* State Of Washington, Respondent V. Darris Drake Jr., Appellant

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
(not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
DARRIS EUGENE DRAKE, JR.,
Appellant.
No. 84923-9-I
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Darris Drake was sentenced in 2010 and now appeals
from the denial of his 2022 motion for resentencing. 	Although Drake’s offender
score included a conviction later invalidated by State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481
P.3d 521 (2021), it is undisputed that his score would remain the same at
resentencing due to an intervening 2011 theft conviction. Because the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied Drake’s motion, we affirm.
FACTS
In October 2010, Drake pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree (Count I)
and residential burglary while armed with a firearm (Count II). 	Drake’s offender
score for Count I was calculated as five, resulting in a standard range of 138-184
months of incarceration under the sentencing reform act of 19811 (SRA). 	His
1 Ch. 9.94A RCW. The standard sentencing ranges for these particular crimes under these
offender scores were the same pursuant to the version of the SRA in effect at the time Drake’s
crimes of conviction were committed as they are under the current version of the SRA. See former
RCW 9.94A.510 (2002).
For purposes of precision and clarity, we cite to the version of the SRA applicable to the
convictions at issue where appropriate.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/2
- 2 -
offender score for Count II was calculated as four, resulting in a standard range of
15-20 months of incarceration under the SRA, plus an additional 72 months for the
firearm enhancement to be served consecutively to the base sentences.2 	The
prosecutor agreed to recommend concurrent sentences of 138 months on Count
I, the low end of the range on that count, and a high-end sentence of 20 months
on Count II. 	According to the plea agreement, Drake did not join the State’s
recommendation and was free to argue for the term of confinement he believed
was appropriate. The record does not include a transcript of Drake’s sentencing
hearing but the judgment and sentence (J&S) establishes that, on October 29,
2010, the court imposed terms of incarceration consistent with the prosecutor’s
recommendation for a total of 210 months’ confinement.
More than ten years later, in February 2021, Blake invalidated Washington’s
former statute that criminalized simple drug possession. 	197 Wn.2d at 173.
Following Blake, Drake filed a motion under CrR 7.8 for resentencing. He argued
that relief was warranted because his offender scores on Counts I and II each
included a point for a 2007 Blake offense and removing that point would result in
a change to his standard range on each count.
The State opposed resentencing for two reasons. 	First, on February 11,
2011, not long after entry of the J&S at issue here, Drake was convicted of theft in
the second degree in a separate proceeding. Thus, the State argued, “at the time
2 The length of Drake’s sentence for the firearm enhancement was doubled from 36 months
to 72 months under RCW 9.94A.533(3)(d), which requires doubling “[i]f the offender is being
sentenced for any firearm enhancements under [RCW 9.94A.533(3)](a), (b), and/or (c) . . . and the
offender has previously been sentenced for any deadly weapon enhancements after July 23, 1995,
under [RCW 9.94A.533(3)](a), (b), and/or (c) . . . or [RCW 9.94A.533](4)(a), (b), and/or (c) . . . , or
both.”
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/3
- 3 -
of resentencing, [Drake] will have the same standard range and offender score
which . . . will include a worse criminal history th[a]n at the original sentencing”
because “[i]t is reasonable to conclude that most sentencing courts would see a
conviction for theft in the second degree as being at least as significant if not more
significant than a conviction for possessing a controlled substance.” Second, the
State argued that Drake needed—but failed—to show that the court would impose
a shorter sentence if the court were to grant him a resentencing.
In reply, Drake argued that his Blake offense “resulted in a sentence of 12
months of incarceration and 9 to 12 months of community control” and he “lost his
freedom for 9 months and he will never have those months return[ed] to him, that
is a miscarriage of justice.” 	Drake contended that “[t]his miscarriage of justice
extends to [his] current sentence because that unconstitutional and voided
conviction was considered by the [c]ourt when pronouncing the agreed upon
disposition.”
On January 11, 2023, the trial court held a show cause hearing on Drake’s
CrR 7.8 motion.3 The State argued that Drake was not entitled to relief because
“[they] ha[d] the correct offender score, the correct standard range,” and “[a]ll that
[the court] would be doing at resentencing . . . is removing the [Blake] conviction
and replacing it with . . . a subsequent theft 2 conviction. . . . And [Drake’s]
sentence is not something that is going to be . . . completely out of left field or
completely incorrect.” 	Meanwhile, Drake argued that “a conviction based on an
3 Under CrR 7.8(c)(3), “[i]f the court does not transfer the motion to the Court of Appeals,
it shall enter an order fixing a time and place for hearing and directing the adverse party to appear
and show cause why the relief asked for should not be granted.”
