Ream v. Ream

2025 UT App 105

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEBRA JEAN REAM,
Appellant,
v.
JACOB M. REAM,
Appellee.

Opinion
No. 20230799-CA
Filed July 10, 2025

Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Derek P. Pullan
No. 230400484

Ryan J. Schriever and Daniel G. Shumway,
Attorneys for Appellant
Asa E. Kelley and Vanessa A. Vietz,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Debra Jean Ream was granted a temporary civil stalking
injunction (the Temporary Injunction) against her ex-husband,
Jacob Ream. 1 Several hours after being served, Jacob emailed
Debra a question related to their child’s health insurance. He was
arrested a few days later for violating the Temporary Injunction.
An evidentiary hearing was held to determine if the Temporary
Injunction should be made permanent. Debra argued it should be
made permanent because Jacob engaged in a course of conduct
that caused her emotional distress and because he violated the

1. Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their
first names, with no disrespect intended.
Ream v. Ream

Temporary Injunction. After hearing the evidence, the district
court dissolved the Temporary Injunction and declined to impose
a permanent injunction. Debra filed a motion to alter or amend
the findings or for a new trial under rules 52 and 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rule 59 Motion). The district court
granted the motion in part—correcting two factual findings and
clarifying its ruling on the course of conduct—and otherwise
denied Debra’s motion. Debra appeals both orders. We affirm.

BACKGROUND 2

Debra and Jacob’s Relationship

¶2 Debra and Jacob divorced in early 2020. They have two
adult children, Ryan and Jessica, and a minor child, Will. 3 After
getting back together and “act[ing] as if they . . . remained
married,” the relationship eventually soured again, and Debra
began exclusively dating her boyfriend (Boyfriend) in 2022. The
relationship between Boyfriend and Jacob became strained as
well, and in February 2023 Jacob sued Boyfriend for defamation,
slander, and electronic communications harassment and
Boyfriend counterclaimed for electronic communications
harassment. Debra and Jacob also remained involved in
contentious custody proceedings.

Stalking Injunction

¶3 In March 2023, Debra filed an ex parte petition for a civil
stalking injunction (the Petition), which alleged that Jacob had
engaged in a course of conduct that amounted to stalking. Debra

2. “In the context of a civil stalking injunction, we will recite the
facts in a light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings.”
Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, n.1, 530 P.3d 945 (cleaned up).

3. We employ pseudonyms for all three children.

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included a declaration from Boyfriend; it was signed on the same
day he was served with Jacob’s defamation lawsuit. Debra filed
the Petition the day after she emailed Jacob to ask if he
remembered who did Jessica’s Halloween makeup the year
before. Debra signed the Petition immediately below the
statement, “I declare under criminal penalty under the law of
Utah that everything stated in this document is true.”

¶4 The court granted the Temporary Injunction, which
ordered Jacob not to “contact, phone, text, mail, e-mail, or
communicate in any way with” Debra, and to stay away from
Debra’s vehicle and home. The Temporary Injunction also
ordered the parties to communicate about Will “only through the
co-parenting app, ‘Our Family Wizard’ with the tone meter
setting enabled and in use.”

¶5 Jacob was served with a copy of the Temporary Injunction
a few days after the court granted it. Several hours after he was
served, Jacob emailed Debra in the same email thread as Debra’s
makeup question and asked, “Could you please take a picture of
the front and the back of . . . my healthcare card and send to me
thank you.” Jacob was later arrested for violating the Temporary
Injunction by sending this email.

Evidentiary Hearing

¶6 The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Jacob had stalked Debra and whether the Temporary
Injunction should be made permanent. At the hearing, Debra,
Jacob, and Boyfriend testified, and the parties presented evidence
regarding the eight incidents alleged in the Petition.

¶7 Wyoming Incident. In the Petition, Debra described this
event as follows:

[Debra] and [Boyfriend] had traveled in his truck to
stay at a hotel so they could watch [Jessica] compete

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in the national high school rodeo finals. The room
was booked in [Debra’s] name with a credit card on
file to pay for the room. . . . On the day they checked
out, the front desk had informed them that the room
had been paid by . . . [Jacob].

