State v. Applegate

2008 UT 63
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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State of Utah, 	No. 20070507
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
F I L E D
Lorinda Lue Applegate,
Defendant and Appellant. 	September 9, 2008
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Seventh District, Moab Dep’t
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson
No. 061700161
Attorneys: 	Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Kris C. Leonard,
Marian Decker, Asst. Att’ys Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
William L. Schultz, Moab, for defendant
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On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
WILKINS, Justice:
¶1 	We have been asked to determine whether the district
court erred in denying Lorinda Lue Applegate’s motion to suppress
evidence discovered during a traffic stop. 	We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	In October 2006, Officer Shaun Hansen spotted Lorinda
Lue Applegate in Moab, Utah, driving a vehicle with Colorado
license plates. 	Officer Hansen had seen Applegate driving this
particular vehicle exclusively for five months and believed that
Applegate was the owner. 	Officer Hansen also believed that
because Applegate worked and lived in Utah, Utah law required her
to have the vehicle properly registered within the state.
Accordingly, he stopped her for a suspected registration
violation.

No. 20070507 	2
¶3 	When Officer Hansen pulled Applegate’s vehicle over, he
observed that Applegate’s speech was “thick” and that she was
shaking. 	Officer Hansen asked if she was taking any medication,
to which Applegate responded that she had recently taken a
Vicodin. 	Based on that information, Officer Hansen did a series
of field sobriety tests, which Applegate failed. 	Accordingly,
Officer Hansen arrested her for DUI; she later tested positive
for methamphetamine. 	A search incident to the arrest resulted in
the discovery of marijuana.
¶4 	In January 2007, Applegate moved to suppress the
evidence seized during the traffic stop, which the district court
denied. 	Applegate subsequently pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony;
driving under the influence with two prior offenses within ten
years, a third degree felony; and possession of marijuana in a
drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor. 	Applegate reserved her
right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 	In June
2007, Applegate filed a notice of appeal with the Utah Court of
Appeals, and the case was certified for immediate transfer to
this court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 	We review for clear error the factual findings
underlying a district court’s decision to deny a motion to
suppress. 	State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ¶ 15, 100 P.3d 1222.
Whether the district court correctly denied the motion to
suppress, however, is a legal conclusion that we review for
correctness. 	State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 15, 103 P.3d 699.
ANALYSIS
¶6 	Applegate argues that the stop of her vehicle was not
supported by reasonable suspicion. 	She first claims that Officer
Hansen could not have reasonably suspected she was the owner of
the vehicle. 	Second, she contends that Officer Hansen
misunderstood Utah’s vehicle registration laws and therefore
“ha[d] no basis upon which to make or defend the stop” as
announced by State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, ¶ 14, 988 P.2d 7.
We address each of these arguments in turn.
I. 	OFFICER HANSEN’S SUSPICION ABOUT THE OWNERSHIP OF THE VEHICLE
¶7 	“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.’” 	State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262,

3 	No. 20070507
¶ 12, 988 P.2d 7 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const.
amend. IV). 	“The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth
Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances
of the particular government invasion of a citizen’s personal
security.’” 	Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). 	Accordingly,
although the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all
searches and seizures, it does protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 	United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
682 (1985). 	Moreover,
[c]itizens do not surrender the protections
of the Fourth Amendment simply because they
are in an automobile. 	In fact, “stopping an
automobile and detaining its occupants
constitute[s] a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose
of the stop is limited and the resulting
detention quite brief.”
State v. Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, ¶ 9, 167 P.3d 544 (quoting State
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)) (second alteration in
original) (internal citation omitted).
¶8 	In determining the reasonableness of a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, “three constitutionally
permissible levels of police stops” have been outlined. 	State v.
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991).
A level one encounter occurs when a police
officer approaches a citizen and asks
questions, but the person is not detained
against his will and remains free to leave.
A level two encounter occurs when a police
officer temporarily seizes an individual
because the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime.
Finally, a level three stop occurs when a
police officer has probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed and effects
an arrest of the suspect.
Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, ¶ 10 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
¶9 	“A brief, investigatory stop of a vehicle constitutes a
level two encounter, for which only reasonable, articulable
suspicion is required.” 	Id.; see also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT

