Saleh v. Farmers Insurance Exchange

2006 UT 20
AMENDED OPINION
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
Antoine Saleh, No. 20040584
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, Fire
Insurance Exchange, dba Farmers
Insurance Group, The Farmers F I L E D
Insurance Group of Companies,
Defendants and Appellees. March 24, 2006
---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
No. 980904149
Attorneys: L. Rich Humpherys, Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
Aaron Alma Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defendants
---
NEHRING, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 This appeal has its origins in a dispute between a
homeowner, Antoine Saleh, and an insurance company, Farmers
Insurance Exchange, over how much and when Farmers should have
paid Mr. Saleh for fire damage to a residence Mr. Saleh owns in
Salt Lake City. After a seven-day bench trial, the district
court ruled that Farmers had breached its contract of insurance
with Mr. Saleh and awarded him $1,252.80 in damages. In this
appeal, Mr. Saleh challenges the adequacy of this award. He also
insists that the district court erred in other significant ways.
Most prominent among these other claims of error is Mr. Saleh’s
contention that the insurance contract required Farmers to pay
Mr. Saleh for the cost of repairs as they were performed and not
upon completion of the entire project as the district court held.
Mr. Saleh also takes issue with the district court’s summary

Nos. 20040365, 20040373 2
rejection of his claims of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, fraud, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, deceptive advertising and
marketing, and breach of warranty. Finally, Mr. Saleh claims
that the district court erred in refusing to award attorney fees,
litigation expenses, and prejudgment interest. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Mr. Saleh purchased a home at 332 East 7th Avenue in
Salt Lake City in 1995. He paid $130,000 for the dwelling. He
insured the home with a homeowner’s insurance policy from Farmers
Insurance Exchange. On June 28, 1996, the house was damaged by a
fire, a hazard covered by the Farmers policy.
¶3 Farmers assigned Mr. Saleh’s claim to its adjuster,
Marcia Brissenden. Ms. Brissenden received repair bids from two
contractors. Only one of the bids included within the scope of
the proposed work repairs that conformed to existing building
codes. Ms. Brissenden analyzed and compared the bids and
concluded that the cost of repairs necessary to satisfy Farmers’
liability was $92,364.64.
¶4 This sum was not, however, the only measure of Farmers’
contractual obligation. Mr. Saleh’s insurance policy provided
that, if he chose not to repair or rebuild, Farmers would pay
only the actual cash value (meaning the replacement cost at the
time of loss, less depreciation) of the damaged or destroyed
dwelling or structure. If Mr. Saleh elected to repair or replace
the structure, Farmers would pay the replacement cost of that
part of the structure with equivalent construction. However,
Farmers would “pay no more than the actual cash value until
repair or replacement is completed.” As we will see, the
conflicting interpretations of this language fueled the dispute
that led to this litigation. After applying a depreciation
factor to the cost of repair, Ms. Brissenden determined that the
actual cash value of the Saleh house was $68,554.14.
¶5 Mr. Saleh signed a Proof of Loss form in which he
confirmed the accuracy of the $92,364.64 that Ms. Brissenden had
determined to be the amount Farmers would cover for repairs. On
October 28, 1996, after receiving the form, Farmers sent
Mr. Saleh a check that brought the total payments made for
repairs on the house to $68,554.14, the actual cash value to
which Mr. Saleh would be entitled if he did not undertake
repairs. Farmers withheld $23,810.50--the difference between
$92,364.64 and $68,554.14--which it indicated would be paid to
Mr. Saleh upon completion of the repairs.

