State v. Meraz-Zamorano

2025 UT App 110

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
JAIRO EMMANUEL MERAZ-ZAMORANO,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230067-CA
Filed July 10, 2025

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Su Chon
No. 181910907

Nathalie S. Skibine and Brenda Viera,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Hwa Sung Doucette,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and JOHN D. LUTHY
concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Jairo Emmanuel Meraz-Zamorano was charged with
multiple counts of sexual abuse involving two minor girls—the
grandchildren of his girlfriend. During voir dire, Meraz-
Zamorano challenged several potential jury members for cause,
but all the challenges were denied by the trial court. His counsel
accordingly used peremptory challenges to strike these
individuals. During trial, the mother of the girls mentioned that
one of them had attempted suicide at the prospect of disclosing
the alleged abuse. Considering this information was presented to
the jury, Meraz-Zamorano’s counsel made two motions for a
mistrial, arguing that the information prejudiced Meraz-
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

Zamorano. His counsel also objected to video recordings of the
girls’ Children’s Justice Center (CJC) interviews being played for
the jury. On appeal, Meraz-Zamorano argues that the trial court
erred in denying his for-cause challenges, in denying his motions
for a mistrial, and in granting the State’s motion to play the
interviews. None of these claims are availing, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

Revelation of Abuse

¶2 Meraz-Zamorano began living with his girlfriend
(Grandmother) around 2016. Living with them were
Grandmother’s son and his wife (Mother), along with their four
children: Daisy (born in 2009), Iris (born in 2011), and two
younger boys. 2

¶3 In the fall of 2018, when Iris was seven years old,
Grandmother was concerned that she seemed troubled. To get Iris
to talk, Grandmother told her about a fictional “girl that had
complained about” Meraz-Zamorano and said that if Meraz-
Zamorano had “done something,” Iris should tell her. Iris then
told Grandmother that Meraz-Zamorano had been touching her
in inappropriate ways. Grandmother asked Iris if the same thing
was happening to Daisy, and Iris said that Meraz-Zamorano was
doing “worse” things to her. A few days later, Grandmother had
a similar conversation with Daisy. Daisy started crying and told
Grandmother that Meraz-Zamorano sexually abused her. Around

1. “On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict and present conflicting evidence
only as necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” Layton
City v. Carr, 2014 UT App 227, ¶ 2 n.2, 336 P.3d 587 (cleaned up).

2. We employ pseudonyms for the children in this opinion.

20230067-CA 2 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

that same time, Grandmother noticed a bite mark on Meraz-
Zamorano’s arm.

¶4 Shortly thereafter, Meraz-Zamorano and Grandmother got
into an argument at a party. In the midst of the commotion,
Grandmother told her brother, who was also at the party, about
the allegations of sexual abuse the girls had made, and someone
called the police. After Grandmother explained the situation to
the responding officers, Meraz-Zamorano was arrested. A
detective (Detective) spoke with Daisy and Iris separately in the
early morning hours after Meraz-Zamorano had been arrested.
With the help of Mother to translate, Detective confirmed that
they reported abuse as Grandmother had indicated. Detective
estimated that the interviews lasted about ten minutes. Detective
then arranged for Daisy and Iris to be interviewed at the CJC.

CJC Interviews and Meraz-Zamorano’s Interview

¶5 A few days later, in early October 2018, Detective
conducted CJC interviews with Daisy and Iris.

¶6 Daisy said that on the first day of school that year, Meraz-
Zamorano asked her to bring some coffee to him in a bedroom of
the house. When she entered the room, he locked the door and
pushed her onto the bed. Daisy told Detective that Iris then began
knocking on the door and trying to get in. Daisy said that Meraz-
Zamorano was “putting his thing on the front of [her] body.” She
also said that Meraz-Zamorano “got on top of [her] and he put his
thingy inside of [her].” By “thing,” Daisy clarified that she was
referring to Meraz-Zamorano’s “thing up front.” She further
revealed that the contact happened “[u]nder the clothes” she was
wearing. When asked how this contact felt, Daisy said that she
was “grossed out” and that her “front part” felt “sticky, . . . almost
like glue.” Daisy said that Meraz-Zamorano’s “thing” had
something that was “white,” “slippery,” “slimy,” and “wet” on it.
She clarified that “the white stuff [was] around his thingy” when
he pulled it out of his pants. Eventually, Iris was able to open the

20230067-CA 3 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

door, at which point Daisy said she bit Meraz-Zamorano and ran
out of the room.

¶7 Daisy said that Meraz-Zamorano also touched her “private
parts” the next day. She said that he used “[p]art of his hand” to
touch “under [her] clothes . . . inside [of her] very strong on the
front and on the back.” When asked to clarify what she meant by
back, Daisy said it was what she used “[t]o poop.”

