Marri v. Rizwan

2025 UT App 137

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MIR MARRI,
Appellant,
v.
RABIA RIZWAN,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20230034-CA
Filed September 18, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robert P. Faust
No. 214902843

Russell Yauney, Attorney for Appellant
Emily Adams and Sara Pfrommer,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE JOHN D. LUTHY authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and AMY J. OLIVER
concurred.

LUTHY, Judge:

¶1 Rabia Rizwan agreed to enter into an arranged marriage
with Mir Marri. Marri later filed for divorce, and Rizwan
counterclaimed for annulment on the grounds of common law
fraud. The trial court held a bench trial and issued an annulment.
It found that Marri had (1) misrepresented that he was legally
divorced from his first wife, that he had no children from that
marriage, and that he held a master’s degree and (2) withheld
information that should have been disclosed—namely, his sexual
attraction to men, which Rizwan alleged prevented the couple
from having a healthy sexual relationship. The court determined
that the misrepresentations and the withheld information directly
Marri v. Rizwan

affected the marriage relationship and that without them Rizwan
would not have agreed to marry Marri.

¶2 Marri appeals, contending that the court acted improperly
in admitting certain evidence, granting the annulment, denying
Marri’s motion for a new trial, and calculating Marri’s child
support arrears. We find none of these arguments persuasive, and
we affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

The Marriage

¶3 Rizwan is a Pakistani American and a practicing Muslim.
Prior to the events of this case, she had been married once and
was divorced, and she had a son from that marriage. She was
interested in remarrying, and because of the difficulties in her
culture associated with marrying after divorce, she sought
assistance from her brother (Brother), with whom she lived, and
a marriage broker.

¶4 The broker sent Rizwan and Brother a profile of Marri, a
Pakistani Muslim man. Rizwan spoke with Marri and his mother
through the video and text messaging app WhatsApp. Marri
represented that he held both a bachelor’s degree and a master’s
degree that he had obtained while living in the United Kingdom
with his first wife. Marri claimed he was employed as a branch
manager for a bank, and both he and his mother represented that
he owned his home in Pakistan. Marri claimed to have no children
from his previous marriage. And he indicated that he was legally

1. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view and recite the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings; we present
additional evidence only as necessary to understand the issues on
appeal.” Bountiful City v. Sisch, 2023 UT App 141, n.1, 540 P.3d
1164 (cleaned up).

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Marri v. Rizwan

divorced from his first wife. Ultimately, Marri provided an offer
of marriage to Rizwan.

¶5 While Rizwan and Brother considered Marri’s offer, they
also considered a marriage offer from another Pakistani Muslim
man. This man was very educated and had a “good job.” Given
Marri’s purported similar qualities in terms of education and
financial stability, Rizwan and Brother decided to proceed with
the match with Marri because the other man had a child from a
previous relationship and was older than Marri.

¶6 Rizwan accepted Marri’s marriage proposal, and she
traveled to Pakistan to be married in November 2017. Marri
continued living in Pakistan after the marriage, and Rizwan
returned to the United States. Rizwan later visited Marri in
Pakistan during the spring of 2018, and after returning to the
United States, she gave birth to the couple’s daughter in February
2019. Marri remained in Pakistan awaiting approval of a visa to
enter the United States.

¶7 In November 2019, Marri received his visa, and he came to
the United States the following month and moved into Brother’s
home with Rizwan, the couple’s daughter, Rizwan’s son, and
Brother. In March 2020, Marri was criminally charged in
connection with a domestic violence incident against Rizwan.
After ongoing difficulties, the parties separated in March 2021.

The Initiation of Divorce and Annulment Proceedings

¶8 In May 2021, Marri filed for divorce, and Rizwan filed a
counterclaim for annulment. In her counterclaim, Rizwan alleged
that Marri had failed to disclose or had misrepresented various
facts, including that he is sexually attracted to men; that he did
not intend to engage in a “healthy, regular and routine sexual and
physical relationship” with Rizwan; that he had a child from his
previous marriage; that he “physically abused and emotionally
maltreated his first wife”; that he did not intend to support

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Marri v. Rizwan

Rizwan financially or in other ways; and that he did not love
Rizwan, as he claimed, but married her only to receive a green
card. Rizwan also stated that Marri “misrepresented the facts
about his . . . prior marriage [and] divorce.” Rizwan asserted that
she relied on Marri’s false representations to her detriment and
that these issues went to the “fundamental elements” of marriage,
thereby providing grounds for annulling the couple’s marriage.

¶9 The case proceeded to a two-day bench trial, during which
the court heard testimony from Rizwan, Brother, Marri’s first
wife, an expert on immigration fraud (Expert), and Marri.

Rizwan’s Testimony

¶10 Rizwan testified that she spoke to Marri and his mother on
WhatsApp twice before going to Pakistan to be married. She said
that Marri told her he had a master’s degree from a university in
the United Kingdom. She also said that he sent her a copy of a
diploma through WhatsApp before the wedding and showed her
the same diploma when she arrived in Pakistan. The diploma,
which was not genuine (Marri admitted at trial that he had no
master’s degree), was admitted into evidence. Rizwan testified
that if she had known Marri was providing false information
about his education, she would not have married him. Rizwan
also stated that Marri’s representation that he was employed as a
bank branch manager was false.

¶11 Rizwan testified that she provided Marri a copy of her
divorce certificate prior to their marriage and that she asked many
times for a copy of Marri’s divorce certificate but that he said he
did not have a copy.

¶12 Rizwan also testified that she learned in March 2021 that
Marri had a child with his first wife. Prior to that time, he had
never told Rizwan about the child. Rizwan said she would not
have married Marri if she had known about his previous child,

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Marri v. Rizwan

explaining that in choosing to remarry, one of her conditions was
that her spouse not already have children.

¶13 She testified that approximately twenty times while Marri
lived with her, she saw pornography on Marri’s phone or
computer depicting sexual interactions between men. Rizwan
introduced an exhibit consisting of a list of websites and login
credentials, which she claimed to have found in Marri’s room
when visiting Pakistan in 2018. 2 She did not investigate the sites
until after Marri filed for divorce, but at that time she discovered
that the list pertained to websites geared toward same-sex
relationships. Rizwan also testified that Marri had the Grindr app
on his phone and that she later discovered that this is a gay dating
app. 3 Rizwan never saw Marri engage in sexual relations with
men, but she once saw a man lying on Marri’s lap at Brother’s
home.

¶14 Rizwan believed Marri’s attraction to men prevented him
from having a healthy sexual relationship with her. She reported
that Marri demanded his own bedroom and showed her no
physical affection, even calling her a “sexaholic” for putting her
arms around him. She claimed the couple had sexual intercourse
only three times during the marriage.

Brother’s Testimony

¶15 Brother corroborated Rizwan’s testimony that, prior to the
marriage, Marri represented that he had studied in the United

2. Marri takes issue with the characterization of the list as
containing multiple websites, arguing that there was only one
URL on the list. The list is not in the appellate record, so we cannot
address this concern.

3. Grindr describes itself as “the world’s largest network for gay,
bi, trans, and queer adults.” About, Grindr, https://grindr.com
/about [https://perma.cc/RDL9-UUDF].

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Marri v. Rizwan

Kingdom and obtained both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree.
Brother agreed that Marri had claimed to be financially stable and
to own property in Pakistan, which he said he would sell when he
moved to the United States so he could buy a home here. Brother
stated that Marri’s purported educational and financial status
were the chief reasons that he and Rizwan decided to accept
Marri’s marriage offer.

¶16 Brother testified that, as described above, see supra ¶ 5,
Rizwan had received a marriage offer from another Pakistani
Muslim man but that, despite that man being well-educated and
favorably employed, they did not accept his offer because he had
a child and was “a little bit older.” Brother agreed with Rizwan
that Marri represented that he had no previous children. Brother
testified that when Marri was asked why he did not have children
from his previous marriage, he repeatedly stated that his first wife
had been a model and did not want to “destroy her figure” by
having children. Brother explained that Marri’s lack of children
was an important consideration because it would make the
transition easier for Rizwan’s son from her previous marriage.
Brother said that Marri avowed before the marriage that he would
take care of Rizwan’s son, provide for him financially, and raise
him as if he were Marri’s own. But Brother testified that when
Marri eventually moved into Brother’s house, Marri repeatedly
grabbed the son by the neck, pinched him on his wrist, and pulled
on his ears.

Marri’s First Wife’s Testimony

¶17 When Rizwan’s counsel called Marri’s first wife to testify,
Marri’s counsel objected that she had not been timely disclosed as
a witness. The court reserved ruling on that issue.

