Schvaneveldt v. South Davis Metro Fire

2022 UT App 2
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GARY S CHVANEVELDT,
Petitioner,
v.
S OUTH DAVIS M ETRO F IRE S ERVICE A REA,
Respondent.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20210431-CA
Filed January 6, 2022
Original Proceeding in this Court
Randall K. Edwards and Jeanne D. Marshall,
Attorneys for Petitioner
Todd J. Godfrey and Jayme L. Blakesley,
Attorneys for Respondent
Before JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER , DAVID N.
M ORTENSEN , and R YAN M. HARRIS.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	This matter is before the court on South Davis Metro Fire
Service 	Area’s 	(South 	Davis 	Fire) 	motion 	for 	summary
disposition based on lack of jurisdiction.
¶2 	South Davis Fire is a “service area,” a species of “local
district” organized pursuant to statutory authority. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 17B-2a-901 to -907 (LexisNexis 2017 & Supp. 2021);
id. § 17B-1-102(27) (Supp. 2021). By statutory definition, a service
area is a political subdivision of the state, see id. § 17B-1-103(1)(a)
(Supp. 2021), and is not a state agency, see id. § 63G-4-103(1)(b)
(2019). South Davis Fire terminated Gary Schvaneveldt from his
position as a firefighter. The decision to terminate was made by
the Fire Chief of South Davis Fire and was then sustained, on
appeal, by an independent hearing officer retained by South

Schvaneveldt v. South Davis Metro Fire
20210431-CA 	2 	2022 UT App 2
Davis Fire for the specific purpose of hearing the appeal of the
decision to terminate. Schvaneveldt seeks judicial review of that
decision.
¶3 	South 	Davis 	Fire 	argues 	that 	no 	statute 	confers
jurisdiction on this court to allow it to review the final decision
of 	South 	Davis 	Fire 	to 	terminate 	Schvaneveldt. 	Utah 	Code
section 78A-4-103(2)(a)
defines 	the 	outermost 	limits 	of 	our 	appellate
jurisdiction, 	allowing 	us 	to 	review 	agency
decisions 	only 	when 	the 	legislature 	expressly
authorizes a right of review. It is not a catchall
provision authorizing us to review the orders of
every administrative agency for which there is no
statute 	specifically 	creating 	a 	right 	to 	judicial
review. In the absence of such a specific statute, we
have no jurisdiction.
DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627, 627–28
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (cleaned up). Here, 	Schvaneveldt can
identify 	no 	statute 	allowing 	this 	court 	to 	review 	the 	final
decision of South Davis Fire.
¶4 	Schvaneveldt points us to two different statutes that he
believes may confer jurisdiction upon this court, but neither
statute is applicable to service areas. First, Schvaneveldt argues
that the Utah Administrative Procedures Act may operate to
confer jurisdiction in this court. But that statute applies only to
agencies 	of 	the 	state. 	See 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	63G-4-102(1)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2021). Agency is, in turn, defined as
a board, commission, department, division, officer,
council, 	office, 	committee, 	bureau, 	or 	other
administrative 	unit 	of 	this 	state, 	including 	the
agency head, agency employees, or other persons
acting on behalf of or under the authority of the

