Klein v. Klein

2025 UT App 170

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

AMBER KLEIN,
Appellee,
v.
MELVIN JAMES KLEIN,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20240231-CA
Filed November 20, 2025

Sixth District Court, Manti Department
The Honorable Marvin D. Bagley
No. 194600147

Brody N. Miles, Attorney for Appellant
Douglas L. Neeley, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Amber Klein and Melvin James Klein divorced after
twenty-seven years of marriage. Melvin 1 challenges several
aspects of the district court’s alimony award, several of the court’s
evidentiary decisions, and the court’s distribution of marital
property. Melvin’s claims are either unpreserved, inadequately
briefed, unpersuasive because of a failure to marshal relevant
evidence, or otherwise obviously without merit. We therefore
reject his claims, affirm the court’s decree, grant Amber’s request
for attorney fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

1. Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their
given names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent
informality.
Klein v. Klein

Procedure, and remand the matter to the district court for a
determination of those fees.

BACKGROUND

The Marriage and Its Deterioration

¶2 During Amber and Melvin’s marriage, “Melvin was the
primary, and for the most part, sole income provider for the
family.” While the parties had young children, “both Melvin and
Amber were agreeable and supportive that Amber not have [full-
time] employment; but instead, that she primarily care for their
children.” However, as the children became older and began
reaching adulthood, Melvin “felt his contributions to the marriage
were unfairly burdensome compared to Amber’s,” and he began
demanding “that Amber make a fair contribution to the
marriage.” He “insisted that Amber’s offsetting contribution to
the marriage should be that she either get a job and bring in
income or, in the alternative, willingly engage with him in regular
anal sexual intercourse.”

¶3 Amber “was not agreeable to having anal intercourse with
Melvin”—both “because she felt it was morally wrong” and
because she had suffered “[f]or a substantial period of time” from
“debilitating” colorectal ailments that made anal intercourse
particularly painful. She contended that these ailments prevented
her from “obtain[ing] or maintain[ing] regular and consistent
employment.” Melvin “told [Amber] that . . . because she was not
working, if she did not regularly engage in anal sexual intercourse
with him, the marriage was over.” Amber refused. And in
December 2019, she filed for divorce.

¶4 Melvin moved out of the marital home on “approximately
January 1, 2020,” but continued to pay the mortgage and utility
bills for eight months. After a failed mediation in September 2020,
he told Amber “he could no longer afford to pay her any financial
support.” Thereafter, Melvin provided no financial support to

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Amber and made no mortgage or other payments toward the
marital home.

The Trial

¶5 The divorce action proceeded to a bench trial that occurred
over five nonconsecutive days, beginning in December 2022 and
ending in May 2023. “The most substantial disputes between the
parties surrounded Melvin’s demands for anal sexual intercourse,
Amber’s physical condition, and Amber’s lack of employment.”
Other issues included Melvin’s income and the value of the
marital home. Amber’s witnesses included her treating physician
(Doctor), a home appraiser (Appraiser), and Amber herself.
Melvin’s witnesses included a colorectal surgeon (Expert), a
vocational rehabilitation counselor (Counselor), one of Melvin’s
coworkers (Coworker), the plant superintendent from Melvin’s
work (Superintendent), Amber, and Melvin himself.

¶6 Amber testified about the history of the marriage. She also
testified about her health. She explained that her medical
condition was at its worst in 2015. At that time, she said, she
would sometimes “be down for four days” after a bowel
movement. After 2015, she explained, her condition progressively
improved until about 2020. She stated that in 2020 her condition
“leveled out” and that it had not “really changed since then.” At
the time of trial, she testified, she was still “unable to do anything”
after bowel movements and would therefore “deliberately not eat
for as long as possible”—sometimes going days without food—in
order to avoid going to the bathroom.

¶7 Amber confirmed that after Melvin moved out, he
continued paying the mortgage and utilities on the marital home
until about September 2020 but provided no support thereafter.
She testified that in early 2022, she received notification that the
bank was going to foreclose on the home. She explained that this
prompted her to borrow $25,000 from a friend and to use $18,250
of the borrowed funds to “save the home from foreclosure.” She
also testified that as of the time of trial, there were problems with

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the home, including leaks in the roof, a broken furnace, and issues
with electrical outlets.

¶8 Finally, Amber detailed her monthly expenses, and she
testified that after June 2020 she applied for several jobs but
received no employment offers.

¶9 Doctor testified that he examined Amber in 2020, and he
read from a letter he had written following that examination. In
it, he said that her medical condition was severe and that she had
told him “the pain [was] bad enough that she ha[d] to [lie] down
for up to eight hours after a bowel movement.” He also wrote that
some “healing . . . had taken place” but that it “look[ed] like it
[was] as good as it [was] going to get.” Doctor also read from a
medical assessment record that stated “there [was] no surgery
that [could] repair [her] anatomy.” Doctor then testified that there
was “a significant mental health impact related to” Amber’s
condition, namely, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Ultimately, Doctor opined that Amber would have difficulty
working due to her “rectal pain and her mental status.”

