* State Of Washington, Respondent V. David Chesnokov, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
DAVID V. CHESNOKOV,
Appellant.
No. 67924-4-1
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: July 8, 2013
Appelwick, J. — Chesnokov was convicted of first degree robbery and three
counts of second degree assault. 	The robbery "to convict" instruction listed the victim
as Venneti or Dickey, 	one assault instruction 	listed 	Venneti as the victim, and one
assault instruction listed 	Dickey as the victim. 	Chesnokov argues that his assaults
against Venneti 	and 	Dickey 	both 	merge 	into 	his 	robbery 	conviction, 	because 	the
conduct constituting the assaults was necessary to elevate robbery to the first degree.
The State argues neither assault conviction should merge with the robbery conviction,
We 	hold 	that 	the 	merger 	doctrine 	applies, 	but 	only 	one assault 	convictiefi 	wis;
<= 	«o
necessary to elevate robbery to the first degree. 	We vacate only one assault convicti9a-
CO 	=u-n
and remand for resentencing. 	=J 	;£•£
FACTS 	^ 	-^
On the evening of February 20, 2011, 	David 	Chesnokov and Mark Shtefanio
went into 	an AT&T store in Mount Vernon. 	A surveillance video shows that they
wandered around the store for about 20 minutes looking at various phone and tablet
displays.
The next morning, Morgan Venneti and Lupe Dickey were working at the front
counter when Chesnokov and Shtefanio reentered the store. 	This time, Chesnokov and
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924^-1/2
Shtefanio were wearing bandanas over the lower portion of their faces and Chesnokov
was holding what about appeared to be a gun. 	Unknown to Venneti and Dickey at the
time, the gun was actually a BB gun. 	Chesnokov pointed the gun at Venneti's head and
told her and Dickey to get on the ground. 	Shtefanio began grabbing phones.
Melissa Suarez was working in the store's back room. 	After hearing loud voices
from the sales floor, she walked out and saw Chesnokov pointing a gun at Venneti and
Dickey. When Chesnokov saw Suarez, he ran toward her, told her to get on the floor,
and pointed the gun at her head. 	Chesnokov and 	Shtefanio left the store with two
phones and a tablet.
Police 	officers 	executed 	search 	and 	arrest 	warrants 	on 	Chesnokov 	and
Shtefanio. 	Police discovered the stolen tablet, clothes and bandanas that Chesnokov
and Shtefanio wore during the robbery, and a BB gun that looked like the one used in
the robbery.
The State charged Chesnokov with robbery in the first degree and three counts
of assault in the second degree. 	The three assault charges were based on his assault
of Suarez, Venneti, and 	Dickey. 	It also charged him with tampering with a witness,
based on a phone call from jail in which he told Shtefanio's girlfriend to "[t]ell them we
didn't show you anything."
After 	Chesnokov was 	convicted 	on 	all charges, 	he 	argued 	that the 	assault
charges should merge into the robbery conviction. 	The State argued that the assault
against Suarez did not merge because she was not named as a victim of the robbery,
and that the assaults against Venneti and Dickey did not merge because the assaults
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/3
were not necessary to elevate the robbery to first degree. 	The trial court agreed with
the State and concluded that none of the assault charges merged.
DISCUSSION
The State may bring multiple charges arising from the same criminal conduct in a
single proceeding. 	State v. Michielli. 132 Wn.2d 229, 238-39, 937 P.2d 587 (1997).
However, state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy prohibit
multiple punishments for the same offense. 	State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798, 803, 194
P.3d 	212 	(2008). 	Where 	a 	defendant's 	act supports 	charges 	under two 	criminal
statutes, a court weighing a double jeopardy challenge must determine whether, in light
of legislative intent, the charged crimes constitute the same offense. 	State v. Freeman,
153 Wn.2d 765, 771, 108 P.3d 753 (2005). 	The court engages in a three-part test to
determine 	whether 	the 	legislature 	intended 	multiple 	punishments 	in 	a 	particular
situation. 	Kier, 	164 Wn.2d at 804. 	First, the court searches the criminal statutes
involved for any express or implicit legislative intent. 	State v. Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769,
776, 888 P.2d 155 (1995). 	Second, if the legislative intent is unclear, the court turns to
the "same evidence" Blockburger test, which asks if the crimes are the same in law and
in fact. 	]a\ at 777-78 (citing Blockburger v. United States. 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct.
