Nielsen v. Cronquist

2025 UT App 199

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TRAVIS I. NIELSEN AND BRITTNI L. NIELSEN,
Appellants,
v.
ELAM TERRELL CRONQUIST, LYLE KIM CRONQUIST SR.,
AND BERNIECE W. CRONQUIST,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20240680-CA
Filed December 26, 2025

First District Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Angela Fonnesbeck
The Honorable Lynn W. Davis
No. 210100168

Wayne K. Caldwell, Aubri O. Thomas, Wayman
Stodart, and Arther P. Hart, Attorneys for Appellants
Samuel A. Goble, Erin E. Byington, and
Jill L. Sanders, Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and
DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Travis I. Nielsen and Brittni L. Nielsen (the Nielsens) lived
on a parcel of land that shared a boundary with two other parcels
owned by members of their extended family: one parcel owned
by Elam Terrell Cronquist (Terry) and another parcel owned by
Lyle Kim Cronquist Sr. (Kim) and Berniece W. Cronquist
(Berniece) (Terry, Kim, and Berniece are herein collectively
Nielsen v. Cronquist

referred to as “the Cronquists”). 1 In 2021, a dispute between the
Nielsens and the Cronquists ignited a lawsuit involving over a
dozen claims and counterclaims, including claims for quiet title,
boundary by acquiescence, conversion of personal property,
interference with water rights, nuisance, trespass, and attorney
fees. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the Cronquists
on all claims and awarded attorney fees on some of those claims.

¶2 The Nielsens appeal, asserting that the trial court’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law were erroneous in various respects.
But during the pendency of this appeal, the Nielsens sold their
parcel, an eventuality that renders moot all of the Nielsens’ title-
and boundary-related claims. As for the Nielsens’ remaining
appellate challenges, we affirm in part and reverse in part, and we
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND 2

¶3 The three parcels of land central to this case were once a
single parcel. The owners of this single parcel—Ollie and Wilda
Cronquist—successfully applied to subdivide it in 1997. This
subdivision resulted in the creation of multiple lots, including the
three adjacent parcels relevant here: the Nielsens’ parcel, Terry’s
parcel (situated southwest of the Nielsens’ parcel), and Kim and
Berniece’s parcel (to the southeast). At the time of the subdivision

1. Because several parties share the same last name, we follow our
usual practice of referring to them by their first or preferred
names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality.

2. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view and recite the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings; we present
additional evidence only as necessary to understand the issues on
appeal.” State v. Sparling, 2024 UT App 59, n.1, 549 P.3d 86
(cleaned up), cert. denied, 554 P.3d 1096 (Utah 2024).

20240680-CA 2 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

in 1997, a survey was conducted and a plat map was recorded,
outlining the boundaries of these three parcels.

¶4 Between Terry’s parcel and Kim and Berniece’s parcel lay
an access road that stretched from the Nielsens’ parcel southward,
connecting to Smithfield Canyon Road. This access road was
situated in a fifty-foot-wide corridor that belonged to the
Nielsens’ parcel in fee simple, without any restrictions, covenants,
or easements recorded on the Nielsens’ property deed. Sometime
before the subdivision of parcels, a fence was installed along the
west side of the access road, separating the road from Terry’s
parcel. On the east side of the access road, Kim and Berniece
maintained a lawn, sprinklers, and a septic system from their
house up to the access road and had done so since at least the
subdivision in 1997.

¶5 Aside from the shared boundary lines, the Nielsens’ parcel
also shared water lines with Kim and Berniece’s parcel. The
Nielsens’ parcel featured a retention pond, which was supplied
with water from a source called “Swamp Springs,” where “all
parties enjoy[ed] established water rights.” From this retention
pond, two lines extended to Kim and Berniece’s parcel, one
providing water for irrigation and the other providing water to a
horse trough inside their corral. The Nielsens’ parcel also featured
an above-ground electric water pump, which pulled culinary
water from a nearby source called “Miles Spring” to the Nielsens’
home. From the Nielsens’ parcel, a water line extended to Kim
and Berniece’s parcel, providing culinary water to their home.
This water line existed when the Nielsens purchased their parcel
in 2018, and soon thereafter, Berniece began making payments to
the Nielsens for the electricity required to pump the Miles Spring
culinary water to Kim and Berniece’s home.