¶18 Marri’s first wife testified that Marri was the father of their
daughter. She testified that she married Marri in 2008 and that the
pair separated in 2012 but did not then divorce. She indicated that,
thereafter, the pair obtained only a religious divorce. The court

20230034-CA 6 2025 UT App 137
Marri v. Rizwan

asked about a divorce certificate issued in January 2018, and she
stated that she never received notice of a divorce from Marri.

¶19 Further, she testified that while she lived with Marri, she
witnessed him acknowledge to his mother that he was gay. She
said that she observed him accessing gay pornography on his
computer and that she saw him watching gay pornography
movies ten to twelve times. She also stated that he had an account
on a website called Manjam. 4

Expert’s Testimony

¶20 Rizwan called Expert, an expert on immigration and
marriage fraud. Marri objected as to Expert’s qualifications,
arguing that his experience with federal investigations of
immigration and marriage fraud did not qualify him in this case
because he was unfamiliar with Utah law. The court determined
that Expert was qualified and allowed him to testify. Expert then
testified that after reviewing the documents and facts provided to
him, it was his opinion that Marri had “engaged in marriage fraud
in order to obtain permanent residen[t] status in the United
States.”

¶21 Expert was particularly suspicious of the divorce certificate
Marri provided from his first marriage. The certificate stated that
the effective date of the divorce was January 2017, but the issuance
date was January 2018. Expert pointed out that the document did
not exist in November 2017, when Marri and Rizwan married.
Expert stated, “So at the time [Rizwan] and [Marri] got married,
there was no divorce.” Expert also noted that the document
contained the word “Talaq” and that his research suggested that

4. “Manjam was a social networking website that used GPS
technology and social discovery to connect mutually attracted gay
and bisexual men. . . . The site was active from 2004 to 2016, when
it shut down.” Manjam.com, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Manjam.com [https://perma.cc/78BQ-FHE4].

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Marri v. Rizwan

this word related to “a religious divorce under Sharia Law” rather
than to a legal divorce. Further, Expert indicated that the
document’s lack of mention of the couple’s daughter and its lack
of a Hague Convention Apostille made it suspicious.

¶22 Expert highlighted other facts upon which he based his
opinion that Marri’s agreement to marry Rizwan was a pretext,
including that Marri waited to move to the United States until
after a deadline had passed that would have required the couple
to prove “that the marriage [was] viable” and that the parties had
“established a life together”; that Marri failed to include his
daughter from his first marriage on his immigration paperwork;
and that Marri listed his status as single on his first United States
tax return, not as married filing separately.

Marri’s Testimony

¶23 Marri also testified. He agreed that the marriage was
arranged, though he asserted that Rizwan did not list any specific
requirements for a spouse. He contended that he and Rizwan
communicated daily on WhatsApp for several months before the
wedding.

¶24 He declared that he had not claimed to have a master’s
degree and that he did not recognize the fake diploma or know its
origins.

¶25 Marri asserted that he had told Rizwan about his daughter
from his first marriage before he and Rizwan married. He said he
had explained to her that he had not had contact with his
daughter for roughly a decade because his first wife and her
family prevented him from contacting her and replaced him as
her father with an uncle, telling her that her father had died. Marri
explained that he had not had contact with his first wife since
2014, but he said she could have contacted him if she had wanted
to because they had relatives who were connected. He stated that
he did not report his daughter on his immigration paperwork

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Marri v. Rizwan

because he had no documents for the child and Rizwan did not
want the hassle of taking care of someone else’s child. When
shown a text message Rizwan sent him after they married in
which she asked if he had any other children besides their
daughter, Marri acknowledged that he had, at that time, denied
having other children.

¶26 Marri disagreed that he and Rizwan had only had sex three
times, insisting that they had sex multiple times per week. He
claimed that he slept in a separate room only because Rizwan’s
son, who shared her room, did not want him in the room. Marri
denied ever watching gay pornography in Utah. He testified that
he was unfamiliar with the websites on the list Rizwan had
purportedly found. And he said he did not know how she
obtained the list.

¶27 The court asked about Marri’s income for purposes of child
support and potential alimony, and Marri’s counsel proffered that
Marri earned $26.52 per hour and was scheduled to work thirty-
six hours per week. The court asked if Marri would object to
imputing his income based on a forty-hour work week, and
counsel replied, “I certainly hope that the same courtesy be shown
him, but I will agree, Your Honor.” The court responded, “Well,
absolutely. They’re [both] entitled to [the principle that] you have
to have a full-time job.”

The Court’s Order

¶28 After the trial, the court issued a written order granting
Rizwan’s counterclaim for an annulment. In addressing Rizwan’s
request for an annulment, the court first reviewed the legal
standard set forth in Haacke v. Glenn, 814 P.2d 1157, 1158–59 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), for using fraud as a basis for annulment.

¶29 The court then noted Expert’s opinion that Marri married
Rizwan “to obtain an immigration benefit,” and it stated that it
found credible “[t]he basis and reasoning provided by [Expert].”

20230034-CA 9 2025 UT App 137
Marri v. Rizwan

The court stated, however, that it ultimately “[did] not make a
determination on this issue.”

¶30 The court found that Marri obtained a religious divorce
from his first wife but that the divorce certificate Marri ultimately
provided was created after his marriage to Rizwan. The court
further stated, “There is evidence [Marri] is still married to his
first wife, never having obtained a legal divorce at the time he
married [Rizwan].”

¶31 The court then made the following findings:

In [weighing] the testimony and credibility of the
parties and the witnesses called, the [c]ourt finds
[Marri’s] testimony not as creditable when
compared to the other witnesses. In addition,
several times the evidence had shown [Marri’s]
testimony was not believable, in particular [Marri’s]
education and having a Master’s degree in business
administration at a college in the United Kingdom
and providing of education certificates; not
disclosing about having a child from his first
marriage; about watching gay pornography during
the marriage and frequenting websites of the similar
nature. After their marriage, [Rizwan] found some
evidence by way of gay pornographic websites and
[Marri’s] viewing of homosexual movies.

¶32 Based on these findings, the court granted Rizwan an
annulment “on the grounds of fraud that directly affected their
marriage relationship, based upon facts at that time which were
affirmative false representations and based upon facts that were
withheld and should have been disclosed.” The court determined
that “[t]hese false representations and facts which were withheld
were to such a degree that if [Rizwan] had known she would have
not consented to and entered into the marriage.”

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Marri v. Rizwan

¶33 The court also ordered Marri to pay child support, and it
determined that he already owed Rizwan child support from
April 2021 (the first full month of the parties’ separation) through
December 2022 (the month in which the trial concluded). For both
the ongoing and retroactive child support, the court imposed a
rate of $542 per month, which was based on a gross monthly
income for Marri of $4,596.80, calculated by multiplying Marri’s
wage of $26.52 per hour by forty hours per week. The court used
a twenty-hour work week for calculating Rizwan’s income,
explaining that it was “not going to impute income to [Rizwan]
for a full-time (40) hour work week [because] the parties’ minor
child is not school age and day care expenses would offset the
additional income.” The court subtracted the amount of child
support Marri had voluntarily given Rizwan over the indicated
months, finding that Marri still owed Rizwan $5,839.

Marri’s Post-trial Motion

¶34 After the court entered its order, Marri filed a Motion for
Supplemental Findings or, In the Alternative, a New Trial. As to
the request for supplemental findings, Marri argued that the
court’s order contained no findings addressing the nine elements
of fraud and that it was not clear from the court’s order what
standard of proof the court had applied. Marri based his request
for a new trial on, among other things, an assertion of surprise—
namely, that Rizwan’s evidence that Marri was not legally
divorced from his first wife when he married Rizwan constituted
a new claim that Rizwan had not previously raised.

¶35 The court denied Marri’s motion. It reviewed the potential
grounds for a new trial under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and concluded that none of them applied. Regarding
the adequacy of its findings, the court then stated:

As mentioned in the hearing, the court did not want
[Marri] to be deported from the country and be
deprived of his parental right to be with his child or

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Marri v. Rizwan

[Rizwan to] not receive child support because
[Marri] was not in the country. The [c]ourt did not
and does not want its ruling to have any influence
or impact upon or be determinative on any possible
future immigration issues or be utilized in other
legal proceedings, and therefore the [c]ourt was as
minimal as possible with its ruling and intentionally
did not state the standard [of proof] is clear and
convincing [evidence], despite both counsel and the
[c]ourt knowing that was the standard as was
discussed at trial. The [c]ourt does not see how it
helps [Marri] [meet] the above objectives to have
every single thing determined by the [c]ourt against
him listed and detailed in an opinion.
Respectfully[,] [the] [c]ourt denies the Motion under
Rule 59 and declines the invitation to supplement
findings.

