State v. Montiel

2005 UT 48
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah, 	No. 20040780
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
F I L E D
Alex Montiel,
Defendant and Petitioner. 	August 5, 2005
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
No. 021906524
Attorneys: 	Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Karen A. Klucznik,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Byron F. Burmester, Asst. Att’y
Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Lori Seppi, Heidi Buchi, Salt Lake City, for
defendant
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
DURHAM, Chief Justice:
¶1 	Defendant Alex Montiel appealed his conviction for
aggravated robbery, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in rejecting a pretrial plea agreement based on a
stated policy of rejecting pleas that waive penalty enhancements
for use of a firearm. 	The court of appeals affirmed Montiel’s
conviction. 	We granted certiorari to consider the scope of
judicial discretion vis-à-vis plea agreements. 	We hold that
trial courts retain broad--though not unlimited--discretion in
accepting or rejecting plea agreements, and that, under the
circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. 	We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Montiel was charged with aggravated robbery, a first-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-6-302. 	If
convicted, Montiel was also subject to an enhanced penalty
pursuant to Utah Code section 76-3-203.1 because the crime was
committed in concert with two or more persons. 	Under Utah Code

1 Effective May 5, 2003, the legislature amended section 76-
3-203, moving the dangerous weapon enhancement to section 76-3-
203.8, which was further amended in 2004. 	See Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-203.8 (Supp. 2004). 	All citations herein are to the law
in effect at the time Montiel was tried and convicted.
2 While use of a dangerous weapon is an element of
aggravated robbery, a number of cases support the proposition
that a defendant charged with a crime for which use of a
dangerous weapon is an element may still be subject to an
enhanced penalty when that weapon is a firearm. 	See State v.
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988); State v. Angus, 581 P.2d
992, 995 (Utah 1978); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 85-87 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990). 	All of these cases, however, were decided prior to
1995, when the legislature amended the enhanced penalty statute
to encompass all “dangerous weapons” rather than singling out
firearms. 	See ch. 244, § 52, 1995 Utah Laws 813. 	This court has
not addressed whether, under the broader statutory language, the
penalty for aggravated robbery may still be enhanced for use of a
dangerous weapon even though use of a dangerous weapon is an
element of the substantive offense. 	Since this issue is
immaterial to the disposition of the case before us, we leave
resolution of this question for another day.
3 The record does not reflect the specific third-degree
felony to which Montiel agreed to plead guilty.
No. 20040780 	2
section 76-3-203, 1 Montiel was arguably subject to a further
enhanced penalty for use of a dangerous weapon in the commission
of the underlying offense. 2
¶3 	During the pretrial conference the prosecutor informed
the trial court that the State and Montiel had reached a plea
agreement, in which the State agreed to reduce the aggravated
robbery charge to a third-degree felony in exchange for a guilty
plea. 3 	The prosecutor explained that there were “some facts that
[made] the story not as presentable to the jury and [he] would
rather accept the . . . lesser plea than run the risk of
(inaudible).”
¶4 	The trial court responded by noting that Montiel had
been charged with a first-degree felony, which was further
subject to enhanced penalties because Montiel had “used a firearm
[and] committed a crime with four other persons.” 	The court
questioned why “the State want[ed] to drop this down to a third-
degree felony” and then stated, “Well, I don’t waive firearms
enhancements, folks. 	You plead them, they’re stuck unless I’m
convinced that there was some mistake in pleading.”