¶6 Near the northern boundary of Terry’s parcel (adjacent to
the Nielsens’ parcel), there is an open-sided shed that—all parties
agree—was primarily located on the Nielsens’ parcel according to
the plat map. Terry’s son, Destry Cronquist, provided sheet metal

20240680-CA 3 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

for the shed’s roof, and he left some additional sheet metal next to
the shed, located at least partially on the Nielsens’ parcel. At some
point, Travis transported the spare sheet metal to another
property and refused to return it to either Destry or Terry.

¶7 By January 2021, the Nielsens were considering selling
their property. Around this time, disputes arose regarding the
boundaries between the Nielsens’ parcel and the other two
parcels. Specifically, the Nielsens claimed that the fence on the
west side of the access road (alongside Terry’s parcel) encroached
on their parcel, and that Kim and Berniece’s maintenance of the
lawn and septic system on the east side of the access road also
encroached on their parcel. In addition to the location of the
boundaries along the access road, the parties disputed the
location of the southern boundary of the Nielsens’ parcel—from
the north end of the access road westward along Terry’s parcel
and eastward along Kim and Berniece’s parcel.

¶8 Eventually, the Nielsens filed suit against the Cronquists,
seeking to quiet title to their parcel’s boundaries. After the suit
was filed, Travis disconnected the water line to Kim and
Berniece’s horse trough, and as a result, their horses went without
water for four days. Travis also “intermittently” turned off the
valve controlling the water connection to Kim and Berniece’s
irrigation line. The Nielsens also set up cameras around their
property and recorded interactions between the parties.

¶9 The Cronquists answered the Nielsens’ complaint and, in
addition, filed counterclaims of their own. The counterclaims
included causes of action for boundary by acquiescence as well as
various tort claims, including a conversion claim for the sheet
metal and nuisance claims alleging that the Nielsens interfered
with Kim and Berniece’s water rights in both Swamp Springs and
Miles Spring. In their answer to the counterclaims, the Nielsens
alleged that the right to use culinary water from Miles Spring was
“granted only to [the Nielsens] through Smithfield City” and that
Kim and Berniece had “been illegally diverting” water “to their

20240680-CA 4 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

own homes for their own use.” The Nielsens then filed an
amended complaint, which, among other things, added a claim
for conversion against Kim and Berniece for “wrongfully
install[ing] water lines” to obtain water from Miles Spring.

¶10 By stipulation of the parties, the matter was reassigned to
a senior judge who presided over a five-day bench trial. After
receiving evidence and hearing argument, the court issued
written findings of fact and conclusions of law. As relevant to this
appeal, the court ruled in favor of the Cronquists on their
boundary-by-acquiescence claims. 3 As for Terry’s conversion
claim (for the sheet metal), the court found that Destry “testified
that the metal belonged to him and he gave permission for its use
on” Terry’s shed. And the court found that Travis had taken the
sheet metal. Yet the court ordered that “the metal be returned to
Terry who was the intended beneficiary of the metal.” No other
findings were made as to the ownership of the spare sheet metal.

¶11 The court also ruled on the water claims. As for Kim and
Berniece’s interference with a water right claim, the court
concluded that Travis had “wrongfully interfered” with Kim and
Berniece’s Swamp Springs water by “cutting and pulling water
lines to [Kim and Berniece’s] horse trough and arbitrarily shutting
off the water valve” to their irrigation. The court then rejected the
Nielsens’ conversion claim involving the Miles Spring water,
finding that the claim was “without merit” and “improperly
motivated.” The court explained that the Nielsens “purchased
[their parcel] subject to sharing a [one-inch] pipe from Miles
Spring for culinary water” and that the Nielsens received
payments for the electricity to pump the Miles Spring water to
Kim and Berniece’s parcel for more than three years. The court
further observed that the Nielsens “offered no explanation why
[Kim and Berniece] would suddenly have no right to their
culinary water.” Thus, the court concluded that the Nielsens’

3. For the reasons discussed below in Part I, we need not relay the
trial court’s analysis on the boundary-related claims.

20240680-CA 5 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

conversion claim was “unsupported by any reasonable belief,”
“contradicted by [the Nielsens’] own testimony and actions,” and
“improperly motivated to blame” Kim and Berniece for the
Nielsens’ “participation in the Miles Spring water system.”

