State Of Washington, Respondent V Ramsey Ray Shabeeb, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 47239-2-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RAMSEY RAY SHABEEB,
Appellant.
MAXA, J. – Ramsey Shabeeb appeals his conviction of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver and the trial court’s imposition of discretionary legal
financial obligations (LFOs). The conviction arose from a search of Shabeeb’s car pursuant to a
search warrant, during which officers discovered controlled substances in a locked backpack in
the car’s trunk.
We hold that (1) probable cause supported issuance of the search warrant for Shabeeb’s
car and (2) the locked backpack in the car’s trunk was within the scope of that warrant. We also
decline to consider, under the specific facts of this case, whether the trial court erred in failing to
assess Shabeeb’s future ability to pay his LFOs because he did not object below. Accordingly,
we affirm Shabeeb’s conviction and sentence.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
June 14, 2016

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FACTS
Stipulated Facts
At trial, Shabeeb agreed to a trial based on stipulated facts. He stipulated that on April
16, 2014, Detective Robert Latter of the Clark-Vancouver Regional Drug Task Force (the Task
Force) stopped Shabeeb’s vehicle and arrested him for selling heroin to a confidential informant
(CI) working for the Task Force. The Task Force officers saw Shabeeb place a backpack into the
trunk of his car and obtained and executed a search warrant for the vehicle. The officers seized
the backpack from the trunk, cut off the padlock securing it, and discovered controlled
substances in it. The officers also seized a digital scale and a spiral notebook containing
notations about collection of money.
Facts from Search Warrant Application
In his affidavit for a search warrant, Latter detailed his 10 years of experience working
with narcotics investigations and arrests. He stated that he could identify marijuana,
methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine by sight and smell. And he stated that he confirmed
these identifications in the past through field testing and state laboratory tests.
Latter described the events leading to Shabeeb’s arrest. Latter employed a CI to purchase
heroin in a controlled buy. He described the CI as reliable because of a prior heroin purchase the
CI had made while working for the Task Force and as knowledgeable because of his previous
involvement in the drug subculture. Latter explained that the CI was working for the Task Force
because of a pending felony charge and that the CI had no prior felonies and three prior gross
misdemeanors.

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Latter then described further surveillance of Shabeeb. CP 12. Officers observed as
Shabeeb parked at an auto parts store and then another car parked next to Shabeeb. Shabeeb
talked with the driver of the other car for a time and then retrieved a backpack from the trunk of
that car. Officers arrested Shabeeb after he drove away from the store based on probable cause
to arrest developed at an earlier date. During a search incident to arrest, officers discovered a
black substance wrapped in tin foil that later field tested positive for heroin.
Latter stated that after the police impounded Shabeeb’s car, an officer used a K-9 dog to
search the outside of the car. The K-9 was trained to identify cocaine, crack, marijuana,
methamphetamine and heroin. The K-9 alerted to the presence of drugs at the rear bumper seam
on the driver’s side of Shabeeb’s car.
Latter requested a warrant because he believed that searching Shabeeb’s vehicle could
uncover drug packaging materials, identification, controlled substances, and cell phones. A
magistrate granted Latter’s request and issued a search warrant. As noted above, the police
seized controlled substances, a digital scale, and a transaction record from the backpack found in
Shabeeb’s trunk.
Motion to Suppress Evidence
Before his stipulated facts trial, Shabeeb filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized
based on the search warrant. He challenged the magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant
because the K-9 was trained to alert on five substances, one of which was marijuana. Shabeeb
argued that because possession of small amounts of marijuana is lawful, the K-9’s alert could not
be used to establish probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that
the K-9’s alert, along with other factors, could establish probable cause.

