Mary E. Jackson v Richmond DSS

0226992Vactapp

Texte intégral

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bray
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MARY E. JACKSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 0226-99-2 	JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
DECEMBER 28, 1999
RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Randall G. Johnson, Judge
(Robert W. Carll, on brief), for appellant.
Appellant submitting on brief.
Alexandra Silva, Assistant City Attorney;
Robin M. Morgan, Guardian ad litem for the
minor child (Office of the City Attorney, on
brief), for appellee.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Mary Jackson appeals from a decision terminating her parental
rights of her daughter, Ruth Jackson. 	The issue on appeal is
whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the clear and
convincing standard required for termination of parental rights
under Code § 16.1-283(C). 	We find that the evidence is sufficient
and affirm the trial court's ruling terminating Mary Jackson's
residual parental rights.
- 2 -
BACKGROUND
In January 1995, approximately a week after her birth, Ruth
Jackson was removed from her parents' custody due to concerns
raised by hospital personnel. 	Several days later, Ruth Jackson
was placed back in the custody of her parents, with legal custody
remaining with the Richmond Department of Social Services (DSS)
until March 1995. 	In July 1995, Ruth was again removed from her
parents' custody because of allegations that she was abused and
neglected. 	At that time, Ruth's father, Harold Jackson, was
hospitalized for a gunshot wound received during a drive-by
shooting. 	Mary Jackson had been hospitalized several times for
mental health problems, and she did not have a permanent
residence. 	The juvenile court returned Ruth to her parents'
custody, but ordered stabilization services to prevent future
removals from the home.
In the ensuing months, Mary Jackson was repeatedly
hospitalized for psychiatric problems and she was still unable to
maintain a permanent residence. 	During this period, Harold and
Mary Jackson would occasionally live together at friends' homes or
hotels. 	DSS encouraged and assisted Mary Jackson in moving to
Norfolk, where her mother could assist her with caring for Ruth.
Mary Jackson, however, stayed in Norfolk for only six days before
returning to Richmond.
- 3 -
On April 24, 1996, Ruth was again removed from her mother's
custody based on allegations that Mary Jackson was unable to care
for Ruth. 	In May 1996, Janet Kramer, Ruth's foster care worker,
counseled Mary Jackson on various things she should do in order to
regain custody of her daughter. 	Kramer recommended that Mary
Jackson establish a stable residence, obtain full-time employment,
and obtain a psychological evaluation. 	While living in Virginia,
the Jacksons lived at twelve different locations. 	Despite being
advised to move to Richmond where services could be provided and
where the Jacksons would have access to the Richmond Mental Health
facility, Harold Jackson indicated that he preferred to live in
Chesterfield County. 	In June 1997, the couple moved to
Pennsylvania. 	Mary Jackson did not avail herself of the referral
by DSS to assist the Jacksons in obtaining housing, employment, or
a psychological evaluation.
When Ruth was placed in foster care in April 1996, she was
dirty, had head lice, and was withdrawn. 	She has been diagnosed
with having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 	Ruth
is a very active child, and she is more difficult to care for than
the average child. 	She attends a special needs school and is
enrolled in an early childhood development program.
From April 1996 until June 1998, Mary Jackson had supervised
visits with Ruth. 	Until Mary Jackson moved to Pennsylvania in
June 1997, she visited Ruth at least once per month; after Mary
- 4 -
Jackson moved, she visited Ruth once in September 1997, once in
October 1997, once in February 1998, and once in May 1998. 	During
the visits, Ruth did not appear to bond with her mother. 	She
would cry when Mary Jackson tried to hold her and seemed to be
fearful of Mary Jackson. 	The Jacksons would frequently telephone
Ruth at her foster parents' home to check on her and to talk with
her.
Howard Rosen, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, conducted a
psychological evaluation of Mary Jackson on April 9, 1998. 	He
diagnosed her with schizophrenia, dependent personality disorder,
and a history of alcohol abuse. 	Dr. Rosen stated that Mary
Jackson was deficient in identifying critical issues of children's
feelings and presenting adequate solutions to problems.
Dr. Rosen also stated that, although she exhibited some "good"
parenting skills while in a controlled environment with support,
her parenting skills deteriorated rapidly when the child became
"fussy." 	Dr. Rosen predicted that if she were to care for Ruth,
who had ADHD, Mary Jackson's schizophrenia would "escalate." 	He
concluded that without substantial community supports, Mary
Jackson is incapable of safely or adequately parenting a child.