3 	No. 20040780
¶5 	Defense counsel then offered judicial economy as an
additional reason for the plea agreement. 	The trial court
responded:
I don’t care about judicial economy when
people are alleged to have used firearms in
the commission of a crime. 	I’ll take
whatever time is necessary to resolve the
issue properly. 	I’m not going to waive the
firearms enhancement[] [u]nless you can tell
me you don’t have any evidence that
[defendant had] a firearm or there wasn’t a
firearm or your witness is lying.
The prosecutor then commented that it was “just a matter of
weighing . . . the case” and that “sometimes it’s better to have
the . . . verdict in hand than . . . two in the bush.” 	He
further explained that the objective of the agreement was to
ensure that “a dangerous person” was locked up. 	The court
responded by saying, “Lock him up for zero to five, what kind of
a deal is that?” 	The prosecutor replied, “It’s better than zero
to zero.”
¶6 	The court then inquired about the victim’s response to
the plea agreement. 	The prosecutor stated that he had “not
talked to the victim about this particular one, although [he had]
talked to the victim previously about offering a second
(inaudible).” 	The trial court expressed reservations about
accepting a plea when the State had not “even told the person who
claims all these things occurred as to what [the State was] going
to do.” 	The court declared that the victim was “entitled to
know.”
¶7 	Following this exchange, the trial court announced its
ruling: 	“I’m not going to allow the filing of [the] amended
Information [sic] at this point and I’m not going to accept any
plea to a third-degree felony on the basis of what I’ve heard.”
Thereafter Montiel was tried and convicted of aggravated robbery,
with sentencing subject to penalty enhancements both for
committing the crime in concert with two or more persons and for
using a dangerous weapon. 	Montiel appealed his conviction,
arguing that the trial court’s comments at the pretrial hearing
demonstrated a fixed policy of refusing to accept plea bargains
in cases involving firearms, and that rejecting Montiel’s plea on
the basis of such a policy constituted an abuse of the court’s
discretion.
¶8 	The court of appeals affirmed Montiel’s conviction,
reasoning that,

No. 20040780 	4
[a]lthough not crystal clear, the record in
this case is sufficient to support the
State’s argument that the trial court
rejected the plea agreement, not only because
the underlying charge involved the use of a
firearm, but also because the court was
concerned that Defendant would receive too
lenient a sentence under the terms of the
agreement and because the victim had not been
informed of the agreement.
State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, ¶ 17, 95 P.3d 1216. 	We
granted Montiel’s petition for a writ of certiorari as to the
following issue: 	whether the trial court’s stated policy of
refusing to allow plea reductions in cases where a firearm had
been used constituted a refusal to properly exercise its
discretion in assessing the appropriateness of the plea
agreement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 	“On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of
appeals and not that of the district court.” 	State v. Brake,
2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. 	“We conduct that review for
correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals.” 	Id.
“The correctness of the court of appeals’ decision turns on
whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court’s decision
under the appropriate standard of review.” 	State v. Visser, 2000
UT 88, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 1242. 	The standard of review in assessing
the appropriateness of a trial court’s acceptance or rejection of
a plea agreement is abuse of discretion. 	State v. Turner, 980
P.2d 1188, 1189-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 	A failure to exercise
discretion is generally encompassed within the meaning of abuse
of discretion. 	See United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 565
(9th Cir. 1983) (“[A]s a general rule, the existence of
discretion requires its exercise.”); People v. Darlington, 105
P.3d 230, 232 (Colo. 2005) (“[F]ailure to exercise discretion is
itself an abuse of discretion.”). 	Therefore, we must determine
whether the court of appeals correctly decided that the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in rejecting the plea
agreement.
ANALYSIS
¶10 	Montiel contends that the court of appeals erred in
affirming his conviction because the trial court (1) failed to
consider all legally relevant factors; (2) exceeded the scope of
its authority; and (3) acted arbitrarily in its rejection of the
plea agreement. 	We first outline the scope of judicial