¶10 Appraiser testified about the value of the marital home. He
explained that he conducted an inspection and appraisal of the
marital home in August 2020. He stated that, during his
inspection, he saw that the roof leaked and the asphalt shingles
needed to be replaced. He also testified that there were electrical
issues and that the home’s deck “was not stable.” He opined that
the home’s value in August 2020 was $226,000, and his appraisal
to that effect was admitted over Melvin’s objection on relevancy
grounds.

¶11 After Amber presented her case, Melvin presented his,
during which he called Expert to testify. Expert had not
personally examined Amber, and he therefore testified based on
his review of Amber’s medical records and a photograph of her
condition. Expert testified that he had been a colorectal surgeon
for ten years and had “never had a patient with such severe
symptoms” as Amber’s. He said that a condition like Amber’s

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“can consume the life of a person, to the point the person dreads
eating, having bowel movements, or doing any type of normal
activity.” Expert opined, however, that Amber’s condition could
be surgically repaired to the point that Amber could “kind of go
back to a normal life.” He further opined that Amber would be
able to return to work within four to six weeks after surgery if
there were no complications. Expert testified that he had “never
diagnosed anyone with PTSD” and that if he were to treat anyone
with “any issues . . . like a long-term trauma,” he would refer the
patient to a psychiatrist or other mental health professional.

¶12 Melvin called Counselor to opine on Amber’s ability to
work. Counselor identified several entry level jobs near where
Amber lived that matched Amber’s qualifications. The starting
pay for these jobs was about $12 an hour.

¶13 Coworker and Superintendent testified as well. Coworker
testified that he and Melvin worked together for about eight years
until Melvin moved into a lesser-paid position due to their
company’s restructuring. Superintendent testified that after
Melvin moved into the lesser-paid position (which was three
years prior to trial), higher-paying jobs for which Melvin was
qualified—some paying upwards of $28 an hour—had come open
in the same company, but Superintendent did not know whether
Melvin had applied for any of them.

¶14 Finally, Melvin testified. He explained that he was
demoted when his employer restructured its organization and
that at the time of trial, he was making $20.65 an hour. He
confirmed that he had not applied for any positions that came
open after his demotion. He also detailed his monthly expenses.

The District Court’s Rulings

¶15 Following trial, the court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law. It found that “[b]ased on the severity of
Amber’s physical condition, together with her accompanying
mental health elements, it was reasonable that Amber [had] not

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[sought], obtain[ed], or maintain[ed] full[-]time employment.” It
further found, however, “that with proper action on her part,
[Amber could] obtain the needed medical diagnosis, treatment[,]
and surgery” and that “following a reasonable recovery period,
she [would] be capable of entering the marketplace and obtaining
full[-]time employment.”

¶16 Accordingly, the court determined that Amber should be
given one year to obtain treatment and find employment. It then
imputed to Amber a wage of $12 an hour, for a gross monthly
income of $2,080 and a net monthly income after taxes of $1,601,
beginning one year after entry of the divorce decree. And it
imputed to Amber a wage of $17 an hour, for a gross monthly
income of $2,946 and a net monthly income of $2,268, beginning
three years after entry of the divorce decree. The court found
Amber’s reasonable monthly expenses to be $3,639.

¶17 As to Melvin, the court found that after the parties
separated in 2020, Melvin’s income was $3,818 per month. But
based on Melvin’s testimony, Coworker’s testimony, and
Superintendent’s testimony, the court found that “Melvin ha[d]
passed up, and/or voluntarily chosen not to pursue[,] higher
paying jobs that [had since become] available at his workplace”
that “were well within Melvin’s capabilities and would not have
appreciably changed his work schedule or location.” The court
further found that Melvin had “been satisfied to keep his income
at his current level” at least in part because of “his desire to avoid
paying Amber alimony in a higher amount.” Thus, the court
imputed to Melvin an hourly income of $28 an hour, for a monthly
gross income of $4,853 and a monthly net income of $3,736. It
determined his reasonable monthly expenses to be $3,257.

¶18 Based on the parties’ respective incomes and expenses, the
court determined that Melvin should pay Amber alimony in the
amount of $2,059 per month for the first year after entry of the

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divorce decree, $1,258.50 per month for the second and third years
following entry of the decree, and $925 per month thereafter.2

¶19 Next, the court considered the fair market value of the
marital home. Amber had asked the court “to deduct $20,000 from
the value testified to by [Appraiser]” based on evidence that the
home’s needed repairs would cost approximately $20,000. But the
court noted that “[o]n cross examination, and in argument,
Melvin [had] challenged the testimony of [Appraiser], arguing the
house should be valued much higher” than the appraised value.
Ultimately, the court found the fair market value of the home to
be $224,000.

¶20 The court subtracted from the home’s $224,000 value the
mortgage balance, which was approximately $143,000, as well as
the $18,250 Amber had borrowed from her friend to save the
home from foreclosure, resulting in an equity amount of $62,750.
The court then determined that half of the equity—$31,375—
should be awarded to each party.