180, 	182, 76 	L. 	Ed. 2d 	306 (1932)). 	Third, the merger doctrine may be an aid 	in
determining legislative intent. 	Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772-73. 	Even if two convictions
would appear to merge on an abstract level under this analysis, they may be punished
separately if the defendant's particular conduct demonstrates an independent purpose
or effect of each. 	Kier, 164 Wn.2d at 804. 	The usual remedy for violations of the
prohibition of double jeopardy is to vacate the lesser offense. 	State v. Hughes, 166
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/4
Wn.2d 675, 686 n.13, 212 P.3d 558 (2009). 	The court's review is de novo. 	Freeman,
153Wn.2dat770.
I. 	Merger Doctrine
Chesnokov argues that two 	of 	his 	assault convictions, 	against Venneti 	and
Dickey, merge into his first degree robbery conviction. 	Under the merger doctrine, when
the 	degree 	of 	one 	offense 	is 	raised 	by 	conduct 	separately 	criminalized 	by 	the
legislature, the court presumes the legislature intended to punish both offenses through
a greater sentence for the greater crime. 	Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772-73. 	For instance,
the doctrine applies when, to prove first degree rape, the State must prove not only that
a defendant committed rape, but also that the rape was accompanied by an act defined
as a crime elsewhere in the criminal statutes, such as assault or kidnapping. 	JcL at 777-
78 (quoting State v. Vladovic. 99 Wn.2d 413, 420-21, 662 P.2d 853 (1983)).
There is no per se rule that assault in the second degree merges into robbery in
the first degree. 	jg\ at 774. 	Rather, a case by case approach is required. 	]d 	But, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that second degree assault merges into first
degree robbery when there is no independent purpose for each crime.
Freeman involved the consolidated 	cases of State v. 	Freeman and 	State v.
Zumwalt. 	]d at 765. 	Freeman and his accomplices were supposed to be driving an
acquaintance to a party. 	Id. at 769. 	Instead, they stopped on a dark, dead-end street.
kL 	Freeman got out of the vehicle, walked around to the acquaintance's car door,
ordered him to hand over valuables, and shot him when he did not immediately comply.
]a\ 	Freeman and his accomplices then robbed the acquaintance and left him. 	]d A jury
convicted Freeman of first degree assault and first degree robbery. 	Jd. 	The trial court
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/5
determined that the two convictions were not the same for double jeopardy purposes.
li
Zumwalt offered to sell drugs to a woman he met at a casino. 	jd at 770. 	When
they met in the parking lot to conclude the transaction, Zumwalt decided not to sell her
drugs. 	]d 	Instead, he punched her hard enough to 	knock her to the ground and
fracture her eye socket, 	Jd 	He then robbed her of approximately $300 in cash and
casino chips. 	]d 	He was convicted of second degree assault and first degree robbery.
]d 	The trial court determined that the two convictions were not the same for double
jeopardy purposes. ]d
Going through the three-part test, the Supreme Court first noted that the standard
sentence for first degree assault is substantially longer than the penalty for first degree
robbery. 	]d at 775-76. 	It concluded that vacating 	Freeman's first degree assault
charge would have produced a windfall and could not have been what the legislature
intended. 	]d 	at 	776. 	Rather, 	the 	disparate 	sentences 	were 	evidence 	that 	the
legislature intended to punish first degree assault and first degree robbery separately.
]d 	As to Zumwalt, it found no evidence in the statutes themselves that the legislature
intended to punish second degree assault and first degree robbery separately. 	Id 	The
supreme court did not apply the Blockburger test because the parties seemed to agree
that the crimes were not the same at law. ]d at 777.
The court then turned to the merger doctrine. 	It explained that, "to prove first
degree 	robbery as 	charged 	and 	proved 	by the 	State, the State 	had to 	prove the
defendants committed an assault in furtherance of the robbery." 	]d at 778. 	"[Wjithout
the conduct amounting to assault, each would be guilty of only second degree robbery."
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/6
Id 	It determined that, "[ujnder the merger rule, assault committed in furtherance of a
robbery merges with robbery" unless an exception applies or there is other evidence of
contrary legislative 	intent. 	Jd 	Thus, 	Zumwalt's second 	degree assault conviction
merged 	into his first degree robbery conviction, but Freeman's first degree assault
conviction did not merge with his first degree robbery conviction, 	because there was
other evidence of contrary legislative intent. 	Jd 	The court stated that generally first
degree 	robbery 	and 	second 	degree 	assault 	"will 	merge 	unless 	they 	have 	an
independent purpose or effect." Jd at 780.
