State v. Chacon

2026 UT App 22

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL MANUEL CHACON,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240150-CA
Filed February 12, 2026

Seventh District Court, Moab Department
The Honorable Don M. Torgerson
No. 231700035

Dylan T. Carlson, Debra M. Nelson, Benjamin Miller,
and Wendy M. Brown, Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Michael Gadd,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER
and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 A jury convicted Michael Manuel Chacon of failure to
respond to a police officer’s signal to stop. Chacon appeals his
conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
it and that his trial attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective
assistance by failing to object to certain aspects of the jury
instructions. For the reasons that follow, we reject Chacon’s
arguments and affirm his conviction.
State v. Chacon

BACKGROUND 1

The Incident

¶2 Late one evening, Chacon borrowed a pickup truck owned
by a friend (Friend)—Chacon was living with Friend at the time—
and drove to a convenience store to purchase gas and groceries. A
police officer (Officer) noticed that the truck Chacon was driving
had a damaged taillight. After Chacon completed his purchases
and returned to the truck, he drove out of the store’s parking lot
and headed back toward Friend’s house. Officer followed him
without initially attempting to stop him.

¶3 Chacon recognized that he was being followed, and he
pulled over to the side of the road to allow Officer to pass. When
Officer passed, Chacon pulled out behind Officer. Confused by
this, Officer then pulled over to the side of the road to let Chacon
pass, but instead of passing, Chacon pulled over behind Officer,
and Officer and Chacon sat there in their vehicles for about “five
to eight minutes.” Eventually, Officer “start[ed] to feel unsafe”
and pulled back onto the road and made a right turn. Chacon
followed, pulling out behind Officer and making the same right
turn. More concerned now, Officer pulled into a nearby grocery
store parking lot and turned on her emergency lights. After
Chacon passed, Officer pulled out of the parking lot and got
behind Chacon to “initiate a traffic stop.” At this point, Officer’s
emergency lights and sirens were on to “alert [Chacon] that [she
was] attempting to initiate a traffic stop.”

1. “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly. We
present conflicting evidence only when necessary to understand
issues raised on appeal.” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, n.1, 453
P.3d 657 (cleaned up).

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State v. Chacon

¶4 Chacon did not pull over right away. He was not driving
fast, and he appeared to be obeying traffic laws, but he did not
pull over in response to Officer’s lights and sirens. After about
three minutes of slow pursuit, Officer called for backup. A couple
of minutes later, two additional officers in separate vehicles
arrived, both with their lights and sirens on. Officer radioed the
more experienced backup officer (Backup Officer) and asked him
to take the lead because Officer “had a [civilian] ride-along with
[her] that night and [she] did not want to put [that person] in
jeopardy.” Backup Officer then replaced Officer as the vehicle
closest to Chacon, and Chacon soon pulled into Friend’s driveway
and stopped the truck. From the time Officer pulled out of the
grocery store parking lot with her lights and sirens on until
Chacon stopped his vehicle, “about six minutes” had elapsed and
Chacon had driven “[a]pproximately two miles,” through mostly
residential city streets that were largely devoid of other traffic.

¶5 At Friend’s house, Backup Officer “positioned [his] car so
[he] could stay behind [the] front pillar [of the] cab [of the police
vehicle], just in case the person that was fleeing—or not
stopping—came out with a gun to shoot at [him].” Backup Officer
drew his firearm and shouted commands at Chacon, indicating
that he wanted to place Chacon under arrest. Chacon complied
with these commands. During the arrest, Chacon told Backup
Officer that he felt like he had to bring the truck back to Friend’s
house because, as he described it, Friend was not someone anyone
would want to mess with.

The Trial

¶6 Later, the State charged Chacon with failure to respond to
an officer’s signal to stop, a third-degree felony, and the case
proceeded to trial. During the trial, Officer and Backup Officer
testified for the State, and they related the facts outlined above.
Their testimony was accompanied by video evidence from
Officer’s dashcam and Backup Officer’s bodycam.

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State v. Chacon

¶7 Following the State’s presentation of evidence, Chacon’s
counsel (Counsel) moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there
was “insufficient evidence to sustain the count as alleged.” The
State responded, arguing that it had met its burden by identifying
Chacon as the operator of the vehicle, showing that the officers
tried to conduct a traffic stop, and showing that Chacon drove for
two miles before finally stopping. The court denied Counsel’s
motion, concluding that there was “sufficient evidence that would
sustain a conviction if the jury decide[d] to convict.”