Debra did not testify about this incident at the hearing, but Jacob
did. Jacob testified that Debra contacted him about flying her to
Wyoming to watch Jessica compete at the national high school
rodeo finals. Jacob agreed and paid for the flight. Debra and Jacob
had a discussion over text about whether Debra could stay in
Jacob’s trailer or if she should get her own room. Then, rather than
flying, Debra drove to Wyoming with Boyfriend and stayed in a
motel. Debra and Jacob got along well, which prompted Jacob to
pay for Debra’s motel room. However, he testified that he did not
end up doing so because someone else had already paid for it.

¶8 Moving Vehicle Incident. Jessica was driving Debra,
Jacob, and Will in Jessica’s vehicle that was pulling a horse trailer.
During the drive, Debra “ma[de] some derogatory statements
about [Jacob’s] sister or niece.” Jessica pushed back on Debra’s
comments and an argument ensued, with both Debra and Jessica
yelling and screaming. Jacob began to record the argument for
around thirty seconds but stopped after Will told Debra that Jacob
was filming her. As the argument escalated, Debra demanded
Jessica pull over and let her out. Jessica pulled over but there was
not enough room to pull off the road all the way, so the trailer was
in the road to some degree. Jacob told Jessica to continue driving,
and Debra did not get out. A dispute occurred about whether
Debra would take Will with her and ultimately, Jessica drove to
Debra’s house where Debra got out of the vehicle.

¶9 Home Incident. Jacob returned Will to Debra’s house after
his parent-time, but she was not home. Ryan was inside with
some friends, and Jacob asked everyone if they had anything to
eat and offered to buy them something from a fast food

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restaurant. Jacob bought food and brought it back to the house.
Debra and Jacob disagreed about whether Jacob “entered the
house and sat on the couch or not.”

¶10 School Christmas Party Incident. Boyfriend saw two cars
that he thought belonged to Jacob drive by the elementary school,
but he was unable to identify who was driving the cars.

¶11 First Police Station Incident. Words were exchanged
between Jacob and Debra at one of their parent-time exchanges at
the police station. Jacob accused Debra and Boyfriend of being
intoxicated, and as he got back into his car, he angrily directed a
police officer to search Debra’s car. The officer spoke with Debra
and Boyfriend and ultimately did not find them to be intoxicated.

¶12 Second Police Station Incident. Debra and Boyfriend
picked Will up from Jacob at the police station. While Debra was
buckling Will into his seat in Boyfriend’s truck, Jacob “got into his
vehicle, did a U-turn and pulled up alongside the truck, then
rolled down his window” and took out his phone. Debra and
Jacob disagreed about whether Jacob took pictures and videos of
Boyfriend at this point or if Jacob only mimicked doing so.

¶13 Horse Show Incident. Debra and Boyfriend went to watch
Jessica and Ryan in a two-day horse show. Jacob was in the arena
helping Jessica, while Debra and Boyfriend watched from the
stands. Debra and Jacob disagreed as to whether Jacob mouthed
words and pointed his fingers at Debra and Boyfriend from his
location in the arena. After the event had concluded for the night,
Jacob emailed Debra at 1:11 a.m., asking—in reference to Will—
“Where was my boy at who is watching him?” The next day, after
watching the show, Debra and Boyfriend got in Boyfriend’s truck.
Jacob, who was riding his horse while leading another horse,
stopped his horse “immediately behind the truck,” where he
stayed for around thirty seconds. Debra and Jacob disagreed as to
whether Jacob then followed the truck as it was leaving or
whether he went to “do things outside of the arena” and

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happened to go the same direction as the truck. Jacob then
sent another email later that day, saying, “Where was my boy at?
[You] didn’t respond yesterday.”

¶14 Email Incident. Debra and Jacob were in their respective
cars at the same location—either a school parking lot or a grocery
store parking lot—when Debra received an email from Jacob that
said, “Pretty cute little boy.”