In Kier, Qualgine Hudson was driving home and his cousin, Carlos Ellison, was in
the passenger seat. 	164 Wn.2d at 802. Three men in another car honked their horn at
Hudson. 	Id 	He pulled over, got out of the car, and began talking to one of the men. 	Id
Kier got out of the other car and pointed a gun at Hudson. 	Jd. 	Hudson ran away. 	Jd
Kier then approached Ellison, who was still in Hudson's car, and pointed the gun at him.
Jd 	He ordered Ellison to get out of the car. 	Jd 	After Ellison got out, Kier and his two
accomplices drove away with both cars. 	Id 	at 803. A jury found Kier guilty of second
degree assault and first degree robbery. 	Jd
Kier was convicted of first degree robbery under RCW 9A.56.200(1 )(a)(i-ii), which
provides that robbery is elevated to the first degree if the defendant is armed with a
deadly weapon or displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon in the
commission of the robbery or in immediate flight from the robbery. 	Jd. at 805. 	Robbery
itself requires the taking of property by the use or threatened use of immediate force,
violence, or fear of injury to a person or his property. 	Jd at 805-06. 	The robbery to
convict instruction required the State to prove that, in addition to using fear or force, Kier
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924^-1/7
'"was 	armed 	with 	a 	deadly weapon 	or 	displayed 	what 	appeared 	to 	be 	a 	deadly
weapon.'" 	Jd at 808-09. 	Kier was convicted of second degree assault under RCW
9A.36.021(1)(c), which provides that a person is guilty of second degree assault if he
"assaults another with a deadly weapon." Jd at 806. 	Assault involves putting another in
apprehension or fear of harm, 	regardless of whether the actor intends to inflict or is
incapable of inflicting such harm. 	Jd 	The to convict instruction required the State to
prove that Kier assaulted Ellison "'with a deadly weapon.'" 	Jd at 809. 	The trial court
denied Kier's motion to vacate his second degree assault conviction. 	Jd. at 803.
The Supreme Court concluded that "the completed assault was necessary to
elevate the completed robbery to first degree." 	Id at 807. 	It explained, "The merger
doctrine is triggered when 	second degree assault with 	a 	deadly weapon elevates
robbery to the first degree because being armed with or displaying a firearm or deadly
weapon to take property through force or fear is essential to the elevation." Id at 806.
In this case, Chesnokov was charged with first degree robbery pursuant to RCW
9A.56.200(1)(a). 	Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that to convict, it needed
to 	find that 	in the 	commission 	of 	robbery 	or 	in the 	immediate 	flight 	therefrom,
Chesnokov or an accomplice "display[ed] what appealed] to be a firearm." 	It instructed
the jury that, to convict Chesnokov of assault in the second degree, it needed to find
that he assaulted "another with a deadly weapon."
The State argues that Chesnokov's convictions do not merge, because the jury
could have concluded that Chesnokov displayed what appeared to be a firearm, the BB
gun, but that the BB gun was not a deadly weapon. 	In that scenario, the jury could have
convicted for first degree robbery but not for second degree assault. 	Essentially, the
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/8
State argues that proving second degree assault was sufficient, but not necessary, to
elevate the robbery conviction to the first degree.
The only reference to weapons in the definition of second degree assault is
"[ajssaults another with a deadly weapon." 	RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). 	In contrast, robbery
can be elevated to the first degree when the defendant "[i]s armed with a deadly
weapon" or "[displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon." 	RCW
9A.56.200. 	The State argues that, by charging under the more lenient "[displays what
appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon," it avoids double jeopardy concerns.
(Quoting RCW 9A.56.200.)
We reject the State's argument. 	First, although the State frames its argument in
terms of "merger" and "elevation," it is really applying the Blockburger test. 	Under that
test, crimes may not be punished separately "if the crimes, as charged and proved, are
the same in law and in fact." 	Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 777 (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S.
at 304). 	"[T]he mere fact that the same conduct is used to prove each crime is not
dispositive." 	Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 777. 	The State makes that precise argument
here, contending that it is not dispositive that the same conduct was used to prove first
degree robbery and second degree assault, because the second degree assault charge
required an additional finding that the BB gun was a deadly weapon. 	But, Chesnokov
does not rely on the Blockburger test. 	The merger doctrine is a different consideration.