¶36 Marri now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶37 On appeal, Marri raises a number of issues for our review. 5
First, he contends that the trial court improperly granted the
annulment. We review the court’s annulment order for
correctness with respect to its interpretation of the law, for clear
error with respect to its factual findings, and for abuse of
discretion with respect to its application of statutory requirements
to factual findings. See RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, ¶ 22, 96
P.3d 935 (“We review the trial court’s conclusions of law . . . for

5. In his opening brief, Marri identifies five issues for review, but
he advances eight points in the argument section of the brief. We
address Marri’s arguments using the organizational framework
employed by Rizwan in her brief, sometimes covering more than
one of Marri’s eight points of argument under a single issue.

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Marri v. Rizwan

correctness, according the trial court no particular deference.”
(cleaned up)); id. (“We will not reverse the findings of fact of a
trial court sitting without a jury unless they are clearly
erroneous.” (cleaned up)); Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 63, 379
P.3d 890 (“A challenge that involves a review of the trial court’s
application of statutory requirements to factual findings is a
mixed question of law and fact. . . . The trial court’s application of
the statute to those findings will not be reversed absent an abuse
of discretion.” (cleaned up)).

¶38 Second, Marri asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing Expert and Marri’s first wife to testify and
in admitting the fake master’s degree diploma and the list of
websites geared toward same-sex relationships along with the
associated login credentials. “We review for correctness any legal
questions underlying the admissibility of evidence, but we review
for abuse of discretion any decisions to admit or exclude evidence
and determinations regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony.” Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Sorf, 2023 UT App 146,
¶ 28, 542 P.3d 87 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 550 P.3d 992 (Utah
2024).

¶39 Third, Marri argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial on the basis of
surprise. “[B]oth the granting of, and the refusing to grant, a new
trial is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that
decision will be reversed only if the judge has abused that
discretion by acting unreasonably.” Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988).

¶40 Fourth, Marri contends that the trial court inaccurately
calculated the retroactive child support award. “Because district
courts have broad discretion to award child support, we will not
disturb such decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” Burggraaf v.
Burggraaf, 2019 UT App 195, ¶ 24, 455 P.3d 1071 (cleaned up).

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Marri v. Rizwan

ANALYSIS

I. The Annulment

¶41 Marri first argues that the trial court erred in granting an
annulment. He takes issue with both the adequacy of the court’s
findings and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting those
findings. He also contends that, in any event, the fraud found by
the trial court was not of a kind that supported the granting of an
annulment. We address each of his contentions in turn.

A. Adequacy of the Findings

¶42 “Under Utah law, there is a distinction between a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence, which asserts that there was
insufficient evidentiary support for a particular factual finding,
and a challenge to the adequacy of the court’s findings, which
asserts that the court’s findings did not adequately explain the
basis for the court’s rulings.” Mortensen v. Mortensen, 2025 UT App
8, ¶ 34, 564 P.3d 508 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 570 P.3d 659 (Utah
2025).

¶43 Marri challenges the adequacy of the trial court’s findings,
but he fails to provide any meaningful analysis to support his
challenge. He acknowledges that “unstated findings can be
implied if it is reasonable to assume that the trial court actually
considered the controverted evidence and necessarily made a
finding to resolve the controversy.” Fish v. Fish, 2016 UT App 125,
¶ 22, 379 P.3d 882 (cleaned up). And he observes that, in contrast,
missing findings will not be implied “where there is a matrix of
possible factual findings and we cannot ascertain the trial court’s
actual findings.” Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025–26 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (cleaned up). He then simply asserts, without analysis,
that “[t]he court failed to make findings regarding each of the nine
elements of fraud.” Marri’s challenge to the adequacy of the
court’s findings is inadequately briefed. See U.S.A. United Staffing
All., LLC v. Workers’ Comp. Fund, 2009 UT App 160, ¶ 14, 213 P.3d

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Marri v. Rizwan

20 (“A brief is inadequate if it merely contains bald citations to
authority without development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority.” (cleaned up)). Therefore, we
need not address it. See Li-Huang Pon v. Brewer, 2020 UT App 99,
¶ 5 n.1, 468 P.3d 581 (declining to address an inadequately briefed
issue).

¶44 Nevertheless, we note that this case does not involve a
matrix of possible factual findings from which the trial court’s
actual findings cannot be ascertained. Instead, because the court
granted an annulment expressly based on common law fraud, we
can readily ascertain that it found that each element of fraud had
been met. Additionally, the court made explicit findings
regarding the specific misrepresentations and the withheld
information that formed the basis of Marri’s fraud. And in its
ruling on Marri’s post-trial motion, the court explained that it
intentionally made the contents of its written order “as minimal
as possible” so as to limit the potential impact of its ruling on
Marri’s immigration status and said that there were unstated
findings “determined by the [c]ourt against” Marri that could
have otherwise been “listed and detailed.” This comment further
supports our determination that the court found that each
element of fraud was satisfied.

¶45 For the foregoing reasons, we reject Marri’s contention that
the trial court’s findings were inadequate.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶46 We next consider Marri’s argument that there was
insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings that Marri
made affirmative misrepresentations and withheld facts that
should have been disclosed.

¶47 Fraud forming the basis for an annulment “may consist of
an affirmative false representation or the withholding of the truth
when it should be disclosed.” Haacke v. Glenn, 814 P.2d 1157, 1158

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Marri v. Rizwan

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (cleaned up). Here, the trial court found that
Marri had made misrepresentations and withheld material
information. It pointed to Marri’s misrepresentation about being
divorced from his first wife at the time he married Rizwan, his
failure to disclose his sexual attraction to men, his
misrepresentation about having no previous children, and his
misrepresentation about his level of education. Marri disputes
that there was sufficient evidence for the court to make these
findings. 6

¶48 In the tort context, fraud must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT
14, ¶¶ 19, 27, 70 P.3d 35. Here, the trial court determined that
fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence in the
annulment context as well. The parties do not challenge that
determination, and we therefore assume that the clear and
convincing burden of proof applies. 7

¶49 “Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate
standard of proof that implies something more than the usual
requirement of a preponderance of the evidence[] and something
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Put differently, this
standard requires the existence of facts that make a conclusion
very highly probable.” In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22, 525 P.3d

6. Marri raises concerns about other purported facts as well, but
we limit our discussion to the findings that support the court’s
determination that Marri committed fraud.

7. While the issue has not been addressed by Utah’s appellate
courts, the apparently universal consensus among jurisdictions
that have addressed the issue is that a party seeking an annulment
for fraud must prove the fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Dolecka, 489 P.3d 724, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2021); Irving v. Irving, 134 P.3d 718, 720 (Nev. 2006); Nwankwo v.
Uzodinma, 185 N.E.3d 513, 519 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022).

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Marri v. Rizwan

519 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 731 (Utah 2023). “An
appellate court will reverse a trial court’s decision that clear and
convincing evidence was presented only if that decision is clearly
erroneous.” Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, ¶ 18, 186 P.3d 978.
“To qualify as clearly erroneous, a trial court’s findings must be
either against the clear weight of the evidence or must induce a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
(cleaned up).

¶50 While Marri presented evidence—primarily his own
testimony—contrary to the court’s findings, the court specifically
determined that Marri’s testimony was “not as creditable when
compared to the other witnesses.” And on the issue of witness
credibility, “we may not substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court as trial courts are in a better position to weigh
conflicting evidence and evaluate the credibility of witness
testimony.” Id. ¶ 19; see also Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233,
¶ 20 n.5, 217 P.3d 733 (“No matter what contrary facts might have
been found from all the evidence, our deference to the trial court’s
pre-eminent role as fact-finder requires us to take the findings of
fact as our starting point, unless particular findings have been
shown . . . to lack legally adequate evidentiary support.”). Thus,
Marri’s pointing to evidence that may have supported contrary
findings does not render the court’s actual findings clearly
erroneous.