¶15 In addition to these eight incidents, Jacob also testified as
to Debra’s assertion that he had violated the Temporary
Injunction. He testified that, after being served, he “looked at the
top of [the Temporary Injunction] and flipped through two pages
and thought, well, I don’t know what it is.” Jacob called his
attorney for guidance regarding the papers, who told Jacob that
he would “look at them, [and] visit with [Jacob]” that night. Jacob
testified that he “absolutely [did] not” understand the
requirements of the Temporary Injunction when he received it.
And when asked, “Did you intend for that e-mail [about health
insurance] to violate the [Temporary Injunction]?” he responded,
“Absolutely not.”

Court’s Ruling

¶16 Following the hearing, the district court issued written
findings of fact and conclusions of law (Order) that vacated the
Temporary Injunction. With respect to whether Jacob
intentionally violated the Temporary Injunction, the court found
that while Jacob acknowledged being served with a copy of the
injunction, the injunction “came at a time of litigation pending in
[Jacob’s] civil defamation case with [Boyfriend] as well as
litigation pending in an ongoing modification of the [p]arties’
divorce.” Thus, Jacob was frequently receiving legal papers. Jacob
“examined the first couple of pages, did not fully understand
what was required of him, contacted his legal counsel who said
he would get back to him, and in that interim before [he] had
consulted with legal counsel or fully underst[ood] his

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obligations,” he sent an email, not through Our Family Wizard, to
Debra about the health insurance card. The court concluded that
Jacob had not intentionally violated the Temporary Injunction.

¶17 The court also found that Jacob did not knowingly violate
the Temporary Injunction. Debra and Jacob had “been involved
in a lengthy high-conflict divorce” with “significant periods of
reconciliation post-divorce where they acted as if they remained
married to each other.” The day before filing the Petition, Debra
emailed Jacob about Halloween makeup. According to the court,
“Things appeared to be business as usual.” The court found that,
“[a]t best, the evidence [w]as evenly balanced as to whether
[Jacob] knew or reasonably should have known what was
required of him” by the Temporary Injunction. Accordingly, the
court concluded that Debra “could not demonstrate that [Jacob]
intentionally or knowingly violated” the Temporary Injunction.

¶18 The court found that Debra also failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Jacob “intentionally or
knowingly engaged in a course of conduct” that would cause a
reasonable person in Debra’s position to fear “for her own safety
or the safety of a third party” or cause “other emotional stress.”
The court specifically found that Debra’s “failure to disclose the
totality of the circumstances” surrounding the Wyoming Incident
“seriously undermine[d] her credibility in the eyes” of the court.
The court also found that several of the incidents arose from
custody exchanges and co-parenting, which the court found
“should be expected in the context of the divorce.” “Given the
totality of the circumstances and how evenly the evidence [wa]s
balance[d] on all of the events,” the court was “not persuaded that
a reasonable person under the circumstances presented in
[Debra’s] life would reasonably experience emotional distress.”
Thus, the court concluded that Debra failed “to demonstrate that
there were two or more incidents of stalking” as required by
statute, see Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a), (2)(a).

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Rule 59 Motion

¶19 Debra filed the Rule 59 Motion. She argued that the
evidence showed Jacob acted intentionally and knowingly in
violating the Temporary Injunction. She also argued that the court
did not conduct the proper analysis because it “looked at each
event individually” rather than considering the cumulative effect
of the course of conduct. Debra argued that the court’s credibility
determination of her was improper because the court “relied on
statements outside of what was admitted at the evidentiary
hearing,” namely the Petition. Finally, Debra argued that two
factual findings about the Wyoming Incident were incorrect.

¶20 The district court granted the Rule 59 Motion in part (the
Rule 59 Order). The court clarified that it had not considered the
“individual events in a vacuum” and had instead “considered
those events in a totality of the circumstances as it [was] required
to do,” and was “not persuaded” that Jacob’s course of conduct
would cause a reasonable person in Debra’s position emotional
distress or to fear for her safety or the safety of others. The court
amended two factual findings—the date of the “text messages
regarding the . . . Wyoming [Incident]” and that Debra “travelled
to Wyoming with [Boyfriend] by car” rather than by plane.
Referencing Debra’s argument that the court improperly relied on
statements she made in the Petition, the court noted that those
statements “constitute[d] a judicial admission” and the court
“properly considered her statements in evaluating her
credibility.” The court otherwise denied the Rule 59 Motion.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶21 On appeal, Debra argues that the district court’s decision
to take judicial notice of the Wyoming Incident when she did not
offer testimony about that incident at the hearing violated rule
201(e) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. “Two different standards of
review apply to . . . claims regarding the admissibility of evidence.

