Fuja v. Stephens

2025 UT App 109

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TANNIN J. FUJA AND MEGAN FUJA,
Appellants,
v.
CORBETT STEPHENS,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20240293-CA
Filed July 10, 2025

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Robert C. Lunnen
No. 220400256

Tannin J. Fuja and Megan Fuja, Appellants Pro Se
Robert C. Keller and Dani N. Cepernich,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Tannin and Megan Fuja appeal the dismissal of their
complaint against Corbett Stephens for acts committed while he
was employed by the City of Woodland Hills. The district court
held that the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. We affirm the dismissal, but we do so on
grounds of governmental immunity apparent in the record.
Further, we reject the Fujas’ constitutional challenges to the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This appeal stems from a dispute over the construction of
a house on property (the Site) in Woodland Hills, Utah, that is
Fuja v. Stephens

adjacent to property the Fujas owned. Believing that city
authorities had been unresponsive to their concerns, the Fujas,
proceeding pro se, filed a petition for review in 2022, followed by
an amended petition for review, naming the City of Woodland
Hills, the Woodland Hills Building Inspector, the Woodland Hills
Building Official, the Woodland Hills Zoning Enforcement
Officer, the Woodland Hills City Engineer, the Woodland Hills
City Council, the Woodland Hills Mayor, and Corbett Stephens as
respondents. 1 In their amended petition, the Fujas alleged that
construction on the Site was conducted in violation of the
approved building permit, the Woodland Hills Zoning
Ordinances, the Woodland Hills Development and Construction
Standards, and other mandatory land use regulations. They
further alleged that the Woodland Hills Building Inspector, the
Woodland Hills Building Official, the Woodland Hills Zoning
Enforcement Officer, the Woodland Hills City Engineer, and the
Woodland Hills City Council willfully failed to correctly enforce
the mandatory land use regulations and the requirements of the
building permit in relation to the Site.

¶3 The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the amended
petition, arguing that they were immune under the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah (the UGIA). See Utah Code §§ 63G-7-101 to
-904. In response, the Fujas did not dispute that the City of
Woodland Hills was immune, but they then argued that
Stephens’s immunity was waived by the UGIA.

¶4 In early 2023, the Fujas filed a stipulated Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal of the Enforcement Claims. The court heard
oral argument on the motion to dismiss. There, the Fujas
represented that they were no longer pursuing claims against the

1. At the time the Fujas filed their first amended petition, they
alleged that Corbett Stephens was working as the Woodland Hills
Building Inspector and the Woodland Hills Building Official.
They listed Stephens as a respondent using both his name and his
official titles.

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Fuja v. Stephens

City of Woodland Hills or many of its officials but were only
pursuing claims against Stephens.

¶5 After oral argument, but before the court entered its ruling,
this court issued its opinion in Graves v. Utah County Government
(Graves I), 2023 UT App 73U, amended and superseded on reh’g, 2024
UT App 80, 551 P.3d 1029. Graves I supported the Fujas’
contention that Stephens’s immunity had been waived. Id. ¶ 22.
Given this development, the respondents filed a notice of
supplemental authority alerting the district court to this decision.
In their notice, the respondents stated, “Woodland Hills notes that
the time for a petition for rehearing and petition for certiorari in
[Graves I] has not yet run. Woodland Hills will update the Court
in the event either is filed and granted. Woodland Hills expressly
reserves the right to challenge the Court of Appeals’ decision in
[Graves I] in the event it is not modified on rehearing or certiorari.”

¶6 Shortly after Graves I was issued, the district court ruled on
the motion to dismiss, granting it as to the Fujas’ claims against
all respondents except Stephens and expressly denying the
motion as to claims against Stephens. The court also instructed the
Fujas to file an amended complaint.

¶7 As directed, the Fujas filed a second amended complaint.
In that complaint, the Fujas named only Stephens as a
respondent. 2 The Fujas alleged that, during the ongoing court
proceedings related to this dispute, Stephens willfully and
intentionally undertook his duties as a city employee in a
fraudulent way by knowingly giving false testimony, fabricating
evidence, failing to disclose evidence, and allowing construction
on the Site in violation of the city code. In response to the Fujas’
second amended complaint, Stephens filed a motion to dismiss

2. At the time the Fujas filed their second amended complaint,
they alleged that Stephens was working as the Woodland Hills
Building Official and the Woodland Hills Public Works Director,
but that he was no longer working as the Woodland Hills Building
Inspector.