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/4
- 4 -
unconstitutional statute cannot be considered in calculating an offender score, and
that is exactly what has happened in [his] case.” 	He also argued, again, that he
was entitled to resentencing because he “ha[d] his freedom stolen from him for
nine months from the prior [Blake] conviction as well.” 	Additionally, Drake
indicated that he planned to seek an exceptional sentence below the standard
range at resentencing.
The trial court denied Drake’s motion for resentencing, observing that
Drake’s 	offender 	scores 	and 	standard 	ranges 	would 	remain 	the 	same 	at
resentencing and that Drake “has already received the low end of the sentence.”
Drake timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Standard of Review & Legal Standards
A CrR 7.8 motion for resentencing is a collateral attack. 	State v. Molnar,
198 Wn.2d 500, 509, 497 P.3d 858 (2021). 	“Relief by way of collateral attack is
extraordinary,” and the “bases . . . for collateral attack are limited because
‘[c]ollateral relief undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades the
prominence of trial, and sometimes costs society the right to punish admitted
offenders.’” State v. Basra, 10 Wn. App. 2d 279, 287, 448 P.3d 107 (2019) (final
alteration in original) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Hagler, 97 Wn.2d 818, 824,
650 P.2d 1103 (1982)).
To 	obtain 	collateral 	relief, 	“a 	defendant 	must 	either 	show 	that 	a
constitutional error actually prejudiced them or that a nonconstitutional error
amounted to ‘a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.’”
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/5
- 5 -
State v. Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d 528, 533, 541 P.3d 415 (quoting In re Pers.
Restraint of Elmore, 162 Wn.2d 236, 251, 172 P.3d 335 (2007)), review denied, 3
Wn.3d 1007 (2024). 	A miscalculated offender score is a nonconstitutional error.
In re Pers. Restraint of Fletcher, ___ Wn.3d ___, 552 P.3d 302, 314 (2024).
Accordingly, Drake needed to show that including the Blake offense in his offender
score amounted to a fundamental defect resulting in a “complete miscarriage of
justice.” Id.
There are few cases elaborating on the “complete miscarriage of justice”
standard, and Division Three of this court recently observed that, “[o]utside of very
general statements, [it found] no Washington authority describing standards for
determining when nonconstitutional errors . . . will result in a petitioner being
granted collateral relief.” 	In re Pers. Restraint of Quintero, 29 Wn. App. 2d 254,
309, 541 P.3d 1007 (2024) (footnote omitted). That said, it is well established that
the standard for collateral relief based on a nonconstitutional error is more
demanding than the “actual and substantial prejudice” standard for constitutional
error, which already presents a high barrier to relief. See In re Pers. Restraint of
Wolf, 196 Wn. App. 496, 507, 384 P.3d 591 (2016) (“[A] collateral attack
undermines the strong interest of the courts in finality, and that interest justifies the
high and sometimes very difficult actual and substantial prejudice standard.”); In
re 	Pers. 	Restraint 	of 	Davis, 	152 	Wn.2d 	647, 	672, 	101 	P.3d 	1 	(2004)
(“Nonconstitutional error 	requires 	more 	than 	a mere showing of 	prejudice.”
(emphasis added)); In re Pers. Restraint of Call, 144 Wn.2d 315, 329 n.57, 28 P.3d
709 (2001) (the “burden is higher” for nonconstitutional errors than those of
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/6
- 6 -
constitutional magnitude); In re Pers. Restraint of Stockwell, 179 Wn.2d 588, 611,
316 P.3d 1007 (2014) (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring) (“[N]onconstitutional
errors [are] subject to a far more demanding prejudice inquiry.”).
It is also well established that the defendant bears the burden to prove a
complete miscarriage of justice by a preponderance of the evidence. 	In re Pers.
Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). 	Furthermore, the
defendant may not rely on bald assertions and conclusory allegations to meet that
burden. 	See State v. Cervantes, 169 Wn. App. 428, 434, 282 P.3d 98 (2012)
(explaining “bald, self-serving statement[s] without corroboration” insufficient for
relief under CrR 7.8); CrR 7.8(c)(1) (motion must “stat[e] the grounds upon which
relief is asked, and [be] supported by affidavits setting forth a concise statement of
the facts or errors upon which the motion is based”).