¶8 Chacon then testified in his own defense. He told the jury
that initially, when Officer was driving behind him, Officer “had
[her] brights on to where [Chacon] couldn’t even see to drive,” so
he pulled over to “adjust [his] mirrors so [he could] operate [his]
vehicle safely.” He also thought that “if [he was] in trouble,
[Officer would have] initiate[d] a traffic stop at that point.” After
Officer drove past him, he “figured there[] [was] nothing wrong”
and “pull[ed] . . . back out onto the road to try and continue
home.” When he caught up to Officer, he claimed she was
“driving five under the speed limit.” As Officer pulled over in
front of Chacon, he “pulled right behind,” assuming that if Officer
thought there was “something wrong with [Chacon’s] vehicle,
[Officer would] come out and tell [him].” After sitting there for a
few minutes, Chacon decided he “was not going to approach”
Officer’s vehicle, because he didn’t want Officer “to feel like [he
was] trying to attack her or anything.”

¶9 Continuing with his testimony, Chacon stated that after he
pulled out behind Officer, Officer turned on her “red and blues”
before doing a three-point turn in front of Chacon to drive the
opposite way. He testified that he had thought, “[S]weet,
[Officer]’s got another call; she’s going to leave me alone and stop
harassing me.” Officer then “pull[ed] into [a grocery store]
parking lot” without “initiat[ing] anything.” At that point,
Chacon was “turning super slow” and just “watching” Officer,
wondering what Officer was doing. Chacon acknowledged that,

20240150-CA 4 2026 UT App 22
State v. Chacon

at this point, Officer pulled back onto the road behind Chacon
with her lights and sirens on. Chacon explained that he decided
not to pull over because he “was scared,” not because he thought
Officer would physically harm him but because he felt like local
police officers in general—and one officer in particular—had been
“intimidating and bullying” him. He stated that he’d had a
previous experience in which a different officer had harassed him
by “follow[ing him] around and stop[ping him] for whatever he
[could] stop [him] for and question[ing him] on everything under
the sun.” He testified that he did not stop his vehicle until he got
to Friend’s house because that is where he felt safe.

¶10 Chacon testified that he would’ve pulled over at the
grocery store parking lot, when Officer originally turned on her
lights, but “at that point, [he] didn’t know what in the hell
[Officer] was doing.” After that, he said he was too scared and
“just wanted to get home where [he] felt safe.” He testified that he
“was always under the assumption you can drive to where you
feel safe, either a parking lot that’s lit with people in it, or you
[can] go home.” He acknowledged that, while the officers were
following him with their lights on, he had passed several well-lit
areas, including one near a different friend’s house where he felt
safe, but that he didn’t stop at those places. He also didn’t pull
over in some of the other residential areas he drove through
“[b]ecause [he didn’t] know” the people who lived there and
because he “just wanted to go home where [he] felt safe.”

The Jury Instructions

¶11 The State and Counsel proposed competing jury
instructions on the elements of the charged offense. The only
difference between the two instructions was that the State’s
proposed instruction had some additional language about the
jury’s obligation to find Chacon guilty or not guilty. Counsel
stipulated to adopting the State’s proposed instruction, which
stated in relevant part as follows:

20240150-CA 5 2026 UT App 22
State v. Chacon

[Chacon] is charged with failure to respond to
officer’s signal to stop on or about December 26th,
2022, in Grand County, Utah. You cannot convict
him of this offense unless, based on the evidence,
you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
following elements:

1. [Chacon];

2. As an operator who received a visual or audible
signal from a peace officer to bring the vehicle to a
stop;

3. Attempted to flee or elude a peace officer by
vehicle or other means.

As discussed below, this instruction did not inform the jury which
mental state—e.g., intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly—
Chacon needed to have in order to be convicted of the charged
offense. In a separate instruction, however, the court gave the jury
definitions of “intentionally,” “knowingly,” and “recklessly.”