¶8 Finally, Daisy said that she was “afraid” to tell anyone
about the abuse because Meraz-Zamorano had told her, “If you
tell somebody I could kill your parents.” When asked how she felt
at the time of the interview, Daisy said she was still “scared”
Meraz-Zamorano would come back and abuse her again.
Detective reassured her by saying, “You know he’s in jail right
now.”

¶9 In her interview, Iris initially said that she had not told
Grandmother anything about Meraz-Zamorano’s abuse. But
when Detective reminded her that he had come to her house and
talked with her and Daisy, she began disclosing the abuse Meraz-
Zamorano inflicted on her. She said that Meraz-Zamorano had
touched her a “lot of times.” When asked what part of her body
she was talking about, she said that it was her “privacy” and “[i]n
[her] thingy” and that Meraz-Zamorano touched it with his hand
on top of her clothes. Iris also recalled a time when Meraz-
Zamorano locked himself and Daisy in his bedroom, and Iris
opened the door with a hanger so Daisy could escape.

¶10 Detective interviewed Meraz-Zamorano about a week
after the arrest. As relevant here, Detective testified that he had
gone to the police precinct on the night of the arrest to interview
Meraz-Zamorano but, because of a language barrier, he had to
delay the interview for a week. Detective further stated that
Meraz-Zamorano was transported to the precinct after his arrest
because Detective “wanted to interview him at some point.” In
the interview, Meraz-Zamorano denied that the abuse happened,

20230067-CA 4 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

but he admitted that “he played with the girls a lot” and there
might have been a time when he touched their buttocks. Meraz-
Zamorano also admitted that he had “touched the girls to check
them medically.”

Initial Legal Proceedings

¶11 Meraz-Zamorano was charged with one count of rape of a
child, one count of lewdness involving a child, and two counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child for his conduct involving
Daisy, with the aggravating factors being (1) the use of force,
duress, intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm; (2)
causing bodily or severe psychological injury; (3) being in a
position of special trust; and (4) penetration of a genital or anal
opening. Meraz-Zamorano was charged with three counts of
aggravated sexual abuse for his conduct involving Iris, with the
aggravating factors limited to (1) the use of force, duress,
intimidation, coercion, menace, or threat of harm; (2) causing
bodily injury or severe psychological injury; and (3) being in a
position of special trust. See Utah Code § 76-5-404.3(2) (listing
circumstances for aggravated sexual abuse of a child).

¶12 Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit the CJC
interviews under rule 15.5(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which provides the conditions for admitting
previously recorded statements of children in cases concerning a
charge of child abuse. The State clarified that it did not intend to
play the CJC interviews as long as Daisy and Iris were able to
testify. Meraz-Zamorano’s counsel (Counsel) objected, arguing
that the CJC interviews were not sufficiently reliable or
trustworthy to be admitted in any event. More specifically,
Counsel argued, “[T]he statements of the children were unreliable
because they were influenced by the interviewer through
challenge and repetition. Further, the statements were made after
the children were questioned by [Detective] and various family
members.” Counsel also asserted that allowing the CJC

20230067-CA 5 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

interviews to be played would “bolster the statements” of Daisy
and Iris and “unfairly prejudice [Meraz-Zamorano] at his trial.”
The trial court ruled that the CJC interviews were admissible,
finding that, “although not perfect,” the interviews were
“sufficiently reliable and trustworthy” to meet the threshold for
admission. When Meraz-Zamorano’s case was reassigned to a
new judge, Counsel asked for reconsideration of the prior judge’s
ruling. Concluding that the original ruling was “not incorrect,”
the new judge denied the motion to reconsider.

¶13 As relevant here, Counsel raised seven for-cause
challenges during jury selection. The trial court denied all these
for-cause challenges. After voir dire, Counsel used six
peremptory challenges to remove six of these challenged
members, and the State used one of its peremptory challenges to
remove the seventh. The trial court then empaneled eleven jurors
to try the case, none of whom had been challenged for cause.
Counsel affirmatively agreed she had selected the empaneled
jury.

Trial

¶14 The State called Daisy, Iris, Mother, Grandmother,
Detective, and several experts, whose relevant testimony we
recount here.

¶15 Daisy, who was by this time twelve years old, testified that
Meraz-Zamorano started abusing her when she was six years old.
She said that Meraz-Zamorano started “getting . . . naked” around
her to make her to feel “comfortable.” She also revealed that
Meraz-Zamorano started touching her arms, then moved to her
chest, eventually moving to her “waist and to [her] front private.”
She said this touching occurred “multiple times” and “[m]ostly in
his bedroom.” She further testified that the touching began “over
clothes” and then moved to touching “without clothes.” She said
that when she was seven, Meraz-Zamorano made her watch a
movie with him while he was naked. Then, she said, he undressed

20230067-CA 6 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

her and touched inside her “front private part” and her “butt”
with his fingers. She further testified that Meraz-Zamorano
“touched [her] with his front private part” when she was about
nine years old. She explained that he had told her to get him some
coffee, and when she brought it to his bedroom, he locked the
door, undressed her and “put his penis inside” of her “front
private part.” She testified that this “hurt [her] a lot,” that “white
stuff” came out of his penis, and that she started crying loudly.
Daisy said the abuse ended when Iris was able to unlock the door,
enter the room, and bite Meraz-Zamorano in the arm.