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Fuja v. Stephens

for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, see
generally Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which the district court granted.

¶8 In March 2024, the Fujas filed their notice of appeal. In May
2024, this court filed an amended opinion in Graves v. Utah County
Government (Graves II), 2024 UT App 80, 551 P.3d 1029. In that
opinion, this court clarified that the relevant section of the UGIA,
section 63G-7-202(3)(c)(i), is “not a blanket waiver of immunity for
governmental employees for any fraud or willful misconduct.” Id.
¶ 21 n.5.

¶9 Because the district court granted Stephens’s motion to
dismiss based on the Fujas’ failure to state a claim, the Fujas’
briefing on appeal largely focuses on the merits of their claim.
However, they acknowledge Graves II and challenge the
constitutionality of the UGIA. 3 Stephens’s briefing on appeal asks
us to affirm the district court on the alternative grounds that
Stephens’s immunity was not waived by the UGIA and he was
thus immune from suit in this case.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶10 The Fujas appeal, arguing that the district court erred in
dismissing their claims. “A motion to dismiss should be granted
only if, assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint . . . ,
it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Hudgens v.
Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, ¶ 14, 243 P.3d 1275 (cleaned up). We
generally review a district court’s decision to dismiss claims
under rule 12(b)(6) for correctness. Blanch v. Farrell, 2018 UT App
172, ¶ 14, 436 P.3d 285. But in this case, we decide the matter on
the alternative grounds of governmental immunity.
Interpretation of the UGIA is a question of law. Nunez v. Albo, 2002
UT App 247, ¶ 9, 53 P.3d 2. Finally, the Fujas ask us to consider

3. While the Fujas do challenge the constitutionality of the UGIA
as it was interpreted in Graves II, 2024 UT App 80, 551 P.3d 1029,
they do not argue that Graves II should be overruled.

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Fuja v. Stephens

the constitutionality of the UGIA. “We review constitutional and
statutory interpretation issues for correctness, granting no
deference to the district court.” Vega v. Jordan Valley Med. Center,
LP, 2019 UT 35, ¶ 11, 449 P.3d 31.

ANALYSIS

I. Stephens’s Immunity

¶11 The Fujas’ assertion that the district court erred in
dismissing their claims fails because Stephens is entitled to
immunity under the UGIA.

¶12 “It is well established that we may affirm the judgment
appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling
or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is
not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the
lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower
court.” Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Ass’n, 2005 UT App 327,
¶ 11, 120 P.3d 34 (cleaned up); see also State v. Steele, 2019 UT App
71, ¶ 16, 442 P.3d 1204. An alternative theory is “apparent on the
record” when the record contains “sufficient and uncontroverted
evidence supporting the ground or theory to place a person of
ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may rely
thereon on appeal.” Francis v. State, 2010 UT 62, ¶ 10, 248 P.3d 44
(cleaned up).

¶13 Here, the issue of Stephens’s immunity is apparent on the
record. Stephens asserted immunity in the respondents’ initial
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. In his motion to
dismiss the second amended complaint, Stephens asserted that he
maintains section 63G-7-202(3)(c) “does not constitute a waiver of
immunity.” Further, Stephens reserved “the right to revisit this
argument in the event [Graves I was] altered on reconsideration
on certiorari and to appeal this issue.” Graves I was altered. It was

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Fuja v. Stephens

apparent in the record that should there ever be an opportunity,
Stephens would return to his argument that the UGIA did not
waive his immunity, which Stephens does in his principal brief on
appeal, and to which the Fujas have responded.

