State v. Anderson

2013 UT App 272
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CASSANDRA ANDERSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20110864-CA
Filed November 21, 2013
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable Claudia Laycock
No. 101401414
Douglas J. Thompson, Attorney for Appellant
John E. Swallow and Michelle I. Young, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES
CAROLYN B. MCHUGH and J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred.
ROTH, Judge:
¶1 Cassandra Anderson appeals from the district court’s
decision to deny her motion to suppress drug evidence
discovered after Anderson was detained by an officer who had
been observing her interaction in a parking lot with a woman in
another vehicle. Anderson contends that the officer did not have
reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain her. We affirm.

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20110864-CA 2 2013 UT App 272
BACKGROUND
¶2 At the time of the events leading to this appeal, Sergeant
Bryan Robinson was an Orem City police officer who had been
assigned to the Utah County Major Crimes Task Force (Major
Crimes) for almost three years. Major Crimes focuses on
‚narcotics and controlled substances*+ interdiction, gang
enforcement and property crimes.‛ Upon joining Major Crimes,
Sergeant Robinson received hands-on field training in narcotics
interdiction from more experienced detectives, including specific
training on ‚methods to distribute controlled substances,‛ such
as hand-to-hand transactions. He kept his knowledge current by
attending conferences for narcotics officers twice a year. In the
course of his service as a police officer, Sergeant Robinson had
‚*o+bserved hundreds of *drug+ transactions‛ and had become
familiar with the manner in which they take place. At the time of
the stop at issue here, Sergeant Robinson was a team leader for
one of the narcotics units. As a higher ranking officer, he
‚assist*ed+ with the . . . Field Training Officer Program,‛ which
involves ‚training . . . [new] officers on how to recognize and
identify a drug transaction‛ by ‚advis*ing] them on operations‛
like surveillance for drug transactions at a location known to
have a lot of drug activity, including ‚what we’re looking for,
the list of clues, then ultimately the hand-to-hand transaction.‛
¶3 Among Sergeant Robinson’s primary duties as a member
of Major Crimes were ‚set*ting+ up controlled buys‛ of
controlled substances and conducting surveillance of known
hotspots for drug activity. In connection with these activities,
Major Crimes observed and spoke with suspected drug
traffickers to learn ‚where people meet to distribute their
controlled substances.‛ One such location was a gas station in
Orem, Utah. Major Crimes knew the gas station parking lot to be
a common location for drug activity because it had made prior
‚arrests from that parking lot‛ for drug crimes and, as a result,
had ‚set up controlled buys there at that location numerous
times.‛ Due to the high prevalence of drug activity at this
particular gas station, Major Crimes ‚often used‛ the parking lot
for the ‚express purpose‛ of ‚watching for drug transactions.‛

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20110864-CA 3 2013 UT App 272
¶4 On April 27, 2010, Sergeant Robinson and two other
members of Major Crimes spent the afternoon watching the
parking lot as part of an operation aimed at apprehending
distributors of illegal drugs. Around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m., Sergeant
Robinson, using binoculars from about 100 feet away, observed a
maroon car drive into the parking lot and park in a stall in the
northeast corner of the lot, farthest away from the store, despite
there being several closer empty parking spaces. The driver, who
was subsequently identified as Anderson, remained in the
vehicle. Anderson’s daughter left the vehicle and entered the
convenience store, returning moments later. Approximately ten
minutes later, another car entered the lot and parked a few stalls
down from Anderson. Anderson got out of her car, walked to
the driver’s window of the other vehicle, and leaned in to talk to
the driver.
¶5 During the interaction, Sergeant Robinson observed
Anderson make a ‚hand-to-hand transaction‛ with the other
driver and then place something in her right front pocket. He
did not see Anderson give anything to the other driver but
testified that such an exchange could have taken place without
him seeing it. At that point, Anderson stood up, said a few more
words, and then returned to her car. Both vehicles immediately
left the parking lot. The entire interaction took less than two
minutes.
¶6 ‚Based upon [his] experience and training as a drug
enforcement officer,‛ Sergeant Robinson characterized the
exchange as ‚consistent . . . with the hand-to-hand drug
transaction.‛ Sergeant Robinson explained that he gave the
encounter this characterization due to its brief duration (under
two minutes), the manner of the transaction (concealed), and the
nature of the item exchanged (small and easily concealable). As a
result, Sergeant Robinson pursued Anderson, employing his
‚red and blue lights‛ and ‚chirping *the+ siren.‛ Sergeant
Robinson had not observed Anderson commit any traffic
violations and explained that he made the stop ‚*t+o detain her
and ask her about the transaction‛ at the gas station.