3 Nos. 20040365, 20040373
¶6 Mr. Saleh decided not to merely restore the house to
its original condition, but to substantially increase its size
and the quality of construction materials. The first contractor
retained by Mr. Saleh, Maka Lelini Vai, determined that he could
not complete the house for the agreed-upon fee and pulled off the
job in April 1997. After Mr. Vai abandoned the project,
Mr. Saleh undertook to complete the job by acting as his own
contractor and by hiring his fiancée’s father to assist.
¶7 Most of the work was completed under this arrangement,
but Mr. Saleh claimed that his funds ran out in September 1997,
and he consequently had to stop construction. During this time,
Mr. Saleh attempted to get additional funds from Farmers, either
by increasing the amount of his total claim, which would increase
the amount of the actual cash value, or by acquiring the
additional $23,810.50 earmarked for repairs but not advanced
because all of the work had not been completed.
¶8 Mr. Saleh pursued the first option by calling Farmers
on July 10, 1997, over eight months after signing the Proof of
Loss form, and claiming that Ms. Brissenden had overlooked
several items. Farmers rejected most of these claims as inflated
estimates for damages Mr. Saleh had claimed previously, but it
agreed to pay an additional $600 for repairs to the garage roof.
Farmers then mailed a check to Mr. Saleh for $24,410.50, covering
the remaining $23,810.50 owed upon completion and the $600 for
the garage roof.
¶9 When Farmers tendered the payment of this sum to
Mr. Saleh, it indicated that by cashing the check Mr. Saleh would
confirm that the claim had been fully settled. However,
Mr. Saleh refused to cash the check because he believed that
additional legitimate claims remained unpaid.
¶10 Mr. Saleh claimed that Farmers breached its contract
obligations to him both when it withheld the $23,810.50 pending
completion of the repairs and when it refused to pay his
additional claims of loss. According to Mr. Saleh, Farmers’
behavior was in furtherance of corporate practices designed to
minimize overpayments to policyholders, practices that exposed
Farmers to liability for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, fraud, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, deceptive advertising and
marketing, and breach of warranty. Of these additional claims,
the district court summarily dismissed all but breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the case

Nos. 20040365, 20040373 4
went to trial on this claim and on Mr. Saleh’s claims for breach
of contract.
¶11 Following a seven-day bench trial, the court issued a
Memorandum Decision finding that there was a partial breach of
contract and held Farmers liable for damages in the amounts of
$1,252.80 to rebuild a wall and $10 in nominal damages to
hardwood flooring that had not been paid in the original
settlement. During the course of the trial, the court made
various legal rulings, most notably concerning the admissibility
of evidence, which are at issue on appeal. Mr. Saleh also
objected to the court’s conclusion that he was not entitled to
attorney fees and prejudgment interest and appeals those
decisions.
ANALYSIS
I. THE INSURANCE POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS
¶12 The central issue presented in this appeal is at what
point Farmers was obliged to pay Mr. Saleh the final $23,810.50.
Most of the remaining issues orbit this one. The solution is
obtained with aid from the tools of contract construction. We
begin our analysis by examining the text of the disputed policy
terms. They state:
Covered loss to Buildings under Coverage A
and B will be settled by one of the following
methods;
(1) Actual Cash Value
If you do not repair or replace at the
same location shown in the Declarations the
damaged or destroyed dwelling or separate
structure, we will pay the smallest of the
following:
(a) the limit of insurance applying to
the damaged or destroyed dwelling or
separate structure.
(b) the actual cash value of the damaged
or destroyed dwelling or separate
structure.
You may make a claim for an additional
amount within 180 days after the loss on
a replacement cost basis if the property
has been repaired or replaced.