¶14 “Governmental immunity shields the State and its
employees acting in their official capacities from suit unless the
State expressly consents to being sued.” Graves II, 2024 UT App
80, ¶ 14, 551 P.3d 1029. The UGIA states that “each employee of a
governmental entity [is] immune from suit for any injury that
results from the exercise of a governmental function.” Utah Code
§ 63G-7-201(1). Thus, “to determine if an employee of a
governmental entity is immune from suit under the UGIA, we
apply a three-part test, which assesses (1) whether the activity
undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether
governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity;
and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver.” Graves II,
2024 UT App 80, ¶ 14 (cleaned up).

¶15 First, Stephens’s actions were exercises of a governmental
function. The UGIA defines “[g]overnmental function” as “each
activity, undertaking, or operation performed by a department,
agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.”
Utah Code § 63G-7-102(5)(b). “Governmental entity” is defined as
“the state and its political subdivisions.” Id. § 63G-7-102(4)(a). Our
supreme court has recognized that the current definition of
governmental function is broad. The legislature has “restricted
governmental liability” by continually “expanding the [UGIA’s]
definition of ‘governmental function’” to the point where it now
encompasses “anything the government decides to do.” Scott v.
Universal Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64, ¶ 58, 356 P.3d 1172.

¶16 Here, Stephens’s actions qualify as governmental functions
because each action that the Fujas complain of was an activity,
undertaking, or operation performed by Stephens when he was
an employee of a governmental entity. The Fujas do not contend
that Stephens’s actions were not a governmental function under
the statutory definition. To the contrary, the Fujas’ second

20240293-CA 6 2025 UT App 109
Fuja v. Stephens

amended complaint suggests that at all times relevant to the Fujas’
claims, Stephens was acting as an employee of the City of
Woodland Hills, a political subdivision of the state. The Fujas’
second amended complaint consistently refers to Stephens as “a
city employee” acting “in his official capacity” as “the building
official.” In fact, in their second amendment complaint, the Fujas
specifically argue that they relied on him “because [he] was the
building official.” Here, just as in Graves II, Stephens was acting
in his official capacity during all the complained-of actions, and
his actions thus qualify as governmental functions under the
UGIA. See Graves II, 2024 UT App 80, ¶ 16.

¶17 Second, nothing in the UGIA waives Stephens’s immunity
for any of the particular activities alleged by the Fujas. The UGIA
makes clear that a “governmental entity and an employee of a
governmental entity retain immunity from suit unless that
immunity has been expressly waived in this chapter.” Utah Code
§ 63G-7-101(3). There is no provision of the UGIA that expressly
waives the immunity Stephens has as an employee of the City of
Woodland Hills, a political subdivision of the state. The Fujas
argue that the UGIA expressly waives Stephens’s immunity in
section 63G-7-202(3)(c). But that is the exact argument that was
originally raised in Graves I and then clarified by this court in
Graves II.

¶18 In Graves I, Graves, a county commissioner, brought tort
claims against the county, the other commissioners, and a county
employee. 2023 UT App 73U, ¶ 13, amended and superseded on reh’g,
2024 UT App 80, 551 P.3d 1029. Graves claimed that the employee
“fabricated allegations of sexual harassment against” him and
that the other commissioners published false statements about
him regarding the alleged sexual harassment. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13. The
district court granted a motion to dismiss Graves’s claims, in part
because the district court found that the county employee enjoyed
governmental immunity. Id. ¶ 15. In Graves I, this court concluded
that “immunity is waived for individual employees when they
commit willful misconduct by making and maliciously repeating
false claims,” as Graves had alleged. Id. ¶ 24. The court thus

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reversed the district court’s initial dismissal of Graves’s claims. Id.
¶ 40. But in Graves II, this court affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of Graves’s claims “because they involved the exercise
of a governmental function that enjoys immunity.” 2024 UT App
80, ¶ 26. The court in Graves II explained that the other
commissioners “were acting in their official capacities when they
communicated publicly about” the alleged sexual harassment
because they held their press conference “immediately after an
official meeting” and posted their prepared statements “to their
official social media accounts.” Id. ¶ 16. As for the employee, the
court concluded that her actions qualified as a governmental
function because “at all times relevant to the allegations in the
complaint, [she] was an employee of the county.” Id. ¶ 18 (cleaned
up).

