Richardson v. Richardson

2008 UT 57
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Kynda Kay Richardson, 	No. 20070578
Respondent,
v.
F I L E D
Kenneth Andrew Richardson,
Petitioner. 	August 19, 2008
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Third District, Salt Lake City
The Honorable Stephen L. Roth
No. 034905249
Attorneys: 	Scott L. Wiggins, Joseph Lee Nemelka, Salt Lake
City, for respondent
J. Bruce Reading, Jonathan H. Rupp, Salt Lake City,
for petitioner
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Justice:
¶1 	We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of
appeals was correct in affirming the prospective increases in
alimony made by the district court in the alimony order. 	We hold
that the court of appeals was correct, and that the prospective
increases in alimony were within the district court’s discretion.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	In 2003, Respondent Kynda Kay Richardson filed for
divorce from Petitioner Kenneth Andrew Richardson. 	At trial, the
district court awarded Respondent physical custody of the
couple’s four minor children. 	Respondent was also awarded the
statutorily mandated amount of $1374 per month in child support
payments, with Petitioner’s obligation to pay ceasing as each
minor child reached the age of eighteen or graduated from high
school. 	The district court also awarded Respondent $420 per
month in alimony.

1 A district court also examines other factors, including
the length of the marriage and which spouse has custody of minor
children, which are not relevant to our analysis. 	See Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iv)-(vii) (Supp. 2007).
No. 20070578 	2
¶3 	In addition, the district court ruled that as each
minor child reached majority--and Petitioner’s child support
obligation therefore ceased as to that child--Petitioner’s
alimony obligation was to increase by $100 per month. 	Petitioner
appealed to the court of appeals, arguing that a prospective
increase in alimony constituted an abuse of discretion by the
district court. 	He also argued that the decision amounted to
child support for his adult children masquerading as alimony.
¶4 	On appeal, the court of appeals reviewed the district
court’s decision and determined there was no abuse of discretion.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals
erred in affirming the prospective increases in alimony.
ANALYSIS
¶5 	“On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the
court of appeals, not that of the [district] court. 	When
reviewing a [district] court determination of alimony . . . an
appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion.” 	Willey v.
Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 	A
district court has broad discretion when deciding alimony awards.
See, e.g., Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382 (Utah 1983).
¶6 	In making alimony determinations, a district court
considers several factors, including: (1) the financial condition
and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the
recipient spouse to produce sufficient income, and (3) the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support. 1 	Jones v. Jones,
700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
¶7 	Along with these factors, a district court also
considers the primary aims of alimony when making an award: (1)
to get the parties as close as possible to the same standard of
living that existed during the marriage, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-
3-5(8)(c) (Supp. 2007); (2) to equalize the standards of living
of each party, see id. § 30-3-5(8)(d); and (3) to prevent the
recipient spouse from becoming a public charge, English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).
¶8 	The court of appeals correctly determined that, in
making its alimony determination in this case, the district court
did not exceed its permitted discretion. 	Instead, the district

2 Petitioner also argues, based upon certain language used
by the district court, that the increases in alimony were
actually intended to be child support for those children who had
reached majority, but who were still living with Respondent. 	It
is well settled that a parent’s child support obligation
terminates when a child reaches majority, and alimony is not a
substitute for child support. 	See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-12-
102(6), -105(1) (2008). 	We do not find, however, that the
district court intended the increased amount to be child support
disguised as alimony, and accordingly do not address Petitioner’s
argument on this point.
3 See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d
722 (holding that a petition to change alimony based upon the
husband’s imminent retirement was not ripe because the planned
retirement was not an “actual ‘substantial material change in
circumstances’” (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) (Supp.
2003))); Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (“[A]ny future changes in alimony are limited to instances
where a material change of circumstances has occurred.” (emphasis
added)).
3 	No. 20070578
court properly considered the three factors in fashioning an
alimony order that sought to achieve the stated goals. 	The
amounts awarded, both before and after Petitioner’s child support
obligations ended, were arrived at after careful consideration of
the appropriate factors and the stated aims.
¶9 	Petitioner argues, however, that any prospective
increase in alimony exceeds the district court’s discretion. 2 	In
support, Petitioner cites to cases from the court of appeals
where such prospective changes in alimony orders have been held
improper. 3 	Petitioner argues that whether a change in the amount
of alimony will be appropriate in the future should be left to
the district court’s continuing jurisdiction and should not be
done speculatively.
¶10 	Generally, it is true that, because of the uncertainty
of future events, prospective changes to alimony are disfavored.
Thus, a plan to retire, without actually retiring, would be
insufficient to justify a prospective alimony reduction. 	See
Nelson v. Nelson, 2004 UT App 254, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 722. 	There are
other contexts, however, where the certainty of the future event
is such that prospective changes are appropriate. 	Where the
future event is certain to occur within a known time frame, then
prospective changes are appropriate.

No. 20070578 	4
¶11 	The prospective increase in alimony here was based on
such circumstances. 	Within a known time frame--each minor child
reaching majority--Petitioner’s child support obligations for
each child will cease. 	These events are certain to take place on
specified dates. 	The result of Petitioner’s obligations ending
is also certain: 	Petitioner’s financial condition will have
improved and Respondent’s financial condition--which previously
included the $1374 in child support payments--will have worsened.
Because Petitioner’s obligation to pay child support for each
child is certain to end at a specified time, prospective changes
to the amount of alimony based thereon are appropriate, and are
within the district court’s discretion to include in the alimony
order.
CONCLUSION
¶12 	The court of appeals was correct in affirming the
district court’s alimony order, because the district court
properly analyzed the appropriate factors and made a reasonable
decision within its permitted discretion. 	Accordingly, we
affirm.
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¶13 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Judge Page concur in Justice Wilkins’
opinion.
¶14 	Justice Nehring does not participate herein, District
Judge Rodney S. Page sat.