Prime Insurance Company v. Dixon

2025 UT App 38

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PRIME INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellee,
v.
KEVIN DIXON AND WBTL, LLC,
Appellees,

MICHELLE DYER,
Intervenor and Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20230932-CA
Filed March 13, 2025

Third District Court, West Jordan Department
The Honorable L. Douglas Hogan
No. 220902813

Cassandra Dawn, Attorney for Appellant
Andrew D. Wright, Andrew B. McDaniel, Axel
Trumbo, and Kaileen Balzano, Attorneys for
Appellee Prime Insurance Company

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and AMY J. OLIVER
concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Michelle Dyer appeals the district court’s denial of her
motion to intervene in a lawsuit brought by Prime Insurance
Company (Prime) against its insured—the commercial carrier
company WBTL, LLC (WBTL)—and one of its covered drivers—
Kevin Dixon. She also appeals the declaratory judgment entered
by the district court. We conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Dyer did not meet the requirements for an
intervention as of right, and we therefore affirm the court’s denial
Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

of her motion to intervene. And because Dyer is a non-party to the
proceedings below, we do not have jurisdiction to address any
additional issues she raises on appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In the spring of 2021, Dixon was pulling a tractor-trailer for
WBTL in the state of Missouri. Dyer’s daughter (Daughter) was a
passenger in Dixon’s truck. At one point, the truck drifted off the
right side of the road and ultimately overturned down the
embankment. Tragically, Daughter died as a result of the accident.
Several months later, Dyer filed a wrongful death lawsuit in
Missouri against WBTL and Dixon, among others.

¶3 In May 2022, Prime, whose principal place of business is in
Utah, brought a declaratory judgment action in Utah’s Third
District Court against WBTL and Dixon, seeking a determination
as to Prime’s coverage responsibilities under WBTL’s commercial
automobile insurance policy (the Policy). The complaint
referenced Dyer’s claims against WBTL and Dixon and sought a
declaration “to determine the respective rights and obligations of
[Prime] and [WBTL and Dixon] under the Policy.” Prime argued
that “the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Policy make it
clear no coverage is provided for passengers” and that “Prime’s
obligations for the Accident are limited to the minimum financial
responsibility obligations [of $750,000] under the MCS-90
Endorsement.” 1

1. An MCS-90 endorsement is attached to an insurance policy “to
assure compliance by the insured, . . . as a motor carrier of
property, with Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
and the rules and regulations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration.” Form MCS-90, Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,
U.S. Dep’t of Transp. 2 (rev. 2024), https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov
(continued…)

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

¶4 Neither WBTL nor Dixon responded to Prime’s complaint,
and default was entered as to each. Prime then moved for default
judgment, and the district court granted the motion. The court
entered a final declaratory judgment, which included the
following provisions regarding Prime’s responsibilities under the
Policy as they related to Daughter’s injuries and death:

There is no coverage under the plain language of the
Policy for any claims arising from the injuries or
death of [Daughter] as [Daughter] was a passenger
. . . and not an employee of WBTL.

. . . Prime’s obligations for coverage for any
claims arising from the injuries or death of
[Daughter] due to the Accident are limited to the
minimum financial responsibility obligations under
the MCS-90 Endorsement.

. . . In the event Prime is required to make any
payments on [claims brought related to Daughter]
under the MCS-90 Endorsement as a result of the
Accident, WBTL has an obligation to reimburse
Prime for those payments.

¶5 A few months later, Dyer moved to intervene in the case
and set aside the declaratory judgment. First, she argued that she

/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/2024-08/MCS-90%20Form.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JR7Y-P7VN]. Under the endorsement, the insurer
generally agrees to pay “any final judgment recovered against the
insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the
operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles” and the insured
agrees to reimburse the insurer “for any payment that [the
insurer] would not have been obligated to make under the
provisions of the policy” but for the endorsement. Id. The
statutory minimum level of financial responsibility relevant here
is $750,000. See 49 C.F.R. § 387.9 (2023).

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

should be allowed to intervene under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure because she “was never properly added as a
necessary party in these proceedings” even though the
declaratory judgment “is binding on [her] and impairs and
impedes her legal interests.” Specifically, she asserted that she has
an interest in this action “based on the wrongful death of”
Daughter and the claims brought in her Missouri wrongful death
lawsuit. And she stated that the declaratory judgment in this case
“would ‘as a practical matter impair or impede’ an ability to
protect that interest by denying insurance coverage without
meaningfully engaging in the legal process to determine whether
such an assertion actually comports with Utah law.” (Quoting
Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).)