¶51 Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to support the
court’s fraud findings. Specifically, there was sufficient evidence
that Marri represented he was legally divorced from his first wife
but was not actually so when he married Rizwan. Brother testified
that Marri said before he married Rizwan that he was legally
divorced from his first wife. Rizwan also testified that Marri
claimed to be divorced. Expert testified, however, that he found
the divorce certificate from Marri’s first marriage highly
suspicious. Expert noted the document’s issuance date of January
2018, which was after Marri and Rizwan’s marriage. Although the

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Marri v. Rizwan

document stated that the effective date of the divorce was January
2017, Expert opined that “at the time [Rizwan] and [Marri] got
married, there was no divorce.” Expert also noted that the
document contained the word “Talaq” and that his research
suggested that this word related to “a religious divorce under
Sharia Law” rather than to a legal divorce. Further, Expert
indicated that the document’s lack of mention of the couple’s
daughter and its lack of a Hague Convention Apostille made the
document suspicious. Accordingly, the court had sufficient
evidence to find that Marri was not legally divorced at the time he
married Rizwan. 8

¶52 There was also ample evidence that Marri is sexually
attracted to men and that he did not disclose this fact to Rizwan
before their marriage. Rizwan testified that approximately twenty
times while Marri lived with her, she saw pornography depicting
sexual interactions between men on Marri’s phone or computer.
She testified that she found a list of websites geared toward same-
sex relationships along with associated login credentials in
Marri’s room when visiting Pakistan in 2018 and that Marri had
the Grindr app on his phone. Furthermore, she stated that she
once saw a man lying on Marri’s lap at Brother’s home. Rizwan’s
testimony makes the fact that Marri is sexually attracted to men
“very highly probable.” See In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22
(cleaned up). Moreover, that Rizwan found the list of websites
and login credentials mere months after she married Marri

8. In addition to the evidence listed, Marri’s first wife testified that
after she and Marri separated, they did not obtain a legal divorce.
But even without the testimony of Marri’s first wife, Expert’s,
Rizwan’s, and Brother’s testimony provided sufficient evidence
for the court to find that Marri affirmatively misrepresented the
status of his first marriage. And in light of our analysis regarding
the admissibility of Marri’s first wife’s testimony, see infra ¶¶ 101‒
05, we do not rely on this evidence in our assessment of the
sufficiency of the evidence on this point.

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Marri v. Rizwan

supports the finding that Marri was sexually attracted to men
when he married Rizwan and failed to tell her so. 9

¶53 Additionally, there was sufficient evidence that Marri lied
about having no previous children. Brother testified that Marri
claimed he had no previous children and explained the lack of
children by asserting that his first wife had been a model and did
not want to “destroy her figure” by having children. Rizwan
testified that she learned in March 2021 that Marri had a child
with his first wife. Prior to that time, he had never told Rizwan
about the child. Marri did not deny at trial that he was the child’s
father, so the combined testimony of Rizwan and Brother meet the
clear and convincing standard that Marri made an affirmative
misrepresentation before marriage by claiming not to have a
child.

9. Marri’s first wife provided testimony on this point as well. But
again, the court had sufficient evidence to support its finding—
this time of Marri’s sexual attraction to men at the time of his
marriage to Rizwan—without relying on Marri’s first wife’s
testimony. Marri has not argued that viewing gay pornography,
accessing websites geared toward same-sex relationships, and
using Grindr are inconsistent with being sexually attracted to
men. Instead, he has disputed only the strength of the evidence
on this issue, particularly as against Marri’s testimony that he did
not view gay pornography in Utah. Because the court found Marri
less credible than Rizwan on this point, specifically crediting
Rizwan’s testimony about Marri’s use of gay pornography and
websites, Rizwan’s testimony alone on this subject satisfies the
clear and convincing standard that Marri was sexually attracted
to men and did not disclose this fact to Rizwan. And again, in light
of our analysis regarding the admissibility of Marri’s first wife’s
testimony, see infra ¶¶ 101‒05, we do not include her testimony in
our analysis here.

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Marri v. Rizwan

¶54 Finally, there was sufficient evidence that Marri also
misrepresented his level of education prior to the marriage.
Rizwan testified that Marri told her he had a master’s degree from
a university in the United Kingdom. She said that before the
wedding he used WhatsApp to send her a copy of a diploma
evidencing his receipt of a master’s degree and that he showed
her the same diploma when she came to Pakistan. Brother
likewise testified that, prior to the marriage, Marri represented he
had studied in the United Kingdom and obtained both a
bachelor’s and a master’s degree. Marri then admitted at trial that
he did not have a master’s degree. The combined testimony of
Rizwan, Brother, and Marri satisfies the standard of clear and
convincing evidence on this point.

¶55 In sum, the trial court’s findings as to Marri’s
misrepresentations and failure to disclose were supported by
clear and convincing evidence.

C. Whether Annulment was Proper Based on Marri’s Fraud

¶56 We next consider Marri’s contention that the court erred in
concluding that Marri’s fraud justified an annulment.

¶57 In Utah, a court may annul a marriage if, at the time of the
marriage, either (1) the marriage is statutorily prohibited or void
or (2) “upon grounds existing at common law.” Utah Code § 81-
4-302. 10 “Under common law, a marriage could be annulled for a
fraud going to the essence of the marriage.” Haacke v. Glenn, 814
P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

10. This provision was renumbered and amended in 2024. At the
time of Rizwan and Marri’s marriage, it was codified as Utah
Code section 30-1-17.1 (2017). Because the provision has not
materially changed, we cite the current version of the code.

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¶58 This court has addressed a marriage annulment based on
common law fraud only once, in Haacke. 11 There, an attorney who
worked for the Inspector General’s Division of the Utah
Department of Corrections married a man who intentionally
concealed that he had been convicted of a second-degree felony in
another state. Id. at 1157. The attorney’s employer discovered the
conviction and informed the attorney that her employment would
be terminated based on the conflict of interest created by her
marriage to a convicted felon. Id. at 1157–58. The attorney filed for
an annulment, but the district court awarded a divorce instead. Id.
at 1158. On appeal, we considered whether there existed common
law grounds for an annulment based on fraud. Id.

¶59 We stated that fraud permitting annulment “must be such
that directly affects the marriage relationship.” Id. (citing Bing Gee
v. Chan Lai Yung Gee, 202 P.2d 360, 364 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949)).
We explained that “[t]he misrepresentation must go to present
and not future facts.” Id. (citing Wolfe v. Wolfe, 378 N.E.2d 1181,
1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)). We also said that “the fraud must be
material to such a degree that, had the deceived party known of
the fraud, he or she would not have consented to the marriage.”
Id. (citing Avnery v. Avnery, 375 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (App. Div.
1975)). “The test in all cases,” we concluded, “is whether the false
representations or concealment were such as to defeat the
essential purpose of the injured spouse inherent in the contracting
of a marriage.” Id. (quoting Douglass v. Douglass, 307 P.2d 674, 675
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)).

¶60 We also explained that the standard for assessing fraud is
a subjective one that takes into account “the facts of the particular

11. The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the annulment of a
marriage based on common law fraud twice. See Holder v. Holder,
340 P.2d 761 (Utah 1959); Bement v. Bement, 174 P.2d 996 (Utah
1946). But the opinions in those cases do not assist our resolution
of the issues in this case.

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Marri v. Rizwan

marriage.” Id. And we said that in a particular case, “justice may
demand that an annulment be granted even though there is no
[other] case with the same set of specific facts” and even though
“the grounds pleaded for annulment could also constitute
grounds for divorce.” Id. at 1159.

¶61 We then considered the facts of Haacke. We reasoned that
“[n]ot only did [the man’s] fraudulent misrepresentation affect
[the attorney’s] career, but, more importantly, it defeated the
essential purpose of the injured spouse inherent in the contracting
of a marriage,” which was “to have a home, a husband of
honorable character whom she could respect and trust, one whom
she would be proud to have as a companion and to introduce to
her friends, and who would be a suitable father for her children.”
Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, we determined that the man’s “false
representations and concealments . . . so violated the essential
purpose of the marriage, that [the attorney was] entitled to an
annulment.” Id.

¶62 Here, the trial court similarly determined that Marri’s
misrepresentations and withheld information “directly affected
[Rizwan and Marri’s] marriage relationship” and that “[t]hese
false representations and facts which were withheld were to such
a degree that if [Rizwan] had known she would not have
consented to enter into the marriage.” In conducting this analysis,
the court applied the correct legal standard—as set forth in
Haacke—by conducting a subjective assessment of whether
Rizwan would have agreed to marry Marri had he not made false
representations and withheld the truth. We conclude that the trial
court did not err in its conclusion.

¶63 Rizwan expressed that finding a spouse was difficult given
her situation as a Muslim Pakistani American woman who had
been previously divorced, so she sought assistance from a
marriage broker. Through this channel, she received a marriage
offer from Marri. Both Marri and Rizwan considered the marriage

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Marri v. Rizwan

to be arranged, and Rizwan testified that she spoke to Marri only
twice before traveling to Pakistan to marry him. Given these
unique circumstances, we place significant weight on the criteria
Rizwan and Brother used in determining that Marri was an
acceptable match for Rizwan and on the representations
regarding those criteria that Marri made before the marriage.