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Trial and Sentence
Based on the stipulated facts, the trial court found Shabeeb guilty of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court authorized a residential drug
treatment program and referred Shabeeb to drug court. The drug court imposed three to six
months of residential chemical dependency treatment, two years of community custody, and
legal financial obligations of $4,125.1 The drug court checked a box stating that “the defendant
is presently indigent but is anticipated to be able to pay financial obligations in the future. RCW
9. 94A.753.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 78. But the drug court did not specifically assess Shabeeb’s
ability to pay.
Shabeeb appeals his conviction and the imposition of LFOs.
ANALYSIS
A. VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT
Shabeeb argues that the district court erred in issuing a search warrant because (1)
Shabeeb’s behavior at the auto parts store did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity; (2) the K-9 was trained to alert on marijuana, which eliminated the alert as a basis for
probable cause; (3) there was no nexus between Shabeeb’s car and the CI’s earlier purchase of
heroin from Shabeeb; and (4) the warrant failed to establish the CI’s reliability. We hold that the
magistrate did not abuse his discretion in finding probable cause and issuing the search warrant.
1 At least $900 is mandatory (victim assessment, criminal filing fee, crime lab fee, and DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) collection fee) and Shabeeb agreed to pay $600 for drug court, leaving a
discretionary total of $2,625.

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1. Legal Principles
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution, issuance of a search warrant must be based on probable cause. The
affidavit supporting the search warrant application must “set forth sufficient facts to convince a
reasonable person of the probability the defendant is engaged in criminal activity and that
evidence of criminal activity can be found at the place to be searched.” State v. Lyons, 174
Wn.2d 354, 359, 275 P.3d 314 (2012). There must be a “nexus between criminal activity and the
item to be seized and between that item and the place to be searched.” State v. Neth, 165 Wn.2d
177, 183, 196 P.3d 658 (2008). “Probable cause requires more than suspicion or conjecture, but
it does not require certainty.” State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454, 476, 158 P.3d 595 (2007).
We review the validity of a search warrant for an abuse of discretion, giving great
deference to the issuing magistrate. Neth, 165 Wn.2d at 182. We consider only the information
within the four corners of the supporting affidavit. Id. Although we give deference to the
magistrate, we review the trial court’s probable cause determination de novo. Id. We resolve all
doubts in favor of the warrant’s validity. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 477.
2. Reasonable Suspicion
Shabeeb argues that police observations of him and the other vehicle at the auto parts
store did not provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. He claims that the behavior the
police observed was consistent with legal activity and therefore there was an insufficient nexus
between criminal activity and his car. We disagree.

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Shabeeb relies on Neth. In that case, a trooper stopped Neth for speeding. Following a
series of events, the trooper impounded the vehicle and obtained a search warrant to look for
narcotics. Neth, 165 Wn.2d at 179. The search warrant application affidavit listed Neth’s
nervous and unusual behavior, his possession of plastic baggies and large amounts of cash, and
his criminal history as support for the warrant. Id. at 183-84. The Supreme Court reversed,
noting that possession of plastic baggies, nervousness, lack of identification, and criminal history
are not enough to support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 185. It explained that “[s]ome
factual similarity between the past crime and the currently charged offense must be shown before
the criminal history can significantly contribute to probable cause.” Id. at 186.
Shabeeb argues that his activities similarly were consistent with lawful behavior. He
claims that the facts show that he was working on his car when a friend stopped by to help or
check on him and return his backpack. Shabeeb notes that officers did not see plastic baggies or
an exchange between Shabeeb and the driver. And Shabeeb did not have a criminal history that
included drug offenses.
However, the warrant application showed more than these potentially innocuous facts. In
addition to Latter’s observations about the surveillance, he also explained in the application
affidavit that a CI had purchased heroin from Shabeeb, that he had probable cause to arrest
Shabeeb, that he arrested Shabeeb and discovered heroin in a search incident to arrest, and that a
K-9 alerted on Shabeeb’s vehicle. In light of these facts, Shabeeb’s behavior at the auto parts
store was suspicious enough to establish a nexus between criminal activity and Shabeeb’s car.

