State v. Garcia

2025 UT App 119

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
RODOLFO GARCIA,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20231072-CA
Filed August 7, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Heather Brereton
No. 211911916

Nathalie S. Skibine, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Natalie M. Edmundson,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Rodolfo Garcia appeals his convictions on six counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of enticing a
minor. First, Garcia argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion for a directed verdict on two of the counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child because there was insufficient
evidence to convict him. Second, Garcia argues the district court
erred when it admitted expert testimony that addressed the
factors that play into delayed reporting of child sexual abuse.
Finally, Garcia asserts it was plain error for the district court to
inform the jury of the offense classifications of the charges against
him. We affirm Garcia’s convictions.
State v. Garcia

BACKGROUND 1

¶2 When Alexis and Mila 2 were in elementary school, their
mother’s (Mother) boyfriend, Garcia, began living with them.
Mother later married Garcia after becoming pregnant with their
son. Eventually, Alexis and Mila began to see Garcia as a father
figure and called him “apa,” “an abbreviation of dad in Spanish.”

The Abuse

¶3 Within a year of moving in with their family, Garcia began
sexually abusing Alexis and Mila. His abuse continued for years.
Even though Alexis and Mila told Mother about some of Garcia’s
conduct, the behavior continued.

¶4 Alexis. Garcia began slapping Alexis’s buttocks around the
time he married Mother. Garcia would smack Alexis’s buttocks
when she would walk past him or any other time he “had a chance
to.” Alexis did not think much of it at first because she was “little,”
and she thought it was just “a weird quirky trait” because his
family said it was “what he always did.” As Alexis got older,
Garcia began making comments when he slapped her buttocks,
such as “It’s getting bigger. Your butt’s getting bigger” or “Your
butt looks good in those jeans.” When Alexis told Garcia to stop,
it would “evolve into a fight” and Garcia would ignore her for
days or weeks. Alexis told Mother about the buttocks slapping,
and Mother’s advice was for Alexis to avoid putting herself in
situations where Garcia could slap her buttocks.

1. On appeal from a jury verdict, “we review the record facts in a
light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts
accordingly, and we present conflicting evidence only as
necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Herrera,
2025 UT App 1, n.2, 563 P.3d 416.

2. Alexis and Mila are pseudonyms.

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State v. Garcia

¶5 When Alexis was in fifth grade, Garcia also started flicking
her breasts over her clothes around twice a week. When he flicked
her breasts, Garcia would make comments, such as “They’re
growing” or “They’re getting bigger.”

¶6 Garcia also touched Alexis’s vagina with his hand under
her clothes on multiple occasions. 3 Garcia first touched her vagina
when she was in third or fourth grade and watching television on
the couch in the living room while Mother was on a trip to Mexico.
The second time occurred when Alexis was in fourth or fifth
grade. Alexis woke up to Garcia entering the bedroom she shared
with Mila. Alexis got up, and Garcia put his hand under her
pajamas and touched her vagina. Garcia continued to enter her
room at night and touch her vagina under her clothes
“sporadic[ally],” “[w]henever . . . he wanted to.”

¶7 Garcia’s conduct “felt wrong” to Alexis, but she did not
know it was wrong until she took a sex education class at school.
Alexis told a friend in middle school about Garcia’s conduct, but
her friend did not believe her. Alexis did not tell Mila about
Garcia’s conduct because it was “very obvious” that Garcia and
Mila were close and she did not know if Mila would believe her.
She did not disclose the abuse to Mother right away because she
did not want to “crush” Mother’s dream of having a family and
her own dream of having a father.

¶8 Mila. Garcia also slapped Mila’s buttocks almost
“everyday” for the “whole time that he was a part of [their]
family.” Garcia repeatedly made sexualized comments when he
slapped Mila’s buttocks, such as “Oh, you’re thick.” He would
also smack her buttocks when she did something good or played

3. Because the details of these allegations of abuse are not
necessary to our determination of the legal issues raised on
appeal, we include only an abbreviated version of the facts
sufficient to provide context to the reader.