¶64 Prior to the marriage, Marri represented that he held a
master’s degree, which he had obtained while living in the United
Kingdom; that he was employed as a bank branch manager; and
that he owned his home in Pakistan. He further claimed that he
was legally divorced from his first wife and that he had no
children from that marriage. This was the limited information
Rizwan and Brother received from Marri to determine whether
Marri was an appropriate match. Much of this information was
false, and Marri’s sexual attraction to men was undisclosed.
Marri’s argument that his misrepresentations and identified
omission would not have impacted Rizwan’s decision to marry
him simply falls flat. There is no reason to believe that Rizwan
would have accepted Marri’s proposal if he had truthfully
disclosed that he was still married to his first wife and that he had
less education and resulting financial stability than Rizwan was
seeking, a child for whom he provided no care or support, and
sexual inclinations that would result in his refusal to regularly
engage in sexual intercourse with Rizwan. In sum, the trial court
did not err in concluding that Marri’s actions defeated Rizwan’s
essential purpose in contracting to marry, which was to enter a
relationship with a Pakistani Muslim man who would be a
trustworthy and engaged husband and father and would be able
to provide financial security for Rizwan and her son. See Haacke v.
Glenn, 814 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

¶65 In resisting this conclusion, Marri contends that none of the
topics about which he made misrepresentations or withheld
information are sufficient to establish fraud that directly affected

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Marri v. Rizwan

the parties’ marriage relationship. We consider each such topic in
turn.

1. Sexual Inclinations

¶66 Marri argues that withholding information regarding one’s
sexual orientation is not sufficient grounds for annulment. In
support, he cites Woy v. Woy, 737 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987),
wherein a husband sought annulment after discovering that his
wife used illicit drugs and “engaged in lesbian affairs which she
concealed from [him].” Id. at 771. The court determined that this
situation did not constitute grounds for annulment, reasoning:

[The husband] testified that he had heterosexual
relations with [the wife] for a ten year period, about
five of which had to be before the marriage took
place. Clearly the marriage was consummated and
cohabitation took place up to the time the parties
separated . . . . Thus, the fact that [the wife] used
drugs and engaged in lesbian activities had nothing
to do with consummation of the marriage or with
the essential part thereof of sexual intercourse. [The
husband] testified that he thought they were fine
sexually. . . . Since the parties had engaged in normal
sexual relations both prior to and subsequent to the
marriage, there would exist no basis for [the wife] to
believe that her lesbian activities would go to the
very basic essential of normal and usual sexual
intercourse, there was not cast upon her an
affirmative duty to disclose to [the husband] her
relations with other women.

Id. at 773–74. Marri argues that “this reasoning defeats [Rizwan’s]
request for annulment on the grounds of sexuality, regardless of
the truthfulness of the claim.” Marri’s argument is unavailing.

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Marri v. Rizwan

¶67 First, Woy is not binding on this court, and Marri has
provided no Utah case with similar reasoning. Thus, we need not
follow the rationale in Woy, and we are disinclined to do so.
Moreover, even if Woy applied, the facts before us are readily
distinguishable from those in Woy. Here, Rizwan testified that she
and Marri had sex only three times over the course of their
marriage and that Marri showed her no physical affection, even
calling her a “sexaholic” for putting her arms around him. These
facts contrast sharply with the facts in Woy, where the couple
engaged in regular sexual interactions for ten years and the
husband “thought they were fine sexually.” Id. at 773. Unlike the
wife in Woy, whose lesbian activities, the court found, did not
affect “the very basic essential of normal and usual sexual
intercourse” between the couple, Rizwan testified that she
believed Marri’s sexual inclinations to be the reason their sexual
relationship was not “normal and usual.” See id. at 773–74. So even
if Woy applied, it would not apply in Marri’s favor.

¶68 This case is much more like S.K. v. F.K., 2010 N.Y. Slip Op.
50461(U), 2010 WL 979701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). There, the court
granted an annulment after a Muslim American woman married
a Pakistani man whom she later saw kissing another man. Id.
paras. 19, 32. The woman testified that the husband never kissed
her during the marriage. Id. para. 20. Additionally, the court
found that the husband failed to disclose multiple previous
marriages and engagements and made affirmative
misrepresentations on various other subjects, including his
income, employment, living situation, and religious practices and
beliefs. Id. para. 30. The court found that “[v]irtually nothing
about the [husband] was true” and that his “intentional lies [were]
of such a nature that the only viable remedy [was] to void the
contract because clearly had the [wife] known [the truth,] she
would never have married him.” Id. These facts are similar to
those before us for at least two reasons. First, the woman’s
testimony that her husband never kissed her is akin to Rizwan’s
testimony that Marri never showed her physical affection and

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Marri v. Rizwan

engaged in sexual relations with her only three times during the
course of the marriage. Both cases involve a situation where,
unlike in Woy, one spouse’s undisclosed sexual inclinations
impacted the sexual component of the marriage relationship.
Second, here, as in S.K., one spouse’s undisclosed sexual
inclination was just one of several misrepresentations and
withheld truths on which the court based its annulment decision.
Indeed, the S.K. court determined that “[v]irtually nothing about
the [husband] was true,” id., and the same is largely true of Marri.

¶69 We do not decide that undisclosed sexual inclinations, by
themselves, necessarily qualify a marriage to be annulled based
on fraud. But we do determine that Marri’s undisclosed sexual
inclinations were relevant to the fraud inquiry and that
annulment was justified when those undisclosed inclinations are
coupled with the affirmative misrepresentations Marri made on
other topics and the lack of a healthy sexual relationship between
the parties.

2. Previous Children

¶70 Marri also argues that his misrepresentation about having
no previous children is not a sufficient basis for a finding of fraud
that directly affected the parties’ marriage relationship. He asserts
that this misrepresentation falls short because the other marriage
candidate Rizwan and Brother considered also had a child and
because Brother’s reasoning on this point was that it would be
difficult for Rizwan’s son to adjust to another child but Marri’s
child from his prior marriage was not a part of his life. Marri’s
argument suffers from two infirmities.

¶71 First, Marri fails to acknowledge Brother’s testimony that
Rizwan did not accept the proposal from the other prospective
match chiefly because that man had a child, demonstrating the
importance Rizwan placed on her second husband not having
children. And Brother’s testimony was corroborated by Rizwan’s

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Marri v. Rizwan

own insistence that one of her conditions for remarriage was that
her new spouse not already have children.

¶72 Second, the fact that Marri’s child from his first marriage
never lived with Rizwan and Marri does not render Marri’s
misrepresentation harmless. Although Brother explained that he
thought the transition would be easier for Rizwan’s son if
Rizwan’s second husband did not already have children, this was
not the limit of Rizwan’s concern. For Rizwan, care and support
for her son and any future children was part of the essential
purpose of the marriage, and the fact that Marri already had a
child he was not providing for went to the heart of that concern.
Surely Rizwan would have felt differently about Marri’s potential
as a provider and father had Marri truthfully informed her that he
had not seen or supported his daughter in some ten years.

3. Lack of Legal Divorce

¶73 Marri does not contend that a misrepresentation regarding
still being married to a former spouse at the time of a subsequent
marriage is not a sufficient basis for a finding of fraud that directly
affects the marriage relationship. Instead, he asserts that the
court’s finding that Marri was still married at the time of his
wedding to Rizwan is unsupported by the evidence. However, as
reviewed above, see supra ¶ 51, there was evidence on which the
court could base its findings regarding Marri’s previous marriage
and divorce. Thus, the court properly considered this
misrepresentation in its fraud inquiry.

4. Educational Status

¶74 Marri argues that misrepresentations regarding his
education and financial situation are also not sufficient grounds
for a finding of fraud that directly affected the parties’ marriage
relationship. He again cites nonbinding authority, which states,
“It is a general rule that false representation as to character, health,
wealth and external conditions do not constitute such fraud as

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Marri v. Rizwan

will annul a marriage contract. In order to be such a fraud it must
affect the marital relation in its essential parts.” Stepp v. Stepp, No.
03CA0052‒M, 2004 WL 626116, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004)
(cleaned up).

¶75 As noted above, however, because the present case deals
with an arranged marriage where the parties each made the
decision to marry based on limited information and little direct
interaction, we place particular weight on the criteria Rizwan and
Brother used in determining that Marri was an acceptable match
and on Marri’s prenuptial representations related to those criteria.
Brother testified that educational level and financial status were
key considerations. And Rizwan testified that she would not have
married Marri if she knew he had lied about his education.

¶76 Still, we need not decide whether Marri’s
misrepresentations regarding his holding a master’s degree and
his level of financial security were, in themselves, sufficient
grounds for a finding of fraud that directly affected the marriage
relationship. Because Marri also misrepresented that he was
legally divorced and did not have a child, and because he failed
to disclose his sexual inclinations that prevented him from having
a healthy sexual relationship with Rizwan, Marri’s
misrepresentations as to his education and wealth simply
complete the picture of Marri’s multi-fronted deception.