¶16 Daisy also testified that she never told Mother about the
abuse because she was “scared” that Meraz-Zamorano “was
going to do something” to Mother. She said that Meraz-Zamorano
would threaten her with a gun by putting a bullet in it and saying,
“[Y]ou better not tell anybody or . . . I will end . . . your family’s
life and your sister’s.” However, Daisy testified that she
eventually told Grandmother about the abuse after Iris had done
the same.

¶17 During the cross-examination of Daisy, the court asked the
prosecutor and Counsel whether the victim advocate should be
moved closer to where Daisy was sitting because Daisy seemed
“a little nervous.” But the prosecutor thought it was best to get
through her testimony as quickly as possible. The court agreed,
but it asked whether Iris would benefit from having the victim
advocate accompany her when she testified. The prosecutor said
he would ask Iris what she would prefer to do, and Counsel did
not object.

¶18 Iris, who was eleven years old at the time of trial, indicated
that she would prefer to testify with the victim advocate next to
her. Counsel did not object to this arrangement. Iris testified that
Meraz-Zamorano had touched her “private” over her clothes
more than five times with his hand. She also testified that on one
occasion she heard Daisy screaming from behind a locked door.

20230067-CA 7 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

She said that she unlocked the door and the two of them ran into
another room and locked the door. Iris said she never talked to
anyone about the abuse because Meraz-Zamorano threatened to
“kill [her] family” if she did.

¶19 Mother testified that a few months before she learned of
the abuse, she had noticed Daisy and Iris had become “really
aggressive,” “emotional,” and prone to crying. She said they
would hide behind her “every time they saw” Meraz-Zamorano.
Mother also said Daisy had to be treated for blood in her urine
and a UTI a few weeks before the abuse was revealed. She said
that she helped translate for the girls when they were initially
interviewed in the early morning hours after the party. She
clarified that this was the first she learned of the abuse. The
prosecutor asked Mother to describe the girls’ behavior in “the
immediate aftermath” of “when this all came out.” The following
exchange ensued:

Mother: Okay. Well, they can’t sleep at night. They
always have nightmares. My oldest daughter, . . .
she’s been having suicidal thoughts. Once she
tried to do it ‘cause she was scared to come to
court, so she tried to commit suicide.
Prosecutor: How long ago was that?
Mother: A month ago.

¶20 Counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial
due to the “extremely prejudicial” nature of the revelation that
Daisy had attempted suicide. “[T]he fact that she tried to commit
suicide a month ago in preparation for this trial,” Counsel argued,
is not something “the jury should have heard.” Counsel asserted
that given the “incredibly” and “overwhelming[ly] prejudicial”
nature of the revelation, a curative instruction would fall short,
leaving a mistrial as the only remedy. The trial court denied the
motion, noting that (1) the State did not intentionally elicit it, as
evidenced by the “shocked” look of the prosecutor on hearing

20230067-CA 8 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

Mother’s response, and (2) Daisy’s suicide attempt could be
explained in various ways. As a remedy, the court provided a
curative instruction to the jury to disregard that aspect of
Mother’s testimony.

¶21 Detective testified about his investigation into the abuse,
including his CJC interviews with Daisy and Iris. On cross-
examination, Counsel, quoting extensively from the transcript of
the CJC interviews, challenged Detective on the way he
questioned the girls. In particular, Counsel suggested that
Detective was trying to get the answers he would need in order
for the State to prosecute Meraz-Zamorano. Because Counsel
challenged the way the CJC interviews were conducted, the State
moved to introduce the videos themselves. The State argued that
since Counsel had gone through “each interview line by line of
the transcripts, . . . the easiest way to rebut [Counsel’s suggestion]
is to play the interviews of the children.” Counsel responded that
the cross-examination of Detective was to highlight deviations
from interview protocol and allowing the video to be played
would bolster the girls’ testimony by repeating “recitations of the
event themselves.” The court ruled that the State could play the
videos because the court had already determined they were
admissible and to allow the State to rebut the assertion that the
allegations were the result of “some kind of recent fabrication”
arising from “improper influence or motive.”

¶22 When Daisy’s CJC interview was played, the following
portion was inadvertently shown to the jury, despite a stipulation
to redact this part of the video:

Detective: Okay. So tell me how you feel now?
Daisy: I’m scared.
Detective: And tell me what you’re scared of?
Daisy: I don’t know. Maybe [Meraz-Zamorano]
getting back.

