Forest v. Hall

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION
Bennington Unit Case No. 21-CV-01852
207 South St
Bennington VT 05201
802-447-2700
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Stephanie Forest v. Lucas Hall et al

ENTRY REGARDING MOTION
Title: Motion to Amend; Motion to Strike or Alter Judgment; Motion for Hearing
(Motion: 9; 10; 11)
Filer: George E. Gay; Andrew C. Boxer; Andrew C. Boxer
Filed Date: March 20, 2025; April 01, 2025; April 01, 2025

This case involves Plaintiff Stephanie Forest (Forest) suing Defendant Police Officers
Lucas Hall (Hall) and Ryan Gardner (Gardner) for using excessive force during a traffic stop.
Forest plans to introduce expert opinion testimony about police practices from Dr. Christopher
Chapman at trial. On February 20, 2025, Hall filed a Motion in Limine to Strike the Expert
Report and Anticipated Testimony of Expert Christopher Chapman. Hall asserts that Dr.
Chapman impermissibly opines on ultimate legal conclusions, weighs witness credibility, and
offers irrelevant policy compliance considerations. Forest did not respond to the Motion and the
Court granted the Motion on March 17, 2025. Forest filed a Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment (Reconsider) and Request for Hearing on March 20, 2025, asking this Court to
reconsider its decision. In response, Hall filed a Combined Motion to Strike and Response in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and Request for a Hearing.

The ruling on the motions, for the reasons herein, is:

1. Forest’s Motion to Alter or Amend and Request for Hearing is granted in part and denied
in part.
2. Hall’s Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part.
Discussion
I. The Court will consider Forest’s Motion.
Forest’s reconsideration motion is not a Rule 59(e) motion. A Rule 59(e) motion may be
filed after the entry of final judgment. See V.R.C.P. 58 (entry of judgment). A decision on a
motion in limine does not put the case in a post-judgment phase. It remains in an interlocutory
phase until final judgment is entered. While the case remains in an interlocutory phase, the
Court retains intrinsic authority to revisit its earlier decisions. It is typically called upon to do so
by an ordinary motion for reconsideration. See Cho v. State, 168 P.3d 17, 27 (Haw. 2007).

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“The standard for granting [a motion to reconsider] is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995). “[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to
relitigate an issue already decided.” Id. “Additional facts and arguments that should have been
raised in the first instance are not appropriate grounds for a motion for reconsideration.” Rossi v.
Troy State Univ., 330 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2002).

While the above precedents inform the Court’s review, as Rule 54(b) provides, the Court
retains extremely broad discretion to reconsider its interlocutory orders. V.R.C.P. 54(b)
(interlocutory orders “subject to revision at any time” prior to entry of final judgment); see
Drumheller v. Drumheller, 2009 VT 23, ¶ 36, 185 Vt. 417.

Here, the previous Motion was unopposed, so the Court granted the Motion to Strike the
Expert Report. In its discretion, the Court will consider the motion to reconsider its previous
interlocutory order since the Court now has the benefit of both Forest’s and Hall’s arguments on
the matter.

II. The request for a hearing is denied because the Court can rule based
on the motion papers.
Both parties have requested that this Court hold a hearing on this matter. V.R.C.P.
7(b)(5) provides that the Court “may hold oral argument on [a] motion or may dispose of [a]
motion without argument.” see SynEcology Partners, L3C v. Bus. RunTime, Inc., 2016 VT 29, ¶
27, 201 Vt. 424 (noting that the civil rules give the trial court discretion to decline oral argument
on motions in all cases citing Shaw v. Barnes, 166 Vt. 610, 610 (1997) (mem.)). Here, the Court
has been briefed by both parties on this matter and can rule on the motion papers. Accordingly,
the request for a hearing on this matter is denied.

III. Dr. Chapman may testify at trial and embrace ultimate issues but
cannot make legal conclusions in his testimony.
Evidence must at least be relevant to be admissible. V.R.E. 401 provides that relevant
evidence has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” See also State v. Picknell, 142 Vt. 215, 230 (1982). “All relevant evidence is
admissible …. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” V.R.E. 402.