¶21 Amber had requested a retroactive alimony award for the
time between September 2020 (when Melvin stopped paying the
mortgage or providing other support) and trial. The court agreed
that “Melvin had a legal and equitable obligation to provide
support to Amber during that period of time . . . and that he did
not do so.” But the court noted that if it based alimony for that
time on the same monthly amount it had determined to award

2. The court calculated these amounts by first subtracting
Melvin’s monthly expenses from his imputed monthly income,
resulting in excess funds of $479 per month. The court then
determined that those excess funds should be paid toward
Amber’s reasonable monthly expenses of $3,639 and that the
parties should bear equally Amber’s remaining monthly shortfall,
which varied depending on her imputed income for the identified
periods. Accordingly, the court added $479 to the number
representing half of Amber’s remaining monthly shortfall for each
respective period to arrive at the respective alimony totals.

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Amber for the first year following the divorce—$2,059—then the
retroactive alimony amount would total $74,124. The court found
that such a retroactive alimony award would not be “reasonable
or equitable under all the facts in this case” because “Melvin [did]
not . . . have the ability to pay that amount.” Instead, the court
found that a “more equitable, implementable and enforceable
order [would be] to award Amber retroactive alimony in an
amount [equal to] Melvin’s share of the equity in the parties’
house”—namely, $31,375.

¶22 The court stated that it would give Melvin six months to
pay the retroactive alimony award and that to ensure payment, it
would give Amber “an equitable lien in the amount of $31,375
against Melvin’s share of equity in the parties’ house.” If Melvin
did not pay the retroactive alimony within six months, Amber
would “be allowed to equitably foreclose Melvin’s equity in the
house.” If Melvin timely paid the amount in full, “the equitable
lien [would] be deemed satisfied and released,” and if Amber was
unable to assume or refinance the mortgage, Melvin would be
able to force a sale of the home with the proceeds of the sale
(minus amounts related to selling the home, paying off the
mortgage, and repaying the $18,250 Amber borrowed from a
friend) being divided between the parties.

¶23 Finally, as to the division of the parties’ personal property,
the court initially found that it would be “fair and equitable that
Melvin be awarded the highlighted items” listed in an exhibit
Melvin had prepared and that Amber be awarded the non-
highlighted items listed in the same exhibit, “with the exception
that [a particular] .22 rifle [was to] be awarded to Amber.” Among
the highlighted items that were to go to Melvin were “[Amber’s]
pearl necklace, tennis bracelet, earrings, long pearl [necklace]
(light pastels), [two] Apple iPads, and [two] KitchenAid mixers.”

Amber’s Motion for Clarification

¶24 Before the court issued its decree, Amber filed a motion for
clarification. In the motion, she noted that the court’s findings of

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fact and conclusions of law anticipated awarding Amber’s
jewelry, two iPads, and two KitchenAid mixers to Melvin, and she
“ask[ed] if the [c]ourt intended that [Melvin] be awarded her
jewelry, both iPads, and both mixers.” Melvin did not respond to
Amber’s motion, and the court issued an order stating that it had
not intended to award the jewelry, both iPads, and both
KitchenAid mixers to Melvin. Instead, the court said the jewelry
“should be awarded to [Amber] and one each of the iPads and
KitchenAid mixers should be awarded to [Melvin].” The court
entered a final decree reflecting the determinations made in its
prior findings of fact and conclusions of law as modified by its
ruling on Amber’s motion for clarification.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶25 Melvin now appeals, raising a number of issues for our
review. First, he challenges the district court’s alimony award on
several grounds. “We review a trial court’s award of alimony for
an abuse of discretion.” Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 5,
233 P.3d 836 (cleaned up). “Thus, we will not disturb a trial court’s
ruling on alimony as long as the court exercises its discretion
within the bounds and under the standards we have set and has
supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions.”
Id. (cleaned up). We will overturn the findings supporting an
alimony award only if they are clearly erroneous, and “under our
clearly erroneous standard, we will disturb a court’s factual
findings only where the court’s conclusions do not logically
follow from, or are not supported by, the evidence.” Mintz v.
Mintz, 2023 UT App 17, ¶ 11, 525 P.3d 534 (cleaned up).

¶26 Second, Melvin asserts that the district court erred by
relying on improper evidence, including assertedly inadmissible
expert testimony. “We review deferentially a district court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence, including its determination
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony[,] for an abuse of
discretion.” Bailey v. Bailey, 2024 UT App 51, ¶ 22, 548 P.3d 519
(cleaned up).

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Klein v. Klein

¶27 Third, Melvin asserts two errors related to the district
court’s distribution of the parties’ property. “In divorce actions, a
district court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the
. . . property interests of the parties, and its actions are entitled to
a presumption of validity.” Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App
28, ¶ 39, 507 P.3d 385 (cleaned up). “We can properly find abuse
of the district court’s discretion only if no reasonable person
would take the view adopted by the district court.” Id. (cleaned
up).