4 Contrary to the court of appeals’ understanding, rule
11(g)(1) does not conflict with this statement. 	That rule
(continued...)
5 	No. 20040780
discretion in rejecting plea agreements. 	We then address each of
Montiel’s arguments in turn.
I. 	JUDICIAL DISCRETION REGARDING PLEA AGREEMENTS
¶11 	We begin by noting that there is no constitutional
principle that obliges a trial court to accept a defendant’s
guilty plea. 	See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971) (“There is, of course, no absolute right to have a guilty
plea accepted.”); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38
(1970) (“A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right
under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the
court . . . .”). 	Indeed, “[a] plea bargain standing alone is
without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere
executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a
court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other
constitutionally protected interest.” 	Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S.
504, 507 (1984).
¶12 	We generally adhere to the proposition that, subject to
constitutional constraints, “[t]he Executive remains the absolute
judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first
and presumptively best judge of whether a pending prosecution
should be terminated.” 	United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513
(5th Cir. 1975); see United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,
464 (1996). 	Plea bargains, however, implicate not only the
ordinarily plenary executive power to indict or dismiss; they
also “go to the traditionally judicial function of determining
what penalty to impose.” 	United States v. Escobar Noble, 653
F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Torres-
Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen the
dismissal of charges or agreement not to pursue potential charges
is conditioned on acceptance of a plea agreement, the court’s
authority to adjudicate guilt and impose sentence is
implicated.”). 	Thus, after initial charges have been filed, the
vast majority of courts permit, encourage, or require some degree
of judicial discretion in accepting or rejecting such
arrangements.
¶13 	Moreover, it is well established under Utah law that
trial courts are not required to accept plea agreements. 	This
principle is based on the plain language of rule 11 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly provides that
“[t]he court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty.” 	Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(e) (emphasis added). 4 	This discretion extends to

4 (...continued)
provides that, “[i]f it appears that the prosecuting attorney or
any other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance
of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other
charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court.” 	Utah R.
Crim. P. 11(g)(1). 	This is not to be interpreted as an
affirmative obligation on the part of the court to accept a plea
agreement. 	Rather, it is merely a statement of procedure,
indicating that the court’s approval is necessary in order to
effectuate the plea agreement.
5 Of course, under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
there are also specific circumstances in which a trial court is
compelled to reject a guilty plea. 	The remainder of rule 11(e)
delineates such circumstances, none of which is applicable here.
No. 20040780 	6
guilty pleas that are tendered as part of a plea bargain. 	See
State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1153; Turner,
980 P.2d at 1190; State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
¶14 	The foregoing, however, does not imply that a trial
court may reject a guilty plea arbitrarily. 	We acknowledge that
the state is usually in a better position than the court to
determine whether a plea agreement is in the public interest, and
we do not take lightly the role of prosecutorial discretion in
this regard. 	We affirm that, generally speaking, “courts should
be wary of second-guessing prosecutorial choices.” 	Miller, 722
F.2d at 565. 	Even as we acknowledge prosecutorial prerogatives
regarding plea agreements, however, we also recognize that
unfettered discretion invites abuse. 	Thus, some oversight from
the bench is necessary both to “protect a defendant from the
power of coercion and abuse of the state, [and] also [to] protect
the interests of other members of our society in living in a
peaceful, orderly atmosphere.” 	Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160,
165 (Ind. 1983). 	The trial court has an important role to play
in assessing the appropriateness of a proffered plea agreement--
especially where there is evidence of either an overzealous or a
lackadaisical prosecution--and “may reject a plea in the exercise
of sound judicial discretion.” 5 	Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262.
II. 	SCOPE OF DISCRETION
¶15 	Having established that the exercise of judicial
discretion in such matters is both necessary and proper, we now
must define the extent of that discretion. 	Because Utah case law
is not fully developed on this issue, we look to “the case law
from other jurisdictions for guidance.” 	Arndt v. First
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, ¶ 17, 991 P.2d 584.