¶12 With regard to these water claims, the Cronquists
requested attorney fees. Specifically, they sought fees for the
interference claim under a statute that entitles the “prevailing
party in a civil action . . . to collect reasonable costs and attorney
fees, if that action is brought . . . for injuries caused by a diversion
of water in violation of an existing water right.” See Utah Code
§ 73-2-28. And they sought fees for defending against the
Nielsens’ conversion of water claim under Utah’s bad-faith
litigation statute, which entitles the prevailing party to fees where
a claim is found to be “without merit and not brought or asserted
in good faith.” See id. § 78B-5-825(1).

¶13 In support of their attorney fees claims, the Cronquists’
counsel submitted an affidavit as well as time records of the
attorneys’ work on the case, all of which set forth the hours spent,
the hourly rates, and descriptions of the tasks performed. For
some of the time entries, the amount requested was one-third of
the total amount billed for the task, while other entries were
requested at 100%. In their motion for fees, the Cronquists
explained that they sought 100% “of the billing entries that were
only related to water” but only “33%” of entries “that were related
to all of the claims for the case,” and that the “33% calculation
[was] based” in part on “the amount of fact preparation”
attributable to the water claims “versus the rest of the claims in
the case.” After reviewing the motion, the court granted the
request and specifically found that the Cronquists had “made
reasonable efforts in calculating attorney[] fees relating to both”
the interference with a water right claim and the conversion claim.

¶14 Later, the Nielsens appealed. A few days after the Nielsens
filed their opening brief on appeal, the Cronquists filed a
suggestion of mootness and motion to dismiss. In that motion,

20240680-CA 6 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

they asserted that all boundary-related claims had become moot
because the Nielsens had sold their parcel to a third party during
the pendency of the appeal and therefore no longer had any legal
interest in those specific claims. The Cronquists also pointed out
that no effort had been made to substitute the third-party
purchaser of the Nielsens’ parcel in as a party to this appeal.

¶15 In response, the Nielsens acknowledged that they had sold
the parcel, but they nevertheless opposed the motion to dismiss
the appeal entirely. They first argued that “the property [was] not
integral to all of the issues on appeal or the parties’ claims,”
asserting specifically that they retained an interest in the
conversion and nuisance claims, as well as the attorney fees
issues. As for the boundary-related claims, the Nielsens argued
that rule 38 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure “allows for
the substitution of parties when necessary but does not outright
require it.” The Nielsens thus posited that “until a court is
presented [with] a motion for substitution and that motion is
granted, the original party remains in that matter as the party in
question,” and they asserted that the third party’s purchase of
their parcel did “not automatically render the appeal moot or
deprive the court of jurisdiction.” The Nielsens further argued
that the sale of their parcel “in no way rendered relief impossible,”
because the third-party purchaser had, “for those claims strictly
tied to the land, become a true successor in interest as any relief
that would have been afforded to [the Nielsens] [was] now
properly afforded to [the third-party purchaser].”

¶16 We deferred our ruling on the suggestion of mootness
“pending plenary consideration of the appeal,” and the parties
filed the remaining briefs according to the briefing schedule.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶17 In this appeal, the Nielsens assert that the trial court
committed various errors in its post-trial ruling. With respect to

20240680-CA 7 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

many of these alleged errors, the Cronquists have asserted
mootness as grounds for dismissal of the appeal. If an issue is
moot, we “lack judicial power to address” the merits of the
argument. In re M.S., 2023 UT App 74, ¶ 22, 533 P.3d 859. Because
this mootness issue “arises for the first time here on review, our
decision is not governed by any standard of review, and we
decide the matter as a question of law in the first instance.” Grewal
v. Junction Market Fairview, LC, 2024 UT 20, ¶ 12, 554 P.3d 863
(cleaned up).

¶18 The Nielsens also challenge the trial court’s findings and
conclusions regarding the Cronquists’ sheet-metal conversion
counterclaim, asserting that the court erred in awarding relief to
a non-party in the case by ordering the return of the spare sheet
metal to Terry despite evidence that Destry was the owner. “We
review the trial court’s legal conclusions for correctness, granting
them no particular deference,” but “we review the trial court’s
findings of fact for clear error, reversing only where the finding is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach
a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Covey v. Covey,
2003 UT App 380, ¶ 17, 80 P.3d 553 (cleaned up).