¶12 After deliberation, the jury found Chacon guilty of the
charged offense.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶13 Chacon now appeals, and he asks us to consider two issues.
First, he challenges the court’s ruling denying his directed verdict
motion. “We review [a trial] court’s denial of a motion for directed
verdict for correctness.” State v. Graydon, 2023 UT App 4, ¶ 26, 524
P.3d 1034 (cleaned up). And “when a defendant challenges the
denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on the sufficiency
of the evidence, . . . we will uphold the [trial] court’s denial if,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, some

20240150-CA 6 2026 UT App 22
State v. Chacon

evidence exists from which the elements of the crime could be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶14 Second, Chacon argues that Counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
elements jury instruction, which contained no provision
regarding the required mental state. “A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal presents a
question of law, which we consider de novo.” State v. King, 2018
UT App 190, ¶ 11, 437 P.3d 425 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶15 First, Chacon challenges the trial court’s ruling denying his
motion for a directed verdict. Specifically, he argues that there
was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. We disagree,
and on that basis we conclude that the trial court did not commit
error in denying Chacon’s motion. 2

¶16 “A directed verdict is warranted only when, viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, no evidence exists from which a
reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime.” State v. Pola, 2025 UT App 143,
¶ 35, 579 P.3d 407 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 581 P.3d 560 (Utah
2025). “But if there is any evidence, however slight or

2. The State asserts that Chacon’s sufficiency challenge is
unpreserved. However, we can easily resolve this issue on the
merits in favor of the State, and we choose to take that route here.
See State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28, 484 P.3d 415 (“[I]f the
merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor of the party asserting
that the claim was not preserved, we readily may opt to do so without
addressing preservation.”).

20240150-CA 7 2026 UT App 22
State v. Chacon

circumstantial, which tends to show guilt of the crime charged,
the court must submit the case to the jury.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶17 In order to convict Chacon of the charged crime, the State
had to prove that Chacon was an “operator” of a vehicle who had
“receive[d] a visual or audible signal from a law enforcement
officer to bring the vehicle to a stop” and had made an “attempt
to flee or elude a law enforcement officer.” See Utah Code § 41-6a-
210(1)(a) (2022). In his argument on appeal, Chacon focuses
entirely on the last element. That is, he acknowledges that he was
an operator of a vehicle and that “[t]he evidence . . . supports the
jury’s determination that [he] ‘receive[d] a visual or audible signal
from a law enforcement officer to bring the vehicle to a stop,’” but
he asserts that the evidence “does not . . . support a finding that
[he] . . . intend[ed] ‘to flee or elude a law enforcement officer.’”
(Quoting id.)

¶18 The governing statute, as codified at the time of Chacon’s
arrest, did not specify which mental state was required for
conviction. 3 But prior to Chacon’s arrest, our supreme court had
concluded that in order to win a conviction on this charge, the
State had to prove that the defendant had knowledge of a “visible
or audible signal from a [law enforcement] officer” and that the
defendant intentionally “attempt[ed] to flee or elude” the officer.
See State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7, ¶¶ 23–24, 26, 345 P.3d 1141. Thus,
under precedent in effect at the time, the State had to prove that
Chacon knew that Officer gave him a signal to stop and that—

3. In 2024, our legislature amended the statute to add a specific
mental state requirement. See Towing Requirements, ch. 134, § 1,
2024 Utah Laws 1079, 1079. As currently worded, the statute now
expressly requires the State to show that the defendant
“knowingly or intentionally attempt[ed] to flee or elude a law
enforcement officer.” See Utah Code § 41-6a-210(1)(a)(ii).

20240150-CA 8 2026 UT App 22
State v. Chacon

after receiving that signal from Officer—Chacon intentionally
attempted to flee or elude the officers.

¶19 To support the contested second element—that Chacon
intentionally attempted to flee or elude law enforcement—the
State at trial pointed to Chacon’s own admission that, due to
negative experiences with another officer, he was too scared to
pull over and that he “just wanted to go home where [he] felt
safe.” The State also pointed to Chacon’s admission that he felt
like he had to bring the truck back to Friend’s house because, as
he described it, Friend was not someone anyone would want to
mess with. In the State’s view, a jury considering these facts could
reasonably have concluded that Chacon intended to try to flee or
elude the officers.

