State v. Robinson

2018 UT App 227
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
TIMOTHY R YAN R OBINSON ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20160990-CA
Filed December 13, 2018
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Vernice S. Trease
No. 161901905
Debra M. Nelson and Wojciech S. Nitecki, Attorneys
for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Jonathan S. Bauer, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and R YAN M. HARRIS
concurred.
HAGEN, Judge:
Timothy 	Ryan 	Robinson 	appeals 	his 	sentence 	for	¶1
aggravated assault, 	arguing 	that 	the district 	court 	failed 	to
properly resolve an inaccuracy in his presentence investigation
report (PSR). Specifically, Robinson objected to the four points
added to his criminal history score based on his prior conviction
for assault on a police officer. In determining that the assault was
a “person crime with injury” for purposes of the sentencing
guidelines, the district court looked to the PSR, police report,
and photographs from the prior crime and concluded that an
“injury” occurred where Robinson punched the police officer in
the face, causing pain and a laceration to his nose. Robinson

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	2 	2018 UT App 227
argues that the court should not have relied on such evidence
and that the court abused its discretion by finding that the injury
sustained 	by 	the 	police 	officer 	qualified 	for 	the 	four-point
assessment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Following 	an 	episode 	of 	domestic 	violence 	between	¶2
Robinson and his wife, the State charged Robinson with several
offenses, including aggravated assault. In exchange for the State
dismissing six of the charges, Robinson pled guilty to one count
of aggravated assault, a third-degree felony, with a weapon
enhancement.
At the district court’s request, Adult Probation and Parole	¶3
(AP&P) conducted an investigation and submitted a PSR. As
part of the PSR, AP&P calculated a criminal history assessment
score for Robinson, which it then incorporated into the Utah
Sentencing Commission’s general matrix (Sentencing Matrix).
The 	Sentencing 	Matrix 	“compare[s] 	a 	defendant’s 	‘criminal
history assessment’ score with the degree of the offense of which
he ha[s] been convicted” to “assist sentencing judges in deciding
whether or not to incarcerate.” State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 561–
62 (Utah 1987) (Durham, J., dissenting).
Robinson received a criminal history assessment score of	¶4
eight, placing him in criminal history category III. Four of the
eight criminal history points were based on Robinson’s prior
conviction for attempted homicide, which AP&P categorized as
a “person crime with injury.”1 When viewed in conjunction with
1. This category no longer appears in the Utah Sentencing
Guidelines. 	“The 	distinction 	between 	prior 	person 	crimes
with or without injury has been replaced with a specific number
for a specific type of offense by severity.” Utah Sentencing
Comm’n, 	Adult 	Sentencing 	& 	Release 	Guidelines 	1 	(2017),
(continued…)

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	3 	2018 UT App 227
the 	third-degree 	felony 	to 	which 	Robinson 	pled 	guilty,
Robinson’s category III score produced a recommendation of an
“intermediate sanction” on the Sentencing Matrix—i.e., “any
sanction 	between 	regular 	probation 	and 	prison.” 	Utah
Sentencing Comm’n, Adult Sentencing & Release Guidelines 17
(2015), 	https://www.utah.gov/pmn/files/172049.pdf. 	AP&P
recommended, however, that the district court deviate from that
recommendation 	and 	impose 	the 	maximum 	sentence 	of
one-to-ten years in the Utah State Prison “due to the extremely
brutal nature of the offense, as well as the defendant’s repeated
history of violent behaviors,” which indicate that Robinson is
“an immediate public safety risk.”
Robinson challenged the accuracy of the PSR, arguing	¶5
that 	AP&P 	had 	incorrectly 	categorized 	his 	prior 	attempted
homicide conviction as a “person crime with injury” based on
the 	mistaken 	belief 	that 	the offense 	had 	resulted 	in 	death.
Because no injury or death had occurred during the commission
of that prior crime, Robinson argued that he should have been
awarded only two points instead of four toward the total score
on his criminal history assessment. A reduced criminal history
score of six would have placed him in criminal history category
II, resulting in a recommendation of “probation” under the
Sentencing Matrix.
After 	reviewing 	the 	objections 	to 	the 	PSR, 	AP&P	¶6
admitted 	that 	it 	had 	erroneously 	stated 	that 	Robinson
had previously caused the death of another individual. But
AP&P 	determined 	that 	Robinson 	should 	nevertheless 	be
assessed four points for committing a prior person crime with
injury based on a separate class A misdemeanor conviction for
assaulting a police officer.
(…continued)
https://justice.utah.gov/Sentencing/Guidelines/Adult/2017%20A
dult%20Sentencing%20and%20Release%20Guidelines.pdf.

