Del Ray Properties, Inc., Dba Del Ray Mobile Home Park, Respondent V. Kim Elliott, Appellant

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
DEL RAY PROPERTIES, INC., No. 49969-0-II
Respondent,
v.
KIM M. ELLIOT, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
SUTTON, J. — Kim M. Elliott appeals the superior court’s judgment in favor of Del Ray
Properties for unpaid rent Elliott owed for space in Del Ray’s mobile home park. Elliott argues
that the superior court erred by modifying its initial ruling in her favor because Del Ray failed to
comply with CR 59’s 10-day deadline to file a motion to reconsider. And Elliott argues that the
superior court’s finding of fact, that Del Ray failed to act in good faith in attempting to collect the
unpaid rent and evict her, bars any judgment in Del Ray’s favor under the Mobile Home Landlord-
Tenant Act (MHLTA), chapter 59.20 RCW. Finally, Elliott claims that as the prevailing party she
is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal. Because the superior
court had not entered written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final judgment related to
its initial ruling in Elliot’s favor, the superior court did not err by modifying its initial ruling. The
MHLTA’s requirement that a party act in good faith does not bar judgment in Del Ray’s favor.
Therefore, we affirm the superior court’s judgment in favor of Del Ray.
Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
June 12, 2018

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FACTS
Elliot occupied a mobile home placed on a space in Del Ray’s mobile home park. After a
dispute arose over unpaid rent, Del Ray filed an unlawful detainer action to evict Elliott. Del Ray
also alleged that Elliott was not a proper tenant of the mobile home park.
In December 2014, Del Ray obtained a default judgment in the amount of $3,107.00 and a
writ of restitution against Elliott. The superior court later vacated the judgment and quashed the
writ of restitution. Del Ray then filed motion for summary judgment. In June 2015, the superior
granted Del Ray’s motion for summary judgment on the unlawful detainer action and issued
another writ of restitution against Elliott. Finally, the superior court awarded Del Ray all unpaid
rent owed by Elliott, awarded late fees, and awarded Del Ray reasonable attorney fees. Elliott
filed a motion to reconsider and a motion to stay the writ of restitution. The superior court denied
both motions.
Del Ray then filed a motion to amend the order granting summary judgment to include a
specific amount of unpaid rent owed. Elliott responded that Del Ray had obtained the writ through
fraud and that it had knowingly overstated the amount of unpaid rent due. Ultimately, the superior
court ordered a trial on the amount of unpaid rent owed.
On March 22, 2016, following a bench trial, the superior court entered a written ruling in
favor of Elliot (March 22 ruling). Regarding the unlawful detainer action and the superior court’s
summary judgment granted in Del Ray’s favor, the superior court stated, in relevant part,
1. At the time the original summary judgment was granted, it appears that there was
no past due rent upon which to enter that judgment.
. . . .
3. Neither party appears to have complied with RCW 59.20.073 in any substantial
way.

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. . . .
5. Allegations were made at the time of the summary judgment that in excess of
$9,000.00 was due, which at time of trial proved to be a false assertion. It would
appear that the summary judgment was granted without factual basis.
. . . .
Based upon the foregoing findings and analysis, the court is left with an eviction
that likely should not have been granted.
The landlord [Del Ray] has acted throughout these proceedings in bad faith in
contravention of RCW 59.20.010 which impacts its ability to pursue remedies
under the chapter.
Restoration of the tenancy to the defendant [Elliott] is procedurally foreclosed, and
under the circumstances would be a poor resolution.
The landlord [Del Ray] remains in possession of the tenant’s [Elliott’s] mobile
home. It is unknown what the current condition of the mobile home is. No evidence
was introduced to indicate the mobile home had declined in value from its purchase
price of $12,000 during the time prior to the eviction.
The tenant [Elliott] has lost the use and enjoyment of that property for
approximately 10 months. It is unknown if the tenant has incurred additional rental
expenses. The court will need documentation of any rental expense incurred by the
tenant [Elliott] that would be in excess of the $415.00 per month.
. . . .
The court will entertain briefs from the parties as to what, if any, credit against the
judgment the landlord [Del Ray] may be entitled to for storage. The court will also
consider whether any credit should be offset by the tenant’s [Elliott’s] loss of use.
As the Defendant [Elliott] is the prevailing party in this matter, she shall be entitled
to reasonable attorney fees in an amount to be determined by the court upon
submission of documentation of same.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 285-88.
On May 19, after Elliott filed proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed
judgment, Del Ray filed a “Response to Defendant’s Proposed Judgment” and objected to various
aspects of the proposed findings and conclusions based on the court’s ruling. On May 20, the
superior court issued a written supplemental ruling that substantially changed portions of the
March 22 ruling.