6 See United States v. Moore, 637 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir.
1981) (holding that “a district court is under no duty to
consider a negotiated plea agreement”); United States v. Stamey,
569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1978) (similar); United States v. Jackson,
563 F.2d 1145, 1148 (4th Cir. 1977) (“In our opinion each
individual judge is free to decide whether, and to what degree,
he will entertain plea bargains, and his refusal to consider any
plea bargaining whatsoever will not vitiate a guilty plea which
has otherwise been knowingly and voluntarily entered.”). 	These
exceptions to the general rule appear to be limited to the Fourth
and Eighth Circuits. 	We can find no other cases that directly
stand for the proposition that a court may categorically refuse
to consider all plea agreements.
7 This is not necessarily true regarding plea agreements
that involve only sentencing recommendations, i.e., those in
which the prosecutor agrees to recommend a more lenient sentence
(or not to seek a harsher one) in exchange for a guilty plea to
the original crime charged. 	Such “sentence bargains” directly
implicate the judicial authority to affix punishment and in many
jurisdictions--particularly in the federal courts--a judge
retains the prerogative to reject all such plea agreements. 	See,
e.g., United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1437 (10th Cir.
1995); Miller, 722 F.2d at 564; Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1,
(continued...)
7 	No. 20040780
¶16 	In regard to accepting or rejecting plea agreements,
jurisdictions vary, as to precisely what degree of discretion is
appropriate and the manner in which that discretion must be
exercised. 	The numerous approaches, each with its own particular
nuances, do not lend themselves to easy categorization. 	However,
we are able to extract principles common to the majority of
jurisdictional approaches that inform our analysis. 	Those
principles are: 	(1) that trial courts retain broad discretion to
reject plea agreements, but may not do so arbitrarily; (2) that
courts need not methodically consider a list of mandatory factors
before rejecting a plea agreement; and (3) that courts must state
their reasoning for rejecting a proposed plea agreement on the
record.
A. 	Court Cannot Arbitrarily Reject
a Proposed Plea Agreement
¶17 	With a few notable exceptions, 6 the vast majority of
jurisdictions require some affirmative exercise of discretion on
the part of the trial court before rejecting a plea agreement;
that is, courts are not permitted to categorically reject all
plea bargains. 7 	See, e.g., Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (holding

7 (...continued)
24 (Ky. 2004); Sandy v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Court, 935 P.2d
1148, 1151 n.1 (Nev. 1997). 	Because the case before us does not
involve a plea agreement of this type, our analysis is limited to
“charge bargains,” or those in which the prosecutor agrees to
reduce or dismiss the original charge(s) in exchange for a guilty
plea on some other charge(s).
8 See also United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 555, 558 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (“[T]he rule in this circuit and others is that ‘the
trial judge must provide a reasoned exercise of discretion in
order to justify a departure from the course agreed on by the
prosecution and defense.’” (quoting United States v. Ammidown,
497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973))); United States v. Moore, 916
F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1990) (“By leaving the decision whether
to accept or reject a plea to the ‘exercise of sound judicial
discretion,’ the Supreme Court did not intend to allow district
courts to reject pleas on an arbitrary basis.” (quoting
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262)); Miller, 722 F.2d at 566 (holding
that “courts must review individually every charge bargain placed
before them”); United States v. Delegal, 678 F.2d 47, 50 (7th
Cir. 1982) (“While a defendant has no absolute right to have a
guilty plea accepted, a court must exercise sound discretion in
determining whether or not to reject a plea. 	Thus, a defendant
is entitled to plead guilty unless the district court can
articulate a sound reason for rejecting the plea.”); Hoskins, 150
S.W.3d at 24 (holding that a court “may not adopt a categorical
policy to reject all charge . . . bargains” and must
“independently review each bargain placed before it”); Sandy, 935
P.2d at 1150 (holding that, while a trial court has discretion to
reject a guilty plea, the court is nonetheless “obligated to
consider seriously the proffered plea”); State v. Hunt, 485 A.2d
109, 114 (Vt. 1984) (noting that a “plea should not be refused
without good reason”).
No. 20040780 	8
that “trial courts cannot reject a plea on an arbitrary basis”
but must “give the plea agreement due consideration before
reaching a decision on whether to grant [it]”). 8 	This rule
against arbitrary or blanket rejections of plea agreements makes
sense in light of the fact that plea bargaining is “an essential
component of the administration of justice,” and that, when
“properly administered, it is to be encouraged.” 	Santobello, 404
U.S. at 260. 	We therefore adopt the majority rule in requiring
an affirmative exercise of discretion on the part of the trial
court prior to rejecting a plea agreement.