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	4 	2018 UT App 227
Robinson moved the district court to correct the PSR,	¶7
contending that AP&P’s amended evaluation was “driven by the
earlier 	error[] 	rather 	than 	a 	fair 	assessment 	of 	the 	facts”
underlying the prior assault conviction. Robinson further argued
that the award of four points was “particularly inappropriate”
because the PSR for the prior assault conviction reflected that the
police officer reported “no physical or emotional injury as a
result of the incident.”
The district court requested that Robinson submit the	¶8
police report, photographs, and PSR from the prior assault case
for it to consider. Before relying on that evidence to determine
whether Robinson’s prior person crime conviction involved an
injury, 	the 	court 	asked, 	“[D]oes 	anybody 	contest 	what 	the
photograph and the police reports say?” Robinson’s counsel
responded, “No.” The court followed up by asking, “[D]oes
everybody agree the police reports are what they are? This is
what 	they 	say? 	The 	photographs 	of 	the 	police 	officer.” 	In
response, Robinson’s counsel stated, “That is correct.”
The district court ultimately determined that Robinson’s	¶9
prior assault conviction qualified as a “person crime with injury”
under the Sentencing Matrix. Because the sentencing guidelines
do not include a definition of “injury,” the district court referred
to the Utah Criminal Code, which defines “bodily injury” as
“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (LexisNexis 2017). Based on this
definition, the court found “the officer did have an injury,” even
if it was minor. In support of its finding, the court pointed to the
police report, which stated that the officer had been “punched in
the nose by [Robinson],” and the photograph, which showed
“blood on the left side of his nose.”
The 	district 	court 	adopted 	the 	PSR, 	including 	the	¶10
four-point enhancement for the prior assault, and ultimately
sentenced Robinson to one-to-ten years in prison, the maximum
permissible 	sentence 	for 	a 	third-degree 	felony 	with 	an
enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon. In doing so,

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	5 	2018 UT App 227
the court stated that its decision to send Robinson to prison was
not “based on those two extra points.”
Robinson appeals. Although he does not challenge the	¶11
ultimate sentence imposed, he asserts that his PSR “will follow
him through the justice system” and seeks “a remand for the
purpose of correcting the inaccuracy in his PSR.”
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Robinson raises two sentencing issues on appeal, one	¶12
procedural and one substantive. As to the procedural issue, he
contends that the district court failed to comply with its legal
duty to properly resolve the alleged inaccuracy contained in the
PSR. “Whether the [district] court properly complied with a legal
duty 	to 	resolve 	on 	the 	record 	the 	accuracy 	of 	contested
information in sentencing reports is a question of law that we
review for correctness.” State v. Waterfield, 2014 UT App 67, ¶ 29,
322 P.3d 1194 (quotation simplified). Robinson also argues that
the court erred in relying on unreliable police reports and
photographs to resolve his objection. Whether the court based its
sentencing decision on reliable information also “presents a
question 	of 	law 	that 	is 	reviewed 	for 	correctness.” 	State 	v.
Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, ¶ 24, 94 P.3d 295.
Substantively, 	Robinson 	contends 	that 	the 	district	¶13
court 	abused 	its 	discretion 	in 	determining 	that 	the 	injury
sustained 	by 	the 	police 	officer 	rendered 	that 	conviction 	a
“person 	crime 	with 	injury.” 	This 	sentencing 	determination
resulted in a higher criminal history assessment score. District
courts are afforded wide latitude in sentencing, and we will
reverse 	a 	sentencing 	decision 	only 	if 	the 	court 	abused 	its
discretion. See State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 34, 282 P.3d 985. “This
court reviews the sentencing decisions to discover any abuse of
discretion by applying varying standards of review consistent
with the issues raised.” State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). For questions of law, we employ a correctness