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After determining the correct amount of unpaid rent, storage fees, and late fees due by
Elliott through November 2016, the superior court granted judgment in favor of Del Ray. The
court ordered that Elliott retain ownership of the mobile home, and because both parties prevailed
on some of their claims, the court ordered that all parties were required to pay their own attorney
fees and costs. The superior court made a specific finding of fact that the “landlord did not act in
good faith.” CP at 328. In the May 20 ruling, the superior court specifically stated,
The parties can consider this a final ruling from which to file the motions to
reconsider discussed at today’s presentation, so the CR 59 timelines will commence
[on] this date.
CP at 328.
On January 13, 2017, the superior court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of
law consistent with its May 20 ruling. The superior court also entered a final judgment in favor of
Del Ray. Elliott appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. MODIFICATION OF THE MARCH 22 RULING
Elliott argues that the superior court erred by modifying its March 22 ruling because Del
Ray did not file a timely motion for reconsideration under CR 59. Because the superior court’s
March 22 letter ruling was not reduced to written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final
judgment, the superior court did not err by later modifying its ruling.
CR 59(b) states,
A motion for a new trial or for reconsideration shall be filed not later than 10 days
after the entry of the judgment, order, or other decision. The motion shall be noted
at the time it is filed, to be heard or otherwise considered within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment, order, or other decision, unless the court directs otherwise.

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A motion for a new trial or for reconsideration shall identify the specific
reasons in fact and law as to each ground on which the motion is based.
The superior court’s March 22 ruling did not trigger the 10-day deadline to file a motion to
reconsider under CR 59. As Division Three of this court has explained,
Washington case law has long considered letter rulings as preliminary or
tentative decisions subject to change before a final decision that begins the time for
an appeal or motion for reconsideration. Although a court’s oral opinion or written
memorandum of opinion may be considered in interpreting the court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law and amounts to an informal expression of opinion when
rendered, the oral or written opinions have no final and binding effect unless
formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions and judgment. Even a written
memorandum opinion filed prior to the entry of a formal judgment or order does
not deprive the trial court of the power to change its indicated ruling.
In re Marriage of Tahat, 182 Wn. App. 655, 672, 334 P.3d 1131 (2014) (citations omitted).
Therefore, a “letter ruling does not commence the 10 day[]” deadline to file a motion to reconsider
under CR 59. Tahat, 182 Wn. App. at 675.
Here, the superior court’s March 22 ruling was a tentative letter ruling that did not trigger
the 10-day deadline under CR 59. The superior court’s March 22 ruling did not fully resolve all
issues and its ruling was subject to additional consideration by the superior court based on the
additional briefing and arguments to be presented by the parties. And, if the superior court had
intended the March 22 ruling to constitute a final decision for purposes of the 10-day deadline to
file a motion to reconsider under CR 59, it clearly could have designated it as such, as it did with
its May 20 supplemental ruling. Because the March 22 ruling was a letter ruling and not a final
decision, the superior court was free to modify its decision until the entry of formal findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and a final judgment. Accordingly, the superior court did not err by
modifying its March 22 ruling.