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The first standard of review, correctness, applies to the legal
questions underlying the admissibility of evidence,” while the
“second standard of review, abuse of discretion, applies to the
[district] court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence.” Dierl v.
Birkin, 2023 UT App 6, ¶ 15, 525 P.3d 127 (cleaned up).

¶22 Debra also contends that the district court erred in
dismissing the Temporary Injunction. “Whether the course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person in a petitioner’s
circumstances to suffer fear or emotional distress is a question of
fact that we review for clear error,” and “we review the district
court’s interpretation of the underlying legal standard for
correctness.” Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 22, 530 P.3d
945 (cleaned up). And whether an actor violated a temporary civil
stalking injunction depends upon the intent of the actor. “The
determination of intent is a question of fact, which will only be
reversed if the district court’s finding is clearly erroneous.” Bonnie
& Hyde, Inc. v. Lynch, 2013 UT App 153, ¶ 13, 305 P.3d 196.

ANALYSIS

I. Wyoming Incident Evidence

¶23 The district court found that Debra’s sworn statements in
the Petition “constitute[d] a judicial admission.” “A judicial
admission is a formal waiver of proof that relieves an opposing
party from having to prove the admitted fact.” Dale K. Barker Co.
PC CPA Profit Sharing Plan v. Turner, 2021 UT App 119, ¶ 35, 500
P.3d 940. As such, the “effect of a judicial admission is that once it
has been made, the party cannot present any evidence that
contradicts that statement.” Id. And our supreme court has noted
that under the judicial admission doctrine, “a party should not be
able to plead or admit certain facts and then later present
contradicting evidence.” Luna v. Luna, 2020 UT 63, ¶ 28, 474 P.3d
966; see also Rutherford ex rel. Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin. Co.,
LLC, 2014 UT App 190, ¶ 11 n.6, 333 P.3d 1266 (noting that a

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factual allegation in a complaint “is a judicial admission and is
normally conclusive on the party making it.” (cleaned up)).

¶24 Utah’s civil stalking statute allows “an individual who
believes that the individual is the victim of stalking” to “bring a
verified written petition for a civil stalking injunction against the
alleged stalker.” Utah Code § 78B-7-701(1)(a)(i). A petition is thus
the operative pleading for initiating a civil stalking case. And
here, Debra signed the Petition under the statement, “I declare
under criminal penalty under the law of Utah that everything
stated in this document is true.” Accordingly, the district court
properly considered Debra’s sworn statements in the Petition
regarding the Wyoming Incident as a judicial admission.

¶25 On appeal, however, Debra frames the issue as the district
court improperly taking judicial notice of the Petition because she
did not introduce it into evidence at the hearing. Specifically, she
complains that neither “the district court nor either party asked
for judicial notice of the” Petition and, thus, “it was never
admitted and should not have been considered as evidence for
impeachment or any other purpose.” But even if we accept
Debra’s framing, we see no merit in her argument.

¶26 A district court may take judicial notice of “an adjudicative
fact” on its own or when requested by a party and provided with
the requisite information. Utah R. Evid. 201(a), (c). The “general
rule is that courts may take judicial notice of the records and prior
proceedings in the same case.” Iota LLC v. Davco Mgmt. Co., 2016
UT App 231, ¶ 40, 391 P.3d 239 (cleaned up); see also State v. Shreve,
514 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1973) (“A court will take judicial
knowledge of its own records insofar as those records are a part
of the matter before the court”); In re F.M., 2002 UT App 340, ¶ 3
n.2, 57 P.3d 1130 (holding that the court did not err when it took
judicial notice of records in the same case). The Petition was a
record in the same case and was thus proper for judicial notice.