This court’s review of a trial court’s denial of a CrR 7.8 motion is “‘limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying [the] motion.’”
Pascuzzi, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 533 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Larranaga,
126 Wn. App. 505, 509, 108 P.3d 833 (2005)). “A trial court abuses its discretion
if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on ‘untenable grounds, or for
untenable reasons.’” 	In re Pers. Restraint of Duncan, 167 Wn.2d 398, 402, 219
P.3d 666 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayer v. Sto Indus.,
Inc., 156 Wn.2d 677, 684, 132 P.3d 115 (2006)).
II. 	Denial of CrR 7.8 Motion for Resentencing
Drake argues that by denying his CrR 7.8 motion, the trial court abused its
discretion for a number of reasons. We disagree.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/7
- 7 -
Drake first cites In re Personal Restraint of Goodwin4 for the proposition that
a defendant establishes a complete miscarriage of justice by “show[ing] that the
sentence imposed upon him was longer than it should have been,” and he asserts
that “it is undisputed that [his] sentence . . . was nine months longer than it should
have been.” But the record citations Drake provides do not support that this point
is undisputed. 	One citation is to the part of the show cause hearing where the
State conceded only that Drake’s CrR 7.8 motion did not need to be transferred to
this court.5 Another is to Drake’s own reply in the trial court in support of his motion
for resentencing.
Furthermore, Goodwin is inapposite. There, Goodwin was sentenced to the
high end of the standard range based on a miscalculated offender score. 	See
Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d at 864 (noting standard range was 36-48 months on one
4 146 Wn.2d 861, 868, 50 P.3d 618 (2002)
5 See CrR 7.8(c)(2) (requiring the trial court, under certain circumstances, to transfer a CrR
7.8 motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition). It is undisputed that the
trial court properly retained Drake’s CrR 7.8 motion for consideration on the merits, rather than
transferring it to this court.
At oral argument before this court, Drake argued that he is entitled to resentencing under
the “plain language” of CrR 7.8(c)(2) Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, State v. Drake, No.
84923-9-I (July 24, 2024), at 0 min., 45 sec.; 6 min., 19 sec., video recording by TVW,
Washington State’s 	Public 	Affairs 	Network, 	https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-
2024071139/?eventID=2024071139. That rule provides the following:
A defendant is entitled to relief under [CrR 7.8(c)(2)(i)] where the person
(A) is serving a sentence for a conviction under a statute determined to be void,
invalid, or unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court, the Washington
Supreme Court, or an appellate court where review either was not sought or was
denied or (B) is serving a sentence that was calculated under RCW 9.94A.525
[governing offender score calculations] using a prior or current conviction based
on such a statute.
CrR 7.8(c)(2).
But Drake did not raise this argument in briefing before the trial court or on appeal. Cf.
State v. Kirwin, 137 Wn. App. 387, 394, 153 P.3d 883 (2007) (“Absent a change in applicable law,
we will not consider an issue raised for the first time during oral argument.”), aff’d, 165 Wn.2d 818,
203 P.3d 1044 (2009). 	Regardless, we are unpersuaded that CrR 7.8(c)(2), which governs
transfers to this court, relieves a defendant claiming nonconstitutional error from demonstrating a
complete miscarriage of justice.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/8
- 8 -
count and 0-12 months on other, and Goodwin was sentenced to 48 months and
12 months plus one day, respectively). 	On collateral review, our Supreme Court
held that Goodwin was entitled to resentencing “using a correct offender score.”
Id. at 877-78. 	In doing so, it did state that “a sentence that is based upon an
incorrect offender score is a fundamental defect that inherently results in a
miscarriage of justice.” 	Id. at 868. 	But, as the State points out in its briefing on
appeal, Goodwin simply did not reach the issue that is presented here: whether a
defendant can establish a complete miscarriage of justice based on an offender
score that was incorrect at the time of sentencing but, due to an intervening
conviction, was correct at the time the defendant sought collateral relief and would
remain correct at resentencing.
Next, and to that end, Drake contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by considering what would happen at resentencing, rather than asking
whether 	Drake 	suffered 	a 	complete 	miscarriage 	of 	justice 	at 	his 	original
sentencing. 	Drake points out that in the context of a constitutional sentencing
error, the inquiry into whether a defendant has shown actual and substantial
prejudice is backward looking. 	For example, in In re Personal Restraint of
Meippen, 	where 	the 	petitioner 	argued 	the 	sentencing 	court 	committed
constitutional error by failing to comply with the holding set out in State v. Houston-
Sconiers,6 our Supreme Court denied relief because the petitioner did not present
any evidence that the sentencing court “would have imposed a lesser sentence”
6 188 Wn.2d 1, 9, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) (holding a court sentencing a juvenile must take
defendant’s youthfulness into account and “must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they
want below otherwise applicable . . . ranges and/or sentencing enhancements”).