¶6 Second, Dyer argued that the declaratory judgment should
be set aside under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This argument was based on several reasons, including that it was
a mistake for Prime to fail to join her as a necessary party, that
Prime failed to properly serve Dixon, that her neglect in not filing
an earlier motion was excusable, that adjudication on the merits
is preferred, and that Prime “engaged in misrepresentation with
the Court.”

¶7 Prime opposed Dyer’s motion, arguing that Dyer should
not be permitted to intervene because she had not “claimed a
legally protectable interest that can be impacted by the outcome
of this litigation.” Prime also specifically addressed each of Dyer’s
arguments for setting aside the declaratory judgment, concluding
that such action was not warranted under any of the asserted
grounds.

¶8 The district court, after hearing oral argument on the
matter, ultimately denied Dyer’s intervention motion. The court
denied intervention because it determined that “Dyer does not
have a legally protectible interest in this litigation.” The court
reasoned that “third parties have no standing to seek affirmative
relief against an alleged tortfeasor’s insurer”; that the declaratory

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

judgment “does not, and indeed cannot, determine the rights or
duties of” Dyer; and that “the instant litigation does not impact
[Dyer’s] rights in any way.” As to Dyer’s motion to set aside the
declaratory judgment, the district court determined that because
it had denied her motion to intervene, “Dyer, as a non-party, ha[d]
no standing or other ability to pursue” a motion to set aside the
declaratory judgment.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶9 Dyer appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to
intervene based on its determination that she did not have a
legally protectable interest in the litigation. “[A] ruling on a
motion to intervene encompasses several types of analysis, each
subject to a different standard of review.” Supernova Media, Inc. v.
Pia Anderson Dorius Reynard & Moss, LLC, 2013 UT 7, ¶ 14, 297 P.3d
599. The specific type of analysis at issue in this appeal—“whether
the intervenor has claimed an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action”—is reviewed for
correctness. Id. ¶ 16 (quotation simplified).

¶10 Dyer raises additional challenges, arguing that the district
court erred in failing to set aside the declaratory judgment and
that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the declaratory
judgment. But, as we discuss below, as a non-party, Dyer is not
entitled to appeal these issues, and we therefore do not entertain
these additional arguments. See Mendenhall v. Summerwood Invs.,
LLC, 2024 UT App 45, ¶ 15, 548 P.3d 904.

ANALYSIS

I. The Motion to Intervene

¶11 Under rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the district court must allow anyone to intervene who “claims an

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject
of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to
protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent
that interest.” 2 Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Dyer contends that she
possesses an interest relating to the coverage determination that
is at issue in the instant case. She argues that she “wants to be able
to collect her full judgment” arising from her wrongful death
lawsuit and that as a result of her wrongful death claim against
WBTL and Dixon in Missouri, she has “a property interest in the
outcome of this litigation.” We agree with the district court’s
conclusion that this alleged right is not a “right” sufficient to
secure the right to intervene under rule 24(a)(2).

¶12 As our supreme court has explained, “a party moving for
intervention must file an accompanying pleading setting forth the
claim or defense for which intervention is sought” and that this
pleading requires “(1) a statement of the claim showing that the
party is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for
specified relief.” In re United Effort Plan Trust (Swallow v. Jessop),
2013 UT 5, ¶ 38, 296 P.3d 742 (quotation simplified). If a party
seeking intervention has, instead, asserted only “abstract
[interests], disconnected from any demand for judgment for
specified relief,” then that party “lack[s] an interest in the subject

2. Dyer argues that “the circumstances before the court now have
little guiding case law” because the Utah Declaratory Judgment
Act does not include rules for joinder or intervention. But the very
case on which Dyer bases her argument explains that our supreme
court has exercised its constitutionally granted authority to create
rules of civil procedure addressing joinder and intervention and
that “[b]ecause nothing in the Act purports to modify [those
rules], those rules govern.” Bell Canyon Acres Homeowners Ass’n v.
McLelland, 2019 UT 17, ¶¶ 16, 18, 443 P.3d 1212. Thus, here we are
appropriately guided by the applicable rules of civil procedure
and the case law interpreting and applying those rules.