ANALYSIS

I. Alimony

¶28 Melvin asserts that the district court “arrived at an
improper alimony award.” He argues that this is so for three
reasons: (1) Amber “failed to provide evidence of her need[s],”
(2) the district court “over-imputed Melvin to a higher income
level,” and (3) the district court “imputed Amber to an insufficient
income level.” 3 We address and reject, in turn, each of these
assertions.

A. Evidence of Amber’s Needs

¶29 Melvin first contends that “Amber did not introduce into
evidence any documents to back her claim” for alimony and that
this “failure to justify and demonstrate her need for alimony is a
basis to deny alimony.” But Melvin cites no authority for the

3. Under separate headings, Melvin also asserts that the district
court “did not engage in a sufficient or correct [alimony] analysis”
and “should not have awarded retroactive or prospective
alimony.” But his arguments under these headings essentially
restate the arguments made in support of the assertions identified
above, and to the extent there are any new arguments under these
separate headings, they are inadequately briefed. We therefore do
not separately analyze these additional assertions.

20240231-CA 10 2025 UT App 170
Klein v. Klein

proposition that documentary evidence is required to establish a
need for alimony. This is likely because “we have previously
considered and rejected the assertion that failure to file financial
documentation automatically precludes an award of alimony.”
Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 28, ¶ 102, 507 P.3d 385
(cleaned up). As we have explained,

Trial courts are vested with discretion to impute
figures for a recipient spouse’s needs analysis, even
where complete documentation is lacking, as long
as there is sufficient evidence to support such
imputation. In cases where an alimony claimant
fails to provide sufficient documentation, courts
may find adequate support for the imputation of
particular expenses in, for instance, the opposing
party’s documentation, or in updated financial
declarations supported not by timely disclosed
financial documents but instead by the sworn
testimony of witnesses.

Wellman v. Kawasaki, 2023 UT App 11, ¶ 17, 525 P.3d 139 (cleaned
up). These principles are not new. See, e.g., Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT
79, ¶ 116, 459 P.3d 276 (stating that a district court may impute “a
figure to determine [a party’s] financial need based either on [the
other party’s] records of the parties’ predivorce expenses or [on]
a reasonable estimate of [the party’s] needs”); Munoz-Madrid v.
Carlos-Moran, 2018 UT App 95, ¶ 10, 427 P.3d 420 (noting that
because the friend in whose home a divorcing wife had been
staying testified about the wife’s living expenses, the wife had
“provided some information, consistent with her financial
declaration, that she had monthly expenses” and holding that it
was therefore “reasonable for the court to . . . accept her expenses
from her financial declaration” (cleaned up)). And the
considerable body of caselaw that runs counter to Melvin’s
position on this point renders his argument obviously without
merit.

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¶30 Melvin further implies that—documentation aside—the
evidence was insufficient to support the court’s findings as to
Amber’s needs because some evidence in the record contradicts
Amber’s claimed expenses. However, Melvin makes no effort to
marshal the evidence that supports her claimed expenses.

¶31 For example, he notes that in her financial declarations,
Amber listed an expense for pet care but that she testified at trial
that because one of her dogs “is too old to have any more litters”
and “the other one has cancer,” the dogs no longer need “special
nutrition and extra vitamins and goat’s milk and liver and all that
kind of stuff” and, thus, that this expense “could just be taken off.”
Based on this testimony, Melvin would have us overrule the pet
care expense portion of Amber’s needs as determined by the
district court. But Melvin fails to marshal Amber’s later testimony
that she still had at least one dog at the time of trial, that this dog
had a litter of puppies six weeks prior to trial, that this dog had
arthritis, and that Amber was still caring for three of that dog’s
puppies. This evidence supports the court’s finding as to the pet
care expense portion of Amber’s needs.

¶32 Melvin’s apparent insufficiency of the evidence argument
as a whole amounts to a presentation of “carefully selected facts
and excerpts from the record in support of [his] position,” Taft v.
Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 19, 379 P.3d 890 (cleaned up), with no
attempt to—as required for proper marshaling—identify “all
relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the
findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly
erroneous,” Horning v. Labor Comm’n, 2023 UT App 30, ¶ 31, 529
P.3d 352 (cleaned up). While a party challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence “does not lose its appeal by default simply for failure
to marshal,” the “traditional principle of marshaling [remains] a
natural extension of an appellant’s burden of persuasion,” and “a
party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the evidence
will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion on
appeal if it fails to marshal.” C.R. England Inc. v. Labor Comm’n,
2024 UT App 170, ¶ 28, 561 P.3d 213 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 564
P.3d 958 (Utah 2025). Such is the case here. By failing to marshal

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the evidence in support of the district court’s findings as to
Amber’s needs, Melvin has not carried his burden to persuade us
that those findings were clearly erroneous. Thus, we do not
disturb the court’s findings as to Amber’s needs.