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	6 	2018 UT App 227
standard. See id. at 50. We review questions of fact for clear error.
See id.
ANALYSIS
I. Procedural Challenge
Under Utah Code section 77-18-1(6)(a), “[a]ny alleged	¶14
inaccuracies in the [PSR], which have not been resolved by the
parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought
to the attention of the sentencing judge.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-1(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). To resolve such issues,
the 	district 	court 	must: 	(1) 	“consider 	the 	objection 	raised;”
(2) “make findings on the record regarding the accuracy of the
information at issue;” and (3) “determine on the record the
relevance of that information as it relates to sentencing.” State v.
Abelon, 	2016 	UT 	App 	22, 	¶ 	19, 	369 	P.3d 	113 	(quotation
simplified).
At sentencing, Robinson objected to the PSR’s calculation	¶15
of his criminal history assessment score. Specifically, Robinson
claimed that his prior conviction for assault on a police officer
did not qualify as a “person crime with injury,” which carried a
four-point 	assessment. 	Robinson 	argued 	that 	assessing 	four
points was only “rational when . . . someone is convicted or
pleads guilty to an offense which requires as an element some
type of injury, [and] this isn’t such an offense.”
The 	district 	court 	considered 	Robinson’s 	objection	¶16
and 	made 	findings 	on 	the 	record 	that 	Robinson’s
prior conviction qualified as a person crime with injury for
purposes 	of 	calculating 	his 	criminal 	history 	score. 	On
appeal, 	Robinson 	challenges 	the 	court’s 	use 	of 	the 	police
report 	and 	photographs 	from 	the 	prior 	offense 	in 	making
that determination. Whether it was permissible for the court to
look 	to 	this 	evidence 	to 	categorize 	the 	prior 	conviction
involves 	two 	sub-issues, 	only 	the 	first 	of 	which 	was
preserved. 	First, 	we 	consider 	whether 	the 	district 	court

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	7 	2018 UT App 227
properly looked beyond the elements of the prior offense to
the 	underlying 	facts 	that 	gave 	rise 	to 	that 	conviction.
Second, because we conclude that the court properly looked
beyond the elements of the offense, we consider whether the
court based its determination on sufficiently reliable evidence.
This 	second 	sub-issue 	was 	not 	preserved, 	and 	although
Robinson asks us to reach it through the plain error exception to
the preservation rule, Robinson cannot establish plain error on
appeal. See State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶¶ 18–19, 416 P.3d 443
(holding 	that 	appellate 	courts do 	not 	consider 	unpreserved
arguments unless an exception to the preservation rule applies
and 	acknowledging 	plain 	error 	as 	an 	exception 	to 	the
preservation rule).
A. 	Consideration of Facts Underlying Prior Conviction
First, Robinson contends that the district court erred in	¶17
categorizing his prior conviction for assault on a police officer as
a “person crime with injury” because that offense does not
include injury as an element. But nothing in the language of the
Sentencing Matrix limits the application of the “person crime
with injury” category to crimes in which injury is an element of
the offense.
The 	phrase 	appears 	only 	once 	in 	the 	2015 	Utah	¶18
Sentencing Guidelines, written as “person crime w/injury” at
the 	top 	of 	the 	Sentencing 	Matrix. 	See 	Utah 	Sentencing
Comm’n, 	Adult 	Sentencing 	& 	Release 	Guidelines 	19 	(2015),
https://www.utah.gov/pmn/files/172049.pdf. 	The 	instructions
accompanying the Sentencing Matrix provide no guidance on
how to interpret the phrase. Nor do they define or place any
limitation on the term “injury.” If the sentencing commission
had wished to limit application of the four points to those person
crimes in which injury was an element of the offense, it could
have easily done so, either in the instructions or by changing the
language in the Sentencing Matrix to “person crime w/injury as
an element.”

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	8 	2018 UT App 227
In contrast, the instructions to the Sentencing Matrix do	¶19
define the term “person crime.” A person crime means “any
offense listed in Utah Code Annotated 76-3-203.5(c), as well as
those designated as person crimes in Addendum B.” Id. at 14.
Addendum B instructs courts to “first determine the degree of
the offense (1st degree, 2nd degree, or 3rd degree) by referring to
the judgment and commitment order or other official court
document. Then, look on this list to determine whether the
offense is categorized as murder, death, person, possession, or
other.” Id. at 43. While offenses that constitute “person” crimes
are listed by statute number, Addendum B does not indicate
which of those person crimes should be categorized as “person
crimes w/injury.” This omission strongly suggests that such a
determination is not categorical based on the elements of the
prior offense, but depends on the facts underlying the prior
conviction.
In the absence of any contrary direction in the sentencing	¶20
guidelines, we apply the general proposition that the sentencing
court “must be permitted to consider any and all information
that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the
particular defendant, given the crime committed.” Wasman v.
United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563 (1984). The calculation of a
defendant’s 	criminal 	history 	score 	does 	not 	increase 	the
statutorily prescribed sentence.2 “The Sentencing Matrix creates
2. We note that the United States Supreme Court has adopted a
categorical approach to determining whether a prior offense
triggers an enhanced sentence under federal recidivism statutes.
Under this approach, a court may look “only to the statutory
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts
underlying those convictions.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 600 (1990). Lower courts have extended this approach to
enhancements under the federal sentencing guidelines based on
prior convictions, see, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 843 F.3d 1215,
1221–22 (10th Cir. 2016), and some states have applied the
(continued…)

