Eugene Koranteng v Federal Express Corporation, et

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
EUGENE KORANTENG MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 1868-98-4 	PER CURIAM
NOVEMBER 17, 1998
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION AND
ALEXSIS RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Joseph T. Trapeni, Jr.; Trapeni, Romero &
Morrison, on brief), for appellant.
Appellant submitting on brief.
(Christopher M. Kite; Frith, Anderson &
Peake, on brief), for appellees. 	Appellees
submitting on brief.
Eugene Koranteng ("claimant") appeals a decision of the
Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") denying his claim
for benefits seeking an award of temporary total disability
benefits beginning January 29, 1997. 	Claimant contends that the
commission erred in finding that he failed to prove that his left
shoulder condition and resulting disability beginning January 29,
1997 were causally related to his compensable November 12, 1995
injury by accident. 	Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. 	See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
"General principles of workman's compensation law provide that
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.

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'[i]n an application for review of any award on the ground of
change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such
change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence.'" 	Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App.
459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570,
572 (1986)). 	Unless we can say as a matter of law that
claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proof, the
commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us. 	See
Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d
833, 835 (1970).
In denying claimant's application, the commission found as
follows: The evidence introduced by claimant
establishes that he was injured while at work
in November of 1995. 	It is also established
that he was treated and apparently recovered.
Subsequently, on January 25, 1997 [sic], the
claimant again had trouble with his shoulder
while at work. 	However, there has been no
showing by the claimant, establishing with
the requisite degree of certainty, a causal
connection between his condition on January
25, 1997 [sic], and the initial injury.
Importantly, there is no statement in
the medical documentation asserting a causal
connection between the initial injury and the
condition for which the claimant now seeks
compensation. 	Dr. [William A.] Hanff's
treatment notes, while establishing a
similarity in the conditions, fail entirely
to state a linking relationship. 	Those notes
merely recite the relevant medical history.
Although this analysis might suggest a
connection, we find that it is insufficient
to establish such a relationship to a
"reasonable probability." 	We will not
substitute our opinion regarding causation

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when the treating physician does not provide
some basis for that opinion.
The commission's findings are amply supported by the record.
No medical evidence established a causal connection between
claimant's initial compensable shoulder injury and his symptoms
and disability beginning on January 29, 1997. 	Moreover, it was
undisputed that claimant had fully recovered from the initial
injury and had returned to work without restrictions on October
15, 1996. 	Based upon this record, we cannot say as a matter of
law that claimant's evidence sustained his burden of proof.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.