The Supreme Court of Vermont has adopted the United States Supreme Court ruling in
Daubert, which outlines the admissibility of expert testimony. State v. Streich, 163 Vt. 331, 342
(1995). In Daubert, the Court held that the trial judge determines whether to allow an expert
witness to testify based on a finding of relevance and reliability. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). The Court acknowledged that the trial judge is a gatekeeper
who must “ensur[e] that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and a relevant
to the task at hand.” Id. at 597. Indeed, “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite

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misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.” Id. at 595. This framework has been
codified in V.R.E. 702, which provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Moreover, V.R.E. 704 states that “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact.” The Court has also concluded that since our rules of evidence are “essentially
identical to the federal ones on admissibility and scientific evidence” it makes sense to adopt
admissibility principles similar to those used in the federal courts. State v. Brooks, 162 Vt. 26,
30 (1993).

Concerning police practices, expert testimony must be helpful to the jury, more probative
than prejudicial, and free of legal conclusions or factual determinations. See Fate v. Vill. of
Spring Valley, No. 11 CIV. 6838 JPO, 2013 WL 2649548, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2013).
While not required under Vermont law, expert testimony can be used to establish the necessary
standard of care a police officer must exercise when using force to make an arrest. See Coll v.
Johnson, 161 Vt. 163, 164 (1993). That said, there are limits as to what these experts may
conclude in their testimony to avoid usurping the Court and jury from making legal and factual
determinations, respectively.

Second Circuit caselaw informs this decision. That court has ruled that expert testimony
about police conduct in an excessive force civil suit that expresses a legal conclusion must be
excluded. Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363 (2d Cir. 1992). There, William Hygh sued police
officer William Jacobs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations related to his arrest,
claiming excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Id. at 361. At trial, Hygh
introduced expert witness testimony from Professor Terry Cox, an expert on law enforcement
practices. Id. The court took issue with Professor Cox’s testimony that the officer’s conduct was
not “justified under the circumstances,” not “warranted under the circumstances,” and “totally
improper.” Id. at 364. The court reasoned that this testimony was improper and essentially told
the jury what conclusion to reach. Id. The court also noted that expert testimony remains
objectionable by communicating a legal standard—explicit or implicit—to the jury. Id. (citing
Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 882 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1989)).

As such, Dr. Chapman may not testify about his legal conclusions or matters left for the
jury, like whether the force used was “justified” or “warranted.” Dr. Chapman may not testify
about the meanings of legal terms such as reasonable suspicion or probable cause since these are
legal terms that Vermont has defined in statute and caselaw.

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Additionally, Dr. Chapman may not make credibility determinations. “Credibility of
witnesses is the sole province of the factfinder and not a proper subject for expert testimony….”
State v. Wetherbee, 156 Vt. 425, 431–32 (1991). Thus, Dr. Chapman cannot testify about if Hall
believed that Forest engaged in unlawful activity or perceived Forest as a threat.

Conversely, Dr. Chapman may testify as to matters like police training and standards and
whether, in his opinion, the Defendants acted in conformance with those standards. These
insights and will allow the jury to draw inferences from the testimony. Likewise, the jury can
disregard the testimony and give it little to no weight. Moreover, Dr. Chapman may testify as to
the standard that a reasonable officer would be held to in the same situation.

While the Court is allowing Dr. Chapman’s testimony, Defendants are not at all
precluded from making objections at trial. Dr. Hall’s expert report may be amended to reflect
this decision.

Conclusion

The Motions are granted in part and denied in part. Dr. Chapman can testify but may not
make legal conclusions or credibility determinations. Dr. Chapman is allowed to testify as to
police practices, standards, and training that is helpful to the jury as factfinders. He may also
testify as to what a reasonable officer would do in the same situation.

Signed electronically May 15, 2025 pursuant to V.R.E.F 9(d).

_________________________________________
David Barra
Superior Court Judge

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