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3. K-9 Alert
Shabeeb argues that because the K-9 may have alerted on marijuana rather than the other
five drugs it was trained to detect and because marijuana is legal to possess in certain quantities,
there is little or no probative value that can be drawn from the alert on his car. He claims that
without the alert, there was not a sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and illegal
activity. We disagree.
The State concedes and we agree that since the decriminalization of marijuana, a K-9
alert standing alone no longer establishes probable cause when the K-9 was trained to alert on
multiple narcotics, one of which is marijuana. However, a magistrate may consider a K-9 alert
as one factor in determining if probable cause exists. This is particularly true where, as here,
there was no evidence that any marijuana was present and there was evidence that other drugs for
which the K-9 was trained were present.
Here, the K-9 alert was only one of many factors establishing probable cause. Therefore,
the district court’s consideration of the alert does not affect the validity of the probable cause
determination.
4. Nexus Between Prior Purchase and Car
Shabeeb argues that Latter’s affidavit failed to establish a nexus between Shabeeb’s
earlier sale to the CI and Shabeeb’s car. He argues that this lack of correlation between the two
eroded any potential probable cause and left the magistrate to rely on only Latter’s experience
rather than on facts demonstrating probable cause. We disagree.
Latter stopped Shabeeb’s car and arrested him for the earlier sale to the CI. He searched
Shabeeb incident to arrest and discovered heroin in his pocket. He also observed the interaction

NO. 47239-2-II
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and backpack exchange at the auto parts store. Combined with the K-9 alert and Latter’s
experience in narcotics investigations, this was sufficient to establish probable cause.
Shabeeb relies on State v. Thein, 138 Wn.2d 133, 977 P.2d 582 (1999). In that case, the
police obtained a search warrant for Thein’s residence even though Thein’s prior drug
transactions had occurred at a different location. Id. at 136-40. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that probable cause could not be established based on stereotypes about drug
dealers without some showing of a nexus between Thein’s criminal activity and his residence.
Id. at 147.
As with the K-9 alert, the fact that Shabeeb had engaged in a drug transaction elsewhere
may not be sufficient – standing alone – to support probable cause to search his car. But the
prior drug transaction was only one of many factors establishing probable cause. Latter’s
affidavit showed a direct connection between Shabeeb’s car and criminal activity. Therefore, the
district court’s consideration of the prior drug transaction does not affect the validity of the
probable cause determination.
5. CI’s Reliability
Shabeeb argues that the search warrant affidavit fails to establish the CI’s reliability. He
argues that the affidavit does not indicate that the CI’s prior purchase was from Shabeeb and
therefore cannot be attributed to him. 2 He also argues that the affidavit fails to show that the
2 The State argues that we should not consider Shabeeb’s argument on the CI’s reliability
because he did not make that argument in the trial court. We exercise our discretion under RAP
2.5(a) to address this argument.

NO. 47239-2-II
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information from the CI in other cases led to an arrest and conviction and therefore is insufficient
to establish his reliability. We disagree.
When a search warrant application is based on information provided by a confidential
informant, under the Aguilar-Spinelli3 test, the supporting affidavit must contain information
from which the court can determine (1) the reliability of the informant’s information, i.e., the
basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) the credibility or veracity of the informant. See State
v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 849-50, 312 P.3d 1 (2013). An informant’s track record may
establish the informant’s reliability for purposes of a probable cause determination. State v.
Marcum, 149 Wn. App. 894, 906, 205 P.3d 969 (2009); see also State v. Woodall, 100 Wn.2d
74, 76-78, 666 P.2d 364 (1983) (reliability is sufficiently shown if the informant has given
information in the past that has led to a conviction); State v. Fisher, 96 Wn.2d 962, 965-66, 639
P.2d 743 (1982) (reliability sufficiently shown where information from informant about drug
trafficking in past proved true and informant made two controlled buys).
Here, Latter’s affidavit explained that he had used the CI for two drug purchases, one of
which resulted in Shabeeb’s arrest for delivery of heroin. Further, the affidavit stated that the CI
gave the Task Force information in the past that the Task Force corroborated with other sources.
It also explained that the CI was working with the Task Force for possible favorable treatment on
a drug charge he was facing. Finally, the affidavit set out the CI’s criminal record, which
contained no crimes of dishonesty.
3 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969).