¶19 Finally, the Nielsens challenge the reasonableness of the
attorney fees awarded to the Cronquists. “A court’s decision
regarding the reasonableness of an attorney fee award is reviewed
deferentially, for patent error or clear abuse of discretion.” Zion
Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC, 2020 UT App 167, ¶ 22,
480 P.3d 1055 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Mootness: The Title- and Boundary-Related Claims

¶20 At trial, this case centered on boundary disputes between
the Nielsens and the Cronquists. But the Nielsens no longer own
the property central to those particular disputes and therefore no

20240680-CA 8 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

longer have any legal interest in the location of that parcel’s
boundaries. Thus, any relief we could afford the Nielsens—the
parties claiming error here—would have no effect. For these
reasons, we agree with the Cronquists that the Nielsens’ appellate
claims—including any related evidentiary challenges—related to
their former parcel’s boundaries are moot, and we therefore
dismiss the Nielsens’ appeal as to those issues.

¶21 “Although the Utah Constitution—unlike the federal
constitution—does not contain a ‘case or controversy’
requirement and therefore ‘includes no express limitation’ on
Utah courts’ jurisdiction, our supreme court has stated that the
Utah Constitution ‘nevertheless mandates certain standing
requirements, which emanate from the principle of separation of
powers.’” Erda Cmty. Ass’n v. Grantsville City, 2024 UT App 126,
¶ 21, 558 P.3d 91 (quoting Laws v. Grayeyes, 2021 UT 59, ¶ 33, 498
P.3d 410). “Our ‘traditional standing’ requirements mimic those
imposed by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the federal constitution.” Id. ¶ 23 (cleaned up). These traditional
standing requirements “subsist[] through all stages” of a case,
including both the “trial and appellate” stages. Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (cleaned up). Generally, to satisfy these
standing requirements, “parties must continue to have a personal
stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶22 “Mootness usually results when a plaintiff has standing at
the beginning of a case, but, due to intervening events, loses one
of the elements of standing during litigation; thus, courts have
sometimes described mootness as ‘the doctrine of standing set in
a time frame.’” WildEarth Guardians v. Public Service Co. of Colo.,
690 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)); see also McInnis-Misenor v.
Maine Med. Center, 319 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Ripeness,
standing, and mootness are closely linked: Ripeness and mootness
easily could be seen as the time dimensions of standing.” (cleaned
up)). Specifically, in the context of an appeal, an issue can become
moot “if during the pendency of the appeal circumstances change

20240680-CA 9 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

so that the controversy is eliminated, thereby rendering the relief
requested impossible or of no legal effect.” In re adoption of L.O.,
2012 UT 23, ¶ 8, 282 P.3d 977 (cleaned up); see also 1A C.J.S. Actions
§ 76 (2025) (“If events that occur subsequent to the filing of a
lawsuit or appeal deprive the court of the ability to give the
plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and
must be dismissed.” (cleaned up)).

¶23 On at least two occasions, our supreme court has held that
the sale of real property during an appeal rendered the case moot,
see Grewal v. Junction Market Fairview, LC, 2024 UT 20, ¶ 29, 554
P.3d 863; Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1996), but the
procedural circumstances of those cases were somewhat different
from those present here. In Richards, buyers sued to enforce their
right to purchase real property, but after receiving an adverse
judgment, the buyers did not obtain a stay of the judgment
pending appeal. See 914 P.2d at 722. And when the property was
sold to a third-party purchaser during the appeal, there was
nothing the appellate court could do to afford relief to the
buyers/appellants. Id. (explaining that “the sole relief the
[appellants] sought at trial was specific performance of a real
estate contract and a decree quieting title to the property,” yet
“[b]ecause of their failure to obtain a stay pending [the] appeal,
the property was lawfully sold to another” and thus “[n]o action
which [the court] could . . . take would affect the litigants’ rights
to the property”). The court thus determined that the buyers’
appeal had been rendered moot. Id. Grewal featured a similar fact
pattern, and in that case the court held that Richards was
“sufficiently analogous” to that case “to control the mootness
question.” Grewal, 2024 UT 20, ¶ 29.

¶24 In this case, by contrast, the remedy itself still exists. That
is, we could still assess the merits of the title and boundary claims,
and our ruling could affect the rights of the third party who
purchased the Nielsens’ parcel. But that third party is not a party
to this appeal, nor has that party attempted to substitute into this
appeal. Thus, in the absence of that real party in interest, the issue

20240680-CA 10 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

here is whether our decision on the title and boundary claims
could provide relief to the Nielsens, specifically. Because we
conclude that it couldn’t, we must in turn conclude that the
Nielsens’ appeal as to those claims has been rendered moot.