¶77 In sum, most of the little information about Marri that
Rizwan received before proceeding with the arranged marriage
turned out to be false. Under these circumstances, Marri’s
affirmative misrepresentations and withheld information were
“material to such a degree that, had the deceived party known of
the fraud, . . . she would not have consented to the marriage.”
Haacke v. Glenn, 814 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus,
the court did not err in determining that Marri’s fraud directly
affected the marriage relationship and that annulment was
therefore appropriate.

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Marri v. Rizwan

II. The Court’s Evidentiary Decisions

¶78 Marri next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in some of its evidentiary decisions. Specifically, he
asserts that the court erred in (1) allowing Expert to testify,
(2) allowing Marri’s first wife to testify, (3) admitting the fake
master’s degree diploma, and (4) admitting the list of websites
geared toward same-sex relationships and the associated login
credentials. We address each of these evidentiary decisions in
turn.

A. Expert

¶79 Marri asserts that the trial court improperly permitted
Expert to testify. He contends that Rizwan did not timely or
sufficiently disclose Expert; that Expert’s report was incomplete;
that Expert was not qualified to provide various opinions,
including “an opinion as to the validity of Mr. Marri’s first
divorce”; and that Expert’s opinion was not based on sufficient
data to be reliable. We disagree with each of these contentions.

1. Timeliness and Sufficiency of the Disclosure

¶80 First, Marri argues that Expert was not timely or
sufficiently disclosed. Under rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, “[t]he party who bears the burden of proof on the issue
for which expert testimony is offered must serve on the other
parties the information required . . . within 14 days after the close
of fact discovery.” Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(C)(i). “If a party fails to
disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to
discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness,
document, or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.” Id.
R. 26(d)(4).

¶81 On June 8, 2022, Rizwan filed a motion indicating her
desire to use Expert “to testify regarding the fraud” of using the

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Marri v. Rizwan

parties’ marriage to “attempt to . . . gain US citizenship.” In this
motion, she reviewed the history of the shifting fact discovery
deadline in this case, noting that fact discovery initially ended on
January 18, 2022, but that Marri served additional discovery
requests on March 23, 2022, and that at a subsequent pretrial
hearing the commissioner sua sponte extended fact discovery to
May 20, 2022. Then on June 6, 2022, Marri filed a notice indicating
his intent to depose Rizwan. Based on these facts, Rizwan asked
the court to permit Expert to testify at trial, asserting that doing so
would be fair in light of the extension of fact discovery and
Marri’s late notice of Rizwan’s deposition.

¶82 The commissioner held a hearing on these issues on June
21, 2022. The minutes for that hearing state that the commissioner
recommended a determination that Rizwan’s motion be deemed
timely. The minutes also indicate that the deposition of Rizwan
would proceed without objection. In its subsequent written order
based on the commissioner’s recommendation, the court did not
indicate whether Rizwan’s motion was timely, but it granted
Rizwan’s motion.

¶83 We decline to disturb the court’s ruling. We first note that
Marri, who bears the burden of persuasion on appeal, has not
provided us with a transcript of the June 21, 2022 hearing. “A
party bringing a claim of error before this court has the duty and
responsibility to support such allegation by an adequate record.”
State v. Case, 2020 UT App 81, ¶ 19, 467 P.3d 893 (cleaned up).
“When an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on
appeal, this court presumes the regularity of the proceedings
below. And when crucial matters are not included in the record
on appeal, the missing portions are presumed to support the
action of the trial court.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶84 At the hearing, the commissioner may have determined
that Rizwan’s June 8, 2022 request to use Expert was timely
because Marri’s unopposed notice of intent to depose Rizwan

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Marri v. Rizwan

effectively extended fact discovery through the date of Rizwan’s
eventual deposition (which ended up being July 26, 2022), and,
thus, also extended the expert disclosure deadline fourteen days
beyond that. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(C)(i); De La Cruz v.
Ekstrom, 2024 UT App 18, ¶ 15, 545 P.3d 285 (“Timeliness is
determined under the facts and circumstances of each particular
case, and in the sound discretion of the court.” (cleaned up)).
Alternatively, the commissioner might have determined that
Rizwan’s failure to disclose Expert earlier was harmless or
supported by good cause. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4).

¶85 Because Marri has not provided the transcript of the June
21, 2022 hearing and there are plausible analytical bases on which
the commissioner could have properly relied in recommending
that Marri’s request to use Expert be deemed timely, we presume
the regularity of the proceedings through which the court
overruled Marri’s timeliness objection. 12

12. Marri argues that Rizwan misled the court in obtaining its
permission to use Expert. He points to Rizwan’s statement in her
motion that Expert would be able to provide a written report
within a reasonable time before trial. From this statement, Marri
draws an assumption that Rizwan intended to mislead the court
because by the time she filed her motion, Expert’s report already
existed. The fact that Rizwan apparently had Expert’s report
before she filed her motion requesting permission to use Expert
may have been relevant to whether Rizwan had good cause for
not disclosing Expert earlier. However, as explained above, there
were grounds besides good cause on which the court could have
based its decision to grant Rizwan’s motion to permit Expert to
testify. And Rizwan did not need to specify in her motion or in
her subsequent disclosure whether Expert had already prepared
a report. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(A). We therefore see no
reason for reversal based on Rizwan’s purportedly misleading
statement.

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Marri v. Rizwan

¶86 We also reject Marri’s argument that Rizwan’s disclosure
was insufficient. On the day the commissioner held the hearing
on Rizwan’s motion, Rizwan provided a notice of intent to use
Expert at trial. In that notice, Rizwan stated that Expert would
“testify that in light of the facts in the case, [Marri] married
[Rizwan] as a pretext to enter the United States by fraud.” Marri
argues that there was no indication in the notice “that there would
be any testimony opining that his first divorce was not finalized
at the time of the parties’ marriage.”

¶87 However, as explained in more detail below, see infra ¶ 114,
Marri misrepresents Expert’s testimony on this point as being
offered in support of an independent basis for annulment—
namely, that the marriage was prohibited or void because Marri
was still married. In reality, Expert testified that the status of
Marri’s first divorce was one of many red flags that contributed to
his overall opinion that Marri’s marriage to Rizwan was
pretextual. While it is true that Expert described the divorce
certificate as the most concerning of the facts of the case, Expert’s
testimony regarding Marri’s divorce was a subsidiary point to his
disclosed opinion that Marri entered the marriage on pretext. We
therefore see no abuse of discretion in the court permitting Expert
to testify based on Rizwan’s disclosure.

2. Disclosure and Completeness of Expert’s Report

¶88 Marri contends that Rizwan refused to provide him with a
copy of Expert’s report. But under rule 26, Marri should have
served Rizwan notice within fourteen days of Rizwan’s disclosure
that he was electing either (1) to depose Expert or (2) to receive a
written report from Expert. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(C)(i). If no
such election is served, “then no further discovery of the expert
must be permitted.” Id. Rizwan’s counsel emailed Marri’s counsel
multiple times referring to this election. One email dated July 28,
2022—after the fourteen-day election period had passed—
contains a statement from Rizwan’s counsel to Marri’s counsel

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Marri v. Rizwan

that Marri had missed the deadline. Marri has not provided
evidence to the contrary. Therefore, under rule 26, Rizwan was
not required to provide Expert’s report to Marri.

¶89 Marri also asserts that Expert’s report was incomplete. At
trial, Marri argued that Expert’s report should be stricken because
Expert received new information and failed to update his report.
We cannot reach this issue, however, because the report is not
included in the record on appeal. See State v. Case, 2020 UT App
81, ¶ 19, 467 P.3d 893 (“A party bringing a claim of error before
this court has the duty and responsibility to support such
allegation by an adequate record.” (cleaned up)).

3. Expert’s Qualification to Opine on Various Topics

¶90 Marri next contends that Expert “was not qualified to
provide an opinion on the issues at trial.” Marri asserts that Expert
was qualified only “to testify as to the date that Mr. Marri could
have lawfully entered the country,” not any other topics,
including Marri’s intent in entering the marriage and the validity
of Marri’s divorce from his first wife.

¶91 Under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, “a witness
who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702(a). “The trial
court has discretion to determine the admissibility of expert
testimony, and to determine if the witness is qualified to give an
opinion on a particular matter.” Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). The trial court’s discretion on these points
is wide, “and we will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the
limits of reasonability.” Wakefield v. Gutzman, 2024 UT App 76,
¶ 38, 552 P.3d 206 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 558 P.3d 85 (Utah
2024).