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	9 	2018 UT App 227
a 	starting 	point 	for 	sentencing 	judges 	by 	reflecting 	a
recommendation for a typical case, but judges are not bound
by 	the 	recommendations 	and 	are 	to 	take 	both 	aggravating
and 	mitigating 	circumstances 	into 	account, 	along 	with
other 	pertinent 	considerations, 	when 	making 	sentencing
decisions.” State v. Harvey, 2015 UT App 92, ¶ 3, 348 P.3d
1199 	(quotation 	simplified). 	In 	particular, 	“the 	decision
whether to grant probation is within the complete discretion of
the 	trial 	court,” 	and, 	in 	making 	that 	decision, 	district
courts properly consider a defendant’s “character, personality[,]
and attitude” in conjunction with his or her “prior record.” State
v. 	Miera, 	2015 	UT 	App 	46, 	¶ 	7, 	345 	P.3d 	761 	(quotation
simplified). We see no reason why, as part of this assessment,
courts should be prohibited from considering the underlying
facts forming the basis of a defendant’s prior person crime
conviction, including whether the victim of that crime was
injured. See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117–18 (Utah 1985)
(holding 	that 	district 	courts 	have 	“substantial 	discretion 	in
imposing a sentence” and may consider all “reasonably reliable
and relevant information in exercising [that] discretion”).
(…continued)
categorical approach to their own recidivism statutes as well, see,
e.g., State v. Dickey, 329 P.3d 1230, 1240 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014).
However, a criminal history assessment under the Utah
Sentencing 	Guidelines 	does 	not 	function 	as 	a 	sentencing
enhancement. Robinson’s third-degree felony conviction with
the weapons enhancement carried a term of imprisonment not to
exceed ten years, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203(3), -203.8(2)
(LexisNexis 2017), regardless of how his prior conviction for
assault on an officer was characterized. Therefore, the court’s
determination that Robinson’s prior conviction involved injury
had no impact on the statutorily prescribed sentence. We express
no opinion on whether the categorical approach would apply if
the classification of Robinson’s prior conviction had subjected
him to an increased penalty.

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	10 	2018 UT App 227
B. 	Due Process Challenge to Reliability of Evidence
Having 	decided 	that 	a 	court 	may 	look 	beyond	¶21
the 	elements 	of 	the 	prior 	offense 	in 	categorizing 	a 	prior
conviction as a “person crime with injury,” we turn to the
second procedural sub-issue: whether the court’s determination
was based on reliable evidence. The State argues that Robinson
has waived this issue under the doctrine of invited error. We
disagree.
Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	invited 	error, 	“where 	a 	party	¶22
makes an affirmative representation encouraging the court to
proceed without further consideration of an issue, an appellate
court need not consider the party’s objection to that action on
appeal.” State v. Bruun, 2017 UT App 182, ¶ 59, 405 P.3d 905
(quotation 	simplified). 	According 	to 	the 	State, 	Robinson
repeatedly assured the district court that he did not contest the
reliability of the police reports and photographs. In support of its
position, the State points to the sentencing hearing where the
court asked, “[D]oes anybody contest what the photograph and
the police reports say?” Robinson responded, “No.” Soon after,
the court again inquired, “[D]oes everybody agree the police
reports 	are 	what 	they 	are? 	This 	is 	what 	they 	say? 	The
photographs of the police officer.” In response, Robinson stated,
“That is correct.”
The district court’s inquiry went to the authenticity of the	¶23
documents, not their reliability. Under rule 901(a) of the Utah
Rules 	of 	Evidence, 	a 	“proponent 	must 	produce 	evidence
sufficient 	to 	support 	a 	finding 	that 	the 	item 	is 	what 	the
proponent claims it is.” Utah R. Evid. 901(a). In affirming that
the documents “are what they are” or say “what they say,”
Robinson 	waived 	any 	challenge 	to 	the 	authenticity 	of 	the
documents, 	an 	evidentiary 	issue 	distinct 	from 	Robinson’s
challenge to the reliability of the evidence. Because Robinson
never affirmatively represented that he had no objection to the
court considering the documents for purposes of sentencing, he
did not waive the issue asserted on appeal.