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State v. Garcia

well in a soccer game. The buttocks slapping made Mila
uncomfortable, and she told Mother “to try and talk to him to get
it to stop.” After Mother talked to Garcia, he would stop slapping
Mila’s buttocks for a period of time but ultimately would start
doing it again. On one particular occasion, to try to get Garcia to
stop slapping her buttocks, Mila put a metal bracelet in her right
back pocket. When Garcia slapped Mila’s buttocks, he felt the
bracelet and asked her “[w]hy [she had] that in there.”

¶9 Garcia also sent Mila several inappropriate text messages
that made her feel “very uncomfortable.” When she was eleven
years old, Garcia sent her a text that said, “Goodbye my heaven. I
hope you dream with the little angels. You’ll tell me tomorrow
how I look naked,” which Mila took to mean that if she saw Garcia
in her dreams, he would be naked, and she should tell him he
looked good. Mila told Mother about the text message, but
nothing changed. Two years later, Mila received texts from Garcia
that said, “Hey, don’t be mean. When you’re touching your little
parts don’t moan so much. You just make me horny,” and, “[N]ext
time, invite me so that we can at least finish at the same time.”
Mila also told Mother about these texts and asked her to do
something, but again nothing changed.

The Reporting

¶10 When Alexis was fourteen, she began skipping school. Her
school called Mother, who was upset and anticipated a negative
reaction from Garcia once she told him Alexis had been skipping
class. Alexis explained that she skipped class because she was
stressed about school and “stressed about having to go home and
fix things with [Garcia],” and she did not even “want to look at
him.” When Mother asked why Alexis did not want to look at
Garcia, Alexis told her that Garcia “touched [her] multiple times.”

¶11 Mother then picked up Mila from school “in case [Garcia]
did something to her as well,” and immediately reported the
alleged touching to police. Both Alexis and Mila gave statements

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State v. Garcia

to the police, and a detective (Detective) interviewed both girls at
the Children’s Justice Center.

¶12 Detective also interviewed Garcia. Garcia denied touching
Alexis’s vagina, but he admitted slapping Alexis and Mila on the
buttocks, even though Mother thought it was inappropriate.
Garcia stated he loved his stepdaughters, saw them as his own
daughters, and did not feel the buttocks slapping was
inappropriate because “it was just like slapping his son on the
butt” or like what he did with his sport teammates. When asked
about the text messages he sent to Mila, Garcia said he intended
to “scare” her into talking to Mother about masturbation. Garcia
was later charged with six counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, all first-degree felonies, and one count of enticing a minor,
a second-degree felony.

The Pretrial Proceedings

¶13 Prior to trial, the State gave notice that it intended to call an
expert witness (Expert) to testify about forensic interviewing,
memory and reactions of child abuse victims, disclosures of child
abuse victims, and close relationships between alleged victims
and abusers. Expert would testify as a “blind expert,” meaning he
had not met Alexis or Mila and did not know anything about the
facts of the case. Garcia’s trial counsel (Counsel) 4 moved to
exclude Expert, arguing that Expert’s testimony was not
necessary to assist the trier of fact under rule 702 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence and was substantially more prejudicial than
probative under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

¶14 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court
ruled that Expert’s testimony would be admissible with
limitations. The district court found Expert was qualified as an

4. Although two attorneys represented Garcia at trial, we need not
differentiate among them on appeal. Thus, we refer to them
collectively as “Counsel” throughout this opinion.

20231072-CA 5 2025 UT App 119
State v. Garcia

expert and that although many people are aware of delayed
disclosure, the court did not know for certain that members of this
jury would be aware of it. The district court therefore thought it
could be helpful for the jurors to hear Expert’s testimony to
“understand they need to judge the credibility of this child based
on this child and not based on expectations of how they believe a
survivor of child sex abuse . . . should act.” But the district court
limited Expert’s testimony to the reasons for delayed disclosure
and prohibited Expert from testifying about either how common
delayed disclosure is or a “profile” of a child who has been
abused.

The Trial

¶15 The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial. After the jury
was sworn in, the court read the information to the jury. When the
court read the information, it also read the offense classification
for each of the charges against Garcia. Neither party objected.

¶16 The State called several witnesses in its case in chief,
including Alexis, Mila, Expert, Mother, and Detective. Alexis and
Mila testified about the abuse as described above, and Detective
testified about her interviews with Alexis and Mila after they
reported the abuse and her interview with Garcia.