¶25 Courts in other jurisdictions have applied the mootness
doctrine in situations like this one, where an appellant no longer
has an interest in the real property anchoring their claims for
relief. See Ditto v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2023-01185-COA-R3-
CV, 2024 WL 4002560, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2024); Ahn v.
Sanger, No. 23-CV-02459-JSC, 2024 WL 1995807, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
May 6, 2024). In Ditto, an appellant’s case was mooted when he
sold the property at issue to a third-party purchaser while his
appeal was pending. 2024 WL 4002560, at *1. In that case, a city
sought to condemn and demolish the structures on the appellant’s
property, and the appellant was denied an injunction prohibiting
the city from doing so. Id. However, on appeal, the court held that
it was “undisputed” that the appellant “no longer ha[d] any legal
interest” in the property that was the “subject of [the] litigation”
because the appellant “concede[d] that he sold the [p]roperty to a
third party after initiating” the appeal. Id. at *5. The court thus
held that even if it reversed, the appellant was “no longer entitled
to anything having to do with the [p]roperty” and, as a result, the
court’s “ruling would not affect him in the slightest.” Id. The court
held that the appellant’s claims were therefore moot. Id.

¶26 Similarly, in Ahn, the claimant sought to have two liens
encumbering the property at issue invalidated by a bankruptcy
court. See 2024 WL 1995807, at *1. But by the time the case reached
the reviewing court, the claimant no longer had any interest in the
relevant property, and by agreement, there was no risk that a
deficiency judgment could have been pursued against the
claimant in personam. Id. Given this, the reviewing court
explained that the claimant “lack[ed] a legally cognizable interest
in whether” the liens “encumbering the property [were] void”
and, therefore, the claimant’s challenge was “constitutionally

20240680-CA 11 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

moot because it [was] impossible for the [c]ourt to grant [the
claimant] effectual relief on her claims.” Id.

¶27 In this case, the Nielsens’ title- and boundary-related
claims are moot because the Nielsens sold their parcel to a third
party while this appeal was pending. As in Ditto and Ahn, the
Nielsens no longer have any legal interest in the property central
to this dispute. Without any such legal interest, the Nielsens
likewise no longer have any interest in the title- and boundary-
related claims in this case, which all involve the now-sold
property. Thus, any relief we could afford the Nielsens on these
claims would have no legal effect for the Nielsens. And the third-
party purchaser—who the Nielsens concede has “become a true
successor in interest” to any “claims strictly tied to the land”—is
not a party to this appeal. There has been no motion to substitute
filed, and therefore, the real party in interest for the Nielsens’ title-
and boundary-based claims is not a part of this case. Thus, all
claims brought by the Nielsens relating to the title and boundaries
of the property are moot, and we are therefore without judicial
power to address the merits of those claims.

¶28 The Nielsens resist this conclusion with two arguments.
First, they argue that the sale of the property did not render
moot the other claims in the appeal, including the tort claims
and claims for attorney fees. This point is well taken, and we
address the remaining claims in Part II below. But the viability of
those remaining claims does not save the title- and boundary-
related claims from becoming moot as to the Nielsens. See Grewal,
2024 UT 20, ¶ 31 (concluding that a dispute regarding attorney
fees was not mooted by the sale of the relevant property even
though the challenges related to the property itself were rendered
moot); see also Dominguez v. Dominguez, 583 S.W.3d 365, 371 (Tex.
App. 2019) (addressing a multi-claim case and holding that the
sale of the property mooted the issues relating to the property but,
“for the remaining issues, . . . the rule against mootness [did] not
apply”).

20240680-CA 12 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

¶29 Second, the Nielsens argue that rule 38 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure is permissive and does not require
substitution of the parties. We agree that rule 38 is permissive, but
we do not see how this function of the rule saves the title- and
boundary-related claims from becoming moot on appeal if the
real party in interest is not properly substituted. The third party
here was certainly not required to substitute into this appeal, nor
were the Nielsens required to substitute out. But without such
substitution, we are being asked to adjudicate title and boundary
claims without having the actual owner of the relevant property
before us. Again, any relief we could afford the Nielsens on these
claims would have no legal effect. At least in the context of this
case, rule 38 and our mootness doctrine exist in harmony.