ANALYSIS
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
- 5 -
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128,
409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 	Where the trial court hears the
evidence ore tenus, its decision is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it. 	See Lowe v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
231 Va. 277, 282, 343 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1986).
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the parental rights of a
child placed in foster care may be terminated if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests
of the child and that:
[t]he parent . . . , without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period not to exceed twelve
months from the date the child was placed in
foster care to remedy substantially the
conditions which led to or required
continuation of the child's foster care
placement, notwithstanding the reasonable
and appropriate efforts of social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative
agencies to such end. 	Proof that the parent
. . . without good cause, [has] failed or
been unable to make substantial progress
towards elimination of the conditions which
led to or required continuation of the
child's foster care placement in accordance
with [the parent's] obligations under and
within the time limits or goals set forth in
a foster care plan filed with the court
. . . shall constitute prima facie evidence
of this condition.
"'[T]he rights of parents may not be lightly severed but are
to be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of
the child.'" 	Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 1124, 253 S.E.2d 658,
- 6 -
661 (1979) (quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 400, 192
S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)). 	The termination of parental rights is a
grave, drastic, and irreversible action. 	When a court orders
termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and
child are severed forever and the parent becomes "'a legal
stranger to the child.'" 	Lowe, 231 Va. at 280, 343 S.E.2d at 72
(quoting Shank v. Department of Soc. Servs., 217 Va. 506, 509, 230
S.E.2d 454, 457 (1976)).
The trial court found that Mary Jackson has severe mental
health problems, including schizophrenia and dependent personality
disorder. 	The trial court further found that she failed to follow
through with treatment plans and that even assuming she did comply
with the mental health care providers' treatment plans, she is
unable to adequately provide for Ruth's well-being.
Despite the social services provided, Mary Jackson did not
follow through with the recommendations of the social worker. 	By
her own admission, she suffers from schizophrenia and has been
hospitalized more than twenty times. 	She has been unable to
consistently follow through with recommendations and treatment
plans provided by mental health care providers. 	In 1996, at the
request of mental health personnel at one of the treatment
facilities, Mary Jackson was placed in an adult home, but she fled
from the home twice, stating that she needed her "freedom." 	Her
mental health problems contribute to her inability to successfully
- 7 -
parent Ruth, and it is unlikely that the problems will abate in
the future given her inability to maintain a treatment program.
Further, she failed to present any evidence that her mental health
condition is improving.
The record indicates that Ruth Jackson is doing well in
foster care where she has been since April 1996. 	She is being
treated for ADHD and is attending a special needs school. 	Ruth's
foster parents actively seek community services to assist her.
She is receiving medical treatment for mood liability,
distractibility, and impulsiveness.
Ruth was in foster care for nearly four years, while Mary
Jackson was unable or unwilling to cooperate with the agencies
seeking to assist her. 	She has not demonstrated that she is
willing or able to remedy within twelve months the conditions that
led to Ruth being placed in foster care or shown good cause for
her failure or inability to do so. 	"It is clearly not in the best
interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to
find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming
his responsibilities." 	Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
The trial court's finding that the termination of Mary
Jackson's residual parental rights was in Ruth Jackson's best
interest and the court's finding that DSS presented clear and
convincing evidence to meet the requirement of Code
- 8 -
§ 16.1-283(C)(2) was supported by the record. 	Accordingly, we
affirm the decision.
Affirmed.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bray
Argued at Richnond, Virginia

MARY E. J ACKSON
MEMORANDUM OPI N ON’ BY
Vv. Record No. 0226- 99- 2 J UDGE SAM W COLEMWN ITI
DECEMBER 28, 1999
RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVI CES

FROM THE CI RCU'T COURT OF THE CITY OF RI CHVOND
Randall G Johnson, Judge

(Robert W Carll, on brief), for appellant.
Appellant submitting on brief.