¶17 Expert testified about physiological responses to trauma,
how trauma affects memory, and factors impacting disclosure of
abuse. Expert testified that the factors that can play into whether
a child discloses sexual abuse include age, whether the child
thinks “he or she will be believed,” whether the alleged abuser
has threatened the child, the number of times the abuse happened,
and how close the child is to the person who allegedly abused
them. The State also asked Expert whether child victims ever
continue to have “contact with [the] alleged abuser even after the
abuse occurred” and about “factors” connected to such continued
contact. Counsel objected, but the court overruled the objection,
and Expert answered that child victims do sometimes maintain

20231072-CA 6 2025 UT App 119
State v. Garcia

contact with their alleged abusers and that factors that play into
such continued contact include the alleged abuser living with the
child, feelings of affection toward the alleged abuser, and the
child’s lack of autonomy.

¶18 The State then called Mother to testify. Mother testified
that she often observed Garcia slapping Alexis and Mila on the
buttocks. She also testified that when she asked him to stop,
Garcia would argue with her and tell her she was “exaggerating
or imagining things.” Mother explained that she confronted
Garcia after Mila showed her the first text message he sent her and
kicked Garcia out of the house, but after a week she let him back
in the house because she did not want their son to grow up
without a father. And Mother stated that after Mila showed her
the second text message, Mother again kicked Garcia out of the
house, but she let him come back because their son missed him.

¶19 At the close of evidence and outside of the presence of the
jury, the State moved to amend the enticement count from a
second-degree felony to a class B misdemeanor. After the court
agreed to make the amendment, Counsel asked the court how it
wanted to handle the amendment with the jury because when the
court read the information the count was listed as a felony.
Counsel stated they did not “think [the jury was] going to notice”
the change and, accordingly, did not object to the court’s proposal
to make the amendment by interlineation. The court agreed,
finding it was “very unlikely the jury would recall” the discussion
about the level of offenses from the beginning of the trial.

¶20 Counsel then moved for a directed verdict on the two
counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child that resulted from
Garcia’s slapping Alexis’s and Mila’s buttocks. 5 Counsel argued
the State failed to show that Garcia had the requisite intent to

5. Counsel also moved for a directed verdict on the enticement
charge, but that ruling is not at issue on appeal.

20231072-CA 7 2025 UT App 119
State v. Garcia

“sexually gratify” because he would slap everyone’s buttocks,
including non-household members. The district court denied the
motion, stating that when it viewed the evidence in a light most
favorable to the State there was sufficient evidence to infer that
“Garcia’s intent was to arouse or gratify his sexual desire.”

¶21 When the jury returned, the court read the jury
instructions. One of the instructions stated, “In making your
decision, do not consider what punishment could result from a
verdict of guilty. Your duty is to decide if the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Punishment is not relevant to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.” The State and
Counsel then gave closing arguments.

¶22 The jury found Garcia guilty on all seven counts. He was
sentenced to fifteen years to life for each of the six first degree
felonies—with counts one through five to run concurrently and
count six to run consecutively to counts one through five—and to
a suspended term of 180 days in jail for count seven, the class B
misdemeanor.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶23 Garcia raises three issues on appeal. First, Garcia asserts
the district court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
because there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the two
counts of aggravated sexual abuse for the buttocks slaps of Alexis
and Mila. Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a
motion for a directed verdict for correctness. See State v. Dever,
2022 UT App 35, ¶ 29, 508 P.3d 158. “We will uphold the district
court’s denial if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, some evidence exists from which the elements of the crime
could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶24 Second, Garcia argues the district court erred when it
admitted Expert’s testimony that addressed the factors that play

20231072-CA 8 2025 UT App 119
State v. Garcia

into delayed reporting of sexual abuse and reasons that children
maintain contact with alleged abusers. District courts have “wide
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony,
and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.” State v. Martin, 2017 UT 63, ¶ 19, 423 P.3d 1254 (cleaned
up).

¶25 Third, Garcia asserts that it was plain error for the district
court to inform the jury of the offense levels for each of the seven
counts he was charged with. “The plain error standard of review
requires an appellant to show the existence of a harmful error that
should have been obvious to the district court.” State v. Gallegos,
2018 UT App 112, ¶ 12, 427 P.3d 578.