¶30 In sum, because the Nielsens sold their parcel and no
longer have any legal interest in it, any relief we could provide
them as to the title- and boundary-related claims would have no
legal effect. Those claims are therefore moot as to the Nielsens.

II. The Remaining Claims

¶31 But the Nielsens’ sale of their parcel to a third party did not
moot any challenges regarding non-real-property claims. Those
remain live, and the Nielsens may continue to press them. Indeed,
they attempt to advance some such challenges in this appeal. But
upon review of the Nielsens’ briefing, it is frankly difficult to
ascertain which parts of the court’s findings and conclusions they
are challenging. They assert that the trial court erred in various
respects, and they even provide a chart of the alleged errors in the
court’s findings and conclusions. But they do not attempt to
explain many of the alleged errors’ relevance; they certainly make
no systematic effort to tie the listed errors to particular issues or
claims. We have done our best to figure out which non-real-
property claims are at issue in this appeal, but we note our
supreme court’s observation that “[a] party may not simply point
toward a pile of sand and expect the court to build a castle.” Salt
Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 35, 435 P.3d 248.

20240680-CA 13 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

¶32 After reviewing the briefs, we can discern adequately
briefed challenges to the trial court’s findings and conclusions
regarding the Cronquists’ sheet-metal conversion claim and to the
court’s attorney fees awards, and we address the merits of those
challenges below. But we reject any other intended challenges as
inadequately briefed or clearly without merit. 4 See Utah R. App.

4. In this case, the Nielsens have not adequately briefed several
issues. For instance, they asserted claims for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress at trial and received an
adverse judgment on these claims, and while they note these
claims in their chart of errors, they do not provide any authorities
or analysis on these particular claims or explain how the trial
court erred in ruling against them on these claims. Likewise, the
court found for the Cronquists on their nuisance claim regarding
the cameras that the Nielsens had set up near the Cronquists’
parcels, yet the Nielsens’ brief is devoid of any analysis as to this
particular nuisance claim. And the Nielsens’ assertion that the
trial court erred by denying their motion for a new trial is also
inadequately briefed, given that the Nielsens merely assert
generally that errors in the findings of fact and conclusions of law
merit a new trial.
One other claim mentioned in the Nielsens’ briefs—while
not necessarily inadequately briefed—fails on its merits. The
Nielsens assert that the trial court erred by denying their motion
for partial summary judgment before trial. Part of their argument
turned on the boundary-related claims discussed in Part I, which
are now moot. But another part involved their conversion and
nuisance claims. Specifically, the Nielsens argue that because the
Cronquists did not deny allegations of conversion and nuisance
in their answer, those allegations should have been deemed
admitted for purposes of trial and summary judgment granted
accordingly. This argument fails, because in their answer, the
Cronquists included the following: “To the extent that any
allegations remain that have not been specifically addressed
herein, [the Cronquists] deny any such allegations.” And rule 8(b)
(continued…)

20240680-CA 14 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

P. 24(a)(8) (stating that a party “must explain, with reasoned
analysis supported by citations to legal authority and the record,
why the party should prevail on appeal”); see also Cottam v. IHC
Health Services Inc., 2024 UT App 19, ¶ 15, 544 P.3d 1051 (stating
that parties must “persuade a reviewing court through reasoned,
supported argument that the [trial] court committed harmful,
reversible error—a burden that necessarily requires the appellant
to address the reasoning and basis of the [trial] court’s ruling and
to explain why that court got it wrong”—and that “when an
appellant’s brief fails to satisfy the minimal requirements of rule
24, we need not discuss the merits of the case” (cleaned up)).

A. Conversion of Sheet Metal

¶33 The Nielsens challenge the trial court’s ruling in favor of
the Cronquists on their conversion claim regarding the sheet
metal. Specifically, they argue that the court’s conversion ruling
adjudicated the rights of—and effectively awarded relief to—a
non-party (Destry) over whom the trial court had no jurisdiction.
On this point, we agree with the Nielsens.

¶34 “To prove conversion, a party must establish an act of
willful interference with property, done without lawful
justification, by which the person entitled to property is deprived
of its use and possession, and that the party is entitled to
immediate possession of the property at the time of the alleged
conversion.” Rand v. KOA Campgrounds, 2014 UT App 246, ¶ 11,
338 P.3d 222 (cleaned up).