¶19 In Graves I, the court concluded that section 63G-7-
202(3)(c)(i) of the UGIA waived immunity for suits arising out of
a government employee’s “fraud or willful misconduct.” See 2023
UT App 73U, ¶¶ 22–24. But that precedent changed when Graves
II was issued. In Graves II, this court concluded that this provision,
while embedded in a governmental immunity law, was
establishing an exclusive remedy principle, and not varying the
parameters of immunity itself. 2024 UT App 80, ¶ 21 n.5. The court
pointed out that section 63G-7-202(3)(a) provides that “an action
under the UGIA against a governmental entity for an injury
caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance
of an employee’s duties, within the scope of employment[,] is a
plaintiff’s exclusive remedy.” Id. (cleaned up). The statute goes on
to explain that “[a] plaintiff may not bring or pursue any civil
action or proceeding based upon the same subject matter against
the employee . . . whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.”
Utah Code § 63G-7-202(3)(c). But there are exceptions to that
exclusive remedy provision, including when an “employee acted
or failed to act through fraud or willful misconduct.” Id. § 63G-7-
202(3)(c)(i). Thus, in Graves II this court concluded that, when read
in context, “this provision reflects an exception to a statutory
exclusive remedy, not a blanket waiver of immunity for

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governmental employees for any fraud or willful misconduct.”
2024 UT App 80, ¶ 21 n.5.

¶20 Accordingly, Graves II clarified that the provision of the
UGIA on which the Fujas rely to argue that Stephens’s immunity
has been waived actually does no such thing. We cannot identify
any other provision of the UGIA that waives Stephens’s immunity
for the actions complained of here, and the Fujas have pointed to
none. See generally Utah Code § 63G-7-301 (listing waivers of
immunity under the UGIA). As a result, Stephens retains
immunity from the Fujas’ suit, and on this basis we affirm the
dismissal of the Fujas’ claims against Stephens.

II. The Fujas’ Constitutional Challenges 4

¶21 Anticipating that, given the holding in Graves II, we might
conclude that the UGIA does not waive immunity for Stephens,
the Fujas claim that the UGIA violates the Utah Constitution in a
number of ways. The Fujas allege that the interpretation of the
UGIA adopted by Graves II violates five provisions of the Utah
Constitution: the right to possess and protect property, Utah
Const. art. I, § 1; the right to petition for redress, id.; the right to
open courts and redress of injuries, id. art. I, § 11; the right to due
process, id. art. I, § 7; and the right to the uniform operation of
laws, id. art. I, § 24. 5

4. Because the appeal raises a constitutional challenge to the
UGIA, notice was provided to the Office of the Attorney General,
see Utah R. App. P. 25A(a), and the Attorney General gave notice
that it did not intend to file a brief.

5. Stephens alleges that the Fujas’ constitutional challenges were
not preserved. However, because we can easily resolve the
constitutional challenges in favor of Stephens, we do so here
without addressing the issue of preservation. See State v. Kitches,
2021 UT App 24, ¶ 28, 484 P.3d 415. The principle established in
(continued…)

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Fuja v. Stephens

¶22 “When presented with a constitutional challenge to a law,
we presume the law is valid. A party mounting such a challenge
bears a heavy burden to overcome this presumption, and we
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality.” Jeffs
v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up). Because of
the particularly high burden imposed on litigants challenging the
constitutionality of a statute, the court would expect rigorous
briefing on such issues. In this case, the Fujas’ constitutional
claims are inadequately briefed, and as a result, the Fujas fall far
short of meeting their heavy burden to overcome the presumption
that the UGIA is valid under the Utah Constitution.

¶23 Rule 24(a)(8) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
requires an appellant’s brief to contain an argument explaining,
“with reasoned analysis supported by citations to legal authority
and the record, why the party should prevail on appeal.” When a
party challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the “mere
mention of a constitutional right, phrase, or principle does not
raise a constitutional claim.” Ramos v. Cobblestone Centre, 2020 UT
55, ¶ 48, 472 P.3d 910 (cleaned up). “In addition to identifying the
provision allegedly infringed, a party must develop an argument
as to how that provision has been violated . . . .” Id. (cleaned up).
The Fujas have failed to do so here.