20230067-CA 9 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

Detective: Okay. And what scares you about [Meraz-
Zamorano] getting back?
Daisy: Like, he will do that again.
Detective: Okay. You know he’s in jail right now.
Okay. Give me one more minute. Let me talk to
my friends for a minute again.
Daisy: Yeah.
After the video was played, Counsel again moved for a mistrial.
Specifically, Counsel argued, “Considering the cumulative errors
that have occurred in regard to this matter, including the . . . issue
regarding the suicidal thoughts of [Daisy] on [the] first day of
trial, and [the] supportive way in which [Iris] was brought before
to testify, and now this information that [Meraz-Zamorano] was
in custody, I believe that at this point that [Meraz-Zamorano]
cannot have a fair trial and we ask for a mistrial.” The State
opposed the motion, arguing, “[T]here was talk [previously
elicited] through Detective . . . that [Meraz-Zamorano] was in
custody at the time that these interviews were happening, because
he said they took him in custody and then he went and
interviewed him later at . . . the police station.” Moreover, the
State noted that it was a brief statement made in the context of
explaining why Daisy need not be afraid. The trial court denied
the mistrial motion because there had “already [been] testimony
regarding the fact” that Meraz-Zamorano was in custody right
after his arrest and the CJC interviews “occurred at that same
time.” The court also ruled there was no cumulative error because
it had already ruled that the CJC interviews were admissible and
had “already addressed the issue about the suicide.”

¶23 In his defense, Meraz-Zamorano called a retired law
enforcement officer as an expert to address problems with the
way the girls’ interviews were conducted. The expert opined that
the initial interviews with Daisy and Iris should have been
recorded and conducted using “open-ended questions” and
should not have involved Mother. Regarding the CJC interviews,

20230067-CA 10 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

the expert also raised concerns about improper questioning
techniques employed by Detective.

¶24 Meraz-Zamorano also took the stand in his own defense.
He denied all the sexual abuse allegations. He testified that he and
Grandmother were having problems because he was having an
affair with another woman, which made Grandmother jealous. In
closing, Counsel argued that it was jealousy that prompted
Grandmother to claim that Daisy and Iris made allegations of
sexual abuse against Meraz-Zamorano. Counsel further argued
that Grandmother “made this accusation in the height of her
anger against [Meraz-Zamorano] in a fight about” his infidelity.

¶25 The jury convicted Meraz-Zamorano on all seven counts.
For the two counts of aggravated sexual abuse involving Daisy,
the jury marked on special verdict forms all four potential
aggravating factors identified in the jury instruction. See supra
¶ 11. For the three counts of aggravated sexual abuse involving
Iris, the special verdict forms, apparently due to an oversight,
again listed four potential aggravating factors when they should
have listed only three: they mistakenly included penetration.
Having received this incorrect form, the jury marked all four
aggravating factors, seemingly much to the surprise of the trial
court.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶26 Meraz-Zamorano appeals, arguing that the trial court
erred when it denied his for-cause challenges to several
prospective jurors, thus necessitating that he use all his
peremptory challenges on those challenged venire members. “A
trial court’s determination of whether to excuse a prospective
juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of
discretion.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 41, 299 P.3d 892
(cleaned up).

20230067-CA 11 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

¶27 Meraz-Zamorano next asserts that the trial court “erred
when it denied a motion and a renewed motion for a mistrial after
events portraying the children as scared and Meraz-Zamorano as
dangerous” were allowed to stand. We review a trial court’s
denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v.
Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 14, 469 P.3d 1150.

¶28 Meraz-Zamorano’s third claim is that the trial court “erred
when it granted the State’s motion to introduce” the CJC
interviews under rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. “Whether the trial court correctly admitted the
videotaped interviews into evidence pursuant to rule 15.5 is a
question of law that we review for correctness.” State v. Cruz, 2016
UT App 234, ¶ 16, 387 P.3d 618. 3

ANALYSIS

I. For-Cause Challenges

¶29 Meraz-Zamorano first argues that the trial “court erred
when it denied the six challenges for cause that corresponded to
the defense’s six peremptory challenges during jury selection.”
Meraz-Zamorano argues that the six potential jurors should have
instead been dismissed under the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(14) (“No person may serve

3. Meraz-Zamorano also asserts a claim of cumulative error. Our
supreme court has “repeatedly held that the doctrine will not be
applied when claims are found on appeal to not constitute error,
or the errors are found to be so minor as to result in no harm. In
other words, the doctrine will only be applied to errors that are
substantial enough to accumulate.” State v. Martinez-Castellanos,
2018 UT 46, ¶ 40, 428 P.3d 1038 (cleaned up). Because we conclude
there are no errors to accumulate, the doctrine does not apply
here.

20230067-CA 12 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror
can and will act impartially and fairly.”).