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Marri v. Rizwan

¶92 At trial, Expert testified that he worked as a federal
immigration officer for twenty-seven years with a specialty in
investigating marriage fraud. He said that in that capacity he was
appropriately certified and had investigated more than 500 cases.
He indicated that he is now retired but stays current with
developments in immigration law through continuing education
and by tracking changes in the relevant rules and regulations,
reading relevant cases as they are released, and taking other steps
to stay up to date with trends in immigration fraud. The court
noted that Expert’s knowledge of fraud applies to federal laws
rather than the laws of Utah, but it found him to be an expert and
qualified him as such “within the field of his expertise.”

¶93 We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling or in the
court’s allowance of Expert to provide his opinion as to whether
Marri entered the marriage as a pretext. Indeed, Expert’s
extensive career in immigration fraud, with a specialty in
marriage fraud, qualified him to opine on precisely that subject.
That Expert was not qualified to opine about Utah law was
irrelevant—Expert was qualified to opine about what the
documents and facts given to him suggested about Marri’s
motives for marrying Rizwan and whether the facts were
consistent with an intent to commit fraud.

¶94 Marri takes particular issue with Expert’s testimony
related to the divorce certificate from Marri’s first marriage. But it
is well within the purview of an expert on immigration and
marriage fraud to opine on the validity and import of a purported
divorce certificate. Expert testified that various facets of the
certificate made it suspicious—including its date, the inclusion of
the word “Talaq,” its lack of mention of the couple’s daughter,
and its lack of a Hague Convention Apostille. This testimony fell
within the scope of Expert’s expertise in immigration and
marriage fraud.

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Marri v. Rizwan

4. Whether Expert’s Opinion Was Reliable

¶95 Marri’s final contention regarding Expert is that Expert’s
opinion was not based on sufficient data to be reliable and was
therefore inadmissible under rule 702(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

¶96 Rule 702(b) provides:

Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
may serve as the basis for expert testimony only if
there is a threshold showing that the principles or
methods that are underlying in the testimony . . . are
reliable, . . . are based upon sufficient facts or data,
and have been reliably applied to the facts.

This showing “is satisfied if the underlying principles or methods,
including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their
application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the
relevant expert community.” Id. R. 702(c).

¶97 Marri asserts that Expert failed to satisfy this requirement
because he never interviewed Marri and limited his investigation
to “asking [Rizwan] to fill out a questionnaire and send him
documents she considered relevant.” But Marri did not preserve
this argument.

¶98 At trial, Marri objected to Expert, but he did not object on
these grounds. Marri characterized his objection as being on the
grounds that Expert “was not an expert,” that Expert was “not
timely disclosed,” and that Expert did not “update [his] report.” 13
Marri did not object based on reliability when Expert explained

13. Marri contends again on appeal that Expert fell short because
he did not update his report after receiving additional evidence.
As discussed above, see supra ¶ 89, we cannot evaluate claims
related to Expert’s report because the report is not in the record.

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Marri v. Rizwan

that he had reviewed the facts and documents given to him by
Rizwan, without speaking to Marri.14

¶99 Before the court determined that Expert was qualified to
testify about immigration fraud and marriage fraud, Marri’s
counsel interrupted Rizwan’s counsel’s questioning of Expert
about his “protocol in terms of how [he] would approach
marriage fraud.” After Expert referred to two federal court cases
to explain that the proper protocol was to “look at the conduct of
the parties prior to and after entering into the marriage to
determine [their] subjective intent,” Marri’s counsel argued that
this information was not relevant because a “federal statute
doesn’t help us understand intent.”

¶100 In other words, Marri’s objection below was not that
Expert’s methods were not generally accepted by the relevant
expert community; instead, his objection was that Expert had
experience and expertise with federal law rather than Utah law.
That objection is not properly characterized as falling under rule
702(b); instead, it falls under rule 702(a). In essence, Marri argued
that Expert should not be permitted to testify because his
specialized knowledge, which did not include familiarity with
Utah law, would not “help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702(a). And
the rule 702(b) issue Marri raises now was not preserved by his
rule 702(a) objection below. Because the rule 702(b) issue is

14. Expert testified that “in an investigation to determine marriage
fraud, it’s not necessary, nor is it required,” to interview the
immigrant. Marri has provided no evidence contradicting this or
showing that the decision not to interview the immigrant is not
accepted in the community of immigration and marriage fraud
investigators. Thus, even were we to reach the merits of this issue,
we likely would not disturb the trial court’s discretionary implicit
determination that Expert satisfied the threshold requirements of
rule 702(b).

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Marri v. Rizwan

unpreserved, we do not address it. See, e.g., State v. Schwenke, 2009
UT App 345, ¶ 10, 222 P.3d 768 (“An appellate court will not
address the merits of an argument that has not been preserved
absent either plain error or exceptional circumstances.” (cleaned
up)). 15

B. Marri’s First Wife

¶101 Marri asserts that the trial court improperly permitted his
first wife to testify as well. Even if the court improperly allowed
Marri’s first wife to testify, however, we will not reverse the
court’s decision “unless there is a reasonable likelihood that the
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” Capozzoli v.
Madden, 2024 UT App 176, ¶ 33, 561 P.3d 727 (cleaned up); see also
Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (“On appeal, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating
an error was prejudicial—that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” (cleaned up)).
Without deciding whether the court erred in allowing Marri’s first
wife to testify, we determine that there is no reasonable likelihood
that the admission of his first wife’s testimony affected the
outcome of the proceedings.

¶102 Marri’s complains of his first wife’s testimony regarding
(1) “the sufficiency of [Marri’s] divorce from” her and (2) “her
belief about [his] sexual orientation.” As discussed above, see
supra ¶¶ 51, 51 n.8, we have determined that even without Marri’s
first wife’s testimony, the court had sufficient evidence on which
to base its finding that Marri misrepresented that he was legally
divorced from his first wife when he married Rizwan.
Specifically, Expert testified that he found the document Marri

15. Marri makes a specific argument that Expert was not qualified
to opine about the meaning of “Talaq.” He did not object below—
on any grounds—to Expert’s testimony related to that term.
Hence, this issue is also unpreserved.

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Marri v. Rizwan

represented as the divorce certificate for Marri’s first marriage
highly suspicious, and he opined that Marri and his first wife
were not legally divorced. Expert offered this testimony in
support of his opinion that Marri married Rizwan to obtain an
immigration benefit, and the court determined that the “basis” for
Expert’s opinion in that regard was credible. In light of Expert’s
testimony and the court’s express determination that his
testimony was credible, we are of the view that there is no
reasonable likelihood the court would have made different
findings regarding Marri’s lack of legal divorce from his first wife
if his first wife had not testified.

¶103 Similarly, we have determined that the court had sufficient
evidence related to Marri’s sexual inclinations to reach its findings
on that topic based on Rizwan’s testimony alone. See supra ¶¶ 52,
52 n.9. While Marri’s first wife also testified as to Marri’s sexual
interest in men, Rizwan’s testimony—which the court deemed
credible—established that Marri repeatedly viewed gay
pornography, had login credentials associated with websites
geared toward same-sex relationships, and had the Grindr app,
making the fact that Marri was sexually attracted to men when he
married Rizwan very highly probable.

¶104 Moreover, the court’s reference in its order to the testimony
of Marri’s first wife on this point was limited: “[Marri’s] first wife
from Pakistan testified that [Marri] acknowledged [to her,] while
[they were married,] and [to] family members that he was a
homosexual.” On the other hand, the court referenced multiple
portions of Rizwan’s testimony related to Marri’s sexual interests.
We are therefore not persuaded that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the court would have made different findings
regarding Marri’s sexual interests if his first wife’s testimony had
not been admitted.

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Marri v. Rizwan

¶105 For the foregoing reasons, Marri’s argument for reversal
based on the admission of his first wife’s testimony fails. See
Capozzoli, 2024 UT App 176, ¶ 33; Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 489.

C. The Fake Master’s Degree Diploma

¶106 As discussed above, see supra ¶ 54, we have further
concluded that the court had sufficient evidence before it related
to Marri’s misrepresentation that he held a master’s degree. This
conclusion rests not on the fake diploma itself but on the
testimony of Rizwan, Brother, and Marri. Rizwan testified that
Marri told her he had a master’s degree from a university in the
United Kingdom and that he sent a copy of a diploma indicating
as much through WhatsApp before the wedding and showed her
the same diploma when she came to Pakistan. Marri has not
argued on appeal that Rizwan’s testimony on this point was
improper. Brother likewise testified that, prior to the marriage,
Marri represented that he had studied in the United Kingdom and
obtained both bachelor’s and master’s degrees. Marri then
admitted at trial that he did not have a master’s degree.