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 4 2013 UT App 272
¶7 Sergeant Robinson requested that Anderson exit the
vehicle to avoid upsetting her daughter. Anderson agreed and
accompanied Sergeant Robinson to the back of the car. Sergeant
Robinson then asked Anderson if she had bought or sold
anything at the gas station parking lot. Anderson responded that
she had not, explaining that she was there simply to collect $100
she was owed and that the money was in her planner inside the
vehicle. Sergeant Robinson requested that Anderson show him
the contents of her pockets. She removed a total of seven pills,
five of which she identified as Percocet and two of which
Sergeant Robinson suspected were a prescription pain
medication. Anderson reported that she did not have a
prescription for at least two of the pills. As Anderson was
pulling the pills out of her pocket, she partially exposed a small
plastic bag. Sergeant Robinson explained that in his experience,
this type of plastic bag is commonly used to package drugs so he
grabbed the bag from Anderson’s pocket. It contained a
substance consistent with methamphetamine. Sergeant Robinson
placed Anderson under arrest for possession of controlled
substances. While inventorying Anderson’s car, Sergeant
Robinson found the $100 bill in Anderson’s planner.
¶8 Subsequent testing confirmed that the substance in the
plastic bag was methamphetamine and that two of the pills were
‚preparation for Oxycodone.‛ The State charged Anderson with
two counts of possession of a controlled substance in a drug free
zone and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in a
drug free zone.
¶9 Anderson filed a motion to suppress the drug evidence,
arguing that Sergeant Robinson violated her Fourth Amendment
right to be free from illegal seizure because the officer lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain her for investigation.1
1. Anderson’s motion to suppress further asserted that once
Sergeant Robinson asked her to step out of the vehicle and show
him what was in her pockets, the detention escalated to an arrest
for which the officer lacked probable cause. On appeal,
(continued…)

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20110864-CA 5 2013 UT App 272
Following oral argument on the suppression motion and after
receiving supplemental briefing from the parties, the district
court concluded that Sergeant Robinson had reasonable,
articulable suspicion sufficient to warrant the intrusion and
denied Anderson’s motion to suppress. At a subsequent bench
trial, the court convicted Anderson on all three charges.
Anderson now appeals the denial of the motion to suppress.
ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶10 The issue before us is whether the district court correctly
denied Anderson’s motion to suppress on the basis that Sergeant
Robinson had reasonable, articulable suspicion to initially detain
her. ‚When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, *we+ disturb*+ the district court’s findings of fact only
when they are clearly erroneous.‛ State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58,
¶ 20 (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The district court’s legal conclusions and
application of the law to the facts, however, are reviewed non-
deferentially for correctness. State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464,
¶ 6, 128 P.3d 28. Thus, ‚we review as a matter of law whether a
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion.‛ Gurule,
2013 UT 58, ¶ 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
¶11 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects ‚*t+he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.‛ U.S. Const. amend. IV. ‚‘*S+topping an automobile
and detaining its occupants constitute*s+ a ‚seizure‛ within the
meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment[], even though the purpose
of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.’‛
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 28, 63 P.3d 650 (alterations in
Anderson does not challenge the district court’s rejection of that
argument, and we do not address it further.