¶24 The Fujas’ argument on all five of the constitutional
provisions they identify is contained in less than four pages,
addressing substantial constitutional issues with anywhere from
one to three paragraphs each. Their arguments contain vague and
sweeping statements about the Utah Constitution and the rights
it protects. But they have failed to present a well-reasoned
argument supported by citations on any of the five provisions

Kitches applies equally where we can more easily resolve an issue
in favor of an appellee on non-merits-based grounds, such as
inadequate briefing.

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Fuja v. Stephens

they allege have been violated. 6 None of their constitutional
challenges are properly presented as they have not identified and
engaged in the relevant analyses to any substantive degree.

¶25 For example, the Fujas argue that the UGIA as interpreted
in Graves II violates the Open Courts Clause of the Utah
Constitution. See Utah Const. art. I, § 11. Our supreme court has
“established a three-part test to determine whether a legislative
act runs afoul of the Open Courts Clause.” Waite v. Utah Labor
Comm’n, 2017 UT 86, ¶ 19, 416 P.3d 635.

Under this test, we look first to whether the
legislature has abrogated a cause of action. If it has,
we then determine whether the law provides an
injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy. If there is no substitute or
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the
remedy or cause of action may be justified only if
there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal
remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means
for achieving the objective.

Id. (cleaned up). But the Fujas do not engage in this analysis in any
way. Instead, they submit five sentences in which they briefly
summarize the language of the Open Courts Clause, outline their

6. Further, what authority the Fujas do cite does not support their
position. For example, the Fujas cite Wood v. University of Utah
Med. Center, 2002 UT 134, 67 P.3d 436, for the proposition that the
presumption of constitutionality does not apply when the Open
Courts Clause is invoked. Id. ¶ 46 (Durham, C.J., writing for the
majority on this issue). But Wood has been abrogated on this point.
See Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 135 (recognizing “an
obligation of deference to legislative judgments in [an open
courts] review” and disavowing “prior applications” in caselaw
to the contrary); see also Waite v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2017 UT 86,
¶¶ 21–22, 416 P.3d 635 (acknowledging the abrogation of Wood).

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claims against Stephens, and make vague declarations about the
policy implications of Graves II with no citation to any authority
supporting their propositions.

¶26 The rest of the Fujas’ arguments follow suit. They have not
identified the relevant analysis for any of the constitutional claims
they make. They have not presented a well-reasoned argument
explaining the history of the constitutional provisions at issue or
the parameters of the different constitutional provisions. Nor
have they pointed us to any relevant legal authority that would
support their claims. Because the Fujas’ constitutional claims are
inadequately briefed, they have failed to meet their burden on
appeal to support their constitutional challenges to the UGIA. 7

CONCLUSION

¶27 Stephens was a government employee engaged in a
governmental function when the acts that the Fujas complain of
occurred. He is entitled to immunity under the UGIA, and the
UGIA does not waive that immunity. We thus affirm the district
court’s dismissal of the Fujas’ claims on the alternative grounds of

7. We are sensitive to the fact that the Fujas have been proceeding
pro se and thus do not have the benefit of professional legal
assistance. They are therefore entitled to “every consideration that
may reasonably be indulged.” Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207,
1213 (Utah 1983) (cleaned up). However, “[a]s a general rule, a
party who [proceeds pro se] will be held to the same standard of
knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar.” Id.;
see also Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, ¶ 27, 312 P.3d 951 (“Even
though appellate courts are generally lenient with pro se litigants,
those litigants must still follow the appellate rules.”). Particularly
where the Fujas raise complex issues of law requiring deeper
analysis than what they have provided on appeal, we cannot give
them so much leeway that we effectively “write [their] appeal for
[them] or decide [their] case without sufficient briefing.” See Jones
v. State, 2020 UT App 125, ¶ 30, 473 P.3d 1190 (cleaned up).

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governmental immunity. Because their claims are inadequately
briefed, the Fujas fail to meet their burden on appeal as to their
constitutional challenges to the UGIA.

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