Holste v. State

2018 UT App 67
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
M ATTHEW JAY HOLSTE,
Appellant,
v.
S TATE OF U TAH , G ARY R. HERBERT, S EAN D. R EYES,
DEPARTMENT OF C ORRECTIONS, AND R OLLIN C OOK,
Appellees.
Opinion
No. 20160965-CA
Filed April 19, 2018
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Paul G. Maughan
No. 160904796
Nathan K. Phelps, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes, Erin T. Middleton, Amanda N.
Montague, Attorneys for Appellees
JUDGE R YAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which J UDGES
K ATE A. TOOMEY and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 	Matthew Jay Holste (Holste) filed this lawsuit seeking a
judicial declaration that he is not required to register as a sex
offender under Utah law. The district court dismissed Holste’s
lawsuit, and determined that Holste does indeed need to register
as a sex offender. We agree, and therefore affirm.
¶2 	In 2006, while residing in Idaho, Holste entered a plea of
guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen
years of age, in violation of Idaho law. See Idaho Code Ann. § 18-
1508 (West 2018). Upon entry of Holste’s plea, the Idaho court

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ordered “that the entry of judgment be withheld,”1 and placed
Holste on probation for a term of eight years conditioned upon,
among other requirements, Holste registering as a sex offender.
See id. § 18-8307 (West 2018) (establishing the procedure for a
criminal defendant to register as a sex offender). Thereafter,
Holste registered as a sex offender in Idaho, and successfully
complied with the other terms of his probationary sentence. In
2010, the Idaho court entered an order setting aside Holste’s
guilty plea and dismissing the case with prejudice. The 2010
order did not affect Holste’s registration requirement; indeed,
Holste concedes that he is still required to register as a sex
offender in Idaho.
¶3 	In or about 2010, Holste moved from Idaho to Utah, and
soon thereafter he received a letter from the Utah Department of
Corrections 	(the 	Department) 	informing 	him 	that 	he 	was
“required to register as a sex offender [in Utah] because of [his]
Idaho State conviction in 2006.” Holste complied, and registered
in Utah as a sex offender, and has been so registered ever since.
¶4 	In 2016, Holste filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaratory
judgment that he was not required to register as a sex offender in
Utah. 	The 	Department 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	Holste’s 	lawsuit,
1. 	This procedure 	is analogous to Utah’s plea 	in 	abeyance
procedure. Compare Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2604(1) (West 2018)
(stating 	that 	a 	defendant 	“who 	has 	received 	a 	withheld
judgment,” upon a showing that the defendant “did not admit,
in 	any 	probation 	violation 	proceeding 	that 	the 	defendant
violated any of the terms or conditions of any probation,” may
be permitted, upon request, to “set aside the plea of guilty”),
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (“Upon
finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of
a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may reduce the degree
of the offense or dismiss the case . . . .”).

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20160965-CA 	3 	2018 UT App 67
asserting that Utah law requires Holste to register as a sex
offender in Utah. The district court agreed with the Department,
and determined that Holste was and is required to register, and
therefore 	dismissed 	Holste’s 	lawsuit 	for 	declaratory 	relief.
Holste now appeals.
¶5 	We review for correctness a district court’s ruling on a
motion to dismiss. Bylsma v. R.C. Willey, 2017 UT 85, ¶ 10.
Likewise, 	we 	review 	for 	correctness 	the 	district 	court’s
interpretation of a statute. Meritage Cos. v. Gross, 2017 UT App
223, ¶ 4, 409 P.3d 111.
¶6 	The term “offender,” as defined in Utah’s sex offender
registration statutes, includes any person who falls within the
statutory definition of “sex offender.” See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
41-102(11) (LexisNexis 2017). The term “sex offender,” in turn,
includes (among other categories of persons) anyone “who is
required to register as a sex offender by any state . . . .” Id. § 77-
41-102(17)(c)(i). 	Because 	the 	state 	of 	Idaho 	requires 	him 	to
register as a sex offender, Holste concedes that he is both a “sex
offender” and an “offender” as those terms are defined in Utah’s
statutory scheme.
¶7 	Holste nevertheless argues that, despite his status as a
“sex offender” under Utah law, he need not register as such. His
argument in this regard is based on the premise that Utah’s
statutory scheme requires only a subset of (i.e., less than all) sex
offenders to actually register. Holste grounds his interpretation
in the text of Utah Code section 77-41-105(1), which states that
“[a]n offender convicted by any other jurisdiction is required to
register.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-41-105(1) (LexisNexis 2017).
Holste asserts that, due to the dismissal of his Idaho criminal
case, 	he 	cannot 	be 	considered 	“convicted” 	by 	any 	other
jurisdiction, and therefore he need not register as a sex offender
in Utah.