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¶27 Debra also argues that taking judicial notice of the Petition
was improper under rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
because “impeachment evidence . . . does not contain the type of
information capable of being judicially noticed.” We disagree.
Impeachment evidence is “evidence used to undermine a
witness’s credibility.” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 37, ¶ 11, 566 P.3d
1260 (cleaned up)), cert. denied, May 8, 2025 (No. 20240667). Here,
Debra’s “failure to disclose all of the circumstances surrounding”
the Wyoming Incident in the Petition “significantly undermine[d]
her credibility in these proceedings.”

¶28 Thus, having properly accepted Debra’s sworn statements
in the Petition—whether as a judicial admission or through
judicial notice—the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it considered those statements in assessing her credibility.

II. Dismissal of the Temporary Stalking Injunction

¶29 Utah Code section 76-5-106.5 provides two avenues for an
actor to commit stalking. 4 As relevant to this appeal,

an actor commits stalking if the actor intentionally
or knowingly: (a) engages in a course of conduct
directed at a specific individual and knows or
should know that the course of conduct would
cause a reasonable person (i) to fear for the
individual’s own safety or the safety of a third
individual; or (ii) to suffer other emotional distress;
or (b) violates . . . a [temporary] stalking injunction.

4. Utah Code section 76-5-106.5 has since been modified to change
the wording in subsection 2(a). See Criminal Intent Amendments,
ch. 179, § 2, 2024 Utah Laws 1490, 1492 (modifying “knows or
should know that” to “knows or is reckless as to whether”).
Accordingly, we cite the 2022 version of the statute.

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Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(2) (2022). Debra asserts that the district
court erred by (1) “conflating the first and second elements of the
stalking injunction analysis,” and (2) concluding that Jacob did
not intentionally or knowingly violate the Temporary Injunction.
We reject both arguments.

A. Course of Conduct Causing Emotional Distress

¶30 Utah courts have “made clear” that “establishing a course
of conduct is the first step in the stalking analysis.” Anderson v.
Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 26, 530 P.3d 945. A course of conduct is
defined as “two or more acts directed at or toward a specific
individual.” Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i) (2022). It “does not
necessarily involve threatening behavior” and “merely requires
two or more acts directed at or toward a specific individual.”
Anderson, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 25 (cleaned up). Though these acts
“might well be threatening,” they are not required to be. Id.
Indeed, a course of conduct may include routine acts, such as
when “the actor communicates to or about an individual, directly
or indirectly and by any means.” Id. (cleaned up). Simply put, the
statutory definition of acts that constitute a course of conduct is
quite broad. This results in a relatively low bar for the petitioner
to clear in the first step of the analysis. And the two steps of the
stalking analysis are addressed serially, meaning that if there is
no course of conduct, the court should end its analysis and deny
the request for a civil stalking injunction.

¶31 If the court finds that an individual engaged in a course of
conduct, the court then moves to the second step of the stalking
analysis, where it considers “whether the conduct at issue would
cause emotional distress or fear to a reasonable person in the
petitioner’s circumstances.” Staszkiewicz v. Thomas, 2024 UT App
183, ¶ 17, 562 P.3d 723 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 583 P.3d 260 (Utah
2025); see also Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 45, 491 P.3d 835
(“This is an objective standard under which the subjective effect
of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is irrelevant.”

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(cleaned up)). Under the second step, “courts must consider the
entire context surrounding a respondent’s conduct,” and “in this
context, acts that seem perfectly innocent or even well intentioned
may constitute stalking.” Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 45 (cleaned up).
Importantly, step one “should not be conflated or combined with”
step two. Anderson, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 26 (cleaned up).

¶32 Debra argues that the district court erred because it
conflated the two steps and considered whether each incident
caused emotional distress individually rather than collectively.
We agree that the district court’s analysis of the two steps was
initially unclear. In the Order, the court found that Debra “failed
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Jacob]
intentionally or knowingly engaged in a course of conduct that
would cause” a reasonable person in her position to fear “for her
own safety or the safety of a third party,” or “to suffer other
emotional stress.” The court went on to explain that the Horse
Show Incident was the “one event that has been proven that could
constitute an event of stalking,” but “that is only one and the
statute requires two.” The court then concluded that Debra “failed
to demonstrate two or more incidents required by the statute.”
However, the Order detailed five incidents alleged by Debra that
involved communications directly between Debra and Jacob,
which would establish a course of conduct. Thus, it appears that
the district court might have conflated the two steps of the
stalking analysis.