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 6 2013 UT App 272
original) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
The lodestar of Fourth Amendment protection, however, is not
the preclusion of any seizure but of an unreasonable seizure. State
v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 925. A traffic stop is
reasonable, and therefore constitutional, if the stop ‚*was+
justified at its inception‛ and if ‚the detention following the stop
was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place.‛ Id. ¶ 9 (alteration in
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Anderson is not challenging the scope of the stop
following the detention, we address only whether Sergeant
Robinson was justified in stopping Anderson in the first place.
¶12 ‚In determining the reasonableness of a . . . seizure . . . ,
three constitutionally permissible levels of police stops have
been outlined.‛ Id. ¶ 8 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). ‚A brief, investigatory stop of a vehicle constitutes a
level two encounter, for which . . . reasonable, articulable
suspicion is required.‛ Id. ¶ 9 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). A police officer has reasonable, articulable
suspicion when the officer is ‚able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant th*e+ intrusion.‛ Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); accord State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61,
¶ 14, 147 P.3d 425. An officer is not required to rule out innocent
explanations for behavior that he deems suspicious so long as
his suspicion has a basis in reason. Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10.
But courts will not condone intrusions based merely on an
officer’s ‚inarticulate hunch‛ or ‚inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion‛ that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see
also Applegate, 2008 UT 63, ¶ 10. Rather, ‚it is imperative that the
facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief‛ that the
intrusion the officer plans is justified in order to investigate
criminal activity? Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 7 2013 UT App 272
¶13 In evaluating whether this ‚reasonable, articulable
suspicion‛ standard has been satisfied, a court considers the
‚‘totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether, taken
together, the facts warranted further investigation by the police
officer.‛ Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ¶ 14 (quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). In conducting this analysis,
courts must ‚accord deference to an officer’s ability to
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions,‛ State v.
Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 11, 112 P.3d 507 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), even if that distinction depends on
inferences drawn from the circumstances that might ‚‘elude an
untrained person,’‛ Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, ¶ 8 (quoting
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273).
¶14 At both the preliminary hearing and the evidentiary
hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Robinson described
the circumstances that led him to detain Anderson and
explained why he considered those circumstances suspicious.
Sergeant Robinson explained that he turned his attention to
Anderson from the moment she entered the parking lot because
she parked at some distance from the store despite the
availability of parking near the store front, an indication that
‚she was waiting to meet with somebody.‛ Anderson waited
there for approximately ten minutes until a second vehicle
entered the lot and parked near Anderson’s vehicle, again at a
distance from the store. Then Anderson, but not the other driver,
exited her car and walked to the other vehicle’s open driver’s
window. By this point, Sergeant Robinson was ‚paying close
attention‛ to the encounter because he expected that if it was a
drug transaction, there would be a ‚sleight of hand.‛ He then
observed a hand-to-hand transaction, after which Anderson
slipped something small into her pants pocket. The encounter
then quickly ended, and both vehicles immediately left the lot.
Sergeant Robinson characterized the encounter as suspicious
because, based on his observations of ‚hundreds of these
transactions . . . [,] this is how a drug transaction or transactions
with controlled substance take[] place.‛ Specifically, Sergeant
Robinson pointed to the fact that the encounter lasted ‚less than
two minutes‛ and involved a ‚sleight of hand,‛ circumstances

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 8 2013 UT App 272
that he testified were hallmarks of drug transactions that he had
previously observed.
¶15 Sergeant Robinson acknowledged the possibility that
Anderson’s behavior was also susceptible to innocent
explanations: for example, Anderson may have actually been
there to collect the $100 that she later explained the other driver
owed her, or the two may have met simply to complete some
other lawful transaction. But in his experience, innocent conduct
was usually distinguishable. In particular, he testified that the
gas station is a common meeting place for the exchange of legal
items because of its convenient location just off the interstate. In
those cases, however, ‚the reasons for those meetings are usually
pretty apparent.‛ He explained,
Oftentimes when we’re sitting and observing . . . ,
we’ll see something that appears to be [a drug
transaction], but then the two subjects would meet
outside, and they’re exchanging items that they’ve
listed on KSL or *eB+ay, but it’s done out in the
open. You see the object, what they’re exchanging.
This wasn’t. It was concealed. It was a hand-to-
hand transaction [and] most controlled substances
dealt with on the street level are small, easily
concealed within their hands.
¶16 He observed, as well, that when people meet in the lot to
buy or exchange legal items, ‚they conduct their business
outside the vehicle and they’re talking,‛ while in drug
transactions ‚it’s a brief encounter‛ where ‚one person usually
has to count the money,‛ but then the business is complete.
When defense counsel pressed Sergeant Robinson on the fact
that the other driver drove a small passenger vehicle that
required Anderson to lean down to speak with the driver,
suggesting that what appeared furtive was not, Sergeant
Robinson conceded that doing so would ‚be a natural position‛
to conduct the conversation. But he considered the hand-to-hand
transaction that followed, which involved a small item, to have