¶20 In response, Chacon does not contest the fact that his
actions were intentional, but he argues that his motivation was
not to flee or elude the officers but, instead, to simply find
somewhere safe to pull over and to get the truck back to its owner.
He acknowledges our supreme court’s statement that “fleeing or
eluding” means attempting to “escape or avoid” a police officer,
see id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added), but he asserts that “[t]he six-minute
delay in his stop was based on location and safety, not
avoidance.” And he points to our supreme court’s statement in
Bird that attempting to “flee or elude means something more than
to merely leave or depart; the terms indicate action with a specific
purpose.” Id. In particular, he argues that “[a] person does not
[attempt to] flee or elude an officer who he plans to yield to
momentarily.” We take Chacon’s point that not all motorists who
do not immediately pull over upon receipt of an officer’s signal
intend to flee or elude officers. For instance, in some situations,
traffic conditions might prevent a motorist from safely pulling
over immediately after being signaled; motorists who wait to pull
over until they reach a traffic-safe area have a very good argument
that they did not intend to attempt to flee or elude officers. Indeed,
depending on the specific circumstances, a factfinder might

20240150-CA 9 2026 UT App 22
State v. Chacon

reasonably conclude that a motorist who didn’t feel safe pulling
over immediately, even for non-traffic-related reasons, did not
intend to flee or elude officers.

¶21 But debates regarding a defendant’s intent or motives
present classic jury questions. See State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 324
(Utah Ct. App. 1998) (describing a determination regarding intent
as “the quintessential factual question” (cleaned up)). Under the
governing statute, a defendant who tries to “escape or avoid” an
officer, even temporarily, may—depending on the
circumstances—be found to have intended to attempt to flee or
elude that officer. See Bird, 2015 UT 7, ¶ 23 (“Although a person
might act recklessly by departing from a police stop without the
police officer’s permission, the person would not be fleeing unless
it were [the person’s] intention to escape or avoid the police
officer. To attempt to flee or elude, therefore, requires that the
actor leave in an effort to escape or avoid a peace officer.”
(underscoring added)). And on this record, there was enough
evidence to support the jury’s determination that Chacon
intended to try to avoid—and thereby flee or elude—the officers.

¶22 Here, Chacon did not pull over as soon as he was aware of
Officer’s signal to stop. Traffic safety was not a concern, because
the roads on which he was traveling were largely residential and
devoid of other traffic. And he did not pull over into any one of
several well-lit public areas, such as parking lots, even after
Officer called for backup and multiple officers were on the scene.
He even passed one well-lit lot that was near a different friend’s
house, and he continued driving for a total of about six minutes,
covering some two miles, before finally coming to a stop at the
place where he lived with Friend. He also acknowledged being at
least partially motivated by fear of reprisal from Friend, the
truck’s owner, whom Chacon described as someone a person
would not want to mess with. While a jury could conceivably
have come to the opposite conclusion on these facts, we cannot
say that the conclusion it did reach—that Chacon intentionally

20240150-CA 10 2026 UT App 22
State v. Chacon

attempted to avoid, and thereby flee or elude, the officers—was
unsupported by some competent evidence.

¶23 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Chacon’s
directed verdict motion.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶24 Next, we turn to Chacon’s claim that Counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by not objecting to the jury instruction
containing the elements of the charged offense. 4 While we agree
with Chacon that the elements instruction was infirm, we
ultimately reject Chacon’s ineffective assistance claim on
prejudice grounds.

¶25 A defendant seeking to show that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance must make a two-part showing: that (1) the
attorney’s performance was deficient and (2) this “deficient
performance prejudiced the defense” by giving rise to “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). The first part
of this analysis involves an assessment of the objective
reasonableness of counsel’s actions, see State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13,
¶ 35, 462 P.3d 350, and “requires [a] showing . . . that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. And the second
part requires a showing that “counsel’s errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Id. In this second inquiry, the crucial question is whether

4. Chacon makes no claim that Counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in any other way. In particular, he does not assert that
Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by electing not to seek a
jury instruction regarding any potential lesser-included offense.

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State v. Chacon

“the outcome of [the defendant’s] case would have been different
absent counsel’s error.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 43.

¶26 But in cases where a defendant claims that the attorney
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to jury
instructions, there is a threshold question whose answer will
inform the two-step Strickland analysis: in such cases “we must
first consider whether [the jury] instructions [at issue] were
legally correct.” State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ¶ 12, 355 P.3d 1078.
This is because “failure to object to jury instructions that correctly
state the law is not deficient performance,” State v. Vigil, 2019 UT
App 131, ¶ 11, 448 P.3d 738 (cleaned up), and cannot, by
definition, lead to prejudice, see State v. Von Niederhausern, 2018
UT App 149, ¶¶ 29–30, 427 P.3d 1277 (holding that “where [a]
[d]efendant fails to identify, let alone argue, what would have
been the legally correct version of the instruction,” the
“[d]efendant also fails to show prejudice since an objection to the
jury instructions would have surely been unsuccessful”).
Accordingly, we first assess the correctness of the jury instruction
that Chacon challenges.