Alexandra Silva, Assistant City Attorney;
Robin M Mrgan, Guardian ad litemfor the
mnor child (Office of the Gty Attorney, on
brief), for appellee.

Mary Jackson appeals froma decision termnating her parental
rights of her daughter, Ruth Jackson. The issue on appeal is
whether the evidence is sufficient to neet the clear and
convincing standard required for termnation of parental rights
under Code § 16.1-283(C). W find that the evidence is sufficient
and affirmthe trial court's ruling termnating Mary Jackson's

residual parental rights.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

- 2 -
BACKGROUND
In January 1995, approximately a week after her birth, Ruth
Jackson was removed from her parents' custody due to concerns
raised by hospital personnel. 	Several days later, Ruth Jackson
was placed back in the custody of her parents, with legal custody
remaining with the Richmond Department of Social Services (DSS)
until March 1995. 	In July 1995, Ruth was again removed from her
parents' custody because of allegations that she was abused and
neglected. 	At that time, Ruth's father, Harold Jackson, was
hospitalized for a gunshot wound received during a drive-by
shooting. 	Mary Jackson had been hospitalized several times for
mental health problems, and she did not have a permanent
residence. 	The juvenile court returned Ruth to her parents'
custody, but ordered stabilization services to prevent future
removals from the home.
In the ensuing months, Mary Jackson was repeatedly
hospitalized for psychiatric problems and she was still unable to
maintain a permanent residence. 	During this period, Harold and
Mary Jackson would occasionally live together at friends' homes or
hotels. 	DSS encouraged and assisted Mary Jackson in moving to
Norfolk, where her mother could assist her with caring for Ruth.
Mary Jackson, however, stayed in Norfolk for only six days before
returning to Richmond.

- 3 -
On April 24, 1996, Ruth was again removed from her mother's
custody based on allegations that Mary Jackson was unable to care
for Ruth. 	In May 1996, Janet Kramer, Ruth's foster care worker,
counseled Mary Jackson on various things she should do in order to
regain custody of her daughter. 	Kramer recommended that Mary
Jackson establish a stable residence, obtain full-time employment,
and obtain a psychological evaluation. 	While living in Virginia,
the Jacksons lived at twelve different locations. 	Despite being
advised to move to Richmond where services could be provided and
where the Jacksons would have access to the Richmond Mental Health
facility, Harold Jackson indicated that he preferred to live in
Chesterfield County. 	In June 1997, the couple moved to
Pennsylvania. 	Mary Jackson did not avail herself of the referral
by DSS to assist the Jacksons in obtaining housing, employment, or
a psychological evaluation.
When Ruth was placed in foster care in April 1996, she was
dirty, had head lice, and was withdrawn. 	She has been diagnosed
with having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 	Ruth
is a very active child, and she is more difficult to care for than
the average child. 	She attends a special needs school and is
enrolled in an early childhood development program.
From April 1996 until June 1998, Mary Jackson had supervised
visits with Ruth. 	Until Mary Jackson moved to Pennsylvania in
June 1997, she visited Ruth at least once per month; after Mary

- 4 -
Jackson moved, she visited Ruth once in September 1997, once in
October 1997, once in February 1998, and once in May 1998. 	During
the visits, Ruth did not appear to bond with her mother. 	She
would cry when Mary Jackson tried to hold her and seemed to be
fearful of Mary Jackson. 	The Jacksons would frequently telephone
Ruth at her foster parents' home to check on her and to talk with
her.
Howard Rosen, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, conducted a
psychological evaluation of Mary Jackson on April 9, 1998. 	He
diagnosed her with schizophrenia, dependent personality disorder,
and a history of alcohol abuse. 	Dr. Rosen stated that Mary
Jackson was deficient in identifying critical issues of children's
feelings and presenting adequate solutions to problems.
Dr. Rosen also stated that, although she exhibited some "good"
parenting skills while in a controlled environment with support,
her parenting skills deteriorated rapidly when the child became
"fussy." 	Dr. Rosen predicted that if she were to care for Ruth,
who had ADHD, Mary Jackson's schizophrenia would "escalate." 	He
concluded that without substantial community supports, Mary
Jackson is incapable of safely or adequately parenting a child.
ANALYSIS
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."