ANALYSIS

I. Motion for a Directed Verdict

¶26 Garcia challenges the district court’s denial of his motion
for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence to
convict him on the two counts of aggravated sexual abuse for the
buttocks slaps of Alexis and Mila. Specifically, Garcia asserts that
he lacked the requisite intent to “arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person” required under the statute.

¶27 A district court may grant a defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict dismissing any count in the information if “the
evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged
therein or any lesser included offense.” Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o). We
uphold a district court’s denial of a motion for a directed verdict
if, “when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, some
evidence exists from which the elements of the crime could be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Dever, 2022 UT App
35, ¶ 29, 508 P.3d 158 (cleaned up). We conclude, for the reasons
discussed below, that the State presented sufficient evidence of
Garcia’s intent at trial.

20231072-CA 9 2025 UT App 119
State v. Garcia

¶28 Our legislature has made “clear that touching another
person’s buttocks may constitute a sex crime.” State v. Rallison,
2023 UT App 34, ¶ 14, 528 P.3d 1235 (citing Utah Code §§ 76-5-
404(2), 76-9-702.1(1), 76-5-404.1(2)). And “in most cases, proof of a
sexual act will itself provide a basis from which a factfinder may
permissibly rely on logic and human experience to infer intent
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Whitaker, 2016 UT App 104,
¶ 18 n.8, 374 P.3d 56. Slaps to the buttocks—which “are generally
considered to be private or intimate body parts”—“almost always
carr[y] a sexual connotation” and can on their own provide a basis
for a factfinder to infer sexual intent, especially when they make
the recipient uncomfortable and are accompanied by sexualized
comments. Rallison, 2023 UT App 34, ¶ 15.

¶29 Garcia argues that the buttocks slaps were “an expression
of camaraderie” and similar to buttocks slaps at a sporting event.
However, he fails to explain how extremely frequent buttocks
slapping that regularly occurred in the home and made his
stepdaughters uncomfortable is similar to a “‘way to go’ bump of
encouragement in the middle of a sporting event,” especially
when the buttocks slaps were frequently accompanied by sexual
comments rather than words of encouragement. Id. Indeed,
“[s]exual comments inherently carry sexual connotations.” Id.
And Garcia has no explanation for his sexualized comments that
accompanied the buttocks slaps, other than to call the statements
“descriptive.”

¶30 Further, Alexis and Mila were clearly uncomfortable with
Garcia slapping their buttocks; they both told Mother about it,
and Mila even went so far as to put a metal bracelet in her pocket
to deter Garcia from slapping her buttocks. See id. ¶ 16 (discussing
how employees testified that the supervisor’s buttocks slapping
made them uncomfortable, “presumably because of the intimate
nature of the touching”). Thus, a jury could reasonably infer that
Garcia acted with sexual intent when he slapped Alexis’s and
Mila’s buttocks based on the conduct occurring repeatedly in their

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State v. Garcia

home, accompanied by sexual comments that made them
uncomfortable.

¶31 Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Garcia’s
motion for a directed verdict.

II. Admission of Expert’s Testimony

¶32 Garcia next argues that the district court erred when it
denied his motion in limine and allowed Expert to testify about
the “factors that play into late disclosure” and an individual
“maintaining contact with an alleged abuser.” Garcia asserts the
district court should not have allowed Expert’s testimony because
it “was not helpful to understanding the evidence and worked
instead to cause unfair prejudice through bolstering the testimony
of the stepdaughters.” Garcia argues that the reasons a child may
delay disclosure of sexual abuse and maintain contact with an
alleged abuser fall “within the understanding of the average
juror” and therefore Expert’s testimony was not helpful. We
disagree that Expert’s delayed disclosure testimony would not
have been helpful to the jury, and we determine that even if the
court abused its discretion by admitting Expert’s testimony
regarding factors that contribute to a child victim maintaining
contact with an alleged abuser, its admission was harmless.

¶33 Rule 702(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows an expert
witness to testify to “scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge” that “will help the trier of fact.” “Under this rule,
courts should generally exclude testimony if the testimony is
within the knowledge or experience of the average individual.”
State v. Martin, 2017 UT 63, ¶ 29, 423 P.3d 1254 (cleaned up).
However, “it is not necessary that the subject of the expert
testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not
possibly understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is
it a requirement that the subject be beyond the comprehension of
each and every juror.” Id. ¶ 30 (cleaned up).