B. Melvin’s Income

¶33 Melvin next asserts that the district court imputed too high
an income to him when making its alimony determination. He
does this by, again, presenting only “carefully selected facts and
excerpts from the record in support of [his] position,” Taft, 2016
UT App 135, ¶ 19 (cleaned up), with no attempt to identify “all
relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the
findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly
erroneous,” Horning, 2023 UT App 30, ¶ 31 (cleaned up). The
district court heard evidence that multiple positions for which
Melvin was qualified and which paid around $28 per hour
became available with Melvin’s longtime employer during the
years the divorce was pending yet Melvin applied for none of
them. Melvin does not marshal this evidence in support of the
income figure the district court imputed to him, let alone show
why that evidence was insufficient. Accordingly, we decline to
disturb the court’s imputation of income to Melvin based on a
wage of $28 an hour.

¶34 Melvin challenges the district court’s imputation of income
to him based on the additional assertion that the “court made up
its mind” to impute income to him “before even receiving the
evidence to [support such imputation] in the first place.” The
claim that the court made up its mind before receiving any
evidence on a particular issue amounts to an assertion of bias. 4
Melvin says that this bias “was evidenced in multiple statements

4. Melvin did not preserve his claim of bias. We nevertheless
choose to address it. See State v. Kitches, 2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28, 484
P.3d 415 (“If the merits of a claim can easily be resolved in favor
of the party asserting that the claim was not preserved, we readily
may opt to do so without addressing preservation.” (cleaned up)).

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. . . accusing Melvin of not providing his paystubs—even though
Melvin timely and correctly provided updated paystubs.” We are
not persuaded.

¶35 For starters, before the court mentioned Melvin’s paystubs,
it had already heard the key imputation evidence on which it
ultimately relied—namely, Superintendent’s testimony that
multiple positions for which Melvin was qualified and which paid
around $28 per hour became available with Melvin’s longtime
employer during the years the divorce was pending and
Superintendent was unaware of Melvin applying for any of those
positions. Thus, it is inaccurate to say that the court’s statements
about Melvin’s paystubs indicate that the court made up its mind
to impute income to Melvin before it received evidence to support
the imputation of income.

¶36 “Moreover, parties claiming bias must demonstrate
that the alleged bias stems from an extrajudicial source.”
Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 49, 459 P.3d 276. “Neither bias nor
prejudice refers to the attitude that a judge may hold about the
subject matter of a lawsuit.” State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, ¶ 17, 253
P.3d 1082 (cleaned up). Here, the court heard evidence
that Melvin had intentionally remained underemployed in the
years leading up to trial. At that point, it questioned
why Melvin was relying on paystubs from 2020 (three years
prior to trial) and suggested that if Melvin wanted to enhance
his credibility regarding his income, it would be better for him
to “show his current paycheck stub.” Later, when Melvin
was cross-examined as to why he had not provided a
paystub that was current as of the time of trial, his
counsel objected based on the fact that Melvin had provided
paystubs “all the way until the pretrial disclosure date.” The court
acknowledged that Melvin had provided paystubs up
through the final pretrial disclosure deadline but noted that
Melvin’s income was “a critical issue” and that it believed Melvin
was “doing all he [could] to keep his income down.”
Concurrently, the court noted its assessment that Amber was
“doing all she [could] to not have a job” and that “[b]oth sides

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ha[d] not been credible” on the issue of their income potentials.
The court then asked Melvin if he had provided his current
paystub to his counsel, and Melvin said that he had. Melvin’s
counsel acknowledged that he “probably [did] have” a more
current paystub for Melvin and “could forward [it] over . . . as an
exhibit,” which he then did. We simply see in the foregoing
exchanges no evidence of bias toward a particular party based on
an extrajudicial source, and we remind counsel that “[l]awyers
shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to . . . [a]
court improper motives, purpose, or conduct.” Utah R. Jud.
Admin. 14-301(3).

C. Amber’s Income

¶37 Melvin asserts that the district court made a “clearly
erroneous” decision when it imputed to Amber no income for the
first year following entry of the divorce decree, income of $1,601
per month for the second and third years following entry of the
decree, and income of $2,268 per month thereafter. But Melvin
wholly fails to engage with the court’s reasoning behind that
decision. Nor does he marshal the evidence in support of the
findings that support the court’s reasoning.

¶38 Melvin’s appellate burden of persuasion “necessarily
require[d] [him] to address the reasoning and basis of the district
court’s ruling and to explain why that court got it wrong.” Cottam
v. IHC Health Services Inc., 2024 UT App 19, ¶ 15, 544 P.3d 1051
(cleaned up). By “not meaningfully engag[ing] with the district
court’s reasoning,” Melvin has “fall[en] short of demonstrating
any error on the part of the district court.” Big Game Forever v.
Peterson, 2024 UT App 78, ¶ 19, 551 P.3d 411 (cleaned up). We
therefore do not disturb the district court’s determinations as to
Amber’s income.

¶39 Because we reject each of Melvin’s arguments asserting
error in the district court’s alimony calculation, we affirm the
court’s alimony order.

