State Of Washington, Respondent V. Steve T. Young, Appellant

74246-9Washctapp6 mars 2017

Texte intégral

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) DIVISION ONE
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Respondent, ) 70 CD --.1 _
) No. 74246-9-1 I -11,..........,
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V. ) (PSI .... .
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION -4- r-
STEVE THOMAS YOUNG, ) 9? , tr)
Appellant.
)
) FILED: March 6, 2017 CJI
)
DWYER, J. — Steve Young was charged and convicted of arson in the first
degree. The sentencing court imposed a standard range sentence of 23 months
imprisonment. On appeal, Young contends that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt. This is so, he avers, because the
court gave as its instruction the jury instruction defining "reasonable doubt" set
forth at 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal
4.01, at 85 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC). Young contends that this instruction
unconstitutionally undermines the presumption of innocence and shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant. We disagree and affirm.
1
Young contends that WPIC 4.01, which states "[a] reasonable doubt is
one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of
No.74246-9-1/2
evidence," unconstitutionally undermines the presumption of innocence and
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. This is so, he asserts, because
WPIC 4.01 instructs jurors that they must be able to articulate a reason for
having a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not err in so instructing the jury.
Our Supreme Court has mandated that an instruction in the words of
WPIC 4.01 be given in all cases. State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 318, 165
P.3d 1241 (2007). The constitutionality of the challenged instruction has been
reaffirmed. State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 586-87, 355 P.3d 253 (2015).
We have recognized this controlling authority. State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn. App.
530, 567, 364 P.3d 810 (2015), review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1022 (2016). The trial
court did not err by doing the same.
In any event, WPIC 4.01 does not require jurors to articulate a reason.
"[A] doubt for which a reason exists" is not the same as "a doubt for which a
reason can be given." Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d at 584. Young's argument is
meritless.
II
Young requests that no costs associated with his appeal be assessed
against him, as he was found indigent by the trial court. Pursuant to RAP 14.2,
we may exercise our discretion not to impose appellate costs. State v. Sinclair,
192 Wn. App. 380, 393, 367 P.3d 612, review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1034 (2016).
The State does not contest his claim. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion
and will not impose appellate costs against Young.
2
No.74246-9-1/3
Affirmed.
3
We concur:

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, |

) S 2
) DIVISION ONE =O
Respondent, ) a es.
) No. 74246-9-| do tle
V. ) nee.
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION Se at
STEVE THOMAS YOUNG, ) PO me
) oO SS
Appellant. ) FILED: March 6, 2017 <
)

DWYER, J. — Steve Young was charged and convicted of arson in the first
degree. The sentencing court imposed a standard range sentence of 23 months
. imprisonment. On appeal, Young contends that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt. This is so, he avers, because the
court gave as its instruction the jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt” set
forth at 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattem Jury Instructions: Criminal
4.01, at 85 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC). Young contends that this instruction
unconstitutionally undermines the presumption of innocence and shifts the
burden of proof to the defendant. We disagree and affirm.
|
Young contends that WPIC 4.01, which states “[a] reasonable doubt is

one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of

No.74246-9-1/2
evidence," unconstitutionally undermines the presumption of innocence and
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. This is so, he asserts, because
WPIC 4.01 instructs jurors that they must be able to articulate a reason for
having a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not err in so instructing the jury.
Our Supreme Court has mandated that an instruction in the words of
WPIC 4.01 be given in all cases. State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 318, 165
P.3d 1241 (2007). The constitutionality of the challenged instruction has been
reaffirmed. State v. Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d 578, 586-87, 355 P.3d 253 (2015).
We have recognized this controlling authority. State v. Lizarraga, 191 Wn. App.
530, 567, 364 P.3d 810 (2015), review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1022 (2016). The trial
court did not err by doing the same.
In any event, WPIC 4.01 does not require jurors to articulate a reason.
"[A] doubt for which a reason exists" is not the same as "a doubt for which a
reason can be given." Kalebaugh, 183 Wn.2d at 584. Young's argument is
meritless.
II
Young requests that no costs associated with his appeal be assessed
against him, as he was found indigent by the trial court. Pursuant to RAP 14.2,
we may exercise our discretion not to impose appellate costs. State v. Sinclair,
192 Wn. App. 380, 393, 367 P.3d 612, review denied, 185 Wn.2d 1034 (2016).
The State does not contest his claim. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion
and will not impose appellate costs against Young.
2

No.74246-9-I/3

Affirmed.

We concur:

Becker \.

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