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

matter of the dispute sufficient to sustain their intervention under
rule 24(a)(2).” Id. (quotation simplified); see also In re J.T., 2023 UT
App 157, ¶ 19, 542 P.3d 517 (“[F]or an interest to qualify under
rule 24(a)(2) as an interest related to the subject matter of an
action, it must be a legally protectable interest, one on the basis of
which the applicant for intervention articulates a demand for
specified relief.”). Furthermore, this court has recently stated that
an “inchoate right or interest” that will become established only
upon some future occurrence of events is a right that “ha[s] not
yet matured into a legally protectable one that could form the
basis for intervention as of right under rule 24(a)(2).” 3 In re J.T.,
2023 UT App 157, ¶ 24 n.7.

3. Dyer argues that the instant case “is not simply an interpretation
of contract and rights or facts as relate to the named parties” but
is also determining “facts and law relating to” Daughter. As an
example, she points to the district court’s determination that there
was “no coverage under the plain language of the Policy for any
claims arising from the injuries or death of [Daughter] as
[Daughter] was a passenger . . . and not an employee of WBTL.”
But in reviewing the district court’s decision, it is clear that
language does not represent a factual finding the court made in
the face of disputed facts about Daughter’s status as a passenger
in the vehicle. Instead, the court’s reasoning was focused on the
interpretation of the Policy and, in so doing, it reasoned that
because Daughter was a passenger—a fact over which there is
apparently no dispute considering that Dyer herself asserted as
much in her complaint in the wrongful death case—Prime’s
coverage obligations were limited under the contractual
language. And in any event, Dyer, as a non-party, is not legally
bound by the district court’s judgment—a point she concedes on
appeal. See generally Utah Code § 78B-6-403(1) (“[A] declaration
may not prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
proceeding.”); Bell Canyon Acres Homeowners Ass’n, 2019 UT 17,
(continued…)

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

¶13 We also consider as instructive our supreme court’s
decision in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Chugg, 315 P.2d 277
(Utah 1957). In that case, an insurance company brought a
declaratory action against its insured, seeking a determination of
rights under the relevant automobile insurance contract. See id. at
278. A third party who had commenced a separate suit against the
insured for damages resulting from an automobile accident was
also joined as a defendant. 4 See id. at 278, 281. In reaching its
decision as to the insurance contract, the Chugg court observed,
“Had [the third party] objected to his joinder in this action, which
he did not do, . . . it would have been error to have compelled his
joinder . . . .” Id. at 281. The Chugg court wanted “to repel any
inference which may be drawn from this opinion that one who
claims to be damaged by the negligent act of another, is a proper
party to an action by the insurer of the latter under a public
liability policy, whereby a declaratory judgment is sought

¶ 13 (“[E]ven if appellants sought a declaration purporting to
affect the legal interests of [any] outsiders, that declaration would
have no legal effect on the outsiders unless they were joined in the
action or were privies to a party joined in the action . . . .”).

4. Joinder and intervention both consider whether the third party
claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the current
proceeding. Compare Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (providing for joinder
of a third party who “claims an interest relating to the subject of
the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in
his absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest”), with id. R. 24(a)(2) (providing for
the intervention by a third party who “claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and
is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter
impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest,
unless existing parties adequately represent that interest”).

20230932-CA 8 2025 UT App 38
Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

declaring the legal effect of the terms of such policy.” Id. The
Chugg court further reasoned,

The “transaction” involved in this action is
one between the insurer and insured, namely their
contract. Such contract can be construed without
reference to any liability having accrued
thereunder. This being so, there is no issue of law or
fact in common between the insurer and the
plaintiff, or potential plaintiff, to a tort action
against the insured. The tort victim has no present
legal interest in the insurance contract.

Id. 5

¶14 Accordingly, we have no trouble affirming the district
court’s conclusion that Dyer did not, at the time of her requested
intervention in Prime’s declaratory judgment action, have a
“present legal interest in the insurance contract” existing between
Prime and WBTL. Id. Although she expressed that she “wants to
be able to collect her full judgment” in her wrongful death case,
at the time she sought intervention, no such judgment existed.
Instead, it remained to be seen if a judgment in her favor would
eventually materialize in that case. Thus, any interest Dyer has

5. Dyer questions the applicability of Chugg here, pointing out
certain language from a dissenting opinion in the case and also
asserting that the case precedes “the development of third-party
beneficiary rights in a pending tort action as a transferable
property right.” But we, of course, cannot place more reliance on
the language from a dissenting opinion than on the language
incorporated into the binding majority opinion. And we fail to see
how the transferability of her rights to pursue the wrongful death
claim alters whether such a claim amounts to a matured legally
protectable interest in the contract interpretation at issue here. As
we discuss above, the unadjudicated claim itself does not meet
that requirement.