Indeed, in Freeman the appellants agreed that the crimes were not the same at law and
the court nevertheless reached the conclusion that Zumwalt's second degree assault
conviction merged with his first degree robbery conviction. 	Jd at 777-78.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/9
Second, although the State is correct that the merger doctrine applies to a case
as charged, the prosecutor's charging decisions and careful statutory parsing do not
override the legislative intent to treat these crimes as the same. 	Chesnokov was
charged with crimes that required the State to prove that he was armed with a deadly
weapon or displayed what appeared to be a firearm or other deadly weapon. 	The
conduct and evidence used to establish those elements in the robbery and assault
charges was the same: Chesnokov brandished a BB gun that looked like a real gun and
pointed it at the victims. 	It was not disputed that the BB gun looked like a real gun, and
it was not disputed that the BB gun was in fact a deadly weapon.
Third, the State attempts to distinguish this case from Kier where there is no
meaningful distinction to 	be made. 	In Kjer, the second degree assault instruction
required the jury to find that the assault involved a deadly weapon, but the first degree
robbery instruction only required the jury to find '"the defendant was armed with a
deadly weapon or displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon.'" 	164 Wn.2d at 809
(emphasis added). 	Just as in this case, the jury could have hypothetically determined
that the defendant "displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon," but was not
actually armed with a deadly weapon.
Kier is directly on point. 	The Kier court stated, "The merger doctrine is triggered
when second degree assault with a deadly weapon elevates robbery to the first degree,
because being armed with or displaying a firearm or deadly weapon to take property
through force or fear is essential to the elevation." 	Jd at 806. 	Although we recognize
that there is no per se rule that second degree assault merges with first degree robbery,
the State has not identified any unique characteristic of this case that warrants reaching
9
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/10
a different result.
II. 	Remedy
Chesnokov argues that, because the merger doctrine applies, we must vacate
both his assault committed against Venneti and his assault committed against Dickey.
We disagree.
The merger doctrine applies at the time of sentencing and its purpose is to
correct violations of the prohibition of double jeopardy. 	See, e.g.. State v. Parmelee,
108 Wn. App. 702, 	711, 	32 	P.3d 1029 (2001). 	As such, 	it is a doctrine aimed at
providing 	remedies. 	The 	touchstone 	of 	determining 	the 	appropriate 	remedy 	is
legislative intent. 	Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 771-72.
The jury found Chesnokov guilty of assaulting both Venneti and Dickey, but only
one of those convictions was essential to elevate robbery to the first degree. 	It does not
violate the merger doctrine for Chesnokov to be punished for the remaining assault
count where the State has proven two counts and one of those counts merges with the
robbery conviction. 	The second conviction was not essential and does not merge. 	A
contrary interpretation would produce an absurd result: a defendant convicted of 100
counts of second degree assault and one count of first degree robbery encompassing
100 	potential 	victims 	would 	receive 	the 	same 	punishment 	as 	a 	defendant 	who
committed first degree robbery and second degree assault against one victim.
At oral argument, appellate counsel argued that both convictions must merge
pursuant to Kier. 	In Kier, the to convict instruction for second degree assault specified
Ellison as the victim, but the to convict instruction for first degree robbery did not specify
a 	victim. 	164 Wn.2d 	at 	812. 	The jury could 	have 	determined 	that the 	robbery
10
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 67924-4-1/11
instruction applied to Ellison, Hudson, or both. 	Jd 	The State argued that the assault
against Ellison did not merge, because it specified in closing that Hudson was the victim
of the robbery. 	Jd at 813. 	The Supreme Court concluded that it was unclear whether
the jury found that Ellison was a victim of the robbery as well as the assault, which
created an ambiguity. 	Jd at 811-12. 	Under the rule of lenity, ambiguous jury verdicts
must be resolved in the defendant's favor. 	Jd at 811. 	Thus, it ruled that the assault
conviction merged into the robbery conviction. 	Jd at 814.
As in Kier, it is unclear in this case whether the jury found that robbery was
committed against Venneti, Dickey, or both. 	But, in Kier there was only one assault
conviction. 	Here, the jury found Chesnokov guilty of assaulting 	both Venneti and
Dickey. 	To elevate robbery to the first degree, the State only had to establish the
conduct constituting assault against Venneti or Dickey. 	Regardless of whether the jury
elevated robbery to the first degree based on the assault of Venneti, Dickey, or both, the
fact remains that only one assault conviction was necessary. 	In other words, there is no
resolution of the ambiguity that favors Chesnokov and the rule of lenity does not apply.
We vacate one of Chesnokov's assault convictions and remand for resentencing.
WE CONCUR:
>4~/^ 	,/
11