Page Wheelock v. Alexander Dobbs

VERMONT SUPREME COURT Case No. 22-AP-196
109 State Street
Montpelier VT 05609-0801
802-828-4774
www.vermontjudiciary.org

Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-
appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

FEBRUARY TERM, 2023

Page Wheelock v. Alexander Dobbs* } APPEALED FROM:
} Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
} Family Division
} CASE NO. 22-FA-01966
Trial Judge: Kirstin K. Schoonover

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Defendant appeals the final relief-from-abuse order entered by the family division. We
affirm.

In July 2022, plaintiff filed a complaint for relief from abuse against defendant. The
court held a final hearing at which both parties testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court made the following findings on the record. The court found that the parties were in a
romantic relationship, on and off, for about a year. Plaintiff repeatedly tried to end the
relationship, but defendant would not comply with her requests for him to leave her alone.
Defendant would sit by the door in her bedroom and not allow plaintiff to leave, making plaintiff
feel trapped. He would escalate, causing her to “freeze.” Plaintiff eventually brought
defendant’s belongings to his house and told him that she did not want him to come back.
Defendant subsequently went to her house and left things in her car. He then came back with a
truck and followed her across her farm while she told him to leave. She finally barricaded
herself in a tack room to get away from him. On another occasion, plaintiff agreed to help
defendant by driving him to his car. She told him to go home afterward, and he instead drove to
her home, went away, and then came back a second time uninvited. Plaintiff blocked
defendant’s numerous texts but did not block him on Facebook. He viewed this as an invitation
to continue sending her messages.

The court found that defendant did not hit plaintiff or threaten her with physical abuse.
However, it concluded that defendant had, on at least two occasions, followed plaintiff after she
asked him to leave her alone, and that this and defendant’s other behaviors caused plaintiff
substantial emotional distress including panic attacks and nightmares. The court concluded that
defendant had stalked plaintiff and ordered defendant to stay at least 300 feet away from plaintiff
for one year.

On appeal, defendant argues that plaintiff exaggerated the truth and that he did not stalk
her. He alleges that since the stalking order was issued, plaintiff and her friends have been
harassing him and his personal and professional reputation has been harmed. He argues that he
was prevented from presenting important evidence at the hearing that would have undermined
plaintiff’s claims. He argues that plaintiff lied at various points in her testimony and that the
judge erred in finding her to be credible. He asserts that he does not wish to have any further
contact with plaintiff and only wants the order lifted to clear his name.

“In matters of personal relations, such as abuse prevention, the family court is in a unique
position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the strength of evidence at hearing.”
Raynes v. Rogers, 2008 VT 52, ¶ 9, 183 Vt. 513. Accordingly, we review the court’s decision to
grant an abuse-prevention order “only for an abuse of discretion, upholding its findings if
supported by the evidence and its conclusions if supported by the findings.” Id.

A significant portion of defendant’s brief refers to events that allegedly took place after
the final hearing in this case, as well as evidence that he did not present at the hearing.
Defendant claims that these alleged facts undermine plaintiff’s testimony and require reversal of
the court’s order. We do not consider this information because the record on appeal is limited to
the evidence presented to the family division. V.R.A.P. 10(a) (defining what is included in
record on appeal). We note that defendant cites Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) at
several points in his brief. To the extent that defendant is asserting that the alleged incidents and
information constitute newly discovered evidence justifying relief from the court’s order, such a
claim would have to be presented by motion to the family division in the first instance.

Defendant also asserts “clerical error,” arguing that he was prevented from offering
important exhibits because he lost elevated access to the court’s electronic case-records system
prior to the hearing when he ended his employment at a law firm. We decline to reverse on this
basis because defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the alleged error. See
Lasek v. Vermont Vapor, Inc., 2014 VT 33, ¶ 24, 196 Vt. 243 (declining to reverse based on
error that did not affect outcome of case); V.R.C.P. 61 (stating harmless error does not require
reversal); V.R.F.P. 9(a)(1) (making civil rules applicable in relief-from-abuse proceedings).
According to defendant, the exhibits would have supported his claim that plaintiff gave him
mixed messages about whether she wanted contact. However, plaintiff admitted that there was
“some back and forth,” that she remained attracted to defendant, and that she missed him the first
time she attempted to break up with him. The court also found that the parties were in an on-
again, off-again relationship and that they were “entangled.” Accordingly, the exhibits appear to
be cumulative to evidence that was presented, and defendant has not demonstrated that they
would have significantly affected the court’s findings.

Defendant contends that plaintiff lied or exaggerated at various points in her testimony.
Essentially, he argues that the court should have believed his version of events instead of
plaintiff’s. “As the trier of fact, it was the province of the trial court to determine the credibility
of the witnesses and weigh the persuasiveness of the evidence.” Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485,
497 (1997). The trial court evidently found plaintiff to be credible in her testimony, which
supported the court’s findings. We decline to reweigh the evidence on appeal.

Finally, defendant appears to claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
of stalking. We disagree. Stalking “means to engage purposefully in a course of conduct”
directed at a specific person that the defendant knows would cause a reasonable person to fear
for his or her safety or suffer substantial emotional distress. 12 V.S.A. § 5131(6); 15 V.S.A.
§ 1101(1)(D). A course of conduct requires “two or more acts over a period of time, however
short, in which a person follows, monitors, surveils, threatens, or makes threats about another

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person, or interferes with another person’s property.” 12 V.S.A. § 5131(1)(A). Here, the court
found that on at least two occasions, defendant followed plaintiff after she told him to leave her
alone. Plaintiff’s testimony supports this finding, and defendant effectively conceded at the
hearing that these events occurred. The court also found that defendant’s behavior was part of a
recurring pattern and that the behavior led to substantial emotional distress; plaintiff’s testimony
supports these findings as well. Because the court found that defendant’s behavior met the
definition of stalking, it was required to issue a protective order. 15 V.S.A. § 1103(c)(1).

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

William D. Cohen, Associate Justice

Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice

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