5 Nos. 20040365, 20040373
(2) Replacement Cost. If you repair or
replace at the same location shown in the
Declarations the damaged or destroyed
dwelling or separate structure, we will pay
without deduction for depreciation the
smallest of the following amounts:
(a) the limit of insurance under this
policy that applies to the damaged or
destroyed dwelling or separate
structure;
(b) the replacement cost of that part of
the dwelling or separate structure
damaged with equivalent construction and
for use on the same premises.
(c) the amount actually needed and spent
to repair or replace the dwelling or
separate structure intended for the same
occupancy and use. However, if the cost
to repair or replace is more than $1,000
or more than 5% of the limit of
insurance on the damaged or destroyed
building, whichever is less, we will pay
no more than the actual cash value until
repair or replacement is completed.
¶13 As noted above, this contract language is benign until
the arrival of its last clause, which authorizes Farmers to
withhold payments for repair or replacement “until repair or
replacement is completed.” Farmers claims that this phrase means
that it can retain the value of depreciation--here, the
$23,810.50--until all phases of construction have been completed,
while Mr. Saleh insists that the term is ambiguous and could be
interpreted to mean that Farmers must make periodic payments from
the depreciation reserve as significant amounts of repair and
replacement work are completed.
¶14 The district court found no ambiguity in the phrase and
agreed with Farmers’ interpretation. We have stated that “[a]n
insurance policy is merely a contract between the insured and the
insurer and is construed pursuant to the same rules applied to
ordinary contracts. Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is
a question of law.” Alf v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d
1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). As a question of law, we review the
district court for correctness.

1 Sandt’s test for ambiguity is worded slightly differently
but is functionally equivalent.
Nos. 20040365, 20040373 6
¶15 A contract may be ambiguous because it is unclear, it
omits terms, or “the terms used to express the intention of the
parties may be understood to have two or more plausible
meanings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we do
not confront unclear language or omitted terms, but rather
Mr. Saleh’s claim to alternate plausible interpretation.
¶16 “Plausible” entered the English language from the Latin
verb “plaudere,” to applaud. Although the primary meaning of the
word has evolved to mean likely or reasonable to a degree falling
somewhat short of certainty, vestiges of its root live on in its
connotation. In other words, to earn the designation of
plausible, a notion, explanation, or interpretation must impart
confidence in its credibility sufficient to merit our applause.
A standing ovation is not required, a discreet collision of the
palms will do, but there must be reason to applaud.
¶17 Our cases that have required us to test for the
presence of contract ambiguity have, not surprisingly, avoided an
etymologically-based test of plausibility. Rather, we have been
content to permit plausibility to speak for itself. For example,
we stated that the proffered alternate interpretation “must be
plausible and reasonable in light of the language used,” First
Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah
1998), and that to merit consideration as an interpretation that
creates an ambiguity, the alternative rendition “must be based
upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used and may
not be the result of a forced or strained construction." Home
Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 367 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although this
court has left some discretion to courts in determining whether
ambiguity exists, at minimum one universal standard applies to
this determination: words and phrases do not qualify as
ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a
different interpretation according to his or her own interests.
Alf, 850 P.2d at 1274-75; accord U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt,
854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993).1 In other words, for a proffered
alternative interpretation to merit a court’s applause, it must
be more than a conjecture but may be less than a certainty.
¶18 With this in mind, we return to the phrase at hand:
“[Farmers] will pay no more than the actual cash value until
repair or replacement is completed.” Mr. Saleh asks us to read
“until repair or replacement is completed” as meaning “until