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 9 2013 UT App 272
been ‚secretive‛ in nature. He also conceded that he would not
have been able to distinguish a hand-to-hand exchange of drugs
from another similar type of exchange involving small items,
such as jewelry or cash. But because, in his experience, that kind
of innocent exchange was done more openly and because of the
brief nature of the interaction, he suspected that the exchange
was likely to be drug-related.
¶17 Based on Sergeant Robinson’s training, particularly on
hand-to-hand exchanges in drug transactions, and his
considerable experience observing drug transactions in
controlled buys and otherwise, we conclude that he had an
objectively reasonable basis to suspect that the behavior he
observed that day in the gas station parking lot suggested
criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
Sergeant Robinson supported his suspicion with ‚specific and
articulable facts‛ indicating drug activity was afoot. See id. at 21;
State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ¶ 14, 147 P.3d 425. Although he
acknowledged that Anderson’s conduct may have had an
innocent explanation, officers need not rule out innocent
explanations for behavior deemed suspicious, State v. Applegate,
2008 UT 63, ¶ 10, 194 P.3d 925. Rather, we ‚accord deference to
an officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and
suspicious actions.‛ See Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 11 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
¶18 On appeal, Anderson concedes that Sergeant Robinson
had observed a hand-to-hand transaction in a known drug
trafficking area. However, she contends that this alone is not
enough to support reasonable, articulable suspicion. Rather,
Anderson asserts that courts in Utah and other jurisdictions have
consistently concluded that something in addition to a hand-to-
hand exchange in a high drug trafficking area is necessary for a
bare suspicion to mature into a reasonable one. To support her
position, Anderson cites State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, 47 P.3d
932, and State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, 128 P.3d 28, as well
as a number of cases from other jurisdictions.

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 10 2013 UT App 272
¶19 In Beach, three narcotics interdiction officers were driving
in an unmarked patrol car by a known drug house when they
saw a vehicle parked partially in the travel lane with no license
plates. 2002 UT App 160, ¶ 2. The officers slowed to maneuver
around the parked vehicle and then noticed the defendant ‚pass
something to one of the two individuals in the car.‛ Id. Because
this type of exchange ‚is commonly used in drug transactions,‛
the officers turned the car around to pull up behind the parked
vehicle. Id. When the defendant ‚began to walk away rapidly in
the opposite direction,‛ the officers activated the emergency
lights and detained the defendant. Id. An officer asked him for
permission to search his person, and the defendant produced a
baggie of methamphetamine. Id. ¶ 5. He was arrested and
charged with possession of a controlled substance. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
The defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence, asserting
that the officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to
detain him. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. We affirmed the district court’s denial of
the suppression motion. Id. ¶¶ 6, 15.
¶20 Anderson asserts that denial of the suppression motion
was appropriate in Beach because there were facts in addition to
the hand-to-hand transaction in a drug activity area that
supported the officers’ conclusion that the defendant was
involved in drug activity. For example, while the officers saw the
defendant engage in a hand-to-hand exchange with a person
inside a parked vehicle in ‚proximity to a known drug house,‛
id. ¶ 9, the primary reason that the officers’ attention was drawn
to the three individuals was because they were gathered in and
around ‚a vehicle without a license plate parked illegally,‛
which caused the officers to have to maneuver around it. In
addition, the defendant ‚walk*ed+ rapidly away‛ once he
realized the officers had seen the transaction. Thus, according to
Anderson, it was the parking obstruction and the evasion that
elevated a hunch based on a hand-to-hand exchange in a high

