In re P.M.

2025 UT App 155

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF P.M.,
A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

O.D.M.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH AND M.M.,
Appellees.

Opinion
No. 20240241-CA
Filed October 23, 2025

Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Aaron Flater
No. 1225905

Emily Adams and Heather Ellison,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown, Deborah A. Wood, and John M.
Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee State of Utah
Martha Pierce, Alisha Giles, and Heath Haacke,
Guardians ad Litem

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 O.D.M. (Father) and M.M. (Mother) are the parents of P.M.
(Child). 1 The juvenile court adjudicated Child dependent as to

1. This is a companion case to and arises out of the same facts
involved in In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154, which also issues today.
(continued…)
In re P.M.

Father when Mother was involuntarily committed and Father was
out of the state and not immediately available to take custody of
Child. Father now seeks reversal of the court’s adjudication order.
For the reasons set forth herein, we agree that the court erred in
adjudicating Child dependent as to him and accordingly reverse.

BACKGROUND 2

¶2 While traveling in Utah with Child, Mother was involved
in an incident at a hotel that led police officers to seek the
involuntary commitment of Mother. Father was not with Mother
at the time of the incident, and Child was taken into protective
custody. The State filed a verified child welfare petition alleging
that Child was abused, neglected, or dependent as to both Father
and Mother. At the shelter hearing after Child’s removal, because
of Mother’s allegations of domestic violence against Father and
because the State had not had an opportunity to look into Father’s
fitness or the safety and appropriateness of placing Child with
Father in Idaho, where the family resided, the juvenile court
ordered that Child remain in protective custody. See Utah Code
§ 80-3-302(2)(c)(i) (requiring the court to “make a specific
finding regarding the fitness of the parent [who wants to assume
custody] . . . and the safety and appropriateness of the
placement”). Approximately seven months after the petition was
filed—during which time Father and Mother had relocated from
Idaho to South Dakota and then to Utah and Utah had become the
proper state to make a final child custody determination—the
court held an adjudication hearing on the petition. At the close of

In that opinion, we resolve Mother’s appeal. Here, we resolve
Father’s appeal.

2. A more fulsome description of the facts and procedural history
can be found in Mother’s appeal. See In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154,
¶¶ 3–24. Here, we detail only the facts critical to the issue raised
in Father’s appeal.

20240241-CA 2 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

the hearing, Father requested that the court enter “no findings”
against him.

¶3 Following an oral ruling from the bench, the juvenile court
entered an adjudication order finding Child dependent as to both
Father and Mother. Shortly thereafter, Father filed a motion
pursuant to rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
to clarify or amend the adjudication order. Father asserted that the
order did not clearly “state the reason for court jurisdiction over”
Child, and that the court’s factual findings were not sufficiently
detailed to allow for meaningful appellate review because “many
of the salient facts ha[d] been left out,” thus making it “difficult
for an outsider to determine what facts the court relied upon in
reaching its decision that [Child] was dependent as to the
parents.”

¶4 The juvenile court granted Father’s rule 59 motion and
issued an amended adjudication order in June 2024. The court
made several factual findings addressing the credibility of the
witnesses who had testified during the adjudication hearing,
including both parents and a caseworker from the Division of
Child and Family Services (DCFS). As concerning Father, the
court found that he “was evasive, not credible, and self-serving in
his testimony.” Consequently, unless Father’s testimony was
“corroborated by other information or evidence in the case,” the
court “essentially disregard[ed] the majority of” it. The court
likewise found that there were issues with Mother’s credibility. In
contrast, the court found that the caseworker was a “very
credible” witness who testified “without bias or interest in the
outcome of the case.”