9 See also Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1437 (“While Rule 11 vests
district courts with the discretion to accept or reject plea
agreements, the rule does not define the criteria to be applied
in doing so.”); United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700, 703 (5th
Cir. 1977) (“The plea agreement procedure does not attempt to
define criteria for the acceptance or rejection of a plea
agreement. . . . While appellate courts have reviewed the
refusals of plea bargains, little attention has been given to the
formulation of a standard for the district court’s exercise of
discretion.”).
10 A few have tried, however. 	See, e.g., Hunt, 485 A.2d at
114-15 (listing the American Bar Association’s Minimum Standards
on Pleas of Guilty as “considerations appropriate for application
by the trial court in determining whether it should accept or
reject a plea bargain agreement” but also affirming that judges
exercise “independent judgment, based upon heritage, environment,
education and a myriad of other influences”); State v. Sears, 542
S.E.2d 863, 867 (W. Va. 2000) (enunciating a “primary test to
determine whether a plea bargain should be accepted or
rejected”).
9 	No. 20040780
B. 	Court Need Not Apply a Specific List of
Factors in Rejecting a Plea Agreement
¶18 	Even while recognizing the need to exercise discretion,
few jurisdictions have imposed rigid boundaries on a trial
court’s exercise of this discretion. 	See, e.g., State v. Hage,
630 N.W.2d 828, 834 (Iowa 2001) (noting that in the context of
plea bargains, “there are no established criteria or standards to
consider in the exercise of discretion”); State v. Brown, 689
N.W.2d 347, 351 (Neb. 2004) (noting that, judicial discretion to
reject plea bargains “is not unlimited” but “declin[ing] to adopt
specific limitations”). 	Similarly in the federal courts, the
rules of procedure “do[] not purport to establish criteria for
the acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement.” 	United States
v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1986). 9 	Indeed, “[j]ust
how much ‘consideration’ should be given to the disposition
agreed to by the prosecutor and just how ‘independent’ the judge
should be in these circumstances is a most difficult issue,
seldom addressed in the cases.” 10 	5 Wayne R. LaFave et al.,
Criminal Procedure § 21.3(e) (2d ed. 1999).
¶19 	Given the absence of clear guidelines, the prevailing
approach among those courts that have considered this issue is
decidedly ad hoc. 	Courts generally limit their investigation of
what constitutes a valid reason for rejecting a plea agreement to
the individual circumstances of the case at hand. 	We likewise
decline to set forth a specific list of mandatory factors that a