20231072-CA 11 2025 UT App 119
State v. Garcia

¶34 Here, the district court decided to allow Expert’s testimony
as to the reasons for delayed disclosure because even though “a
lot of people are aware of delayed disclosure,” members of this
jury may not be aware of it. The district court also found Expert’s
testimony could help the jurors “understand they need to judge
the credibility of this child based on this child and not based on
expectations of how they believe a survivor of child sex abuse . . .
should act.” Expert’s testimony here is similar to the expert’s
testimony in Martin, where our supreme court held that it was
within the district court’s discretion to allow expert testimony
regarding “why child victims make inconsistent disclosures”
because it “would be helpful to some—if not all—jurors.” Id.
Therefore, we conclude the district court acted within its
discretion by allowing Expert’s testimony about delayed
disclosure where it could be helpful to at least some jurors.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing Expert’s testimony on delayed disclosure.

¶35 With respect to Expert’s testimony as to the reasons that a
child may maintain contact with an alleged abuser, we believe it
is a closer call as to whether that testimony was helpful to the jury.
Alexis and Mila reported the abuse by Garcia—their stepfather
who lived with them in the same house—to Mother multiple
times. And although Mother kicked Garcia out of the house twice,
she quickly invited him back. Garcia argues that “[n]o expert
testimony was needed to explain that [Mother’s] choice would
create continued contact between” Alexis, Mila, and Garcia. But
even assuming that this would have been obvious to the jury and
Expert’s testimony should have been excluded, we conclude that
Garcia has not met his “burden . . . to prove that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different
if the [district] court had [not] allowed the expert testimony.”
Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993).
It is difficult to see the jury reaching a not guilty verdict in the
absence of Expert’s testimony on this issue. The testimony itself
was very brief; it consisted of only three questions, two of which

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State v. Garcia

Expert answered with a simple, “Yes.” And even if the jury did
not hear this brief testimony, the jury would have still heard
strong evidence of Garcia’s guilt. It would have heard Alexis’s
and Mila’s testimony about the abuse, Mother’s testimony about
their reports to her, and Garcia’s testimony admitting much of the
conduct. Thus, any abuse of discretion in permitting Expert’s
testimony was harmless because there is no reasonable likelihood
it would have resulted in a different outcome.

¶36 Garcia further argues that Expert’s testimony improperly
bolstered Alexis’s and Mila’s testimony. Expert witnesses engage
in impermissible bolstering when they testify that a witness’s
behavior matches a “profile for victims of sexual abuse,” offer
probabilities, or directly opine on the truthfulness of a witness’s
testimony. State v. Boyer, 2020 UT App 23, ¶¶ 44, 47, 460 P.3d 569.
Here, the district court expressly prohibited Expert from
testifying in terms of probabilities or offering a “profile” of a child
who has been sexually abused. And because Expert testified as a
“blind expert” who was unaware of the facts and allegations in
this case, he did not opine on the truthfulness of any of the
witnesses or seek to connect any of his testimony about delayed
disclosure or reasons why children continue to have contact with
an alleged abuser to Alexis’s or Mila’s conduct. See id. ¶ 47
(holding there was no impermissible bolstering when the
“psychiatrist did not address or opine, even hypothetically,
whether the evidence presented . . . was indicative of abuse and
confirmed that he had never met the victim and was not aware of
. . . the allegations against” the defendant); Martin, 2017 UT 63,
¶ 33 (concluding there was no improper bolstering when the
forensic interviewer testified to “general behavioral
characteristics” of child sex abuse victims but did not “seek to
connect her testimony” about these characteristics to the alleged
victims in the case). Thus, Expert’s testimony did not amount to
impermissible bolstering.

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State v. Garcia

III. Offense Classifications

¶37 Finally, Garcia argues that the district court erred when it
informed the jury of the offense classifications for all the charges.
Because Garcia did not object when the court informed the jurors
of the offense classifications for the charges against him, the issue
is unpreserved, and Garcia asks us to review it for plain error.