¶5 Notwithstanding its credibility concerns, the juvenile court
found that “certain statements” made by Mother regarding
Father’s alleged abusive behavior were “significant”; however,
the court made no findings addressing the accuracy or correctness
of Mother’s statements. And although the court acknowledged
that Father told the caseworker during their initial conversation
that Mother “was not well, that she was crazy, that she was doing

20240241-CA 3 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

rituals, that she had a disgusting apartment, and that she was
neglecting [Child],” the court did not address whether Father’s
accusations were supported or believable. Moreover, despite
finding that the caseworker was a credible witness, the court
seemingly ignored her testimony that Father later reported to her
that before he left for Texas “it was a good situation, that there
wasn’t really much concern.”

¶6 The juvenile court made multiple findings regarding the
incident that led to Child’s removal. The court found that there
were “deficiencies in the law enforcement investigation” at the
hotel and that it was therefore difficult “to ascertain what exactly
happened.” Despite these issues, the court found that it was “not
difficult . . . to believe the officers’ testimonies that [Mother] was
behaving very erratically and engaging in some activities and
behaviors that were potentially dangerous to [Child]—
specifically, holding [Child] around the neck when they tried to
remove [Child] from her.” The court also noted that “[t]here were
concerns about [Child] in the parents’ care long before what
happened at the hotel,” but it did not further elaborate on what
those concerns were or who had raised them.

¶7 The juvenile court found that “[d]ue to her mental health
episode and involuntary commitment, [Mother] was unable to
provide proper parental care for [Child].” And the court made the
following finding about Father’s whereabouts at the time of
Child’s removal:

At the time that [Mother] was involuntarily
committed to the mental health facility, [Father] was
not in the state and was thus unavailable to take care
of [Child]. [Child] was removed on the late
night/early morning of June 10, 2023 and DCFS did
not hear from [Father] until June 15, 2023—five days
after [Child’s] removal when he spoke to the
caseworker by phone from out-of-state. [Father]
was not in the State of Utah at the time of [Child’s]

20240241-CA 4 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

removal—or five days thereafter—and could not
take custody of [Child].

The court made no findings regarding when DCFS had attempted
to contact Father about Child’s removal or whether Father had
any information regarding how to contact DCFS during the
period of time between Child’s removal and Father’s first call with
the caseworker.

¶8 Lastly, the juvenile court found that Father’s statement to
the caseworker regarding his concerns about Mother’s mental
state and alleged neglect of Child was “especially concerning” in
light of the fact that Father “knowingly left [Child] alone with
Mother” in Idaho while he traveled to Texas “despite having these
concerns regarding [Mother’s] ability to care for [Child].”

¶9 Based on the foregoing findings, the juvenile court
concluded that Child was dependent as to both Father and
Mother. Several months later, on October 23, 2024, Child was
returned to Father and Mother’s custody, and the court’s
jurisdiction was terminated.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10 Father argues the juvenile court erred in adjudicating Child
dependent as to him because the court’s factual findings do not
support such a conclusion. 3 “We review a juvenile court’s legal
conclusions for correctness; however, we grant the juvenile court

3. Although this appeal is technically moot because Child has
been returned to Father and Mother’s custody and the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction has been terminated, we agree with the parties
that this case satisfies the collateral consequences exception to the
mootness doctrine. See In re M.S., 2023 UT App 74, ¶¶ 31–40, 533
P.3d 859. We accordingly address the merits of the appeal.

20240241-CA 5 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

a measure of discretion when applying the law to a specific fact
scenario.” In re L.M., 2001 UT App 314, ¶ 12, 37 P.3d 1188. 4

ANALYSIS

¶11 Under Utah law, a “[d]ependent child” is defined as “a
child who is without proper care through no fault of the child’s
parent, guardian, or custodian.” Utah Code § 80-1-102(21). This
definition “contains two parts: (1) the child in question must be
without proper care, and (2) that status must have arisen through
no fault of the parent.” In re B.D., 2024 UT App 104, ¶ 40, 556 P.3d
86 (quotation simplified). Here, Father contends the juvenile court
improperly concluded that Child was a “dependent child” as to
Father because the court’s factual findings do not show that Child
was “without proper care” from Father.