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II. Evidence

¶40 Melvin next argues that the district court “permitted
testimony . . . it should not have,” namely (1) Doctor’s expert
opinions, (2) Appraiser’s valuation of the marital home, and
(3) Coworker’s and Superintendent’s purportedly expert
testimony elicited on cross-examination. We address and reject, in
turn, each of these arguments as well.

A. Doctor’s Testimony

¶41 Melvin asserts that the court should have excluded
Doctor’s expert testimony. But Melvin does not adequately brief
this issue.

¶42 Melvin quotes the expert disclosure requirement of rule
26(a)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and asserts that the
district court erred by “adopt[ing] [Doctor’s] expert opinions,
even though he was not designated as an expert, and where
Amber conceded that he was not being used as an expert.” Melvin
fails, however, to either acknowledge or address the fact that
nearly ten months before trial, Amber actually served on Melvin
(apparently at his insistence) a Notice of Expert Witness, which
disclosed Doctor as an expert witness and contained, among other
things, the letter from Doctor discussed above, see supra ¶ 9, in
which Doctor opined that Amber had “healing that [would] need
to occur through counseling and emotional healing over time.”
Additionally, while Amber’s counsel said at trial that Doctor
would testify “not as an expert,” Amber’s counsel also said that
Doctor would testify regarding “what his diagnosis was.” And
medical diagnosis testimony is generally expert testimony. See
Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, ¶ 16, 12 P.3d 1015 (“The
diagnosis and potential continuance of a disease are medical
questions to be established by physicians as expert witnesses and
not by lay persons.” (cleaned up)). Because Melvin does not
address Amber’s pretrial disclosure of Doctor as an expert or her
in-trial declaration that Doctor would testify regarding his
diagnosis of Amber, Melvin does not adequately brief his

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assertion of error based on inadequate disclosure of Doctor’s
expert testimony. See State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶ 31, 973 P.2d 404
(stating that an appellate “court is not a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and
research” and that adequate briefing “requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority” (cleaned up)).

¶43 Melvin also cites rule 702(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
for the proposition that an expert may opine only if there “is a
threshold showing that the principles or methods that are
underlying the testimony are reliable, based upon sufficient facts
or data, and have been reliably applied to the facts.” And he
quotes State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980), for the related
proposition that an “expert may not give an opinion which
represents a mere guess, speculation, or conjecture.” Id. at 230. He
then merely states that Doctor “testified that Amber would have
difficulties returning to work with PTSD.” Melvin provides no
analysis demonstrating why Doctor’s PTSD diagnosis was
speculation or why the principles underlying that diagnosis were
not reliable. And he further fails to provide any analysis showing
why Doctor’s opinion that Amber would have difficulty returning
to work due to her PTSD was unreliable or speculative. Thus,
Melvin’s rule 702(b) challenge to Doctor’s PTSD-related
testimony is also inadequately briefed. See Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ¶ 31.

B. The Appraisal

¶44 Melvin next asserts that the district court should not have
relied on Appraiser’s appraised value of the marital home from
August 2020. At trial, Melvin objected to admission of the
appraisal on relevancy grounds. In his brief, Melvin places his
argument regarding the appraisal under the heading that the
district court “permitted testimony when it should not have,” and
he asserts that the district court “abused its discretion by utilizing
[an] outdated and unreliable appraisal.” To the extent that Melvin
thus means to challenge the admissibility of the appraisal, his
argument amounts to a bald assertion unaccompanied by

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authority or analysis. Melvin’s evidentiary challenge to the
appraisal is therefore inadequately briefed. 5 See id.

¶45 Melvin’s argument regarding the appraisal also challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the court’s finding as
to the value of the marital home. Specifically, Melvin asserts that
the appraisal “failed to provide an adequate basis for valuing the
home.” In support of this assertion, he cites Appraiser’s testimony
that the August 2020 appraised value of the marital home would
not represent the home’s value as of the time of Appraiser’s trial
testimony—March 2023—because the comparisons on which the
appraisal was based were by then “invalid” and because the
market is always changing. However, Melvin fails to marshal
Appraiser’s other relevant testimony, including his explanation
that “[t]he textbook answer” to the question of how long an
appraisal is valid is that it “is good for [only] one day in time” yet
banks will accept appraisals in rural areas for up to one year for
financing purposes. He also fails to marshal the evidence showing
that the home needed $20,000 in repairs. Furthermore, he cites no
authority to support the notion that, though a dated appraisal is
admissible, it is an insufficient evidentiary basis on which to base
a finding of value. Thus, Melvin’s alternative appraisal argument
is also inadequately briefed. See id.

C. Lay Witnesses

¶46 Melvin’s final evidentiary challenge is to the district court’s
admission of Superintendent’s and Coworker’s purportedly
expert testimony—elicited on cross-examination—“even though
[neither] of them [was] disclosed” as an expert. This issue was not
preserved for appeal. While Melvin objected to some of
Superintendent’s testimony on the basis that it was “speculation,”

5. The evidentiary challenge is also wrong on the merits. See
Ellyson v. Ellyson, 265 N.E.3d 670, 677 (Ohio Ct. App. 2025) (“[T]he
court correctly found [the appellant’s] argument that the
appraisals [of the marital home in a divorce action] were outdated
went to the weight to be given the evidence, not admissibility.”).