A. The Challenged Instruction

¶27 When examining jury instructions, we review them “in
their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken as a
whole, fairly instructed the jury about the applicable law.” Liti,
2015 UT App 186, ¶ 12. In this case, as in most cases, the logical
place to begin our analysis is with the statutory requirements of
the charged crime. See id. ¶ 13.

¶28 As already noted, see supra ¶ 17, the State had to prove two
basic elements in order to convict Chacon of failure to respond to
an officer’s signal to stop. First, the State had to show that Chacon
was an “operator” of a vehicle “who receive[d] a visual or audible
signal from a law enforcement officer to bring the vehicle to a
stop.” See Utah Code § 41-6a-210(1)(a) (2022). Second, the State
had to show that Chacon did so while “attempt[ing] to flee or

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State v. Chacon

elude a law enforcement officer.” Id. The governing statute—at
least as it was worded at the time—did not contain an express
mental state requirement. See id. But as also already noted, see
supra ¶ 18, our supreme court had clearly held that, in order to
win a conviction for this offense, the State needed to prove that
the defendant had knowledge of a “visual or audible signal from a
[law enforcement] officer” and that the defendant intentionally
“attempt[ed] to flee or elude” the officer. State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7,
¶¶ 23–24, 26, 345 P.3d 1141. In that same case, the court also
determined that an elements instruction that did not contain these
mental state specifications was infirm. Id. ¶¶ 23–24.

¶29 In the instant case, the relevant jury instruction—quoted in
its entirety above, see supra ¶ 11—did not contain the necessary
mental state specifications. Under precedent from our supreme
court that was in effect at the time the instruction was given, the
absence of these specifications rendered the instruction infirm.
The State does not disagree, stating in its brief that “[n]o one
should feel proud of the elements instruction given in this case.”

B. Deficient Performance and Prejudice

¶30 Because the challenged instruction is infirm, we must
proceed to consider whether Counsel’s decision not to object to
that instruction constituted ineffective assistance. For purposes of
our analysis, we will assume—without deciding—that Counsel’s
decision constituted deficient performance. But to prevail on his
ineffective assistance claim, Chacon must make an adequate
showing on both prongs, see State v. Delgado, 2020 UT App 121,
¶ 25, 473 P.3d 234, and in this case we conclude, for the reasons
discussed below, that Chacon cannot show prejudice. Thus, we
need not consider whether Counsel’s performance was deficient,
because even if it was, Chacon still cannot demonstrate that
Counsel rendered ineffective assistance. See id. (“It is unnecessary
to address both components of the inquiry if we determine that [a
defendant] has made an insufficient showing on one.” (cleaned

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State v. Chacon

up)); see also State v. Roberts, 2019 UT App 9, ¶ 23, 438 P.3d 885 (“In
practice, we often skip the question of deficient performance
when a defendant cannot show prejudice.”).

¶31 “Prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability
that the case would have had a different outcome had trial counsel
not performed deficiently.” State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App 107,
¶ 28, 469 P.3d 1150. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” of the
proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In assessing prejudice, we
“consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury and
then ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the
decision reached would reasonably likely have been different
absent the errors.” State v. Garcia, 2017 UT 53, ¶ 28, 424 P.3d 171
(cleaned up). “Prejudice analysis is counterfactual. To decide
whether a trial affected by error is reasonably likely to have
turned out differently we have to consider a hypothetical—an
alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error.”
State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶ 42, 417 P.3d 86.

¶32 We must therefore envision a hypothetical trial in which
jurors received a correct instruction—telling them that Chacon
needed to have intentionally attempted to flee or elude law
enforcement—but in which the rest of the proceedings went off
identically. And in considering that hypothetical trial, we must
ask whether we think it is reasonably probable that the jury would
have reached a different outcome. Under the circumstances
presented here, a different outcome in that hypothetical trial is not
reasonably probable.