2 E.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Patrick, 647 So. 2d
983, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the trial court
erred “in ignoring the plain language of the replacement cost
policy”); Nat’l Tea Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 456 N.E.2d
206, 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that the policy is “clear
and unambiguous”); Bratcher v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961
P.2d 828, 831 (Okla. 1998) (finding “plain meaning” in the
clause); Higgins v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 469 P.2d 766, 774 (Or.
1970) (finding “the language employed in the policy . . .
sufficiently clear”); Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596
A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding policy language
“clear and unambiguous”).
7 Nos. 20040365, 20040373
significant repair or replacement is completed.” Is this an
interpretation that sparks the impulse to applaud? We think not.
As used in this phrase, “repair or replacement” refers to the
“damaged or destroyed dwelling or separate structure” described
in the first paragraph of the section of the policy defining
“Replacement Cost.” Thus, it would be accurate to render the
phrase in this way: “[Farmers] will pay no more than the actual
cash value until the repair or replacement of the damaged or
destroyed dwelling or separate structure is completed.” It is
difficult for us to extract from this language an alternative
meaning to “is completed.” It is, therefore, not plausible to
suggest that the phrase can be interpreted to mean that repairs
or replacement could be complete, but that additional repairs or
replacements remained to be done. The work is either complete or
it is not. To import the term “significant” into the phrase is
to change the meaning of “complete” to “incomplete.” This is an
effort at interpretation that leaves us sitting on our hands.
¶19 We note that we are not alone in adopting this plain
language interpretation of the payment timing clause at issue
here. A substantial majority of jurisdictions that have analyzed
replacement cost clauses share our conclusion that the payment
timing language is unambiguous.2
¶20 Mr. Saleh points us to Garnett v. Transamerica
Insurance Services, 800 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1990), in which the Idaho
Supreme Court required proportional payments toward the repair of
the insured’s building under the policy’s replacement cost
clause. That case did not, however, turn on an interpretation of
the contract language. Indeed, the court recognized that a
“literal reading” of the policy would require the insured to
repair or replace the building “before being entitled to more
than the actual cash value.” Id. at 665. The court concluded
that the unambiguous contract language was overcome by the fact

3 This is not to say that we feel that interpreting the
contract as Mr. Saleh suggests would result in a more “equitable”
outcome. To the contrary, our interpretation today reflects a
sound policy determination as well as the correct legal
conclusion. The replacement cost clause at issue here is a
crucial tool in which insurance companies protect against moral
hazard, specifically, the opportunity for the insured to collect
a windfall without having to replace the damaged or destroyed
structure. The possibility of holding the insurance company
responsible for multiple payments throughout the rebuilding
process is equally unpalatable because of the transaction costs
that would be associated with frequent inspections, analyses, and
payments throughout the reconstruction. These transaction costs
would require higher premiums on all insurance customers to cover
the increased costs. Finally, there is little reason to believe
that an insured would be unable to acquire sufficient funding to
(continued...)
Nos. 20040365, 20040373 8
that “Transamerica told the Garnetts that Transamerica was
prepared to make proportional payments toward the repair of the
building.” Id. The result in Garnett was, therefore, “based on
purely equitable considerations--something in the nature of
estoppel.” Johny Parker, Replacement Cost Coverage: A Legal
Primer, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 295, 314-15 (1999).
¶21 Mr. Saleh argues, however, that even though he did not
advance any equitable claims, the manner in which Farmers treated
him has much in common with the way Transamerica treated the
Garnetts and that these similarities would entitle him to relief
under his legal claims. Mr. Saleh maintains that his evidence
that Farmers had made proportional payments to other policy
holders and that Farmers was pursuing an aggressive policy to
reduce “overpayments” of claims is relevant to the interpretation
of the payment timing clause and that the district court abused
its discretion by not admitting the evidence. To embrace this
view would require us to radically alter, and not for the better,
our analytical approach to contract interpretation by making even
unambiguous contract terms vulnerable to modification by
extrinsic evidence. We choose to let stand undisturbed our long-
standing interpretive guideposts, including the principle that
“[i]f the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties’ intentions are determined from the
plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may
be interpreted as a matter of law.” Green River Canal Co. v.
Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶ 17, 84 P.3d 1134.
¶22 Mr. Saleh’s argument can be viewed as an attempt to
recruit notions of fairness and equity3 to tug on clear textual