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/9
- 9 -
had it complied. 	Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 317, 440 P.3d 978 (2019); cf. In re
Pers. Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 268-69, 474 P.3d 524 (2020)
(petitioner established prejudice where he showed that “[m]ore likely than not, [he]
would have received a lesser sentence” had the sentencing court not committed
constitutional error).
But 	again, 	the 	“complete 	miscarriage 	of 	justice” 	standard 	for
nonconstitutional errors is more demanding of defendants than the “actual and
substantial prejudice” standard for constitutional errors.7 See Davis, 152 Wn.2d at
672. 	Drake cites no authority for the proposition that, in applying the more
demanding standard, the trial court was precluded from considering the totality of
the circumstances, including the fact that, at resentencing, it would be required to
consider Drake’s subsequent criminal history. 	Contrary to Drake’s contention on
this issue, RCW 9.94A.525(22) expressly states the following:
The fact that a prior conviction was not included in an
offender’s offender score or criminal history at a previous sentencing
shall have no bearing on whether it is included in the criminal history
or offender score for the current offense. . . . Prior convictions that
were not included in criminal history or in the offender score shall be
included upon resentencing to ensure imposition of an accurate
sentence.
Moreover, even if the trial court was required to focus on what the original
sentencing court would have done, Drake cites no support in the record for his
assertion that “the original sentencing court would most likely have imposed a
shorter sentence, had it properly calculated his offender score.” As noted, Drake
says his sentence was “nine months longer than it should have been.” But he does
7 The State suggests in its brief that Drake must satisfy both standards. That is incorrect.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/10
- 10 -
not articulate why this “should” have been the case, much less establish that the
sentencing court more likely than not would have agreed with him on this point.
He assumes that, because his base sentences were concurrent and the low end
of the standard range on Count I would have been 129 months instead of 138
months had his offender score been correct, his total sentence would have been
201 months (129 months + 72 months for the firearm enhancement) instead of 210
months (138 months + 72 months for the firearm enhancement).
But this assumption glosses over the fact that the 138-month base sentence
on Count I was consistent with what the prosecutor agreed to recommend under
the parties’ plea agreement. See State v. MacDonald, 183 Wn.2d 1, 8, 346 P.3d
748 (2015) (plea agreement is a binding contract between State and defendant).
Drake provided no evidence with his CrR 7.8 motion to show what if any impact
his offender score had on the prosecutor’s recommendation or the sentencing
court’s decision. He did not present any evidence about the plea negotiations or
his original sentencing hearing such as, for example, evidence that the prosecutor
would have recommended—and the sentencing court would have imposed—a
lower sentence, or that, had the prosecutor made the same recommendation, the
sentencing court would have rejected it and sentenced Drake to the low end of the
correct sentencing range.
Drake also did not address whether and to what extent the terms of his plea
factor into the “complete miscarriage of justice” inquiry. 	In that regard, Drake’s
plea agreement was quite favorable. 	According to a probable cause affidavit,
Drake broke into the home of Erik Burnett on November 24, 2009 and shot Burnett
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/11
- 11 -
three times while he was asleep in his bed with his girlfriend and their infant child.
The State initially charged Drake with assault in the first degree and burglary in the
first degree—both of which are deemed most serious, or “strike” offenses under
the SRA. 	See former RCW 9.94A.030(30)(a) (2009) (providing that class A
felonies are most serious offenses); former RCW 9A.36.011(2) (1997) (“Assault in
the first degree is a class A felony.”); RCW 9A.52.020(2) (“Burglary in the first
degree is a class A felony.”). 	Drake’s criminal history included a prior strike
offense, a 2004 conviction for assault in the second degree, putting him at greater
risk 	under 	the 	persistent 	offender 	accountability 	act. 	See 	former 	RCW
9.94A.030(35)(a)(ii) 	(2009) 	(persistent 	offender 	is 	one 	who 	has, before the
commission of a current most serious offense, “been convicted as an offender on
at least two separate occasions . . . of felonies that under the laws of this state
would be considered most serious offenses and would be included in the offender
score”); former RCW 9.94A.030(30)(b) (2009) (assault in the second degree is a
most serious offense). 	Additionally, the State included firearm enhancement
allegations on both the assault charge and burglary charge, each of which would
run 	consecutively 	to 	the 	base 	sentences 	and 	each 	other. 	See 	RCW
9.94A.533(3)(e) 	(“Notwithstanding 	any 	other 	provision 	of 	law, 	all 	firearm
enhancements 	under 	this 	section 	are 	mandatory, 	shall 	be 	served 	in 	total
confinement, and shall run consecutively to all other sentencing provisions,
including 	other 	firearm 	or 	deadly 	weapon 	enhancements, 	for 	all 	offenses
sentenced under [the SRA].”).