¶33 But the Order was not the last thing the district court said
about the matter. In the Rule 59 Motion, Debra raised before the
district court the same argument she presents to us on appeal: the
district court erred because it conflated the two steps and
examined whether each incident could cause emotional distress
individually. 5 The district court held a hearing on the Rule 59

5. Indeed, much of Debra’s argument in the Rule 59 Motion was
repeated verbatim in her brief before this court.

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Motion and then issued the Rule 59 Order. The record presented
to us on appeal lacks a transcript of the hearing on the Rule 59
Motion. “Appellants bear the burden of proof with respect to their
appeals, including the burdens attending the preservation and
presentation of the record.” State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 17, 12
P.3d 92. In light of this burden, “if an appellant fails to provide an
adequate record on appeal, this court must assume the regularity
of the proceedings below.” Id. ¶ 11 (cleaned up).

¶34 With only the Rule 59 Order available to us, we must
assume it accurately reflects the proceedings at the hearing. And
in the Rule 59 Order, the district court clarified that it had not
considered the “individual events in a vacuum,” but had, instead,
“considered those events in a totality of the circumstances as it is
required to do” and was “not persuaded” that a reasonable
person in Debra’s position would experience emotional distress.
This is the proper two-step stalking analysis. See Anderson, 2023
UT App 48, ¶ 24. Thus, to the extent the district court’s Order was
unclear on its analysis of the course of conduct, the court made
clear in the Rule 59 Order that it did perform the correct two-step
analysis.

¶35 Insofar as Debra also challenges the district court’s
conclusion that Jacob’s course of conduct would not cause a
reasonable person in Debra’s position to suffer emotional distress
or fear for her safety or the safety of others, we find no merit in
the argument. The court found Debra not credible in her
testimony about several of the incidents, including, most
significantly, the Wyoming Incident, which “seriously
undermine[d] her credibility in the eyes of the Court.” The court
found that Jacob was not credible in his testimony regarding the
Horse Show Incident. And the court found that Boyfriend’s
credibility was “color[ed]” by his motives, including that Jacob
was suing him for defamation and that Boyfriend signed his
declaration in support of the Petition on the same day he was
served with the lawsuit. On matters of credibility, “we defer to the

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district court.” In re Discipline of Steffensen, 2018 UT 53, ¶ 32, 428
P.3d 1104.

¶36 The district court also found that a number of the incidents
arose from tense interactions regarding custody exchanges and
each party’s presence at Will’s school, which the court found
“should be expected in the context of the divorce.” And regarding
several other incidents, the court viewed the evidence as “evenly
balanced” as to what had actually occurred. The court thus
concluded that a reasonable person in Debra’s circumstances
would not suffer emotional distress or fear for her safety or the
safety of others. Debra has failed to demonstrate that any of these
factual findings were clearly erroneous such that “no reasonable
factfinder could review the evidence presented and arrive at the
disputed finding.” Nelson v. Nelson, 2023 UT App 38, ¶ 41, 529
P.3d 370 (cleaned up). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
determination that there was insufficient evidence that Jacob
engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable
person in Debra’s position to suffer emotional distress or to fear
for her own safety or for the safety of another person.

B. Violation of the Temporary Injunction

¶37 An actor can also commit stalking if the actor
“intentionally or knowingly” violates a temporary civil stalking
injunction. Utah Code § 76-5-106.5(2) (2022). See generally id. § 78B-
7-701. Our supreme court has “emphasize[d] that intent is a
question of fact. And we will not set aside a [district] court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” Pennington v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up). A
factual finding is “clearly erroneous only if it is against the clear
weight of the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶38 At the evidentiary hearing, the district court heard
testimony from Debra, Jacob, and Boyfriend. The district court
found that the evidence was “undisputed that it was not [Jacob’s]
conscious objective to violate the” Temporary Injunction and it

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was “not persuaded that [Jacob] knew or reasonably should have
known what was expected of him under the [Temporary
Injunction].” The court further found that Debra and Jacob had
been “involved in a lengthy high-conflict divorce” with
“significant periods of reconciliation post-divorce where they
acted as if they remained married to each other.” The court found
that the day before Debra filed the Petition, she emailed Jacob
about Jessica’s Halloween makeup and “[t]hings appeared to be
business as usual.” Based on these findings, the court was “not
persuaded that [Debra] . . . met her statutory burden” of proving
that Jacob intentionally or knowingly violated the Temporary
Injunction.

