Cheryl A. Greenfield v Bruce R. Greenfield

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
CHERYL A. GREENFIELD
v. 	Record No. 0381-95-4 	MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
BRUCE R. GREENFIELD 	NOVEMBER 7, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
William D. Hamblen, Judge
Robert B. Machen for appellant.
Alan B. Frank (Lawson & Frank, on brief),
for appellee.
The appellant, Cheryl A. Greenfield ("wife"), appeals the
trial court's January 20, 1995 order requiring her to pay her
portion of a marital debt pursuant to a final decree of divorce
entered March 18, 1994, nunc pro tunc to January 24, 1994.
Finding no error, we affirm the trial court's decision.
On June 11, 1992, the wife filed a bill of complaint seeking
a divorce from the appellee, Bruce R. Greenfield ("husband"), in
the Circuit Court of Prince William County. 	On July 7, 1993, the
husband's parents, Eric L. Greenfield and Odette A. Greenfield,
filed a motion for judgment against husband and wife in the
Circuit Court of Arlington County, alleging that the parties owed
$55,000 on a loan the husband's parents had made to them. 	On
August 6, 1993, this motion for judgment was dismissed with
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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prejudice.
During the equitable distribution hearing in Prince William
County, the trial court determined that the $55,000 claim of the
husband's parents was a marital debt and apportioned twenty-five
percent of the debt to the wife. 	The trial court entered a final
divorce decree on March 18, 1994, nunc pro tunc to January 24,
1994, incorporating its conclusion regarding the $55,000 debt.
The wife did not appeal the March 18, 1994 decree.
On July 29, 1994, the husband filed a motion seeking to
enforce that part of the final divorce decree. 	On January 20,
1995, the trial court ordered the wife to comply with the final
divorce decree and make payments directly to the husband's
parents.
The wife filed a timely appeal from the January 20, 1995
order, contending the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
enter an order requiring her to pay debts directly to the
husband's parents. 	The wife further contends that, in ordering
her to pay a portion of the $55,000 debt owed to the husband's
parents, the trial court failed to give full faith and credit to
the final order of the Arlington County Circuit Court and erred
by deciding an issue which was res judicata. 	The wife's final
argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by refusing to
allow wife's counsel to attach to the January 20, 1995 order, or
to proffer, documents allegedly consisting of the record from the
action at law filed by the husband's parents in the Arlington

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County Circuit Court.
The husband argues that consideration of the wife's
questions one and three on appeal is procedurally barred under
Rule 5A:25. 	He contends the formulation of the questions in the
wife's brief does not conform to the presentation of the
questions in her Statement of Questions Presented. 	For the
purposes of this decision, we shall assume, without deciding,
that the requirements of Rule 5A:25 have been met.
The wife argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction on
January 20, 1995 to order her to pay the husband's parents the
portion of the $55,000 debt the trial court apportioned to her in
its final decree entered March 18, 1994. 	She contends that the
trial court improperly reopened the divorce suit in violation of
Rule 1:1. 	This argument is without merit.
Jurisdiction in divorce suits is governed by statute. 	E.g.,
Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 341-42, 349 S.E.2d 422, 425
(1986). 	Code § 20-107.3(K) gives the trial court "continuing
authority and jurisdiction to make any additional orders
necessary to effectuate and enforce any order entered pursuant to
this section." 	Pursuant to § 20-107, the trial court, on March
18, 1994, ordered, in part, the equitable distribution and
apportionment of the Greenfields' marital debt.1 Although the
trial court did not explicitly order the wife to "pay" her share
1Contrary to the wife's contention, in apportioning the
parties' marital debt, the trial court did not make equitable
distribution of marital property to non-parties.

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of the $55,000 debt as apportioned under that same order, it is
reasonable to infer that an order of apportionment under the
equitable distribution carries with it the intent that the
parties "pay" their shares. 	Accordingly, it follows that since
the subsequent order to pay simply implements the order of
apportionment, it does not effect a substantive modification of
the previous order in violation of Rule 1:1. 	See e.g., Caudle v.
Caudle, 18 Va. App. 795, 797-99, 447 S.E.2d 247, 249-50 (1994).
The wife's reliance on the doctrine of res judicata to avoid
liability for the debt apportioned to her is likewise misplaced.
During the equitable distribution hearing, the wife argued that
the $55,000 debt allegedly owed by the parties to the husband's
parents had previously been adjudicated invalid in proceedings
brought before the Arlington Circuit Court. 	The trial court
rejected her argument, denied her motion for reconsideration,
and, on March 18, 1994, entered a final divorce decree in which
it apportioned as marital debt the $55,000 debt in question.
The wife did not appeal the final decree of divorce. 	The
issue reaches this Court only on appeal from the trial court's
January 20, 1995 order compelling the wife to pay the debt.
Since the wife did not file a timely notice of appeal to the
trial court's final decree of divorce, her claim of res judicata

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is not properly before us. 	Rule 5A:6; see also D'Alessandro v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 163, 167, 423 S.E.2d 199, 201 (1992).2
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
2Because we find the issue of res judicata has not been
preserved for appeal, we decline to decide the issue on the
merits. 	Nor do we reach the question whether the trial court
erred by refusing to allow the wife to attach to the January 20,
1995 order, or to proffer, certain documents purported to be
certified copies of the Arlington County law action in which the
alleged debt to the husband's parents was at issue.