NO. 47239-2-II
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This information provided the magistrate with sufficient information to conclude that the
CI was a reliable informant with a basis of knowledge in the narcotics trade. Accordingly, we
hold that the probable cause determination is not invalid on this basis.
6. Conclusion
As noted above, we give deference to the magistrate issuing the warrant and resolve all
doubts in favor of validity. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d at 477. Considering all the surrounding facts
and Latter’s extensive experience in narcotics investigations, we hold that the trial court did not
err in affirming the validity of the magistrate’s probable cause determination.
B. SCOPE OF SEARCH WARRANT
Shabeeb argues that the officers acted improperly in searching the padlocked backpack
found in the trunk of his car because the warrant did not expressly reference the backpack. He
claims that locking a backpack is an indication that the owner has a heightened expectation of
privacy and therefore the magistrate either had to directly authorize the search of the backpack or
require a separate warrant. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to “particularly describe” both the place
to be searched and the items to be seized. The purpose of the particularity requirement is to
prevent the State from engaging in exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings. State v.
Higgs, 177 Wn. App 414, 425, 311 P.3d 1266 (2013). The description of the items sought in the
search must be as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under investigation permit.
State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 692, 940 P.2d 1239 (1977).
Under a search warrant for a premises, personal effects of the owner may be searched if
they are plausible repositories for the items named in the warrant. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641,

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643, 870 P.2d 313 (1994). “A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of every part
of the vehicle that might contain the object of the search . . . [and] applies equally to all
containers.” U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982).
Here, the search warrant and accompanying affidavit described with particularity the
location to be searched and items to be seized. Both the affidavit and the search warrant
identified Shabeeb’s car as the location to be searched. And both identified the items to be
seized as controlled substances including any evidence of distribution of those controlled
substances, and any evidence of exercise of domain and control of the vehicle. The search of the
locked backpack was within the particular scope of the search warrant because it was inside the
car and possibly could contain evidence of controlled substances.
Shabeeb relies on State v. VanNess, 186 Wn. App. 148, 344 P.3d 713 (2015). In that
case, the court invalidated a search of a locked box found in the defendant’s backpack. Id. at
151. However, the court addressed whether the locked box was subject to a warrantless search
incident to the defendant’s arrest under either the officer safety exception to the warrant
requirement or the inventory search exception. Id. at 155. VanNess did not address whether an
officer can search a locked backpack pursuant to a lawful search warrant allowing a search for
items that could be contained in a backpack.
We hold that the officers did not exceed the scope of the warrant when they searched the
locked backpack pursuant to a lawful search warrant.
C. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Shabeeb argues that the drug court erred by failing to conduct an individualized
assessment of his present financial ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs as required

NO. 47239-2-II
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under RCW 10.01.160(3). But he did not object to the drug court’s imposition of discretionary
LFOs. We have discretion under RAP 2.5 to decline to consider issues not raised in the trial
court. See State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 827, 832, 834-35, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). Under the
specific facts of this case, we decline to consider Shabeeb’s LFO argument for the first time on
appeal.
Here, the record indicates that Shabeeb was a 25-year-old man who was given no jail
time, ordered into three to six months of drug treatment, and placed in community custody for
two years. Shabeeb also signed a drug court contract agreeing to maintain full time employment.
At the DOSA hearing, the trial court explained to Shabeeb that if he were to refer him to drug
court he would have to get full time work. Shabeeb responded that he had just obtained his
driver’s license and was able to look for a job. The trial court also discussed the importance of
Shabeeb learning work skills and holding a job in order to be successful. At the sentencing
hearing in drug court, Shabeeb indicated that he had purchased a car and was working.
Based on this record, the drug court had a basis for its conclusion that Shabeeb had an
ability to pay LFOs even if it did not conduct an individualized assessment. Further, Shabeeb
had a strategic reason not to argue in the drug court that he did not have a future ability to pay
LFOs – he wanted to convince the drug court that he would be able to maintain a full time job.
Under the specific circumstances of this case, we exercise our discretion under RAP 2.5
to decline to consider Shabeeb’s LFO argument.

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CONCLUSION
We affirm Shabeeb’s conviction and sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, J.
BJORGEN, C.J.