s office. Because Nelson did not create a pathway
to access the confidential materials outside Young’s office, neither the use of the software program
nor the sharing of the spreadsheets with the expert was a violation of the protective orders (strictly
construed).4
To be sure, Nelson’s use of technology did not comport with the superior court’s subjective
view of what it ordered. It is apparent the superior court intended for Nelson to only access the
materials and take notes in a nonelectronic manner. And the superior court also appears to have
4 The superior court appeared to view Nelson’s use of the software as actually transferring data
onto his computer to create the spreadsheet on his computer. We view the facts in the record
differently. But even if the superior court did not believe Nelson’s testimony about how the
software program worked, there remains no evidence in the record that Nelson actually made
accessible copies of the confidential materials on his laptop during the process of creating the
spreadsheets.

No. 57672-4-II
16
expected that Nelson would be supervised. Frustration is understandable when the superior court’s
subjective intentions were not followed, especially when those intentions were rooted in a
justifiable concern for wrongful dissemination of sensitive information. And one might imagine
a detailed protective order that would reasonably impose the requirements intended by the superior
court.
But the specific language of these two protective orders, when properly construed strictly
in favor of Nelson, do not match those intentions. Because Nelson’s actions did not “plain[ly]”
violate the restrictions in the protective orders, the superior court abused its discretion by finding
Nelson in contempt. See Johnston, 96 Wn.2d at 713.5
II. ATTORNEY FEES
Both Burks and Nelson request attorney fees for this appeal. Burks requests attorney fees
for this appeal under RAP 18.1(a) and RCW 7.21.030(3). RAP 18.1(a) allows us to award attorney
fees if applicable law allows. And RCW 7.21.030(3) allows courts to award attorney fees when a
person has been found in contempt of court. Because we reverse the order finding Nelson in
contempt, we deny Burks’ request for attorney fees; no contempt remains to justify the award.
Nelson requests attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140. Pertaining to dissolution
proceedings, the statute allows an appellate court to, “in its discretion, order a party to pay for the
cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys’ fees.” RCW 26.09.140. In
determining whether to award attorney fees under the statute, “[w]e may ‘consider the arguable
5 Nelson also argues, in the alternative, that the superior court erred in determining Burks’ motion
for contempt was not moot and that he was not afforded the appropriate due process for the type
of contempt Burks requested. Because we reverse on other grounds, we do not address these
arguments.

No. 57672-4-II
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merit of the issues on appeal and the parties’ financial resources.’ ” In re Marriage of Lesinski &
Mienko, 21 Wn. App. 2d 501, 518, 506 P.3d 1277 (2022) (quoting In re Marriage of C.M.C.,
87 Wn. App. 84, 89, 940 P.2d 669 (1997)); RCW 26.09.140. Nelson argues we should award him
attorney fees because Burks’ financial resources “far outweigh” his own. Br. of Appellant at 38.
After considering Nelson’s recently-filed declaration of his financial resources, we decline to
award attorney fees to Nelson on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We reverse, holding that the superior court abused its discretion in finding Nelson in
contempt when his actions did not violate the requirements of the protective orders.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
CRUSER, A.C.J.
LEE, J.