In exchange for Drake’s guilty plea, the State not only reduced the charge
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/12
- 12 -
on Count II from burglary in the first degree to residential burglary, a non-strike
class B felony,8 but also removed the firearm allegation from Count I entirely. The
State also agreed to dismiss or not file a separate charge for unlawful possession
of a firearm in the first degree arising from the same incident with Burnett. And, it
agreed to dismiss or not file additional burglary and residential burglary charges
that would have double scored against one another and against Drake’s conviction
on Count II. See former RCW 9.94A.525(16) (2008) (“If the present conviction is
for Burglary 2 or residential burglary, count priors as in [RCW 9.94A.525(7)];
however, count two points for each . . . prior Burglary 1 conviction, and two points
for each . . . prior Burglary 2 or residential burglary conviction.”); see also former
RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a) (2002) (offender scores generally calculated by treating “all
other current and prior convictions as if they were prior convictions”).
In short, even if Drake were correct about the relevant point in time for the
trial court’s analysis, he fails to show that it was manifestly unreasonable for the
trial court to conclude that Drake’s original sentence did not constitute a complete
miscarriage of justice. 	Cf. Quintero, 29 Wn. App. 2d at 309-10 (observing that,
under federal habeas corpus standards, a petitioner alleging nonconstitutional
error must show that the error “amount[s] to something akin to a denial of due
process”); Fletcher, 552 P.3d at 315 (offender score error resulted in complete
miscarriage of justice where sentencing calculations were “dramatically incorrect”
and there was “high probability that the mistake affected the original sentence”).
Drake next points out that, in denying his CrR 7.8 motion, the trial court
8 RCW 9A.52.025(2); see also former RCW 9.94A.030(30) (2009) (listing strike offenses at
time of offense at issue here).
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/13
- 13 -
stated that “there is an issue in considering what may have transpired ten years
later that may now provide the basis for an exceptional sentence.” 	According to
Drake, the trial court “appears to have concluded that Mr. Drake would have been
precluded, 	in 	a 	resentencing 	hearing, 	from 	citing 	any 	post-conviction
developments in a bid for an exceptional sentence below the standard range,” and
he asserts that “[t]his was error.” But Drake takes the trial court’s statement out of
context. 	The trial court stated that “when the [c]ourt is looking at whether there
would have been a different outcome at the time, I think that there is an issue in
considering what may have transpired ten years later that may now provide the
basis for an exceptional sentence.” 	(Emphasis added.) 	That is, it made the
unremarkable observation that, to the extent it was asking what the original
sentencing court would have done, it would be incongruous to consider events that
transpired some ten years later. 	The trial court’s comment is not a basis for
reversal.
Finally, Drake points out that resentencing would give him the opportunity
to request an exceptional sentence below the standard range on the grounds that
he served a “lengthy term of confinement” on the Blake offense and his base
sentence was “clearly excessive” due to the mandatory doubling of his firearm
enhancement.9 As a preliminary matter, this first contention is effectively a request
to credit time served as a result of the 2007 conviction that was later invalidated
by Blake against crimes committed years later. 	But a collateral attack on the
judgment and sentence herein is not a proper vehicle for challenging the sentence
9 The State correctly points out that Drake cited only medical issues in the trial court as a
basis for his anticipated request for an exceptional sentence below his standard range.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 84923-9-I/14
- 14 -
imposed on Drake’s earlier Blake offense. 	Nor has he offered any authority that
would support a trial court’s deviation from the standard ranges of the SRA in order
to “correct” a conviction and sentence under a statute that was later invalidated.
And, as the trial court observed, Drake’s current term of confinement is already at
the low end of what would remain the standard range at resentencing due to
Drake’s his 2011 theft conviction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it concluded that not giving Drake an opportunity to request an even shorter
exceptional sentence would be a complete miscarriage of justice that warrants
disturbing a long final judgment.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.