¶30 Meraz-Zamorano asserts that the district court’s denial of
his for-cause challenges was prejudicial because there was “a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result” if he had not
been forced to use all his peremptory challenges on jurors who
should have been removed for cause. More specifically, he argues
that because the case hinged on witness credibility, he was
prejudiced by having to use all his peremptory challenges on
venire members who were assertedly biased toward or against a
particular narrative: “In a case like Meraz-Zamorano’s, having a
hand in the jury composition—as opposed to using all
peremptory challenges on jurors who should have been removed
for cause—was reasonably likely to make a difference.” Meraz-
Zamorano further asserts that where “the jurors in [his] case
found an uncharged aggravator three times, bias must have
interfered with their ability to decide the evidentiary issues fairly
based on the law provided.”

¶31 “To prevail on a claim of error based on the court’s failure
to remove a prospective juror, a defendant must demonstrate that
(1) the court erred when it failed to excuse a prospective juror for
cause, and (2) the error prejudiced the defendant, or, in other
words, that a member of the jury that was empaneled was partial
or incompetent.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 41, 299 P.3d 892
(cleaned up).

¶32 For the purpose of our analysis, we will presume, without
deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying some
or all of Meraz-Zamorano’s for-cause challenges to venire
members. But even if the court did so err, Meraz-Zamorano
cannot show prejudice since none of the challenged individuals
sat on the jury.

¶33 Defendants are required to show something beyond
having to expend all their peremptory challenges to pursue a

20230067-CA 13 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

claim of jury bias. And that something is prejudice. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 30(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.”). But prejudice cannot be shown in this context
unless—at the very least—a challenged individual sat on the jury,
a principle that is well established by Utah precedent. See State v.
Ellis, 2020 UT App 119, ¶ 13 n.6, 473 P.3d 211 (“The loss of a
peremptory challenge alone [is] not sufficient to prejudice a party
and [does] not violate the constitution; in such cases, parties are
required to demonstrate prejudice, i.e., to show that a member of
the jury was partial or incompetent.” (cleaned up)).

¶34 Decades ago, the Utah Supreme Court “reject[ed] the
notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a
violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. So long
as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to
use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean
the Constitution was violated.” State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398
(Utah 1994) (cleaned up), superseded on other grounds by
constitutional amendment as stated in State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, 423
P.3d 1236. Thus, “to prevail on a claim of error based on the trial
court’s failure to remove a prospective juror for cause, a
defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member
of the actual jury that sat was partial or incompetent.” State v.
Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 24, 24 P.3d 948. In other words, an “error in
not removing a juror for bias on a for-cause challenge [is] not per
se reversible error”; instead, “for such an error to be reversible,
actual prejudice [has] to be shown, and the expenditure of a
peremptory challenge to remove a biased juror [is] not a sufficient
showing of prejudice.” State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 52, 992 P.2d
951. And again, “Even upon finding that a trial court erroneously
excluded a juror for cause, we will not reverse the jury verdict if
we find the error was harmless. To show prejudice, [an] appellant
must demonstrate that the jury that actually sat for the trial was
in some way partial or incompetent.” State v. Calliham, 2002 UT
86, ¶ 47, 55 P.3d 573 (cleaned up). In other words, even when there

20230067-CA 14 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

are “erroneous for-cause rulings,” the key determination is still
“whether there is sufficient prejudice in the circumstances of the
case to require a reversal of a conviction.” Saunders, 1999 UT 59,
¶ 55.

¶35 Here, no individual that Meraz-Zamorano challenged for
cause actually sat on the jury. This circumstance is fatal to any
automatic claim of prejudice based on the forced use of all
peremptory challenges to remove biased venire members. Meraz-
Zamorano cannot prove prejudice simply because he had to use
all his peremptory challenges on potential jurors that the trial
court passed in spite of his for-cause challenges. In other words,
to “demonstrate prejudice”—in addition to having exhausted his
peremptory challenges—Meraz-Zamorano still must “show that
a member of the jury was partial or incompetent.” Menzies, 889
P.2d at 398. Since no jurors Meraz-Zamorano thought should have
been removed for cause actually served on the jury, Meraz-
Zamorano must find jury bias or some other form of actual
prejudice grounded in a circumstance apart from the exhaustion
of his peremptory challenges.

¶36 Meraz-Zamorano attempts to show prejudice by pointing
to the fact that the jury checked the box for an aggravating factor
that should not have been included on the special verdict form for
the three counts involving the sexual abuse perpetrated against
Iris. Meraz-Zamorano argues that in doing so, “the jury based its
verdict on something other than the facts presented.” But this
assertion of prejudice is unavailing. After all, “a defendant
seeking a new trial because of alleged juror bias has the burden to
prove actual, not suppositional, bias.” State v. Wilder, 2016 UT
App 210, ¶ 15, 387 P.3d 512, aff’d, 2018 UT 17, 420 P.3d 1064. An
equally, and perhaps more, likely explanation here is that the jury
checked the box for the misplaced aggravator not because of bias
but because the trial court supplied it with a faulty special verdict
form. The misapplied aggravator was just as likely the result of
inattention of the lawyers and the judge as it was of juror bias.