¶39 Debra argues it was improper for the court to rely on these
findings because “[f]or the most part, they have to do with
conduct the district court attributed to Debra, but they do not
address the issue of whether Jacob acted with knowledge or
intent.” And in that regard, Debra asserts that Jacob’s testimony
that he did not understand the Temporary Injunction “was not
truthful.” In support of her contention, Debra points to the
following testimony by Jacob at the hearing:

Q: Can you tell me a little bit about what happened when
you were handed the stalking petition?

A. Help me on the stalking position. The—

Q. Petition. So when you were handed the document—
when you were handed the document back in March—

A: The no contact order? That one?

But this testimony does not prove that Jacob’s testimony that he
did not understand the Temporary Injunction on the day he
received it was “not truthful” as alleged by Debra. Rather, the
testimony shows only that at the time of the hearing, which
occurred many months after he was served and after he had been

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Ream v. Ream

arrested for violating the Temporary Injunction, Jacob described
the Temporary Injunction as a “no contact order.”

¶40 The district court found credible Jacob’s testimony that—
on the day he was served and before speaking with his attorney—
he “did not understand what was required of him” by the
Temporary Injunction. District courts “have the benefit of viewing
the witnesses firsthand, to assess their demeanor and to consider
their testimonies in the context of the proceedings as a whole,
making them much better equipped to make credibility
determinations.” Staszkiewicz v. Thomas, 2024 UT App 183, ¶ 19,
562 P.3d 723 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 583 P.3d 260 (Utah 2025).
We therefore do not second-guess the credibility determination of
the district court as long as “there is a reasonable basis in the
record to support” it. Koehler v. Allen, 2020 UT App 73, ¶ 17, 466
P.3d 738 (cleaned up). Here, the record supports the district
court’s determination of Jacob’s credibility. At the hearing, Jacob
testified that he “looked at the top of the [Temporary Injunction]
and flipped through two pages and thought, [w]ell, I don’t know
what it is.” And when he was asked at the hearing, “Did you
understand what it was saying when you got it?” he responded,
“Absolutely not.”

¶41 Because the district court’s findings do not conflict with the
clear weight of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the district
court erred. We therefore affirm the court’s conclusion that Jacob
did not intentionally or knowingly violate the Temporary
Injunction. 6

6. We observe two potential issues that may arise under the
current statutory scheme. First, because Utah’s civil stalking
statute incorporates the criminal definition of stalking, see Utah
Code § 78B-7-102(26), in order to have committed “stalking” by
violating a temporary civil stalking injunction, the respondent
(continued…)

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Ream v. Ream

CONCLUSION

¶42 The district court properly took judicial notice of Debra’s
statements in the Petition and was free to consider them in its
credibility determination. The court performed the correct
analysis of the stalking allegations and its conclusions that Jacob
did not engage in a course of conduct that would cause a
reasonable person in Debra’s circumstances to experience
emotional distress and its findings that Jacob did not intentionally
or knowingly violate the Temporary Injunction were not clearly
erroneous. Affirmed.

must have done so “intentionally or knowingly,” id. § 76-5-
106.5(2). Thus, an individual can avoid both civil and criminal
responsibility for violating a temporary injunction by simply not
reading the injunction when it is served, and is therefore
incentivized not to read it. Second, the current statutory scheme
allows an individual to obtain a permanent stalking injunction—
even if the allegations are ultimately determined to be without
merit—if the respondent violates the temporary injunction before
an evidentiary hearing is held. To be clear, we do not countenance
violation of any court order. But this situation creates the
possibility that an individual could obtain a permanent stalking
injunction where the allegations were without merit. To the extent
that these statutory provisions do not reflect legislative intent, we
invite the legislature to consider amendments to the statutory
scheme.

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