¶12 Although the phrase “without proper care” is not
statutorily defined, this court recently addressed the meaning of
that phrase in In re B.D., 2024 UT App 104, 556 P.3d 86. There, we
determined that “reasonableness concepts” are “naturally
incorporate[d]” into the dependency framework. Id. ¶ 43
(quotation simplified). Thus, “proper care” in the dependency
context means “the level of care and attention that [a] child
reasonably needs under the circumstances.” Id. And “a child is
‘without proper care,’ and therefore ‘dependent,’ where that child
has no parent or guardian at all or where the child’s parent or
guardian—through no fault of their own—is unable to provide
the level of care and attention that the child reasonably needs

4. In addition, Father has adopted Mother’s arguments
concerning the delayed adjudication hearing and the alleged
resulting due process violations. See In re P.M., 2025 UT App 154,
¶¶ 27–37. But given our determination that the juvenile court
erred in adjudicating Child dependent as to Father, we need not
address these additional claims.

20240241-CA 6 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

under the circumstances.” 5 Id. ¶ 44. Following this court’s recent
precedent, we agree with Father that based upon the unique
circumstances that required Child to be taken into protective
custody here, the juvenile court’s findings fail to establish that
Child was “without proper care” from Father.

¶13 As an initial matter, the juvenile court did not find that
Child had “no parent or guardian at all.” Id. And on the facts of
this case, such a finding would have been impossible given that
Child still has both parents.

5. The State argues in passing that the statutory definition of
dependency “is clear as written and does not require any . . .
judicial interpretation.” We are mindful of the recent reminder
from our supreme court that appellate courts should not
“normally interpret [a] statute in light of its supposed purpose
when the plain text tells us how the Legislature intended the
statute to operate.” Scott v. Benson, 2023 UT 4, ¶ 43 n.13, 529 P.3d
319; id. (“[W]here the statutory language is plain, we have no need
to start poking around the statute’s purposes in hopes of finding
a gloss to put on the text.”). But as discussed in In re B.D., the
statutory phrase “‘without proper care’ comes unaccompanied by
further statutory definition . . . [and] is vague and conducive to a
variety of reasonable interpretations.” 2024 UT App 104, ¶ 42, 556
P.3d 86 (quotation simplified). Accordingly, incorporating
notions of reasonableness in the dependency context, as we have
done in the neglect context, makes sense. See id. ¶ 43. Moreover,
“[i]t is undeniably the case that one panel of this court is bound to
follow the previous decisions of another panel of this court, unless
we make a specific decision to overrule or disavow the earlier
precedent.” In re adoption of B.N.A., 2018 UT App 224, ¶ 22, 438
P.3d 10; accord State v. Legg, 2018 UT 12, ¶ 9, 417 P.3d 592. Because
no party has specifically asked us to overturn In re B.D., we
decline to do so at this time. We thus adhere to the definition of
“dependent” as articulated in that case. See In re B.D., 2024 UT
App 104, ¶ 44.

20240241-CA 7 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

¶14 And none of the juvenile court’s findings show that Father
was “unable to provide the level of care and attention that [Child]
reasonably needs under the circumstances.” Id. While the bulk of
the court’s findings address the incident at the hotel and Mother’s
behavior and ability to care for Child at the time she was
involuntarily committed, the findings are silent as to Father
because he was not present at the time of the incident. Indeed, the
only finding specifically addressing Father’s ability to provide
care to Child merely states that Father “was not in the State of
Utah at the time of [Child’s] removal or five days thereafter and
could not take custody of [Child].” But this finding does not show
that Father was unable to provide Child the care and attention she
reasonably needed under the circumstances.