3 (...continued)
rebuild without an up-front payment. As here, there is no doubt
that an insured will be able to collect the full amount once
construction is completed. This certain future cash stream
should serve as sufficient security for the insured to acquire
capital if liquid assets are otherwise unavailable.
9 Nos. 20040365, 20040373
language and pull it into the realm of ambiguity. While
equitable doctrines may intrude upon contract terms, even with
the result of modifying or abrogating their terms, those
doctrines, which generally appear in the form of estoppel, have
not been raised here. When they are invoked, equitable doctrines
like estoppel appear as independent claims and affirmative
defenses that are replete with defining elements and standards of
proof. Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Utah 1991).
Equitable doctrines are not, however, within the toolbox of
contract interpretation. In the context of contract
interpretation, therefore, it is irrelevant whether insurance
companies, including Farmers, regularly pay the depreciation
value prior to completion. It is likewise irrelevant whether
Mr. Saleh can articulate a logical argument for paying before
completion. Farmers has bound itself through textually
unambiguous language, and it is not within this court’s purview
to bind it to more.
II. THE UNAMBIGUITY DETERMINATION RESOLVES ADDITIONAL CLAIMS
¶23 Our legal conclusion that the payment timing clause in
Farmers’ policy unambiguously justified the company’s decision to
withhold the funds representing the depreciated value of the
structure until the repairs were completed leads us to reject
Mr. Saleh’s challenges to the district court’s exclusion of
evidence relating to: (1) standards of the insurance industry,
(2) Farmers’ interpretation of its own policy language,
(3) Farmers’ practices and procedures, and (4) other evidence of
Farmers’ internal policies and programs. Since the clause was
unambiguous, there is no need to try to divine its meaning from
evidence outside the four corners of the contract.
¶24 Our determination of the contract interpretation issue
also causes Mr. Saleh’s challenge to the district court’s ruling
that his claim against Farmers was fairly debatable to fall away.
Mr. Saleh concedes this point in his brief. If a claim brought
by an insured against an insurer is fairly debatable, failure to
comply with the insured’s demands cannot form the basis of bad
faith. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶ 34, 56
P.3d 524. Likewise, if an insurer’s “reason for denying benefits
under the policy is fairly debatable, then [the insurer’s] denial

4 Mr. Saleh insists that attorney fees are available for a
simple breach of an insurance contract’s express term. To
support this claim, he relies on Billings v. Union Bankers
Insurance Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996), which states that
“[a]ttorney fees may be recoverable as consequential damages
flowing from an insurer’s breach of either the express or the
implied terms of an insurance contract.” Billings traces this
principle to Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 420
(Utah 1989). Bracey permits attorney fees to be recovered as
consequential damages flowing from an insurer’s breach of
contract, but is silent on the topic of whether the reach of
consequential damages extends both to express terms and to the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the
case that Bracey looks to, Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
701 P.2d 795, 801-02 (Utah 1985), discusses the subject of when
attorney fees are available for breach of contract. As Billings
itself recognizes, “Beck [sic] did not deal with a breach of the
underlying insurance contract’s express provisions, but only with
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
Billings, 918 F.2d at 466. Furthermore, Beck concludes that
consequential damages (which include attorney fees) are only
available when there has been a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Beck, 701 P.2d at 801-02.
Billings distinguishes between allowing the recovery of
consequential damages for breaches of the express contract and
implied contractual covenants, stating that “consequential
damage[s] . . . [are] available only for breach of the implied
covenant, not . . . for breach of the express terms of the
contract.” 918 P.2d at 466. It reaches this rule by reasoning
that
it would be unfair not to permit an insurer
who has a legitimate dispute with an insured
over a claim to have the dispute resolved
before having to pay the claim. Exposure to
the sweeping measure of damages available for
breach of the implied covenant would
(continued...)
Nos. 20040365, 20040373 10
does not rise to the level of outrageous conduct that could give
rise to liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.” Id. ¶ 39.
¶25 Furthermore, because there was no bad faith in Farmers’
actions, attorney fees are not available. It is settled law that
in order to recover attorney fees for breach of contract, they
must be authorized by a statute or a contract provision, id.
¶ 52, or there must have been bad faith. Lieber v. ITT Hartford
Ins. Ctr. Inc., 2000 UT 90, ¶ 16, 15 P.3d 1030.4