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 11 2013 UT App 272
drug activity area to reasonable suspicion that illicit drug
activity was transpiring.2
¶21 In Singleton, an officer on patrol around midnight in a
residential neighborhood known for drug trafficking observed
the defendant engage in a hand-to-hand transaction with
another person near a parked vehicle. 2005 UT App 464, ¶ 2.
When the officer pulled his marked patrol car behind the parked
vehicle, the defendant turned and walked away while the other
person threw something under the vehicle into the snow. Id. ¶ 3.
The officer detained the defendant based on his suspicions and
then arrested the defendant pursuant to an outstanding warrant.
Id. After transporting the defendant to jail, the officer found
fifteen baggies of methamphetamine under the seat of his patrol
car. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the drug
evidence on the basis that the officer lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion to detain him in the first place. Id. ¶ 5. At
the motion hearing, the officer testified that ‚although he did not
know what was occurring when he observed the hand-to-hand
actions between [the d]efendant and [the other person], based on
his training and experience as a narcotics officer, this behavior
was consistent with an exchange for drugs.‛ Id. The district court
agreed with the defendant, however, and suppressed the drug
evidence. Id. On appeal, we reversed the district court’s decision
to suppress the evidence, concluding that the officer had
sufficiently articulated a reasonable basis for detaining the
defendant. Id. ¶ 7.
2. We note that the Beach court did not cite the defendant’s
evasion as a factor in reaching its conclusion that the officers had
reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain him. State v. Beach,
2002 UT App 160, ¶¶ 9–10, 47 P.3d 932 (‚*The o+fficer*’s+ . . .
training and experience as a police officer led him to suspect
illegal activity when he observed occupants of a vehicle, which
had no license plates and was parked in a manner that
obstructed traffic, make a hand-to-hand exchange with a
pedestrian.‛).

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 12 2013 UT App 272
¶22 Anderson contends that, like the facts in Beach, the facts of
Singleton gave the officer something in addition to a hand-to-
hand exchange in a place known for drug activity on which to
build a reasonable suspicion, namely the defendant’s evasion. Id.
¶ 11. Anderson also cites a number of cases from other
jurisdictions in support of her claim that something in addition
to a hand-to-hand exchange in a high drug activity area is
needed to support reasonable suspicion. See also, e.g., United
States v. Johnson, 627 F.3d 578, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding
that an officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion when he saw
the defendant engage in a hand-to-hand exchange of cash for
pieces of a small, off-white substance in a high crime area known
for drug activity); Davis v. State, 94 S.W.3d 892, 897–98 (Ark.
2003) (concluding that an officer had reasonable suspicion where
he observed a hand-to-hand exchange in a high crime area
known for drug activity and the defendant walked quickly away
when he saw the officers); Commonwealth v. Martinez, No. 98-P-
2060, 2000 WL 1477127, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. July 10, 2000)
(affirming the denial of a suppression motion because there had
been ‚reports of drug activity‛ at the residence the narcotics
officers were observing, the defendant made a ‚quick car stop
and [engaged in a] hand-to-hand transaction‛ with the person
who resided there, and upon seeing the officers, the resident
threw the bag containing the drugs onto the driveway).
¶23 Anderson contends as well that courts across the country
have almost universally held that a hand-to-hand transaction in
a high drug area, standing alone, is not enough to support
reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 40 So. 3d 95, 98 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that under its own precedent,
‚an officer’s observation of hand-to-hand movements between
persons in an area known for narcotics transactions, without
more, does not provide a founded suspicion of criminal activity‛
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); State v.
Carmichael, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95618, 2011-Ohio-2921, ¶¶ 5–
6, 38, 40 (concluding that an officer did not have reasonable,
articulable suspicion when he observed a man walk up to a
minivan parked on the street and ‚hand*+ something to the
passenger,‛ particularly because it was unlikely the officer could

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 13 2013 UT App 272
have seen the transaction under the conditions). But see State v.
Kelley, 08-KA-467, pp. 6–7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/09); 8 So. 3d 684,
688–89 (concluding that an officer patrolling an area of high
narcotics activity had reasonable suspicion after he observed a
hand-to-hand transaction that lasted approximately five seconds
after which the defendant and the other person both left).
¶24 We decline to adopt the approach that Anderson
advocates. This court has recognized that ‚officers’ observation
of a hand-to-hand exchange in an area known for drug
trafficking [can be] a sufficient and independent basis for
reasonable suspicion *that+ the defendant‛ is engaged in criminal
activity. State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, ¶ 12, 128 P.3d 28.
Anderson asserts that this conclusion was not necessary to the
resolution of Singleton and is therefore merely dicta. Even if that
were the case, however, the Utah Supreme Court has advised
courts to avoid a narrow focus in such cases and evaluate the
‚‘totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether, taken
together, the facts warranted further investigation by the police
officer.‛ State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ¶ 14, 147 P.3d 425 (quoting
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). We are
persuaded that the totality of the circumstances here supports a
conclusion that Sergeant Robinson articulated reasonable
suspicion to detain Anderson for further investigation.
¶25 On the date Anderson was detained, Sergeant Robinson
and his two Major Crimes colleagues were not simply patrolling
an area known for drug trafficking. They were conducting
surveillance on a particular gas station parking lot where Major
Crimes had historically observed drug transactions, set up
controlled buys, and made drug-related arrests and which it was
now targeting for further drug-focused observation based on
that history. Sergeant Robinson’s attention was drawn to
Anderson after she entered the lot, parked away from the store,
and waited in her car for ten minutes after her daughter
returned from the store for a second person to arrive. When that
person did arrive, Anderson went directly to the car, leaned in
through the open driver’s window while the other driver
remained in the car, received a small object in a hand-to-hand