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he did not object to either witness’s testimony on the basis that the
witness had not been properly disclosed as an expert. “If a party
makes an objection at trial based on one ground, this objection
does not preserve for appeal any alternative ground for
objection.” State v. Crabb, 2011 UT App 440, ¶ 2, 268 P.3d 193 (per
curiam) (cleaned up). “It is well established that we will not
address the merits of an unpreserved issue absent a showing that
an exception to the preservation rule applies.” State v. Centeno,
2023 UT 22, ¶ 57, 537 P.3d 232. Melvin does not claim that any
exception to the preservation rule applies here. 6 Accordingly, we
do not address the merits of his argument on this issue.

¶47 Apart from the admissibility of Superintendent’s and
Coworker’s purportedly expert testimony, Melvin also argues
that the “court’s use of these witnesses” to impute income to
Melvin of $28 per hour “was an abuse of discretion and error”
because “it disregarded testimony indicating that Melvin was not
voluntarily underemployed and that he was relegated to the
current position he was at.” We have already addressed Melvin’s
argument regarding the district court’s imputation of income to
him. See supra ¶ 33. We noted that Melvin had failed to marshal
the evidence supporting the court’s imputation of income to him.
See supra ¶ 33. And Melvin makes no more attempt in the “lay
witness” portion of his brief to marshal the evidence in support of
the findings that support the court’s imputation analysis than he
did in the portion of his argument addressed above. Nor does he
present any argument that persuades us the court’s imputation

6. Utah courts have “recognized three distinct exceptions to
preservation: plain error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and
exceptional circumstances.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 19, 416
P.3d 443. In ordinary civil cases, however, this list is shorter by
two: ineffective assistance is generally “a claim not afforded in
civil cases,” Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 13 n.11, 445 P.3d 521,
and “plain error review is not available in ordinary civil cases
unless expressly authorized by rule,” Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop.
Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 44, 507 P.3d 357.

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determination was outside the bounds of its considerable
discretion.

¶48 Because Melvin’s challenges related to Doctor’s expert
testimony, the appraisal, and Superintendent’s and Coworker’s
purportedly expert testimony are each inadequately briefed,
unpreserved, or obviously without merit, we do not disturb the
district court’s evidentiary rulings, its findings that are founded
on the challenged evidence, or its discretionary determinations
that are based on those findings.

III. Allocation of Property

¶49 Melvin raises two final issues. First, he argues that the
district court “improperly awarded the [marital] home to Amber
with all the equity.” Second, he contends that the court
“improperly allocated personal property.” These arguments are
also unavailing.

A. Allocation of the Marital Home

¶50 Melvin’s full argument in his principal brief in support of
the assertion that the district court improperly awarded the
marital home to Amber is as follows:

Given the discussion [regarding the appraisal], the
trial court is left with one option regarding the
home: ordering the home to be sold and the
proceeds to be divided between the parties. A sale
will most accurately reflect its market value, as
potential buyers would bid on the house at market
value. This is the default best way to determine the
value of the home, as it will sell to the highest bidder
in a competitive market. This option was not
selected by the trial court, who decided to set an
arbitrary and unreliable value on the home. This
was especially punitive as the trial court effectively
removed Melvin’s entire interest in the home by

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awarding Amber a $31,375 judgment, and
extinguishing Melvin’s equity. By using an
outdated appraisal, the trial court abused its
discretion, especially when it could just order the
sale of the home. Additionally, the alimony
judgment, which is addressed above, should be
removed as a judgment lien against Melvin, and the
proceeds should be equally divided between the
parties.

(Internal cross-reference and record citation omitted.)

¶51 This argument repeats the unsupported assertions we
already rejected regarding admissibility of the appraisal and the
ability of the appraisal to support the court’s finding as to the
value of the marital home. See supra ¶¶ 44‒45. The remainder of
this argument rests largely on the assertion that the district court
effectively and inequitably deprived Melvin of his entire interest
in the home. But the court did not deprive Melvin of his interest
in the home; instead, it granted Amber a lien against Melvin’s
interest in order to guarantee his payment of the retroactive
alimony award. If Melvin timely paid the retroactive alimony
award, he would “maintain[] his one half ownership interest in
the house free and clear of Amber’s equitable lien,” and if Amber
was unable to timely assume or refinance the mortgage, the home
would be ordered sold and the proceeds (minus amounts related
to selling the home, paying off the mortgage, and repaying the
$18,250 Amber borrowed from a friend) divided between the
parties. By containing only unsupported legal assertions and
inaccurate factual representations, Melvin’s argument regarding
the court’s valuation and distribution of the marital home is
inadequately briefed.

