Code v. UT Dept of Health

2007 UT 43
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Nicole H. Code No. 20060372
fka Nicole L. Handrahan,
Petitioner,
v.
Utah Department of Health
and Utah School for the Deaf F I L E D
and Blind,
Respondents. May 18, 2007
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Second District, Ogden
The Honorable Ernest W. Jones
No. 040905007
Attorneys: Brad C. Smith, Benjamin C. Rasmussen, Ogden, for
petitioner
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Debra J. Moore,
J. Clifford Petersen, Reha Deal, Asst. Att’ys Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for respondents
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
BACKGROUND
¶1 Nicole Code filed a complaint against the Utah
Department of Health and the Utah School for the Deaf and Blind
(Defendants) alleging breach of contract and wrongful
termination. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court issued
a memorandum decision on January 10, 2005, which said, “For the
reasons stated above, the Court dismisses the Plaintiff’s claim.”
Defendants failed to prepare an order as required by rule 7(f)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Ms. Code, the
nonprevailing party, provided an order for the district court to
sign, which it did on February 25, 2005. The order dismissed Ms.
Code’s claims with prejudice.

No. 20060372 2
¶2 Ms. Code appealed from the district court’s ruling on
March 8, 2005. The Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the appeal was untimely.
Code v. Utah Dep’t of Health, 2006 UT App 113, ¶ 1, 133 P.3d 438.
We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal, and now reverse.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(a),
(5) (2002).
ANALYSIS
¶3 “Whether appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of
law which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the
decision below.” Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ¶ 16, 982
P.2d 572.
¶4 “An appeal may be taken . . . from all final orders and
judgments,” Utah R. App. P. 3(a), and “notice of appeal . . .
shall be filed . . . within 30 days after the date of entry of
the judgment or order appealed from,” Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The
issue presented in this case is whether Ms. Code filed her appeal
within thirty days after the district court’s final judgment.
Such a determination turns on whether the memorandum decision
issued by the court constituted the entry of final judgment and
thus triggered the time for appeal or whether the order signed by
the district court was the entry of final judgment for purposes
of appeal. We hold that the order, and not the memorandum
decision, constituted the district court’s entry of judgment for
appeal purposes. We therefore reverse and remand the case to the
court of appeals for consideration of the appeal.
¶5 Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that “[u]nless the court approves the proposed order
submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise
directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen
days after the court’s decision, serve upon the other parties a
proposed order in conformity with the court’s decision” (emphasis
added). This rule is clear; it requires a party to prepare and
submit an order within fifteen days of a court’s decision unless
the court has approved a proposed order initially submitted or
“unless otherwise directed by the court.” Utah R. Civ. P.
7(f)(2) (2006). In the case before us, the district court did
not sign a proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum.
Likewise, the court did not “otherwise direct[]” the prevailing
party to refrain from submitting an order within fifteen days of
its decision. The plain language of the rule requires an
explicit direction if an order is not required by the court; it
does not contemplate that the parties must engage in a guessing

1 Consequently, if the court does not explicitly direct that
there is no need to submit an order and the prevailing party
fails to submit an order, the appeal rights of the nonprevailing
party will extend indefinitely.
3 No. 20060372
game to divine the court’s intentions. Thus, in this case,
Defendants, as the prevailing parties, were required to submit an
order within fifteen days. They failed to follow the clear
dictates of the rule. Ms. Code, obviously interested in finality
for purposes of appeal, instead took the initiative and submitted
a proposed order to trigger finality so that she could appeal the
decision of the district court. The order submitted by Ms. Code
and signed by the judge established finality, triggering the
thirty-day period for the filing of an appeal. Ms. Code’s notice
of appeal was filed within thirty days of the court’s order;
accordingly, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.
¶6 The plain language of rule 7(f)(2) does not permit
overriding the requirement of an order by implication or
inference. Either an order must be submitted by the prevailing
party or the court must give the parties explicit direction that
no order is required. We see no benefit to a system in which
parties must guess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a judge’s
language in a memorandum decision “implie[s],” “invite[s],” or
“contemplate[s]” further action by the parties. See Code, 2006
UT App 113, ¶ 4. Not only would such a system be unwise in
practice, it is at odds with the express mandate of rule 7(f)(2).
It is the district court’s role to clearly direct that no order
needs to be submitted; otherwise, an order is required.1 A
court should include this explicit direction whenever it intends
a document--a memorandum decision, minute entry, or other
document--to constitute its final action. Otherwise, rule
7(f)(2) requires the preparation and filing of an order to
trigger finality for purposes of appeal.
¶7 If the prevailing party fails to submit an order within
the fifteen-day period required by rule 7(f)(2), any party
interested in finality--generally, the nonprevailing party--may
submit an order. This option is implicit in the rule, supports
the judicial policy in favor of finality, and avoids traps for
unwary litigants.
¶8 We recognize that this court has, on occasion,
determined that finality supporting appellate jurisdiction exists
by looking to the content and effect of a signed memorandum
decision or minute entry. Dove v. Cude, 710 P.2d 170, 171 n.1
(Utah 1985); Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740, 741 n.1 (Utah 1984).

No. 20060372 4
In those cases, we suggested that when the ruling “constituted a
resolution of the dispute” or “specifie[d] with certainty a final
determination of the rights of the parties,” appellate
jurisdiction was proper. Dove, 710 P.2d at 171 n.1; Cannon, 692
P.2d at 741 n.1. Review of those cases makes clear that they
resulted in the preservation of the appeal rights of the parties.
While these cases remain good authority for that purpose, we
decline to use their analysis to bar appeal rights, as the
analysis of the court of appeals would do.
¶9 Our holding today is consistent with prior cases in
which we have not found finality where a minute entry explicitly
required the submission of an order, Swenson Assoc. Architects v.
State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994), and where a minute entry
“did not purport to finally adjudicate the rights of the
parties,” Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 919,
922 (Utah 1943). Where rule 7(f)(2) requires that an order be
filed, unless a court explicitly directs that no order needs to
be submitted, no finality will be ascribed to a memorandum
decision or minute entry for purposes of triggering the running
of the time for appeal.
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¶10 Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.