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	11 	2018 UT App 227
But neither did Robinson preserve the issue. To preserve	¶24
an issue for appeal, a party “must specifically raise the issue in a
timely fashion and must introduce supporting evidence and
relevant legal authority.” State v. Salgado, 2018 UT App 139, ¶ 27,
427 P.3d 1228. Although Robinson objected to looking beyond
the elements of the offense in determining whether his prior
assault conviction was a person crime with injury, he never
argued that the police report and photographs from the prior
offense were unreliable. Because the issue was unpreserved,
Robinson 	must 	establish 	an 	exception 	to 	the 	preservation
requirement.
Robinson argues that the court’s reliance on this evidence	¶25
amounted 	to 	plain 	error. 	To 	prevail 	under 	the 	plain-error
exception to the preservation rule, Robinson must establish that:
(1) “an error exists”; (2) “the error should have been obvious to
the district court”; and (3) “absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome.” State v. Williams, 2018
UT App 176, ¶ 8 (quotation simplified). “If any one of these
requirements is not met, plain error is not established.” State v.
Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, ¶ 13, 189 P.3d 85 (quotation
simplified).
Robinson 	contends 	that 	the 	district 	court 	plainly	¶26
erred because police reports and photographs are insufficiently
reliable to satisfy due process. Due process “requires that a
sentencing 	judge 	act 	on 	reasonably 	reliable 	and 	relevant
information 	in 	exercising 	discretion 	in 	fixing 	a 	sentence.”
State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). “When there
is 	evidence 	in 	the 	record 	showing 	a 	sentencing 	judge’s
reliance 	on 	specific 	information, 	we 	will 	not 	consider 	it
improper 	for 	a 	judge 	to 	rely 	on 	such 	information 	if 	the
evidence 	in 	question 	had 	indicia 	of 	reliability 	and 	was
relevant in sentencing.” State v. Moosman, 2017 UT App 11, ¶ 9,
391 	P.3d 	395 	(quotation 	simplified). 	“It 	is 	the 	defendant’s
burden to demonstrate that the information relied upon was
unreliable or irrelevant.” Id. (quotation simplified).

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	12 	2018 UT App 227
Robinson 	has 	cited 	no 	authority 	to 	support 	the	¶27
proposition 	that 	police 	reports 	and 	photographs 	generated
during the investigation of a prior offense do not meet this
threshold 	standard 	of 	reliability. 	Instead, 	he 	cites 	cases
concerning 	the 	reliability 	of 	police 	reports 	for 	purposes 	of
determining 	their 	admissibility 	under 	the 	Utah 	Rules 	of
Evidence. See State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983)
(concluding 	that 	police 	reports 	made 	in 	anticipation 	of
prosecution and offered by the State do not provide a basis for
reliability required under the business records exception); Layton
City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294, 1297–98 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(extending Bertul to an incident report introduced at a probation
revocation hearing where the district court applied the Utah
Rules of Evidence). But it is well established that “[e]vidence that
is inadmissible at the guilt stage may be admissible for the
purpose of sentencing.” Howell, 707 P.2d at 117. “The rules of
evidence in general, and the rules on hearsay exclusions in
particular, are inapplicable in sentencing proceedings.” State v.
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); see also Utah R. Evid.
1101(c) (providing that the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply
at sentencing). The cases Robinson cites, which involve the
application of the business records exception to the hearsay rule,
are similarly inapplicable in the sentencing context.
“For an error to be obvious to the trial court, the party	¶28
arguing for the exception to preservation must show that the law
governing the error was clear or plainly settled at the time the
alleged error was made.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 21, 416
P.3d 443 (quotation simplified). In the absence of any authority
suggesting that police reports and photographs relating to a
prior 	conviction 	are 	inherently 	unreliable 	for 	purposes 	of
sentencing, Robinson cannot establish that the district court
plainly erred in relying on such evidence.
II. Substantive Challenge
In addition to the procedural claims addressed above,	¶29
Robinson raises a substantive challenge to the district court’s