11 See also Maddox, 48 F.3d at 558 (citing with approval the
rule that judges must set forth on the record their reasons for
rejecting a plea); Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 (requiring district
courts to “set forth, on the record, the prosecution’s reasons
for framing the bargain and the court’s justification for
rejecting it”); Miller, 722 F.2d at 566 (similar); Delegal, 678
F.2d at 50 (holding that a court must “articulate a sound reason
for rejecting the plea”); Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 24 (holding that
“the trial court must articulate [its] reasons for rejecting [a
plea bargain]”); Sandy, 935 P.2d at 1150 (“If the judge rejects a
plea bargain, he or she . . . must state reasons for the
disapproval.”); State v. Daniels, 648 A.2d 266, 268 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1994) (agreeing that “a judge’s reasons for
rejection of a plea should be made known”); Hunt, 485 A.2d at
114-15 (similar).
No. 20040780 	10
judge must consider before rejecting a plea agreement. 	Rather,
the trial court must simply demonstrate that it gave sufficient
consideration to the plea prior to rejecting it such that the
decision to reject was not arbitrary.
C. 	Court Must State Its Reasons for Rejecting
a Plea on the Record
¶20 	As a means of demonstrating that the trial court gave
all due consideration to the plea, the majority of jurisdictions
require that judges make their reasoning for rejecting a proposed
plea agreement a matter of record. 	See, e.g., Darlington, 105
P.3d at 232 (“The trial court must . . . articulate the reasons
for rejecting an agreement on the record.”). 11 	We agree that
“requiring district courts to articulate a sound reason for
rejecting a plea is the surest way to foster the sound exercise
of judicial discretion.” 	Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136. 	By adopting
this rule, we “facilitate[] appellate review when the defendant
contends that the district court abused its discretion in
rejecting a plea.” 	United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453
(7th Cir. 1998); see also Robertson, 45 F.3d at 1438 (“Requiring
district courts to articulate the reasons for rejecting a plea
agreement not only helps insure the court is aware of and gives
adequate deference to prosecutorial discretion, it is the surest,
indeed the only way to facilitate appellate review of rejected
plea bargains.”).
¶21 	To summarize, the weight of authority stands for the
following propositions: 	(1) while a trial court retains broad
discretion to reject a proposed plea agreement, it may not do so
arbitrarily; (2) a court need not apply a list of mandatory
factors in rejecting a plea; but (3) it must state its general

12 Of all the cases cited by Montiel, however, only one
comes even marginally close to establishing firm criteria for
rejecting plea agreements. 	That case notes that
[a] primary test to determine whether a plea
bargain should be accepted or rejected is in
light of the entire criminal event and given
the defendant’s prior criminal record whether
the plea bargain enables the court to dispose
of the case in a manner commensurate with the
seriousness of the criminal charges and the
character and background of the defendant.
Sears, 542 S.E.2d at 867 (internal quotation omitted). 	In other
words, West Virginia apparently requires that a court collect
much of the information typically included in a presentence
report prior to rejecting a plea agreement. 	Montiel has offered
us no compelling reason to follow this minority approach, which
seems to us unnecessary and burdensome.
11 	No. 20040780
reasoning for rejecting the plea on the record. 	We adopt these
principles for review of plea agreements in Utah.
III. 	TRIAL COURT’S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
¶22 	Having outlined the principles governing judicial
rejection of plea agreements, we now determine whether the trial
court’s action here was in accord with them. 	We conclude that
the trial court was well within its discretion in rejecting the
plea agreement in this case and consequently reject each of
Montiel’s three arguments, listed above.
A. 	“Legally Relevant Factors”
¶23 	Montiel first argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to consider “all legally relevant factors”
before rejecting the proposed plea agreement. 	In support of this
claim, Montiel cites this court’s statement, made in the context
of sentencing review, that a trial court abuses its discretion if
it “fails to consider all legally relevant factors.” 	State v.
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990). 	He then cites certain
cases from other jurisdictions that have sought to identify what
factors are legally relevant in the context of plea bargaining. 12
As we noted above, however, most jurisdictions decline to specify
all those factors that are legally relevant in rejecting plea
agreements, and for good reason. 	First, it would be quite
difficult--if not impossible--to anticipate the myriad potential
legitimate bases for rejecting plea agreements. 	Second, to adopt
stringent guidelines would undermine our stated goal of vesting
trial courts with broad discretion in this area.