- 5 -
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128,
409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). 	Where the trial court hears the
evidence ore tenus, its decision is entitled to great weight and
will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it. 	See Lowe v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
231 Va. 277, 282, 343 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1986).
Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the parental rights of a
child placed in foster care may be terminated if the court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests
of the child and that:
[t]he parent . . . , without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period not to exceed twelve
months from the date the child was placed in
foster care to remedy substantially the
conditions which led to or required
continuation of the child's foster care
placement, notwithstanding the reasonable
and appropriate efforts of social, medical,
mental health or other rehabilitative
agencies to such end. 	Proof that the parent
. . . without good cause, [has] failed or
been unable to make substantial progress
towards elimination of the conditions which
led to or required continuation of the
child's foster care placement in accordance
with [the parent's] obligations under and
within the time limits or goals set forth in
a foster care plan filed with the court
. . . shall constitute prima facie evidence
of this condition.
"'[T]he rights of parents may not be lightly severed but are
to be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of
the child.'" 	Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 1124, 253 S.E.2d 658,

- 6 -
661 (1979) (quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 400, 192
S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)). 	The termination of parental rights is a
grave, drastic, and irreversible action. 	When a court orders
termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and
child are severed forever and the parent becomes "'a legal
stranger to the child.'" 	Lowe, 231 Va. at 280, 343 S.E.2d at 72
(quoting Shank v. Department of Soc. Servs., 217 Va. 506, 509, 230
S.E.2d 454, 457 (1976)).
The trial court found that Mary Jackson has severe mental
health problems, including schizophrenia and dependent personality
disorder. 	The trial court further found that she failed to follow
through with treatment plans and that even assuming she did comply
with the mental health care providers' treatment plans, she is
unable to adequately provide for Ruth's well-being.
Despite the social services provided, Mary Jackson did not
follow through with the recommendations of the social worker. 	By
her own admission, she suffers from schizophrenia and has been
hospitalized more than twenty times. 	She has been unable to
consistently follow through with recommendations and treatment
plans provided by mental health care providers. 	In 1996, at the
request of mental health personnel at one of the treatment
facilities, Mary Jackson was placed in an adult home, but she fled
from the home twice, stating that she needed her "freedom." 	Her
mental health problems contribute to her inability to successfully

- 7 -
parent Ruth, and it is unlikely that the problems will abate in
the future given her inability to maintain a treatment program.
Further, she failed to present any evidence that her mental health
condition is improving.
The record indicates that Ruth Jackson is doing well in
foster care where she has been since April 1996. 	She is being
treated for ADHD and is attending a special needs school. 	Ruth's
foster parents actively seek community services to assist her.
She is receiving medical treatment for mood liability,
distractibility, and impulsiveness.
Ruth was in foster care for nearly four years, while Mary
Jackson was unable or unwilling to cooperate with the agencies
seeking to assist her. 	She has not demonstrated that she is
willing or able to remedy within twelve months the conditions that
led to Ruth being placed in foster care or shown good cause for
her failure or inability to do so. 	"It is clearly not in the best
interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to
find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming
his responsibilities." 	Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
The trial court's finding that the termination of Mary
Jackson's residual parental rights was in Ruth Jackson's best
interest and the court's finding that DSS presented clear and
convincing evidence to meet the requirement of Code

§ 16. 1-283(0C)(2) was supported by the record. Accordingly, ve
affirmthe decision.

Af fi rned.

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.