No. 20070507 	4
125, ¶¶ 35, 37, 63 P.3d 650. 	To determine whether a level two
stop is reasonable, we apply a two-part test. 	See State v.
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). 	The first step is to
determine whether “the police officer’s action [was] justified at
its inception.” 	Id. at 1131-32 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 	Under the second step, we must determine whether the
detention following the stop was “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place.” 	Id. at 1132. 	Because Applegate does not challenge the
scope of the detention following the initial stop, we only
address the first prong of the test.
¶10 	Under the first prong, a routine traffic stop is
justified at the inception “if the stop is incident to a traffic
violation committed in the officers’ presence.” 	Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). 	A police officer need not actually
observe a violation. 	Instead, “as long as an officer suspects
that the driver is violating any one of the multitude of
applicable traffic . . . regulations, the police officer may
legally stop the vehicle.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). 	Accordingly, while an officer may not initiate a stop
based merely on a “hunch” that an individual is violating the
law, he also does not have to completely rule out innocent
conduct prior to making the stop. 	See State v. Markland, 2005 UT
26, ¶ 17, 112 P.3d 507.
¶11 	In this case, Applegate argues that it was unreasonable
for Officer Hansen to suspect that she was the owner of the
vehicle. 	Moreover, she argues that because she was not the owner
of the vehicle--and therefore not required to have the vehicle
registered in Utah--Officer Hansen lacked reasonable suspicion
that she was in violation of the traffic laws, thus rendering the
stop improper. 	In other words, because she was not in violation
of the traffic laws at the time Officer Hansen initiated the
stop, it was per se unreasonable. 	We disagree.
¶12 	As it turned out, it is true that Applegate was not in
violation of the traffic laws at the time Officer Hansen stopped
her vehicle. 	Officer Hansen was not required, however, to rule
out innocent conduct prior to the stop. 	Instead, he was only
required to reasonably suspect that Applegate was “violating any
one of the multitude of applicable traffic . . . regulations.”
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. 	Officer Hansen suspected that Applegate
was violating the traffic laws because (1) he observed Applegate-
-and only Applegate--driving the vehicle for several months prior
to the stop; (2) he observed that the plates on the car were from
Colorado but knew that Applegate worked and resided in Moab; and
(3) he believed--correctly--that an individual who works and
resides in Utah has an obligation to register their vehicle in

5 	No. 20070507
the state within sixty days of their arrival. 	While there are
rare circumstances to the contrary, it was reasonable for Officer
Hansen to assume that as the only driver of the vehicle,
Applegate was also the owner of the vehicle and was therefore
required to properly register it. 	Indeed, “the facts available
to [Officer Hansen] at the moment of the [traffic stop]
warrant[ed] a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate.” 	Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court correctly denied Applegate’s
motion to suppress.
II. 	OFFICER HANSEN’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
¶13 	Applegate also contends that the traffic stop was
unreasonable because Officer Hansen misunderstood Utah’s motor
vehicle registration laws and, therefore, he “ha[d] no basis upon
which to make or defend the stop” as announced in State v.
Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, ¶ 14, 988 P.2d 7. 	The State, on the
other hand, contends that Friesen should be overruled because it
directly conflicts with controlling Fourth Amendment law as
announced in Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
Specifically, the State argues that “Devenpeck makes clear that
the controlling Fourth Amendment question is not whether an
officer has the correct law in mind at the time he acts, but
whether the available facts objectively show that there was some
ground to believe the law was violated.”
¶14 	We decline the State’s invitation to overrule Friesen.
We also conclude that Officer Hansen’s understanding of the motor
vehicle registration laws did not render the traffic stop
unreasonable. 	We now address each of these points in turn.
A. 	State v. Friesen Need Not Be Overruled
¶15 	The parties differ significantly on Friesen’s
application in this case. 	In Friesen, a Utah police officer
stopped a vehicle bearing only a rear Wyoming license plate.
1999 UT App 262, ¶ 2. 	The police officer initiated the stop
based on the erroneous assumption that Wyoming law required both
a front and a rear license plate. 	Id. ¶ 3. 	On appeal, the State
argued that “reasonable, articulable suspicion” encompasses a
police officer’s understanding of what the law is. 	Responding
specifically to that argument, the court of appeals held that
“the facts about which an officer must have a reasonable[,]
articulable suspicion at the time of a traffic stop are those
regarding the conduct of the person stopped, not the nature of
the law.” 	Id. ¶ 14. 	The Friesen court ultimately concluded that
if the police officer’s suspicion is about what the law