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¶8 	Even if we assume, for purposes of this appeal, that the
term “convicted” means what Holste says it means,2 and that
therefore 	subsection 	(1) 	does 	not 	apply 	to 	him, 	Holste’s
argument still suffers from a fatal infirmity: Holste ignores the
plain 	language 	of 	subsection 	(3)(a), 	which 	states 	that 	“an
offender shall . . . register.” Id. § 77-41-105(3)(a).3 Because Holste
concedes that he is an “offender,” this statutory provision is
dispositive of this appeal: all offenders shall register, even if they
do not fit within any of the other subsections of the statute.
2. The Utah sex offender registry statutes do not contain a
definition of “convicted,” although other sections of the Utah
Code use the term “conviction” in a way that may suggest that a
plea held in abeyance is not a “conviction.” See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-2a-2(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (differentiating between a “plea
[held] in abeyance” and a “judgment of conviction”). To erase
any ambiguity, other states have separately defined the term
“conviction” within their sex offender registry statutes. In Idaho,
for instance, a “conviction” for the purposes of the sex offender
statutes “means that the person has pled guilty or has been
found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or
withheld judgment.” See Idaho Code Ann. § 18-8304(3) (West
2018). Our disposition of this case by reference to subsection
(3)(a) relieves us of having to here decide what the legislature
intended the term “convicted” to mean in Utah’s sex offender
statutes, and specifically whether the legislature intended for
that term to be defined by reference to other states’ laws.
3. During oral argument, we raised the potential applicability of
Utah Code section 77-41-105(3)(a), which neither the parties nor
the district 	court addressed, and 	invited 	the parties to file
supplemental briefs addressing its potential applicability, which
invitation both parties accepted.

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¶9 	Holste 	attempts 	to 	escape 	the 	plain 	language 	of
subsection (3)(a) by arguing that interpreting that subsection to
require 	registration 	of 	every 	“offender” 	would 	eviscerate
subsection (1) and render it mere “surplusage”; indeed, the
provisions of subsection (3)(b) already require “an offender who
is convicted in another jurisdiction” to “register.” See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-41-105(3)(b); see also State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 9, 217
P.3d 265 (explaining that “statute[s] should be construed . . . so
that no part [or provision] will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy
another” (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks 	omitted)). 	We 	are 	unpersuaded. 	Even 	under 	our
interpretation of subsection (3)(a), subsection (1) retains vitality
because, unlike subsection (3)(a) or (3)(b), it informs offenders
who were “convicted” in another jurisdiction how soon they
must register in Utah upon moving here. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-41-105(1) (stating that “offender[s] convicted by any other
jurisdiction . . . shall register . . . within 10 days of entering the
state”).
¶10 	Although 	the 	district 	court 	did 	not 	address 	the
applicability of subsection (3)(a), an appellate court can affirm on
any basis supported by the record. See State v. Kropf, 2015 UT
App 223, ¶ 9, 360 P.3d 1. We hold that subsection (3)(a) requires
all “offenders” who do not fit within any of the other subsections
to 	register 	as 	a 	sex 	offender 	with 	Utah’s 	Sex 	Offender
Registration Program. Because Holste is an “offender” who (at
least according to his definition of “conviction”) does not fit
within any of the other subsections, subsection (3)(a) requires
him to register. On this basis, we affirm the district court’s order
granting the Department’s motion to dismiss.