¶35 In this case, the trial court’s findings and conclusions do
not identify the “person entitled to” the sheet metal. See id.
(cleaned up). Terry’s son, Destry, provided sheet metal for the

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “deny all
of the statements in a claim by general denial.” The Nielsens do
not address why we should not treat the Cronquists’ denial as a
general denial consistent with rule 8.

20240680-CA 15 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

shed’s roofing and siding, and left some of it near the shed. And
at some point, Travis took the remaining sheet metal, transported
it to another property, and refused to return it to either Destry or
Terry. The court found that Destry had “testified that the metal
belonged to him and he gave permission for its use on” Terry’s
shed. Yet the court ordered that “the metal be returned to Terry
who was the intended beneficiary of the metal.” No other findings
were made as to the ownership of the spare sheet metal.

¶36 To the extent the court found that Destry was the person
entitled to the sheet metal, the court effectively awarded relief to
a non-party over whom it had no jurisdiction. See Van Leeuwen v.
BANA RESI-NON-CORE, 2023 UT App 91, ¶ 31, 536 P.3d 84
(explaining that “the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the
non-party relief” when the “non-party failed to intervene and the
requirement of intervention was not waived by the opposing
party” (cleaned up)); Fisher v. Fisher, 2003 UT App 91, ¶ 19, 67 P.3d
1055 (holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enforce a
lien filed by a non-party); Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, ¶ 9, 989 P.2d
1073 (reversing the trial court’s order awarding disbursement to
a non-party for lack of jurisdiction); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 12
P.2d 364, 365 (Utah 1932) (holding that a judgment “in favor of a
person who is not a party to the action or proceeding is void
because the court has no jurisdiction to make it”). That was
reversible error. Destry was not a party to the action and should
not have been afforded relief on the conversion claim.

¶37 To the extent that the trial court was attempting to find that
the sheet metal actually belonged to Terry, the findings and
conclusions do not adequately articulate this. See Armed Forces Ins.
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 28, 70 P.3d 35 (explaining that
findings of fact “should be sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached” (cleaned
up)). The trial court did not find that Terry was the owner of the
sheet metal, but instead only ordered that the metal be returned
to him because he was the “intended beneficiary” of the metal.

20240680-CA 16 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

But the court did not explain how Terry came to be the intended
beneficiary of the metal—it made no factual findings on this point,
and it did not discuss any legal theory under which such status
might be obtained.

¶38 Accordingly, we vacate the court’s order regarding the
sheet metal, and we remand the matter for entry of more detailed
findings and conclusions on this point. See Monaco Apartment
Homes v. Figueroa, 2021 UT App 50, ¶ 6, 489 P.3d 1132 (“Where the
inadequacy of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law results in our inability to ascertain the basis of the trial court’s
decision, we are prevented from effectively reviewing [that]
decision and may remand for the entry of more detailed
findings.” (cleaned up)).

B. Attorney Fees

¶39 Finally, the Nielsens challenge the trial court’s award of
attorney fees to the Cronquists on two different claims. But here,
the Nielsens’ challenge is limited: they assert simply that the trial
court abused its discretion in making its determination as to what
amount of fees was reasonable under the circumstances. We
discern no reversible error in the court’s award of attorney fees.

¶40 “The general rule in Utah is that, subject to certain
exceptions, a party is entitled to attorney fees only if authorized
by statute or by contract.” Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d
115, 117 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up). Two statutes provided the basis
for the award of fees here. First, the trial court awarded fees to the
Cronquists for defending against a claim for conversion of the
Miles Spring water under Utah’s bad-faith litigation statute,
which entitles the prevailing party in a civil action to recover
attorney fees “if the court determines that the action or defense to
the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith.” See Utah Code § 78B-5-825(1). Second, on a different claim,
the court awarded fees to the Cronquists under a statute that
entitles the “prevailing party in a civil action . . . to collect

20240680-CA 17 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

reasonable costs and attorney fees, if that action is brought . . . for
injuries caused by a diversion of water in violation of an existing
water right.” See id. § 73-2-28(4).

¶41 Notably, in their briefing, the Nielsens do not appear to
challenge the court’s conclusion that the Cronquists are entitled to
attorney fees under these statutes. 5 Rather, they argue only that
the amount of awarded fees was not reasonable. And as already
noted, our standard of review on this issue is deferential. See Zion
Village Resort LLC v. Pro Curb U.S.A. LLC, 2020 UT App 167, ¶ 22,
480 P.3d 1055 (stating that “a court’s decision regarding the
reasonableness of an attorney fee award is reviewed deferentially,
for patent error or clear abuse of discretion” (cleaned up)).