20230067-CA 15 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

Meraz-Zamorano also claims that he was prejudiced because he
had to use all his “peremptory challenges in a child sex case that
hinged on credibility.” But the same could be said for many cases
involving the sexual abuse of a child. Because Meraz-Zamorano’s
assertions of bias are based on “generalized complaints,” State v.
Aguilar, 2022 UT App 97, ¶ 34, 516 P.3d 768, and supposition,
Wilder, 2016 UT App 210, ¶ 15, his claim of prejudice here
necessarily fails.

¶37 In sum, because Meraz-Zamorano has not demonstrated
that he was harmed by the allegedly improper denial of his for-
cause challenges—and instead articulates only generalized
grievance and unfounded speculation—his first claim of error
fails.

II. Mistrial Motions

¶38 Meraz-Zamorano next asserts that the trial court erred in
denying his motions for a mistrial. Meraz-Zamorano made two
motions for a mistrial. The first occurred after Mother’s reference
to Daisy’s attempted suicide, and it was limited to that issue
alone. The second was made after the CJC interview was played,
in which Detective mentioned Meraz-Zamorano was in jail. That
motion pointed to “cumulative errors” during the trial. Meraz-
Zamorano now claims that a “prejudicial theme” emerged from
the combination of three circumstances: (1) Mother saying that
Daisy attempted suicide because she was scared about coming to
court, (2) the State playing a short section of Daisy’s CJC interview
in which Detective told Daisy she did not need to be afraid of
Meraz-Zamorano because he was in jail, and (3) Iris having a
victim advocate near her during her trial testimony. He asserts
that the issues supporting his motions for a mistrial could not be
considered fleeting or passing because, when taken together, they
“developed a theme that Meraz-Zamorano was scary and that the
children needed protection,” resulting in a situation that was
“unduly prejudicial and warranted a mistrial.” Thus, Meraz-

20230067-CA 16 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

Zamorano claims the trial court should have granted a mistrial
because these circumstances indicated that a fair trial could not be
had.

¶39 When a “court denies a motion for a mistrial, we extend a
high level of deference to that decision, because trial courts are in
an advantaged position to determine the impact of courtroom
events on the total proceedings.” State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App
107, ¶ 17, 469 P.3d 1150 (cleaned up). “In exercising its discretion,
and in view of the practical necessity of avoiding mistrials and
getting litigation finished, the trial court should not grant a
mistrial except where the circumstances are such as to reasonably
indicate that a fair trial cannot be had and that a mistrial is
necessary to avoid injustice.” State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶ 46,
27 P.3d 1133 (cleaned up). “On appeal, the prerogative of a
reviewing court is much more limited. Unless the trial court’s
determination is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had
a fair trial, we will not find that the court’s decision was an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 45, 24 P.3d 948 (cleaned
up). And it is well established that “a mistrial is not required
where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made
in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony
presented.” State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 40, 108 P.3d 730; see also
Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ¶ 47 (concluding a trial court did not abuse
its discretion for denying a motion for a mistrial based on a
“vague, fleeting remark that was not elicited by the prosecutor”
(cleaned up)); Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 46 (“Our review of the record
indicates that [the challenged] statement . . . was not elicited by
the prosecutor, and was an isolated, off-hand remark, buried in
roughly 244 pages of testimony.”); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,
¶¶ 38–40, 993 P.2d 837 (concluding that a trial court’s denial of a
motion for a mistrial based on an improper reference to the
defendant’s “other crimes” was not “plainly wrong” since the
reference was innocuous, insignificant, and vague), abrogated on
other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. In

20230067-CA 17 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

short, to obtain a mistrial, a “defendant must make some showing
that the verdict was substantially influenced by the challenged
testimony,” State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 448 (Utah 1986), and that
task is extremely difficult when the challenged testimony is vague
or made in passing.

¶40 We address each of Meraz-Zamorano’s bases for a mistrial
in turn.

A. Mention of Suicide Attempt

¶41 Meraz-Zamorano argues that Mother’s mention of Daisy’s
suicide attempt prejudiced him sufficiently to justify a mistrial.
But Mother’s statement was not intentionally elicited, was made
in passing, and was relatively innocuous in light of the other
testimony that had been presented. The prosecutor had asked
Mother how the girls were doing in the immediate aftermath of
the abuse. Mother explained that they had trouble sleeping, that
Daisy had experienced suicidal thoughts, and that Daisy had
attempted suicide about a month before the trial. Mother’s brief
mention of Daisy’s suicidal thoughts and suicide attempt was
made in passing, and the State did not dwell on it. Moreover, after
Counsel had drawn the court’s attention to the potential
impropriety of the statement, the court provided a curative
instruction directing the jury to disregard Mother’s mention of
Daisy’s suicide attempt and related ideation. “We normally
presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there
is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to
follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the
effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.”
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) (cleaned up). This
presumption is well-established. See State v. Hodges, 517 P.2d 1322,
1324 (Utah 1974) (“In the absence of the appearance of something
persuasive to the contrary, we assume that the jurors were
conscientious in performing to their duty, and that they followed