13 See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003)
(enumerating factors for the court to consider “[i]n determining
whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively,”
including “the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant”); id. § 76-3-201(7)(e) (requiring the
court to consider “sentencing guidelines regarding aggravating
and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission” when “determining a just sentence”).
No. 20040780 	12
¶24 	Because we have elected not to set forth any mandatory
list of factors that must be considered when rejecting a plea
agreement, we cannot import the definition of abuse of discretion
in the context of sentencing (where mandatory factors are indeed
defined 13 ) for use in the context of plea bargaining. 	More
appropriate language defining the abuse of discretion standard
for this context is found in our decision in State v. Arguelles,
2003 UT 1, 63 P.3d 731, in which we held that “a trial court has
abused its discretion only if the trial court’s decision [is]
beyond the limits of reasonability,” or, in other words, that an
abuse of discretion has occurred “if the trial court’s actions
are inherently unfair or if . . . no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the trial court.” 	Id. at ¶ 101 (internal
quotation omitted). 	So long as the trial court carefully
considers a proffered plea agreement and states its reasons for
rejecting the plea in the record, it will not be overturned on
appeal unless it can be said that the trial court’s decision was
“beyond the limits of reasonability.” 	Id. 	Other jurisdictions
have adopted a similar standard. 	See, e.g., United States v.
Greener, 979 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e will not
reverse the district court’s decision [to reject a plea
agreement] if any reasonable person could agree with the district
court.”); Darlington, 105 P.3d at 232 (“Where the trial court
clearly exercises independent judgment in rejecting the plea
agreement and sets forth on the record its reasons for doing so,
its ruling will not be set aside on appeal.”).
¶25 	Because we decline to adopt the unnecessarily
burdensome standard Montiel proposes, Montiel’s first argument
fails.
B. 	Scope of Judicial Authority
¶26 	Montiel next argues that the trial court abused its
discretion because its rejection of the plea agreement
“exceed[ed] the limits [of judicial authority] prescribed by
law.” 	State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ¶ 66, 52 P.3d 1210. 	In
support of what is essentially a separation of powers argument,

14 Montiel principally relies on United States v. Ammidown,
497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that a trial judge
may not reject a plea bargain unless “he can say that the action
of the prosecuting attorney is such a departure from sound
prosecutorial principle as to mark it an abuse of prosecutorial
discretion”); Sparks v. State, 759 P.2d 180, 185 (Nev. 1988)
(same); and their progeny. 	Other than these two jurisdictions,
we can find no others that have adopted so draconian a limitation
on judicial discretion. 	Indeed, many courts have explicitly
repudiated the rule in Ammidown. 	See, e.g., Moore, 637 F.2d at
1196 n.3 (“The precedential value of Ammidown has been
considerably diminished since the adoption of the 1974 amendments
to Rule 11 that were intended to increase the discretionary
authority of the district court in dealing with guilty pleas.”);
Bean, 564 F.2d at 703 n.4 (noting that “[t]o our knowledge no
other circuit has followed the District of Columbia in so
drastically limiting the discretion of a judge in regard to plea
bargains”); Brown, 689 N.W.2d at 351 (“specifically declin[ing]”
to follow Ammidown’s “attempt[] to define the scope of a judge’s
discretion to reject a guilty plea”).
13 	No. 20040780
Montiel cites cases from two jurisdictions that place great
emphasis on prosecutorial discretion to enter into plea
agreements and therefore require a trial court to show abuse of
that discretion or other similarly extreme circumstances before
it is permitted to reject a plea agreement. 14 	As we noted above,
however, in the vast majority of jurisdictions such a stringent
restriction on judicial discretion is limited to the inherently
executive powers of indictment and dismissal, and not to plea
bargains, in which both executive and judicial functions are
involved. 	The simple fact that a plea bargain may contain an
agreement to dismiss one or more charges does not limit judicial
discretion in considering the plea. 	Even though a “plea bargain
[may be] cast in the form of a dismissal of [a] count, [its]
effect [is] to limit the sentence available;” thus, “the district
judge [may] properly exercise[] reasonable discretion in
rejecting the plea bargain.” 	United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d
1454, 1463 (10th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation omitted); see
also Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 697 (“[A] prosecutor’s
proposal to dismiss a claim . . . in consideration of a plea of
guilty to some other offense . . . implicates core judicial
functions. 	In such a case, the court’s adjudicatory and
sentencing responsibilities justify active scrutiny of the plea
agreement . . . .”).
¶27 	We thus do not believe that any separation of powers
concerns are implicated in this case. 	Indeed, our discussion
above distinguishes this case from those in which such concerns
might arise. 	Here, it is clear that the trial court was well