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II. GOOD FAITH OBLIGATION
Elliott also argues that, because the superior court found that Del Ray did not act in good
faith, the superior court was precluded from entering any judgment in Del Ray’s favor. As
explained below, the failure to act in good faith bars only the exercise of a right or remedy that
requires performance of a condition precedent based on specific statutory provisions for a
particular claim. Because Elliott fails to identify a condition precedent to the collection of unpaid
rent which Del Ray was required to perform in good faith, RCW 59.20.020 does not bar the
superior court from entering judgment in Del Ray’s favor for unpaid rent owed by Elliott.
RCW 59.20.020 provides,
Every duty under this chapter and every act which must be performed as a
condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.
Elliott argues that this obligation of good faith bars judgment in favor of any party who fails to act
in good faith. Elliott relies exclusively on Ethridge v. Hwang, 105 Wn. App. 447, 20 P.3d 958
(2001) to support her argument that the failure to act in good faith precludes judgment in a party’s
favor.
In Ethridge, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the owner of a mobile home park,
unreasonably refused to permit the sale of the plaintiff’s mobile home under the MHLTA. 105
Wn. App. at 451-52. The defendant counterclaimed for unpaid rent. Ethridge, 105 Wn. App. at
452. A jury found in favor of the plaintiff for the violation of the MHLTA, but found in favor of
the defendant on the claim for unpaid rent. Ethridge, 105 Wn. App. at 452. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with various provisions of the MHLTA
barred her claim because she had acted in bad faith. Ethridge, 105 Wn. App. at 454. The court

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disagreed and held that the failure to comply with the statutory provisions only affects the rights
and remedies in those specific provisions. Ethridge, 105 Wn. App. at 454. Ethridge does not
support Elliott’s argument that RCW 59.20.020 bars a party from being awarded judgment if the
party acts in bad faith. Therefore, we must look to the statute itself to determine if it bars the
superior court from entering judgment in Del Ray’s favor.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners
Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). When interpreting a statute, we first look to
the statute’s plain meaning. Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 526. We discern the statute’s plain meaning by
looking at the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute, and the statutory
scheme as a whole. Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 526. “If the statute is unambiguous after a review of the
plain meaning, the court’s inquiry is at an end.” Lake, 169 Wn.2d at 526.
The plain language of RCW 59.20.020 specifically imposes an obligation of good faith on
any condition precedent that is required to exercise a right or remedy under the MHLTA. Here,
Elliott has failed to identify a specific condition precedent to the collection of unpaid rent that Del
Ray has failed to perform in good faith. And to the extent that Del Ray acted in bad faith in
attempting to collect amounts of unpaid rent that were not actually due, the superior court did not
allow Del Ray to collect those amounts. Therefore, the superior court did not err by granting
judgment in favor of Del Ray for the amount of unpaid rent actually owed despite its finding that
Del Ray did not act in good faith.

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ATTORNEY FEES
Elliott also argues that she should be awarded attorney fees for trial. Both Elliott and Del
Ray request an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal. The MHLTA provides that “[i]n any
action arising out of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs.” RCW 59.20.110.
Elliott argues that she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees at trial because the
superior court’s March 22 ruling designated her as the prevailing party. However, as explained
above, the superior court did not err by modifying the March 22 ruling. Based on the superior
court’s final written findings of fact and conclusions of law, neither Elliott nor Del Ray are the
prevailing party because both parties prevailed to some extent (Del Ray prevailed on its claim that
Elliott owed unpaid rent, but Elliott prevailed by showing she did not owe the full amount Del Ray
claimed).1 Therefore, Elliott is not entitled to an award of attorney fees at trial.
And on appeal, Del Ray is the prevailing party. Therefore, despite the fact that Del Ray
does not challenge the superior court’s finding that it acted in bad faith, Del Ray is entitled to an
award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal under RCW 59.20.110.
1 We also note that Elliott does not assign error to any of the superior court’s findings of fact.
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities of appeal. Humphrey Indus., Ltd. v. Clay Street Assocs.,
LLC, 176 Wn.2d 662, 675, 295 P.3d 231 (2013).

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We affirm the superior court’s judgment and award Del Ray its reasonable attorney fees
on appeal.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
SUTTON, J.
We concur:
WORSWICK, P.J.
BJORGEN, J.