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 14 2013 UT App 272
exchange, and then quickly concluded the transaction and left.
Although it is possible that Anderson was at the gas station
simply to collect the $100 that she claimed she was owed, an
officer need not rule out all innocent explanations before
reasonable suspicion can arise. See State v. Applegate, 2008 UT 63,
¶ 10, 194 P.3d 925. Indeed, Sergeant Robinson acknowledged the
possible innocent explanations for Anderson’s conduct but
explained that he believed the conduct to be suspicious because
it was not accompanied by the usual indications of legal
exchanges: both parties stepping out of their vehicles,
conducting the exchange in the open, and spending some time
talking.
¶26 Sergeant Robinson was highly experienced in observing
drug transactions, particularly those involving hand-to-hand
exchanges. He testified that based on the circumstances and his
own experiences with drug purchases, even before Anderson left
her car, he was ‚looking for a hand-to-hand transaction‛ that
was ‚not going to be out in the open.‛ And the occurrence of
such an exchange supported his suspicion that the transaction
was drug-related because ‚based on *his+ experience‛ with
‚arrang*ing+‛ and observing drug buys, ‚they’re trying to hide
something.‛ The two-minute length of the interaction further
confirmed his suspicion because with drug exchanges, ‚it’s
usually brief,‛ whereas innocent exchanges generally involve the
parties talking at greater length.
¶27 Though experience and training alone might lead to only
a hunch, here Sergeant Robinson articulated a basis in his
specific observations of Anderson in the gas station parking lot
that day to justify confidence in the suspicion he developed from
the application of his training and experience to the facts and
circumstances before him. ‚In conducting [a] reasonable
suspicion analysis, officers may ‘draw on their own experiences
and specialized training to make inferences from deductions
about the cumulative information available to them that might
well elude an untrained person.’‛ Singleton, 2005 UT App 464,
¶ 8 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273); see also United States v.
Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 15 2013 UT App 272
‚officers need not close their eyes to suspicious circumstances,‛
even when there are innocent explanations for the conduct
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). As a result, we
accord deference to this ‚ability to distinguish between innocent
and suspicious actions.‛ State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 11, 112
P.3d 507 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We
conclude that the totality of the circumstances in Anderson’s
case—like in Beach and Singleton—supported Sergeant
Robinson’s belief that criminal activity was afoot. See State v.
Beach, 2002 UT App 160, ¶ 9, 47 P.3d 932; see also Singleton, 2005
UT App 464, ¶ 11.3 Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the
motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
¶28 The totality of the circumstances surrounding Sergeant
Robinson’s detention of Anderson after observing her involved
in a hand-to-hand transaction in a parking lot with a high
incidence of drug trafficking demonstrates that Sergeant
3. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reached the same
conclusion in a case that is factually similar. There, two officers
experienced with hand-to-hand drug transactions were
observing a gas station parking lot in an area ‚known for a lot of
drug activity.‛ Hicks v. State, 984 A.2d 246, 252 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). They
saw the defendant and his companion waiting, late at night, in a
car parked in front of the fuel pumps for fifteen minutes without
purchasing gasoline. Id. Neither the defendant nor the
companion engaged in any business with the store, and when a
pedestrian entered the lot, the companion exited the car,
completed a hand-to-hand transaction, and returned to the car
without conversing with the other person. Id. The officers
testified that based on their experience, this conduct indicated a
drug transaction. Id. The court of special appeals held that ‚*t+he
totality of these circumstances support[ed] a reasonable
suspicion of drug-related activity.‛ Id.

State v. Anderson
20110864-CA 16 2013 UT App 272
Robinson had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain
Anderson for further investigation to confirm or allay that
suspicion. We affirm.