20230067-CA 18 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

the instructions of the court.”); State v. Wright, 2013 UT App 142,
¶ 42, 304 P.3d 887 (“In the absence of any circumstances
suggesting otherwise, courts presume that the jury follows
[curative] instructions.”); State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (“[A] curative instruction . . . is ordinarily
presumed on appeal to be effective.”). Thus, in order to show that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
mistrial based on Mother’s reference to Daisy’s suicide attempt,
Meraz-Zamorano must allege facts showing that Mother’s
comment so tainted the jury that he was denied a fair trial. Apart
from speculation about the comment creating an image that
Meraz-Zamorano was someone from whom the girls needed
protection, he has not done so. Accordingly, we cannot conclude
he was prejudiced such that there is a reasonable probability that
hearing Mother’s statement denied him a fair and impartial trial.

B. Mention of Meraz-Zamorano Being in Custody

¶42 Counsel also argued for a mistrial because Detective’s
mention of Meraz-Zamorano being in custody was “inherently
prejudicial” and “presumptively presum[ed] him guilty.” But the
jury already knew that Meraz-Zamorano was in custody at the
time of the CJC interviews. Detective testified at trial that Meraz-
Zamorano was arrested and taken to the precinct because
Detective intended to interview him about the allegations. The
CJC interviews took place a few days after the allegations were
reported. Thus, it would have come as no surprise to the jury to
hear that Meraz-Zamorano was in custody when the CJC
interviews took place. Given that Detective’s statement was
merely cumulative of evidence that had already been presented
without objection, we see no grounds for a mistrial based on this
passing statement. See Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 23 (“But this
is not necessarily grounds for a mistrial, especially given that [the
witness’s] passing reference to the existence of criminal activity
by [the defendant] was cumulative of evidence that [had already
been] elicited from other sources.”). In other words, the

20230067-CA 19 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

challenged segment of the CJC interview merely repeated what
the jury already knew. Therefore, it was “relatively innocuous,”
see Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 40, and Meraz-Zamorano’s claim of
prejudice fails.

C. Presence of Victim Advocate

¶43 Meraz-Zamorano suggests that having the victim advocate
accompany Iris during her testimony contributed to a prejudicial
narrative against him. This aspect of his argument is simply
without legal foundation. As Meraz-Zamorano acknowledges,
Daisy was “in tears” throughout her testimony. It was thus
obvious that it would also be difficult for the younger Iris to testify
about the abuse she had suffered at the hands of Meraz-
Zamorano. Utah law states, “[I]t is necessary to provide child
victims and child witnesses with additional consideration and
different treatment than that usually afforded to adults. . . . The
treatment should ensure that children’s participation in the
criminal justice process be conducted in the most effective and
least traumatic, intrusive, or intimidating manner.” Utah Code
§ 77-37-1(2). In applying this statute, our supreme court has
determined that it is “clearly within the discretion afforded the
trial court” to allow an adult to accompany a child victim of sexual
abuse during testimony. See State v. Billsie, 2006 UT 13, ¶ 15, 131
P.3d 239; see also id. (“In this case, the victim was an eight-year-old
child at the time of trial. The trial court determined that the victim
was in need of comfort or support in order to testify, due to her
young age and sensitivities. Allowing an adult to accompany the
child-victim while she testified was well within the discretion of
the court.”). Instead of calling our attention to any actual
prejudice stemming from the presence of the victim advocate
during Iris’s testimony, Meraz-Zamorano would have us
presume prejudice based on the speculative impact of the victim
advocate’s presence. We simply will not accept that invitation,
especially in light of our legislature’s express desire to facilitate
the testimony of child victims in “the most effective and least

20230067-CA 20 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

traumatic, intrusive, or intimidating manner.” Utah Code § 77-37-
1(2)(b).

D. Cumulative Effect of Alleged Errors

¶44 Regarding Meraz-Zamorano’s contention that the
cumulative effect of Mother’s statement, Detective’s statement,
and the presence of the victim advocate during Iris’s testimony
requires a mistrial, Meraz-Zamorano has failed to show that he
was prejudiced. First, the curative instruction regarding the
suicide reference adequately addressed the possible prejudice
stemming from Mother’s statement. Second, Detective’s
statement merely repeated information that the jury already
knew. Third, the presence of the victim advocate was entirely
proper, so Meraz-Zamorano has no basis for prejudice on that
circumstance. Accordingly, even when taken together, we are
unpersuaded that Meraz-Zamorano was so prejudiced as to result
in an unfair trial.