¶52 Melvin’s argument is also wrong on the merits. See
generally Ramos v. Cobblestone Centre, 2020 UT 55, ¶ 47, 472 P.3d
910 (“It is within our discretion to reach the merits of an argument
that is inadequately briefed . . . .” (cleaned up)). “In divorce
actions, a district court is permitted considerable discretion in

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adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties, and
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.” Dutcher v.
Dutcher, 2025 UT App 21, ¶ 14, 566 P.3d 48 (cleaned up).
Regarding a district court’s considerable discretion in adjusting
the property interests of divorcing parties, we have further
explained,

We can properly find abuse of the district court’s
discretion only if no reasonable person would take
the view adopted by the district court, that is, if a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulted in substantial and prejudicial error, if the
court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, or if
the award is so seriously inequitable as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion.

Id. (cleaned up). Here, the court considered evidence of an
appraised value, Melvin’s objections to that value, and evidence
of significant necessary repairs when valuing the marital home.
And in granting Amber a lien against Melvin’s interest, the court
provided protection to Amber that was reasonable in light of
Melvin’s previous refusal to pay the mortgage or any other
support. Moreover, the court’s action of requiring sale upon
Amber’s inability to assume the mortgage or refinance the home
protected Melvin’s interest. A reasonable person could have taken
the approach the district court did, and we therefore affirm the
court’s valuation and distribution of the marital home.

B. Allocation of Personal Property

¶53 Finally, Melvin asserts as follows in his principal brief:

The trial court should have equally divided the
[parties’ personal] property, as Utah law indicates.
The trial court did not do this. After trial, Amber
requested additional items be awarded to her after

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the trial court had already made its ruling.[7] She did
not file a proper filing as required under Rule 59.
The trial court then proceeded to award Amber with
additional marital items, which should have been
divided equally between the parties. As such, this
issue should be remanded for proper division
between the parties, especially where the claims
were not raised at trial.

(Internal cross-references omitted.)

¶54 This argument, too, is inadequately briefed. For one thing,
Melvin does not explain why Amber’s motion was not proper
under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 Moreover, as
to the jewelry, he does not grapple with our caselaw that says a
“fair and equitable property distribution is not necessarily an
equal distribution.” Clarke v. Clarke, 2012 UT App 328, ¶ 9, 292
P.3d 76 (cleaned up).

¶55 Instead, Melvin argues in his reply brief that because “the
trial court indicated” in its original findings of fact and
conclusions of law that “it had already equitably divided the
parties’ assets,” the “newly awarded assets had to have been
inequitably divided when they were all given to Amber.” But the
identified items were not all given to Amber—an iPad and a
KitchenAid mixer were given to Melvin. More importantly, the

7. As noted above, see supra ¶ 24, Amber’s motion described those
items as “her jewelry, both iPads, and both mixers.”

8. Even if Amber’s motion for clarification may have been
improper under rule 59 (an issue we do not decide), it was plainly
proper under rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
60 allows for motions to correct mistakes in orders or proceedings
if those motions are filed within ninety days of the relevant order
or proceeding, see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (c), and Amber’s
motion asking the court to clarify whether a mistake had been
made here was timely filed.

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court’s clarification that it never intended to give all the identified
items to Melvin thoroughly undermines his assertion that the
original distribution reflected a determination by the district court
that the original distribution was the only equitable option.

¶56 In sum, Melvin’s argument in his principal brief regarding
the district court’s distribution of the parties’ personal property is
inadequately briefed, and the argument in his reply brief plainly
lacks merit. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
distribution of the parties’ personal property.

IV. Attorney Fees

¶57 Amber requests an award of attorney fees pursuant to rule
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under rule 33, if we
determine that an appeal “is either frivolous or for delay, [we] will
award just damages, which may include . . . reasonable attorney
fees, to the prevailing party.” Utah R. App. P. 33(a). “The court
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party’s
attorney.” Id. Our supreme court has explained,

The imposition of such a sanction is a serious matter
and only to be used in egregious cases, lest the
threat of such sanctions should chill litigants’ rights
to appeal lower court decisions. Sanctions are
appropriate for appeals obviously without merit,
with no reasonable likelihood of success, and which
result in the delay of a proper judgment.

Redd v. Hill, 2013 UT 35, ¶ 28, 304 P.3d 861 (cleaned up).

¶58 This is a case where an award of fees under rule 33 is
appropriate. Melvin raises at least eight discrete issues on appeal,
yet his arguments are either unpreserved, inadequately briefed,
void of marshaling, obviously without merit, or some
combination of the above. In short, the appeal had no reasonable
likelihood of success. Moreover, it has resulted in a delay of the
properly entered judgment, which includes an order for Melvin

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to pay $31,375 in retroactive alimony in a situation where his
failure to timely do so would seriously jeopardize Amber’s ability
to assume or refinance the mortgage on the marital home. For
these reasons, we grant Amber’s rule 33 request and order Melvin
to pay Amber’s reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending
this appeal. We remand this matter to the district court for a
determination of those fees.

CONCLUSION

¶59 For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s divorce
decree is affirmed, Melvin is ordered to pay Amber’s reasonable
attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal, and the matter is
remanded to the district court for a determination of those fees.

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