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	13 	2018 UT App 227
conclusion 	that 	the 	injuries 	sustained 	by 	the 	police 	officer
warranted a four-point increase to his criminal history score.
Specifically, Robinson argues that because the victim’s injuries
were 	minor, 	Robinson’s 	score 	and 	the 	resulting 	sentence
recommendation 	were 	disproportionate, 	especially 	when
compared with other offenses listed under the person crimes
category in the sentencing guidelines.
Robinson’s 	challenge 	again 	involves 	two 	sub-issues:	¶30
whether 	the 	district 	court 	correctly 	interpreted 	“injury” 	to
include minor injury and whether the district court abused its
discretion in concluding that the police officer suffered such an
injury. These two sub-issues are each subject to a different
standard of review. See State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049–50
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). First, we review the district court’s legal
interpretation of the term “injury” for correctness. See id. Second,
we 	review 	for 	clear 	error 	the 	court’s 	factual 	finding 	that
Robinson’s prior assault conviction involved “injury.” See id.
A. 	Legal Interpretation of “Injury”
We first consider whether the district court correctly	¶31
interpreted the term “injury,” as used in the Sentencing Matrix,
to include minor injury. Sentencing guidelines are commonly
interpreted using traditional canons of statutory interpretation.
See, e.g., United States v. Enrique-Ascencio, 857 F.3d 668, 672 (5th
Cir. 	2017) 	(“Federal 	sentencing 	guidelines 	are 	analyzed
according to the rules of statutory interpretation.”); State v.
Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012) (“We apply the rules of
statutory 	construction 	to 	our 	interpretation 	of 	[Minnesota’s]
sentencing guidelines.”).
If the guidelines included a definition of “injury,” “we	¶32
would of course look there first.” See O’Hearon v. Hansen, 2017
UT App 214, ¶ 24, 409 P.3d 85. But as we have explained, see
supra ¶¶ 18–19, the sentencing guidelines neither define the
term, 	nor 	do 	they 	specify 	the 	type 	or 	severity 	of 	injuries
contemplated 	by 	this 	category 	of 	offenses. 	Notably, 	the

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	14 	2018 UT App 227
sentencing commission did not use a modifier to limit the prior
person crime category to only those crimes involving “serious”
or “substantial” injuries, as the legislature often does throughout
the Utah Criminal Code. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-
601, -102, -103, 76-5-107, 76-6-102 (LexisNexis 2017).
In the absence of a specialized definition, we interpret	¶33
“injury” according to its plain meaning. See O'Hearon, 2017 UT
App 214, ¶ 24. “A starting point for a court’s assessment of
ordinary 	meaning 	is 	the 	dictionary.” 	Id. 	¶ 	25 	(quotation
simplified). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bodily injury” as
“[p]hysical damage to a person’s body.” Injury, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Similarly, the Utah Code’s definition
provides that “bodily injury” includes “physical pain, illness, or
any impairment of physical condition.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
601. Either definition is sufficiently broad to include a punch to
the face resulting in pain and a small laceration. Therefore, the
district court did not err in concluding that “a minor injury . . . is
nonetheless 	an 	injury” 	that 	qualifies 	for 	the 	four-point
assessment.
B. 	Factual Finding that an Injury Occurred
Second, we review the district court’s factual finding that	¶34
Robinson’s prior assault conviction involved injury. We defer to
factual findings at sentencing unless they are clearly erroneous.
See State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049–50 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In finding that the victim of the prior assault was injured, the
district court relied on the prior PSR as well as a police report
and photographs of the victim’s injuries. According to the police
report, Robinson “punched [the police officer] in the nose,”
resulting in “a cut on the [left] side of [his] nose.” This account
was reiterated in the PSR and corroborated by a photograph
depicting the victim with a small laceration and blood on the left
side of his nose.
Although the police officer reported in his victim impact	¶35
statement that he suffered no physical or emotional injury as a

State v. Robinson
20160990-CA 	15 	2018 UT App 227
result of the incident, the district court, as the finder of fact, was
entitled to resolve apparent conflicts in the evidence. See State v.
Black, 2015 UT App 30, ¶ 19, 344 P.3d 644 (“It is the role of the
factfinder to examine and resolve such conflicts.”). This conflict
alone does not render the court’s finding clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court properly resolved the	¶36
alleged inaccuracy in the PSR and did not abuse its discretion in
assessing 	four 	criminal 	history 	points 	for 	Robinson’s 	prior
assault conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.