15 This proposition, at least in regard to excessive
leniency as a basis for rejecting a plea, finds support among
most federal appellate courts and a large number of state courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 315 F.3d 445, 447 (5th Cir.
2002); United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1330-31 (11th Cir.
1999); Torres-Eschavarria, 129 F.3d at 696; Robertson, 45 F.3d at
1439; United States v. Skidmore, 998 F.2d 372, 376 (6th Cir.
1993); Carrigan, 778 F.2d at 1462; Miller, 722 F.2d at 563; Bean,
564 F.2d at 704; Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 25; State v. Southworth,
52 P.3d 987, 997 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Hunt, 485 A.2d at 112-13.
In regard to a failure to inform the victim of a plea agreement
as a basis for rejecting the plea, see Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 25-
26; State v. Boatfield, 2001 WL 1635447, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Dec. 20, 2001).
No. 20040780 	14
within its authority to review and reject the proposed plea
agreement. 	Thus, Montiel’s second argument also fails.
C. 	Arbitrariness
¶28 	Lastly, Montiel argues that the trial court was
arbitrary in its decision to reject the proposed plea agreement
and therefore abused its discretion. 	As noted above, we agree
that a trial court may not “reject pleas on an arbitrary basis.”
Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136. 	We disagree, however, that the trial
court in this case acted arbitrarily.
¶29 	Montiel insists that the trial court refused to
consider the proffered plea agreement solely because the court
had a fixed policy never to waive firearm enhancements. 	We agree
with the court of appeals that the record instead supports the
conclusion that the trial court considered at least three
different factors before rejecting the proposed plea agreement:
(1) the violent nature of the offense (a robbery committed with a
firearm), (2) the effective reduction in felony level that the
plea would produce and the corresponding reduction in the
possible term of imprisonment, and (3) the fact that the victim
had not been informed of the specific plea agreement reached
between the prosecution and defendant. 	Either of these two
latter criteria, on their own, would likely have provided a
legitimate basis for the trial court to reject the plea
agreement, 15 and when combined that is certainly the case. We are
confident, based on the exchange in the record, that all of these
factors, in combination with the violent nature of the crime, led
the trial court to reject the plea agreement.
¶30 	While the trial court used language signaling finality
in its reference to firearm enhancements at the outset of the
presentation of the plea agreement, it did not reject the plea at

15 	No. 20040780
that juncture. 	Rather, it was only after further discussion of
the available sentence and of the status of notice to the victim
that the trial court reached and announced a decision.
Identifying a predilection against a certain type of plea
agreement is a far cry from refusing to even consider a plea.
Indeed, if the trial court had arbitrarily applied an unwavering
policy as Montiel suggests, one would have expected the court to
terminate discussion and reject the plea at the outset. 	Instead,
the court entertained an ensuing dialogue at some length, and
even furthered this discussion on its own by raising--unprompted
by either party--the issue of whether the victim had been
informed of the plea. 	Thus, we cannot say that the court’s
decision to reject the plea in this case was arbitrary.
Consequently, Montiel’s third argument also fails.
CONCLUSION
¶31 	A trial court must affirmatively exercise its
discretion prior to rejecting a plea agreement by giving due
consideration to the proffered plea. 	The court need not apply a
list of mandatory factors, but it must state its reasons for
rejecting the plea on the record so as to demonstrate that the
court did not reject the plea arbitrarily. 	If the record
reflects such reasoning, the trial court will not be overturned
on appeal unless the appellate court determines that the trial
court’s rejection of the plea agreement was “beyond the limits of
reasonability.” 	Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 at ¶ 101. 	Under the
circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial court
adequately stated its reasons for rejecting the plea on the
record and that its determination was well within the bounds of
reason. 	Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
---
¶32 	Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.