4 (...continued)
effectively deny any careful insurer the
option of declining to pay a contested claim
and awaiting the outcome of the dispute.
Id. at 467.
We see no reason why Billings would unequivocally align
itself with Beck and then do a complete about-face. As
illustrated, this court has historically limited the availability
of consequential damages to breaches of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The admittedly unclear language
suggesting the contrary in Billings does not change that policy.
11 Nos. 20040365, 20040373
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RESOLVED MR. SALEH’S OTHER
CLAIMS
¶26 The district court dismissed Mr. Saleh’s claims of
fraud and misrepresentation and statutory causes of action
through summary judgment. An appellate court reviews a trial
court’s grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving no
deference to its conclusions of law. Jones v. ERA Brokers
Consol., 2000 UT 61, ¶ 8, 6 P.3d 1129. The fraud and
misrepresentation claims were to be based on the disallowed
evidence regarding Farmers’ company policies and industry
standards. This evidence purportedly would have shown that
Farmers had a corporate policy geared towards eliminating
overpayment of claims. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, this evidence would not form a basis for fraud.
Mr. Saleh cannot reasonably contend that he was entitled to be
overpaid for his claim. Instead, he appears to suggest that the
elimination of overpayments is merely corporate code for
encouraging underpayment of valid claims. Nothing in the summary
judgment record permits the application of a sinister gloss to
Farmers’ policy of preventing overpayment. Mr. Saleh alleges
that Farmers’ policies are equivalent to those at question in
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT
89, 65 P.3d 1134 (2001), rev’d on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408.
Such a claim is without merit. Mere efforts to avoid overpayment
and to detect customer fraud are entirely different from the
deceptive and fraudulent practices pursued in Campbell.
¶27 As for the claimed statutory causes of action, this
court recently held that Utah Code section 31A-26-301 does not
allow a private cause of action by an insured against an insurer.
Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2005 UT 37, ¶ 31, 116 P.3d
342.
IV. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT AVAILABLE

Nos. 20040365, 20040373 12
¶28 Prejudgment interest may be recovered where the damage
is complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular
time, and the loss is measurable by facts and figures. Corina v.
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). Generally, a “decision
to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law
which we review for correctness.” Id. However, when the trial
court applies the facts of the case to the law then the question
is a mixed question of fact and law, and the factual basis
underpinning the decision is subject to a clearly erroneous
standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). In
this case, the district court agreed with Farmers that the
additional amounts owed under the policy were not ascertainable
by Farmers until additional evidence was presented at trial. The
district court ruled that because the claim was not liquidated
before trial, prejudgment interest was unavailable. We find no
basis upon which to challenge the soundness of this ruling and
therefore do not disturb it.
V. DAMAGES AWARDED WERE ADEQUATE
¶29 The award of damages is a factual determination that we
review for clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36
(Utah 1994). Mr. Saleh has failed to show that the factual
support for the district court’s award of damages falls short of
this standard. The district court considered voluminous evidence
regarding the scope of damage to the Saleh home and the nature of
the repairs necessary to restore the home to its original state
while complying with the building code. We are not persuaded
that the damage award is clearly contrary to the weight of that
evidence, nor do we have a firm and definite conviction that the
district court was mistaken in reaching its damage award. State
v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
CONCLUSION
¶30 No ambiguity existed in the term of the insurance
policy that Mr. Saleh purchased from Farmers guaranteeing the
timing of payment for Mr. Saleh’s claim; therefore, we conclude
that under the policy Farmers was under no obligation to pay the
full recovery until all of the repairs were completed. Most of
Mr. Saleh’s remaining claims are left meritless upon this
conclusion, and he fails to convince us that the district court
was clearly erroneous in its factual findings. Consequently, the
district court’s decision is affirmed in its entirety.
---

13 Nos. 20040365, 20040373
¶31 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Wilkins,
Justice Durrant, and Justice Parrish concur in Justice Nehring’s
opinion.