No. 20070507 	6
prohibits, “the officer has no basis upon which to make or defend
the stop.” 	Id. 	In this context, it is clear that the court of
appeals simply meant to clarify that reasonable, articulable
suspicion relates to an individual’s conduct, not a police
officer’s understanding of the law. 	Any reading of Friesen to
the contrary is therefore disavowed.
¶16 	In Devenpeck v. Alford--notably, a civil case--police
officers stopped a vehicle specifically because they had probable
cause to arrest the driver for impersonating an officer. 	543
U.S. at 149. 	When the police officers approached the vehicle,
however, they informed the defendant that he was being arrested
for a different crime--violating the state’s privacy laws. 	Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the offense
establishing probable cause must be “closely related”--and based
on the same conduct--to the offense identified by the police
officers at the time of the arrest. 	Id. at 152. 	The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding that the “[s]ubjective
intent of the arresting officer . . . is simply no basis for
invalidating an arrest. 	Those are lawfully arrested whom the
facts known to the arresting officers give probable cause to
arrest.” 	Id. at 154-55 (emphasis added).
¶17 	Friesen is to be read as consistent with Devenpeck.
Both cases stand for the proposition that a police officer’s
subjective intent and thoughts are irrelevant to the reasonable
suspicion inquiry, as well as an improper basis for invalidating
an arrest. 	See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154-55; Friesen, 1999 UT
App 262, ¶ 12. 	Moreover, both cases emphasize that whether
reasonable suspicion exists should be based upon the facts known
to the police officer at the time of the arrest. 	Finally, both
cases emphasize that reasonable, articulable suspicion must be
supported by what the law actually is, not what the officer
subjectively thought the law was. 	In other words, if the
defendant’s conduct gives the officer reasonable, articulable
suspicion, “‘the fact that the officer does not have the state of
mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal
justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the
action as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action.’” 	Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153 (quoting Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
B. Officer Hansen’s Understanding of the Law Did Not Render the
Traffic Stop Unreasonable
¶18 	Applegate argues that because Officer Hansen
misunderstood the motor vehicle registration laws, he lacked the
reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate the traffic stop. 	At

7 	No. 20070507
the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Hansen’s testimony
regarding his understanding of Utah’s motor vehicle registration
laws was threefold: 	First, he testified that if a vehicle had
been in Utah for six months, it must be registered in Utah. 	This
is an erroneous statement of Utah law. 	Second, he testified that
if Applegate was the primary driver of the vehicle, it would have
to be registered in Utah from the first day the vehicle entered
the state. 	This, too, is incorrect. 	Finally, he testified that
Applegate’s vehicle had to be registered in Utah because
Applegate lived and worked in Utah. 	This understanding of Utah
law is correct. 	See Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-202(3) (Supp. 2007).
The district court accepted Officer Hansen’s testimony,
specifically finding that he had not relied on the erroneous six-
month rule when he stopped Applegate’s vehicle. 	Instead, the
district court found that “[h]e relied on his belief that
residents of Utah who purchase vehicles must register those
vehicles in Utah . . . within 60 days of establishing residence
here.”
¶19 	We conclude that “[t]his determination was clearly
within the legitimate exercise of the [district] court’s
discretion.” 	State v. Friesen, 1999 UT App 262, ¶ 10. 	Moreover,
this factual finding was not properly challenged by Applegate,
nor is it clearly erroneous. 	Accordingly, this court is bound by
the district court’s finding and must accept it as true. 	See
Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1158 (Utah 1996). 	Accepting his
testimony, the district court determined that Officer Hansen did
not rely on the misunderstood portion of the law when he stopped
Applegate’s car for a suspected registration violation. 	Instead,
he stopped her based on an accurate understanding of the law,
i.e., when individuals have resided in Utah for sixty days, they
are required to register their vehicle in the state in accordance
with Utah Code section 41-1a-202(3).
CONCLUSION
¶20 	Officer Hansen had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that Applegate was violating the traffic laws when he observed
her driving a vehicle exclusively for several months without
proper Utah registration. 	Moreover, the district court found--
and Applegate did not challenge on appeal--that Officer Hansen
based the traffic stop on a correct understanding of the motor
vehicle registration laws. 	In any event, Officer Hansen’s
subjective understanding of the law is irrelevant. 	Instead, all
that matters is that he was able “to point to specific and
articulable facts regarding [Applegate’s] conduct which, taken
together with rational inferences, created a reasonable suspicion
of” a violation of the traffic laws. 	State v. Friesen, 1999 UT

No. 20070507 	8
App 262, ¶ 17, 988 P.2d 7. 	Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court correctly denied Applegate’s motion to suppress.
¶21 	Affirmed.
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¶22 	Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Judge Hansen concur in Justice Wilkins’
opinion.
¶23 	Justice Nehring does not participate herein; District
Judge Royal I. Hansen sat.