¶33 We acknowledge that our supreme court, in Bird, held that
the term “attempt,” as used in general parlance and in at least one
other statute, “does not necessarily indicate the applicable level of
mens rea” and that, for this reason, an elements instruction
regarding attempt crimes that does not contain a mens rea
provision may be infirm. See 2015 UT 7, ¶¶ 22–24. But the majority

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State v. Chacon

in that case acknowledged that the term “attempt,” as used in the
statute at hand, “implicates an intentional mens rea,” id. ¶ 23, and
for reasons unique to that appeal, the majority did not reach the
question of whether the error at issue—offering the jury an
elements instruction without a mental state provision—was
harmless on the facts presented. Justice Lee dissented in Bird and
agreed with the majority that the term “attempt,” as used in the
relevant statute, connotes intentional action, but—unlike the
majority—he went on to reach the harmlessness question. See id.
¶¶ 32–39 (Lee, J., dissenting). And on that point, he offered the
view that, even if there were “some minor, unarticulated
distinction between the ordinary meaning of . . . ‘attempt[ing] to
flee or elude a peace officer’” and the ordinary meaning of
“intent,” the infirmity in the jury instruction was harmless. Id.
¶¶ 32–33, 39. We find Justice Lee’s position on prejudice
persuasive, especially as applied to the facts at hand.

¶34 At trial in this case, the dispute was never really about
whether Chacon’s actions were intentional. That is, Chacon never
asserted that his actions were taken knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently. To the contrary, he acknowledged that he
intentionally did not pull over, asserting that he was “scared,”
given his previous interactions with another officer who Chacon
believed had “follow[ed him] around and stop[ped him] for
whatever he [could] stop [him] for and question[ed him] on
everything under the sun.” And while Chacon was not afraid for
his physical safety, he was afraid of the officers “intimidating and
bullying” him. Accordingly, he waited to pull over until he
arrived at a location where he felt safe. In addition, he asserted
that he was motivated by the desire to get the borrowed truck
back to Friend, whose reprisal he feared if the truck were not
returned safely. Thus, Chacon described entirely intentional
actions, and he never argued that his actions were taken with a
less-culpable mental state. Compare State v. Simpson, 904 P.2d 709,
714 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (describing a defendant, charged with
“eluding a peace officer,” who defended himself by asserting that

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State v. Chacon

he “might have frozen at the wheel” due to “shock” “when he saw
the officers’ flashing lights”).

¶35 Instead, the dispute—as framed for the jury—was what
Chacon’s precise motivation was. Were his intentional actions
motivated by a desire to avoid, and thereby flee or elude, the
officers? Or were those actions motivated merely by a desire to
find a safe place to pull over? Either way, the actions were framed
as intentional ones; Chacon knew he was being stopped and chose
not to pull over, at least not for six minutes. The jury was not
operating under any illusion that Chacon’s actions were anything
but intentional.

¶36 The elements instruction—even in its infirm mental-state-
free condition—told the jury that it had to consider whether
Chacon had “attempted to flee or elude” the officers. Indeed, that
was the focal point of the dispute between the parties. What the
instruction was missing was the clarification that Chacon’s
actions, in attempting to flee or elude the officers, must have been
intentional. But on the particular facts presented here, adding the
specific intent requirement would not have been reasonably likely
to have made a difference, because—regardless of what his
specific motivations were—Chacon acted intentionally. Even had
the specific intent requirement been included, the jury still would
have needed to grapple with the broader question of what
Chacon’s motivation was for his intentional actions: was it to flee
or elude the officers, or was it just to try to find a safe place to pull
over? And on that question, we know what the jury decided.

¶37 In particular, we consider it highly unlikely—given (a) the
ordinary meaning of the word “attempt,” as used in this context,
(b) Chacon’s tacit acknowledgment that his actions were
intentional, and (c) the evidence in the case indicating that Chacon
was not only attempting to avoid at least one particular officer but
that he was also motivated by fear of reprisal from Friend—that
any juror would have concluded that Chacon only knowingly (and

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State v. Chacon

not intentionally) attempted to avoid, and thereby flee or elude, the
officers. On this record, our confidence in the outcome of the trial
is simply not undermined, and on that basis we conclude that
Chacon was not prejudiced by the jury instruction’s infirmity.

¶38 We certainly do not endorse the elements instruction given
here. It was contrary to governing case law, and it should have
been more explicit about the mental state required for conviction.
But on the facts presented here, Chacon has not demonstrated that
any deficient performance by Counsel in not objecting to the
elements instruction prejudiced him, and on that basis we reject
Chacon’s claim of ineffective assistance.

CONCLUSION

¶39 The trial court did not err in denying Chacon’s motion for
a directed verdict. And Chacon has not carried his burden of
demonstrating that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
objecting to the elements instruction.

¶40 Affirmed.

20240150-CA 17 2026 UT App 22