¶107 Moreover, the court’s order did not make findings about
the fake diploma itself but, rather, that Marri’s testimony was not
credible on several points, including his claim that he did not
falsely report having a master’s degree or provide educational
certificates. See generally Holt v. Holt, 655 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1982)
(“If the court did not rely on [the improperly admitted] evidence,
the error [in admitting the evidence] was harmless.”).

¶108 For these reasons, any purported error in the admission of
this document was also harmless. See Holt, 655 P.2d at 678;
Capozzoli v. Madden, 2024 UT App 176, ¶ 33, 561 P.3d 727;
Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

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Marri v. Rizwan

D. The List of Websites and Login Credentials

¶109 As to the court’s admission of the list of websites geared
toward same-sex relationships along with the associated login
credentials, Marri failed to preserve the issue for our review. At
trial, Marri initially objected to the list for lack of foundation. This
objection was overruled based on Rizwan’s testimony that she
found the list in Marri’s closet in Pakistan. When Rizwan’s
counsel later moved for the list to be admitted into evidence, the
court asked if there were any objections, and Marri’s counsel
responded, “No objections.”

¶110 Marri acknowledges that he did not preserve at trial the
issue of the list’s admissibility. But he asserts that his pretrial and
post-trial objections preserved the issue for our review. However,
Marri’s counsel’s affirmation at trial that he had no objections to
admission of the list superseded his pretrial objection. Cf. State v.
C.D.L., 2011 UT App 55, ¶ 22, 250 P.3d 69 (holding that where the
trial court “deferred ruling on [an] objection” until trial, “the trial
court’s deferred ruling left it up to . . . trial counsel to reraise [the]
objection at trial in order to preserve that issue for appeal”). And
“an objection that could have been raised at trial cannot be
preserved in a post-trial motion.” State v. Fullerton, 2018 UT 49,
¶ 49 n.15, 428 P.3d 1052.

¶111 Accordingly, Marri did not preserve the issue of the list’s
admissibility for our review, and we decline to address it.

III. The Court’s Denial of Marri’s Motion for a New Trial

¶112 Marri next argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial on the basis of
surprise. Marri contends that Rizwan “never identified that she
was seeking an annulment on the grounds of the insufficiency of
[Marri’s] divorce from his ex-wife” and that Rizwan “alleged for
the first time in the middle of trial that [Marri] was not lawfully

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Marri v. Rizwan

divorced from his first wife under the laws of Pakistan at the time
the parties were married.”

¶113 One possible basis for a trial court to grant a new trial
under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is “accident or
surprise that ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.”
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(3). “Generally, we afford trial judges wide
latitude in granting or denying rule 59 motions . . . because the
trial court, having heard the evidence, typically is in a better
position to determine whether the grant or denial of a rule 59
motion is warranted.” Sanpete Am., LLC v. Willardsen, 2011 UT 48,
¶ 28, 269 P.3d 118 (cleaned up). “A motion for a new trial invokes
the sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate review of its
ruling is quite limited.” ASC Utah, Inc. v Wolf Mountain Resorts,
LC, 2013 UT 24, ¶ 21, 309 P.3d 201 (cleaned up). “We will reverse
a district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial only if there is
no reasonable basis for the decision.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶114 Here, the trial court determined that none of the listed
bases under rule 59—including surprise—applied. The court had
a reasonable basis for denying the motion with respect to surprise.
Marri misconstrues the nature of the evidence related to his
divorce from his first wife as a new claim brought at trial, but
Rizwan affirmed to the trial court that she was seeking an
annulment based on common law fraud. See generally Utah Code
§ 81-4-302(2). This basis for annulment is distinct from the other
permissible basis for annulment, namely, that “the marriage is
[statutorily] prohibited or void.” Id. § 81-4-302(1). Had Rizwan
argued that she was entitled to an annulment because Marri was
still married to his first wife, thereby rendering the marriage to
Rizwan statutorily prohibited as void, this could constitute
surprise in the form of a new claim asserted for the first time at
trial. Instead, Rizwan argued that she was entitled to an
annulment because Marri committed common law fraud, in part
because he misrepresented that he was legally divorced from his
first wife. This is a critical distinction. Marri was on notice that

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Rizwan planned to provide evidence of various
misrepresentations by Marri. And in her amended counterclaim,
Rizwan asserted that Marri misrepresented facts about his
divorce. Thus, it was within the trial court’s broad discretion to
deny Marri’s motion for a new trial on the basis of surprise.

IV. The Child Support Arrears Calculation

¶115 Finally, Marri argues that the court erred in calculating his
child support arrears.

¶116 The court calculated Marri’s income by using the hourly
wage from Marri’s July 2022 paystubs and September 2022
financial declaration, $26.52, and imputing a forty-hour work
week, for a gross monthly income of $4,596.80. The court used this
number to determine child support arrears from April 2021 (when
the parties separated) through December 2022 (the month when
the trial concluded).

¶117 Marri points to various filings to demonstrate that he
earned less than that income during that time: his divorce petition
indicating that at that time he earned $15.30 per hour for forty
hours per week, for a monthly income of $2,652; his financial
declaration from August 2021 indicating that he then earned $23
per hour, for a monthly income of $3,987; his financial declaration
from May 2022 indicating a wage of $25 per hour; his July 2022
paystubs and his September 2022 financial declaration, both of
which were admitted into evidence and used at trial, showing that
while he earned $26.52 per hour, he worked thirty-five to thirty-
six hours per week, making his monthly income less than
$4,596.80. Marri argues that in the face of this evidence, the court
erred by (1) using his July 2022 hourly wage to calculate his
income for periods prior to July 2022 and (2) imputing a forty-
hour work week. We conclude that the court acted within its
discretion in using Marri’s July 2022 hourly wage for the period
from April 2021 through December 2022 and that Marri invited
any error related to the imputation of a forty-hour work week.

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Marri v. Rizwan

¶118 Marri provided no evidence at trial of his income from
April 2021 to December 2022 except his July 2022 paystubs and
his September 2022 financial declaration, which both identified a
wage of $26.52 per hour. While Marri’s earlier pleadings and
disclosures identified other hourly rates for earlier periods, he
failed to provide or to point to those documents at trial. The
court’s use of the evidence of Marri’s hourly wage provided to it
at trial was not an abuse of discretion. See Burggraaf v. Burggraaf,
2019 UT App 195, ¶ 24, 455 P.3d 1071 (“Because district courts
have broad discretion to award child support, we will not disturb
such decisions absent an abuse of discretion.” (cleaned up)); cf.
Clarke v. Clarke, 2023 UT App 160, ¶ 62, 542 P.3d 935 (“If a party
offers into evidence only time-of-trial expense amounts, and does
not provide the court with any evidence of pre-separation
expenses (to the extent they are different), that party has no right
to complain when the court awards the time-of-trial amounts.”).
And because the earlier pleadings and disclosures did not
constitute “newly discovered material evidence that could not,
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at
the trial,” Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(4), the court did not abuse its
discretion when it did not alter its arrears calculation in response
to Marri’s rule 59 motion.

¶119 Finally, Marri invited any error related to the imputation
of a forty-hour work week. “Under the doctrine of invited error,
an error is invited when counsel encourages the trial court to
make an erroneous ruling.” State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ¶ 17, 365
P.3d 699. “A party who leads a court into error cannot later
complain of that error to obtain reversal.” Merriam v. Merriam, 799
P.2d 1172, 1175–76 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

¶120 During trial, the court asked if Marri would object to
calculating his income based on an imputed forty-hour work
week, and counsel replied, “I certainly hope that the same
courtesy be shown him, but I will agree, Your Honor.” In so
saying, Marri invited any error with regard to the imputation of a

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forty-hour work week. That Marri expressed a desire for the court
to impute a forty-hour work week to Rizwan as well and the court
ultimately did not do so does not alter the impact of Marri’s
invited error. Marri’s counsel’s references to “hope” and
“courtesy” indicate that his agreement to the imputation to Marri
of a forty-hour work week was not contingent on the same
imputation to Rizwan. Moreover, when the court later used a
twenty-hour work week in calculating Rizwan’s income—despite
initially suggesting that it would impute a forty-hour work week
to her as well—Marri did not object or withdraw his prior
stipulation. Based on Marri’s stipulation, the court did not abuse
its discretion by imputing a forty-hour work week to Marri at trial
or by not altering that imputation after trial.

¶121 For these reasons, Marri’s claim of error in the calculation
of his child support arrears is not well taken.

CONCLUSION

¶122 We are not persuaded by any of Marri’s claims of trial court
error. We therefore affirm.

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