¶15 The relevant question when evaluating dependency is
“whether the parent stands ready, willing, and able to provide the
necessary care.” Id. ¶ 47. Here, given that there was no
determination that Mother was unable to care for Child before
Father left for Texas or that Mother was at risk for involuntary
commitment, there is no dispute that the events giving rise to
Child’s emergency removal were unforeseeable. In light of this
fact, it would be unreasonable to conclude that where Father was
unaware of Child’s need for care, and where Child’s needs had
otherwise been met, Father’s temporary absence alone supported
a determination that Father was unable to provide Child the care
she reasonably needed. Where a child is removed under
unforeseen and emergency circumstances, that child reasonably
needs a parent who can take custody in a reasonable amount of
time and provide reasonable care. And a parent’s lack of knowledge
regarding a child’s need in such circumstance cannot necessarily
be construed as an inability to provide care. Thus, a child is not
“without proper care” in an unforeseen and emergency
circumstance unless a parent who is informed of the child’s need
is unable to provide reasonable care for the child in a timely way.

¶16 Here, the juvenile court’s findings are inadequate
regarding both (1) whether Father was aware of the need
occasioned by Mother’s involuntary commitment and (2) whether

20240241-CA 8 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

Father could have provided reasonable care in a timely way if he
had been informed. The court found that DCFS “did not hear
from” Father until five days after Child’s removal. But the court
made no findings about when the State informed Father that it
had custody of Child and whether Father had any information
about how to contact DCFS. And the court made no findings
concerning Father’s ability to care for Child had he been informed.

¶17 Lastly, none of the juvenile court’s other findings that
mention Father establish that he was unable to care for Child.
Although the court found that Father’s statement to the
caseworker that Mother “was not well, that she was crazy, that
she was doing rituals, that she had a disgusting apartment, and
that she was neglecting [Child]” was “especially concerning” in
light of the fact that he “knowingly left [Child] alone with
Mother” to attend to business in Texas, this finding does not
support a dependency adjudication because those facts have
nothing to do with Father’s ability to care for Child when Mother
later became involuntarily committed. 6 And while the court
found that Mother had raised allegations of domestic abuse by
Father and that there “were concerns about [Child] in the parents’

6. Nor does the finding that Father’s statements about Mother’s
conduct and mental health prior to leaving for Texas were
“especially concerning” support—by itself—a determination that
Father neglected Child by leaving her with Mother while he
traveled to Texas. Neglect, like dependency, includes a finding
that a child lacks care; the two differ only on the issue of parental
culpability. Dependency occurs when a child “is without proper
care through no fault of the child’s parent,” Utah Code § 80-1-
102(21), whereas neglect occurs when the lack of parental care is
“by reason of the fault or habits of the parent,” id. § 80-1-
102(58)(a)(ii). Troubling as Father’s statements may have been,
without a finding either that Mother was actually neglecting Child
or that Child was actually dependent as to Mother before Father
decided to leave Child with Mother and travel to Texas, the
finding that Father’s statements were “especially concerning”
does not alone support a neglect finding as to Father.

20240241-CA 9 2025 UT App 155
In re P.M.

care long before what happened at the hotel,” the court made no
factual findings related to these claims. This is particularly
significant in light of the fact that Mother voiced her allegations
amid a mental health episode that led to her being involuntarily
committed, and the fact that prior to Child’s removal, neither of
the parents had been involved in any Utah court system. Thus, it
is unclear who raised the “concerns” cited by the court, or even
precisely what those “concerns” entailed.

¶18 In sum, the juvenile court’s findings are inadequate to
support a determination that Child was “without proper care”
from Father. Although the court correctly found that Father was
unable to take immediate custody of Child at the time of her
removal because he was not in the state, the court wholly failed to
address whether Father, upon being notified about Child’s
removal, was unable to take custody of Child in a reasonable time
and care for her properly. Given this deficiency, the court erred in
adjudicating Child dependent as to Father.

CONCLUSION

¶19 Because the juvenile court’s findings do not support a
determination that Child was without proper care from Father,
the court erred in adjudicating Child dependent as to Father. We
therefore reverse Father’s dependency adjudication.

20240241-CA 10 2025 UT App 155