Schvaneveldt v. South Davis Metro Fire
20210431-CA 	3 	2022 UT App 2
agency head, but does not mean the Legislature, the
courts, the governor, any political subdivision of the
state, 	or 	any 	administrative 	unit 	of 	a 	political
subdivision of the state.
Id. § 63G-4-103(1)(b) (2019) (emphasis added). South Davis is a
political subdivision of the state. See id. § 17B-1-103(1)(a) (Supp.
2021). Thus, the Administrative Procedures Act is not applicable
to this matter.
¶5 	Schvaneveldt next directs our attention to a provision in
the Utah Municipal Code that contains a procedure under which
municipal 	employees 	can 	seek 	judicial 	review 	of 	adverse
employment 	decisions. 	See 	id. 	§ 	10-3-1106 	(2015). 	But 	this
provision is of no assistance to Schvaneveldt, because he is not—
and 	was 	not—a 	municipal 	employee. 	As 	South 	Davis 	Fire
correctly 	points out, 	the 	review procedure 	set 	forth 	in 	the
municipal code applies only to municipalities. See id. § 10-1-106
(stating that the municipal code “shall apply to all municipalities
incorporated or existing under the law of the State of Utah”).
And South Davis Fire, by definition, is not a municipality. See id.
§ 10-1-104(5) (Supp. 2021) (setting forth a statutory definition of
“municipality” that does not include political subdivisions of the
state, 	service 	areas, 	or 	special 	districts). 	Thus, 	this 	section
likewise fails to provide this court jurisdiction to review South
Davis Fire’s decision. And because Schvaneveldt directs our
attention 	to 	no 	other 	potentially 	helpful 	statute, 	we 	must
conclude that there exists no statutory provision that allows us
to review of the final decision of South Davis Fire.1
1. Schvaneveldt may not be completely without remedy under
applicable statutes and rules. South Davis Fire suggests that
Schvaneveldt could file a petition for extraordinary relief in the
appropriate district court, pursuant to rule 65B(d) of the Utah
(continued…)

Schvaneveldt v. South Davis Metro Fire
20210431-CA 	4 	2022 UT App 2
¶6 	Faced 	with 	the 	absence 	of 	any 	applicable 	statute,
Schvaneveldt contends that South Davis Fire should be estopped
from asserting that this court lacks jurisdiction, because South
Davis Fire’s policy manual specifically identified section 10-3-
1106 of the Utah Code and stated that its decisions were subject
to the review process set forth in the Utah Municipal Code. We
agree with Schvaneveldt that South Davis Fire’s reference to the
municipal 	code 	was 	unfortunate 	and 	even 	potentially
misleading. We urge South Davis Fire to remove that reference
from its manual. Nevertheless, that reference is insufficient to
confer jurisdiction on this court.
¶7 	It “’is a well-established rule that a court cannot acquire
jurisdiction of the subject matter by estoppel.’” Martin v. Martin,
511 	P.2d 	1097, 	1099 	(Okla. 	1973) 	(cleaned 	up) 	(quoting 	28
Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 73); see also People v. Lara, 226
P.3d 322, 330 (Cal. 2010) (“[F]undamental jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent.”). Similarly, Utah
courts have recognized that the conduct of parties cannot create
jurisdiction where it otherwise would not lie. See In re D.A.J.,
2015 UT App 74, ¶ 6, 347 P.3d 430 (stating that “[i]t is well
(…continued)
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Davis County v. Clearfield City,
756 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating that where there
is no specific, statutorily prescribed method for judicial review of
city council action, review is available by “traditional means” of
extraordinary 	writ). 	We 	also 	note 	that 	this 	case 	may 	have
identified a potential gap in Utah statutes: as this case has been
presented to us, it appears that employees of state agencies and
of municipalities have the benefit of established procedures for
seeking administrative and eventually judicial review of adverse
employment decisions, but employees of local districts may not.
To 	the 	extent 	that 	this 	gap 	is 	unintended, 	it 	may 	be 	an
appropriate subject for legislative attention.

Schvaneveldt v. South Davis Metro Fire
20210431-CA 	5 	2022 UT App 2
settled 	that 	parties 	cannot 	stipulate 	to 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction”); State v. Schmidt, 2015 UT App 96, ¶ 12 n.1, 348
P.3d 1206 (“Jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court by
stipulation.” (cleaned up)). Thus, the reference in South Davis
Fire’s 	policy 	manual 	to 	the 	Utah 	Municipal 	Code’s 	review
process does not create jurisdiction by estoppel.
¶8 	For these reasons, we lack jurisdiction to review South
Davis Fire’s decision to terminate Schvaneveldt. We therefore
grant South Davis Fire’s motion for summary disposition and
dismiss this matter for lack of jurisdiction.