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

based on such a hypothetical judgment was inchoate and
insufficient to have given her the right to intervene in the present
action. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Dyer’s
motion to intervene.

II. Additional Issues

¶15 On appeal Dyer also challenges issues beyond the denial of
her motion to intervene, specifically, the district court’s refusal to
set aside the declaratory judgment and the district court’s alleged
lack of jurisdiction to enter the declaratory judgment. But, as
Prime correctly maintains in its appellate briefing, because Dyer’s
motion to intervene was properly denied, she is not a party to this
action, which means she generally is “not entitled to an appeal as
of right,” Utah Down Syndrome Found., Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome
Ass’n, 2012 UT 86, ¶ 9, 293 P.3d 241, and may appeal only the
denial of her motion to intervene, see Millard County v. Utah State
Tax Comm’n ex rel. Intermountain Power Agency, 823 P.2d 459, 461
(Utah 1991) (“[A]n order denying a motion to intervene is a final
disposition of the claims asserted by the applicant for intervention
and is appealable.”).

¶16 The situation here is similar to that in Mendenhall v.
Summerwood Investments, LLC, 2024 UT App 45, 548 P.3d 904. In
that case, the appellants sought review of both the district court’s
order denying their motion to intervene and the court’s later order
dismissing the underlying action. See id. ¶ 9. As to intervention,
the Mendenhall court recognized that the denial of the motion to
intervene was properly raised by the appellants on appeal. Id.
¶ 12. However, as to the challenged dismissal order, the
Mendenhall court determined that because the appellants “were
not parties to the underlying action when the action was
dismissed,” they were not “entitled to an appeal as of right” and
the appellate court was “without jurisdiction” to consider such an
appeal. Id. ¶ 15 (quotation simplified).

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

¶17 Our supreme court gave similar instruction in Brigham
Young University v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d
678, overruled on other grounds by Madsen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
NA, 2012 UT 51, 296 P.3d 671. There, certain appellants who had
moved to intervene in the underlying case (but whose motion to
intervene had been denied via an oral ruling) appealed the district
court’s supplemental order that a previous judgment could be
enforced against their assets. See id. ¶¶ 45–46. Notwithstanding
the fact that the supplemental order contained provisions
concerning the appellants, the Tremco court concluded, “As
nonparties, they cannot appeal the supplemental order. Where an
appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we
must dismiss.” Id. ¶ 46 (quotation simplified). The Tremco court
noted that when the denial of the motion to intervene was
reduced to a written order, that order would be subject to appeal,
but the court stated that such an appeal would still not be the
appropriate vehicle for challenging the validity of the
supplemental order. See id. ¶ 46 n.7.

¶18 Dyer attempts to differentiate these cases, asserting that the
jurisdictional issues fatal to those appeals were due to timeliness
issues and that the cases do not limit our authority to consider
issues beyond the denial of her motion to intervene. But this is
simply not an accurate reading of these cases. In Mendenall, it is
true that the notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after
the denial of the appellants’ motion to intervene and that the appeal
“from that order” was therefore dismissed because it was
untimely. 2024 UT App 45, ¶ 14. But the notice of appeal was filed
within thirty days of the district court’s order of dismissal, making
the appeal timely as to that issue. See id. ¶ 9. Thus, the sole
jurisdictional failure mentioned as to the appeal of the underlying
dismissal order was that the appellants “were not parties to the
underlying action when the action was dismissed” and were
therefore not entitled to an appeal as of right. Id. ¶ 15.

¶19 As to Tremco, although the appellee had raised timing
issues regarding the appeal of the district court’s supplemental

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Prime Insurance Co. v. Dixon

order—and although the court focused on these timing issues to
dismiss the appeal of an appellant who was a party to the
underlying proceedings—that was not the basis for the dismissal
of the appeal brought by the non-party appellants. See 2005 UT 19,
¶¶ 45–47. Instead, as to those non-party appellants, the Tremco
court made its decision based on the “even more fundamental
jurisdictional problem” that they were not parties to the
proceeding. Id. ¶ 46.

¶20 Thus, prior case law clearly establishes we are without
jurisdiction to consider Dyer’s appeal of issues beyond the denial
of her motion to intervene.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We determine that the district court correctly denied
Dyer’s motion to intervene based on the lack of a legally
protectable interest. And this court does not have jurisdiction to
consider Dyer’s appeal as to issues beyond the denial of her
motion to intervene. Affirmed.

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