¶45 In sum, we detect no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
denial of Meraz-Zamorano’s mistrial motions.

III. CJC Interviews

¶46 Meraz-Zamorano next argues that the trial court erred in
permitting the State to introduce the CJC interviews, arguing that
they were unreliable under rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which, as relevant here, provides,

In any case concerning a charge of child abuse or of
a sexual offense against a child, the oral statement
of a victim or other witness younger than 14 years
of age which was recorded prior to the filing of an
information or indictment is, upon motion and for
good cause shown, admissible as evidence in any
court proceeding regarding the offense if . . . the
court views the recording before it is shown to the

20230067-CA 21 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

jury and determines that it is sufficiently reliable
and trustworthy and that the interest of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into
evidence.

Utah R. Crim. P. 15.5(a)(8).

¶47 Meraz-Zamorano argues that the CJC interviews were not
sufficiently reliable to be admitted because they were not
conducted using best practices, the girls were prompted to arrive
at their accusations, and the girls’ statements in the interviews
were tainted since the interviews were conducted after
Grandmother had talked to the girls and after the girls had talked
to each other and since Detective conducted unrecorded
interviews prior to the recorded CJC interviews. Meraz-
Zamorano asserts that allowing the CJC interviews to be played
was prejudicial because the jury heard the allegations twice, and
such “repetition amounted to improper bolstering,” which he
asserts was especially harmful since “this case amounted to a
credibility contest.”

¶48 We reject this claim of error for two reasons. First, Counsel
made the asserted unreliability of the CJC interviews the central
point of her presentation at trial. Rather than merely making the
unreliability argument, Counsel quoted extensively from the
transcript of the CJC interviews in cross-examining Detective and
challenging Detective on the way he questioned the girls. It was
in this context that the trial court granted the State’s motion to
play portions of the interviews. The court reasonably concluded
that because Counsel had used transcripts of the interviews to
suggest Detective had employed improper questioning
techniques to influence the girls’ responses, the State could, in
turn, play the videos to allow the jury to hear the questioning and
observe the “demeanor” and “attitude” of the girls during the
interview session. We agree with the trial court. Because Counsel
used the transcripts to support her assertion that the interviews

20230067-CA 22 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

were conducted in a coercive manner, it was only fair that the
State should be allowed to use the videos—which had already
been determined to be sufficiently reliable to be admissible—to
address that alleged defect. See State v. Johnson, 2016 UT App 223,
¶ 63, 387 P.3d 1048 (stating that fairness requires “allowing the
State to introduce enough of the written statement to not only
counter defense counsel’s tactical attacks on specific elements of
[a victim’s] testimony but also to fairly respond to his strategic
aim of impeaching [a victim’s] credibility generally”).

¶49 Second, we are not convinced that Meraz-Zamorano was
prejudiced by the playing of the interviews. In other words, even
if the CJC interviews should not have been admitted, there is not
a reasonable likelihood of a different result absent their
admission. See State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1295 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (“A substantial right of a party is affected if, viewing
the evidence as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood a
different result would have been reached absent the error.”); see
also Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Commc’ns Corp., 2015 UT App 134,
¶ 17, 351 P.3d 832 (“[E]rror in the district court’s evidentiary
rulings will result in reversal only if the error is harmful.”).

¶50 Here, “the graphic nature” of the girls’ description of
Meraz-Zamorano’s sexual abuse “guaranteed that jurors would
remember it—perhaps despite their best efforts—with or without
[]watching the CJC video recordings.” State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App
234, ¶ 46, 387 P.3d 618. At trial, Daisy spoke in detail about Meraz-
Zamorano putting his penis and fingers inside her “front private
part” and that “white stuff” came out of his penis. At trial, Iris also
described Meraz-Zamorano touching her “private” “front part”
with his hand. Given the graphic and detailed testimony the girls
offered at trial, any bolstering created by the CJC interviews’
repetition of the abuse Meraz-Zamorano inflicted on them was
minimal—certainly falling far short of creating a reasonable
likelihood of a different result had the CJC interviews not been
played.

20230067-CA 23 2025 UT App 110
State v. Meraz-Zamorano

¶51 Meraz-Zamorano’s claim that the trial court erred in
admitting the CJC interviews fails because the evidence was
properly admitted and because Meraz-Zamorano cannot show
how he was harmed by its admission.

CONCLUSION

¶52 Meraz-Zamorano’s claim with respect to the for-cause
challenges being denied fails for lack of prejudice. Moreover, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Meraz-
Zamorano’s mistrial motions. Finally, Meraz-Zamorano’s
assertion that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction
of the CJC interviews fails for lack of prejudice and because their
admission was proper under the circumstances of this case.

¶53 Affirmed.

20230067-CA 24 2025 UT App 110