¶38 “To prevail on plain error review, a defendant must
establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the [district] court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant.” State v. Cesspooch, 2024 UT
App 15, ¶ 7, 544 P.3d 1046 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 550 P.3d 994
(Utah 2024). If any of the three requirements are not met, “plain
error is not established.” Id. ¶ 9 (cleaned up). Informing the jury
of a classification of an offense is an obvious error because “the
classification of an offense is directly tied to its punishment” and
punishment is “not a proper matter for jury consideration.” Id.
¶¶ 11–12. Therefore, we examine whether informing the jury of
the offense classifications was harmful.

¶39 To prove that an obvious error is harmful, Garcia “must
show that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome.” Id. ¶ 14 (cleaned up). This analysis asks
“whether we remain confident that the verdict would be the
same” if the district court had not informed the jury of the offense
classifications. Id. (cleaned up). After considering the
circumstances here, we do not believe there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome without the error.

¶40 First, if “proof of a defendant’s guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial,
but when the evidence is less compelling we will more closely
scrutinize the conduct.” Id. ¶ 16 (cleaned up). Here, Garcia
admitted to slapping Alexis’s and Mila’s buttocks even though he
knew Mother thought it was inappropriate and told him to stop.

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State v. Garcia

He also admitted sending sexual texts to Mila. Although Garcia
denied other allegations, there is still strong evidence pointing
toward his guilt, so we will not presume that the district court
informing the jury of the offense classifications was prejudicial.

¶41 Next, we determine whether informing the jury of the
offense classifications harmed Garcia. Id. ¶ 7. Garcia argues that
first-degree felonies would have “stood out to the jury” due to
their seriousness and would have informed the jury that “each
count was on par with offenses like murder.” While it is possible
that learning the classifications for the offenses had the potential
to harm Garcia, it is just as likely that informing the jury of the
offense classifications here was helpful to Garcia. This is so
because hearing that Garcia was charged with first-degree
felonies for conduct that Garcia argued was akin to a buttocks slap
at a sporting event could make it look like the State was reaching
and overcharged Garcia. See id. ¶ 17. It is also possible that
informing the jury of the offense classifications at the beginning
of the trial had no effect on the jury.

¶42 As in State v. Cesspooch, 2024 UT App 15, 544 P.3d 1046, the
offense classifications here were presented to the jury only once,
in the middle of an elements instruction as part of a broader set of
preliminary jury instructions at the beginning of trial, making
them unlikely to stand out to the jury. See id. ¶ 18. But even more
compelling here, neither Counsel nor the district court thought
the jury would remember having been informed of the offense
classifications. During a conference outside of the presence of the
jury, the court and attorneys discussed the implications of
modifying the enticement charge mid-trial because it would
change the offense classification. Significantly, during that
discussion Counsel commented that the jury probably would not
notice the change in classification, and the court agreed, stating it
was “very unlikely that the jury would recall” the offense
classifications from the beginning of trial. But even if the jury was
aware of the offense classifications, the court provided a final jury

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State v. Garcia

instruction informing the jury to not consider punishment
because “[p]unishment is not relevant to whether the defendant
is guilty or not guilty.” See State v. Suhail, 2023 UT App 15, ¶ 142
(“Jurors are presumed to have followed a trial court's
instructions.”). Thus, we think it is quite unlikely that the jury
would have remembered and focused on the offense
classifications during deliberations.

¶43 Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err by
informing the jury of the offense classifications because Garcia has
not demonstrated prejudice. 6

CONCLUSION

¶44 The district court did not err in denying Garcia’s motion
for a directed verdict for two of the counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child that arose from Garcia slapping Alexis’s and
Mila’s buttocks. The district court also did not abuse its discretion
by allowing Expert to testify. Finally, although it was an obvious
error for the district court to inform the jury of the offense
classifications, Garcia has not shown that the error prejudiced
him. We therefore affirm Garcia’s convictions.

6. Garcia also raises a cumulative error challenge on appeal.
“Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse only if the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence
that a fair trial was had.” State v. Centeno, 2023 UT 22, ¶ 85 n.10,
537 P.3d 232 (cleaned up). Because we concluded that the district
court did not err when it denied Garcia’s motion for a directed
verdict, see supra Part I, and did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Garcia’s motion in limine and allowed Expert’s testimony,
see supra Part II, the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable here.
See State v. Alvarado, 2023 UT App 123, ¶ 39 n.8, 538 P.3d 633
(holding that the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable when
a single error occurs).

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