Derrell William Chappelle v Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DERRELL WILLIAM CHAPPELLE OPINION BY
v. 	Record No. 2161-97-2 	JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
SEPTEMBER 8, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
James B. Wilkinson, Judge
Susan D. Hansen, Deputy Public Defender
(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Derrell William Chappelle (defendant) appeals his
convictions of robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of
a felony. 	He contends the trial court erred in defining the
elements of robbery. 	Specifically, defendant contends the crime
of robbery requires proof the victim felt actual fear when being
robbed. 	Because we hold the common law definition of robbery
does not require proof of fear, we affirm.
Given defendant's full confession, the facts of this case
are remarkably clear. 	On the evening of April 7, 1997, Michael
Staten sat in his car on Lauralee Drive in Richmond when
defendant, wearing a mask to conceal his features, approached
Staten's car and tapped on the driver's window. 	Defendant
displayed a handgun and asked Staten to give him money. 	Staten
testified he felt no fear when he complied, yet he did not

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surrender the money voluntarily.
Defendant took the money and a ring Staten wore and fled
toward a nearby house. 	Staten drove his car down the block,
turned it around, drove back to the house and exited the car. 	He
then began to complain loudly to the occupants of the house that
he had been robbed. 	Defendant fired two shots in the air and ran
into the house. 	Police later found him hiding in the attic of
the house with the gun, money and ring.
At trial, defendant moved to strike the evidence because the
Commonwealth had not proven the victim was put in fear. 	Because
Staten specifically testified he had not felt fear when he
surrendered his property, defendant argued he was guilty of
larceny, not robbery. 	The trial court ruled that, "It doesn't
make any difference about him not being in fear. 	He might be
very courageous but he gave up his money." 	The trial court found
defendant guilty of robbery and use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony and sentenced him to serve eight years.
The legal issue at bar is a narrow one: 	does the crime of
robbery require the prosecution to prove the victim felt actual
fear when he was robbed? 	If so, Staten's plain testimony that he
was not afraid would prove fatal to the Commonwealth's case. 	If
not, then defendant's convictions must stand. 	The answer to this
question lies in the Commonwealth's common law tradition.
It remains an unshakable maxim that "[r]obbery is a common
law crime in this State and while our statute, [Code § 18.2-58],

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regulates the punishment, it does not attempt to define robbery,
but leaves the crime as it was defined at common law." 	Brookman
v. Commonwealth, 151 Va. 522, 525, 145 S.E. 358, 359 (1928). 	See
also George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 277, 411 S.E.2d 12, 20
(1991); Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 860, 864, 183 S.E. 452,
454 (1936); Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 811, 133 S.E.
764, 767 (1926); Jones v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 736, 738, 496
S.E.2d 668, 669 (1998). 	Therefore, we have but to examine the
common law elements of robbery to determine if proof of fear is
necessary to the Commonwealth's case.
The essential elements of common law robbery are "(1) a
felonious taking, (2) accompanied by an asportation of (3)
personal property of value (4) from the person of another or in
his presence, (5) against his will, (6) by violence or by putting
him in fear, (7) animo furandi (with the intent to steal)." 	67
Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 12 (1998) (citing Mason v. Commonwealth,
200 Va. 253, 105 S.E.2d 149 (1958)). 	It is element six which
defendant claims was not proven at his trial. 	He claims the mere
presentation of a firearm to Staten did not create fear and,
therefore, did not satisfy element six.
While it is true Staten testified he was not afraid, element
six may be satisfied even though the victim is not put in fear.
The word "or" appears between the words "violence" and "putting
him in fear." 	Because element six is constructed using the
disjunctive "or," it is satisfied when a defendant instills fear

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in the heart of his victim, when he perpetrates violence against
the victim, or both. 	Proof of both conditions is not necessary
so long as one is present. 	This interpretation of the offense of
robbery is widely recognized as the law in our Commonwealth. 	See
Mason, 200 Va. at 256, 105 S.E.2d at 151 ("robbery must be
accomplished by violence to the person . . . or must be
accomplished by putting such person in fear of immediate injury
to his person." (emphasis added)). 	See also United States v.
Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 69 (1995) (citing Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237
Va. 303, 310, 377 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1989)); Jones v. Commonwealth,
218 Va. 18, 22, 235 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1977) ("The 'gist' of
robbery is the taking and carrying away of the personal property
of another by fear or intimidation.").
If either violence or fear may precede robbery, there is
little question defendant's actions served to complete the crime.
Defendant, by his own words, approached the car wearing a mask.
He displayed the gun to Staten and told him to give up his
money. 	Staten characterized the event as a "stick up" and
admitted he did not relinquish the property voluntarily. 	The
violence inherent in the presentation of a firearm caused Staten
to surrender his property. 	This is the essence of robbery. 	See
Jones, 218 Va. at 20, 235 S.E.2d at 314 (presentation of firearm
constituted violence for purposes of robbery).
We reaffirm the long-standing doctrine that proof the victim
felt fear is not an indispensable element to the offense of

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robbery if violence is shown. 	Because the record fully supports
the conclusion that such violence took place, we affirm
defendant's convictions.
Affirmed.