¶42 Here, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
assessment of what amount of fees would be reasonable. The
Cronquists’ trial counsel submitted time records of the attorneys’
work on the case, as well as an affidavit in support. These records
included the hours spent on the case, the hourly rates charged for
those hours, and descriptions of the tasks performed. For some of
the entries, the Cronquists asked the court to award the full

5. To the extent the Nielsens attempted to mount a challenge to
the Cronquists’ entitlement to attorney fees under those two
statutes, such a challenge is inadequately briefed. For example,
the Nielsens attempt to “incorporate[] . . . by reference” their list
of the trial court’s alleged errors to argue that the attorney fees
award was in error. For reasons already discussed, see supra ¶ 31,
this argument does not help us determine whether the court erred
on the merits of its fees award. For example, nothing in the
Nielsens’ chart of errors touches on the trial court’s determination
that the conversion of water claim proceeded with an improper
purpose or that it was meritless under the bad faith statute. The
Nielsens merely assert that because there were numerous errors
in the findings and conclusions, it necessarily follows that the fees
award was in error. We reject that argument because it lacks the
analysis necessary for adequate briefing.

20240680-CA 18 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

amount, and for other entries, they asked the court to award only
one-third of the billed amount. After reviewing the request and
supporting documentation, the trial court found that the
Cronquists had “made reasonable efforts in calculating attorney[]
fees relating to both” the interference with a water right claim and
the conversion claim regarding the Miles Spring water.

¶43 The Nielsens argue that the Cronquists applied an
arbitrary one-third coefficient to some entries “based on some
internal metric” to calculate the amount allocatable to the water-
related claims. But the Cronquists explained in their motion
where that one-third figure comes from: the “33% calculation
[was] based” in part on “the amount of fact preparation”
attributable to the water-related claims “versus the rest of the
claims in the case.” And after reviewing the time entries—
including the one-third allocation for the general case entries—the
trial court found that the Cronquists had “made reasonable efforts
in calculating attorney[] fees relating to both” the interference
with a water right claim and the conversion claim regarding the
Miles Spring water. We cannot say that the district court exceeded
its discretion in this regard, especially given that the water-related
claims consumed a considerable amount of focus in this litigation,
as evident in the findings and conclusions themselves.

¶44 The Nielsens also argue that at least some of the time
entries appear “unrelated to [the] current action” and that these
entries should not have been included in the request for fees in
this case. Specifically, they argue that “many of the charges”
appear to be “related to work on [the Cronquists’] case with
Smithfield City.” As an example, the Nielsens point to a time
entry involving strategy for “water rights” and “water facility
& water service agreement,” which the Nielsens argue relates to
another case involving water rights and Smithfield City. But the
Nielsens do not provide any explanation as to how that case or
that research would be irrelevant to the instant case. Indeed, some
research regarding Smithfield City’s water rights or any
agreement the city may have had with the Nielsens (or their

20240680-CA 19 2025 UT App 199
Nielsen v. Cronquist

predecessors-in-interest) seems relevant given that the Nielsens
expressly argued that the city prohibited them from sharing water
with another residence—Kim and Berniece’s parcel.

¶45 For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted
within its discretion in making its reasonableness assessment, and
we therefore affirm the court’s attorney fees awards. 6

CONCLUSION

¶46 Because the Nielsens sold the property central to their title-
and boundary-related claims during this appeal, their appeal as
to those claims is moot, and we dismiss the appeal as it relates to
those claims. As for the remaining claims, we vacate the trial
court’s order regarding the conversion of sheet metal claim,
because it was unclear in the findings and conclusions whether
the court was awarding relief to a non-party, and we remand this
case to the trial court for further proceedings on that point. And
finally, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
making its reasonableness assessment regarding attorney fees,
and we therefore affirm the court’s attorney fees awards.

6. The Cronquists request attorney fees for having to address a
“frivolous appeal,” presumably pursuant to rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. We decline to grant this request.
Fees are to be awarded under this rule “only in egregious cases,
lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous
lower court decisions.” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38,
¶ 36, 440 P.3d 757 (cleaned up). While we ultimately reject some
of the Nielsens’ arguments, we do not consider this an
“egregious” appeal worthy of sanctions.

20240680-CA 20 2025 UT App 199