Schofield v. Starbucks Corporation

2025 UT App 29
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
ESTATE OF JOSLYN NICOLE S PILSBURY S CHOFIELD
AND BRAD S CHOFIELD,
Appellants,
v.
S TARBUCKS C ORPORATION ,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20230875-CA
Filed March 6, 2025
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Royal I. Hansen
No. 200903485
Ronald J. Park, Kenneth R. Friedman,
David P. Roosa, and S. Brook Millard,
Attorneys for Appellants
Heather L. Thuet, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE R YAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and R YAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 	One summer morning, Joslyn Nicole Spilsbury Schofield
(Joslyn) was sitting at a table in the outdoor seating area at a
Starbucks coffee shop when a runaway pickup truck crashed into
the seating area, striking her and causing fatal injuries. Her estate
and heir (collectively, the Schofields) sued Starbucks Corporation,
stating claims for negligence, premises liability, and wrongful
death, and generally asserting that Starbucks had not exercised
reasonable care to protect patrons like Joslyn from, or warn them
against, events like this. On Starbucks’ motion, the district court
dismissed the Schofields’ complaint for failure to state a claim,

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and in addition it refused to allow the Schofields the opportunity
to amend their complaint. It concluded that Starbucks had no
duty to Joslyn to protect her from events like this, and it
determined that any amendment to the complaint would be futile.
¶2 	The Schofields appeal those rulings, asserting that the
district court erred when it determined, as a matter of law, that
Starbucks owed no duty to Joslyn, and that the court abused its
discretion 	when 	it 	refused 	to 	allow 	them 	to 	amend 	their
complaint. We agree with the Schofields on the duty issue and
conclude that the district court erred by dismissing their initial
complaint, a conclusion that renders unnecessary any discussion
of the court’s ruling denying the motion to amend. We therefore
reverse the court’s order dismissing the case, and we remand the
case to the district court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND1
¶3 	The Starbucks location that Joslyn visited was located in a
strip mall adjacent to Highland Drive in Millcreek, Utah. The
storefront was oriented facing south, and it was located at the far
eastern end of the strip mall, nearest to Highland Drive, a busy
north-south arterial street with two lanes of traffic in each
direction and a dual-purpose left-turn lane separating the travel
lanes. This Starbucks location, like many others, had an outdoor
seating area; in this particular location, this seating area (the
Seating Area) was on a covered sidewalk directly outside of the
storefront, adjacent to the parking lot and close to Highland
Drive. The Seating Area was not enclosed by a railing or fence,
1. “Our recitation of the facts underlying [the Schofields’] lawsuit
is based on the allegations in their complaint. Because this appeal
involves [Starbucks’] motion to dismiss [the Schofields’] claims,
we must assume all the factual allegations in the complaint are
true and determine whether the claims fail as a matter of law.”
Doe H.P. v. Broadbent, 2024 UT 31, n.1, 554 P.3d 1058 (cleaned up).

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and no protective barriers existed between the Seating Area and
either Highland Drive or the parking lot.
¶4 	At the same time that Joslyn was seated in the Seating Area,
a driver (Driver) of a large pickup truck—a 2016 Dodge Ram
1500—was apparently having some sort of medical episode.2
Driver’s truck began acting erratically while it was traveling
through 	a 	parking 	lot 	located 	across 	Highland 	Drive 	from
Starbucks; as the episode went on, Driver’s truck barreled over a
curb and a landscaped parking strip, into and through another
parking lot, across all five lanes of Highland Drive, and into the
strip mall, where it crashed with considerable force—moving at
29 miles per hour—right into the Seating Area where Joslyn was
sitting. 	The 	truck 	caused 	extensive 	damage 	to 	the 	pillars
supporting the covered sidewalk, and it ended up on its side in
the parking lot in front of Starbucks. The truck hit Joslyn directly,
causing her to suffer “severe head trauma, multiple fractures,
internal bleeding, and ultimately death.”
¶5 	Nearly two years later, the Schofields filed suit against not
only Starbucks but also Driver and several other entities.3 Against
Starbucks, the Schofields asserted claims for negligence, premises
liability, and wrongful death. As the basis for these claims, the
Schofields invoked the business-invitee duty of reasonable care,
alleging that Joslyn was a patron of Starbucks the day she was
injured, that Starbucks possessed the “premises on which the
[Seating Area] was located,” and that Starbucks held the Seating
2. The exact nature of the episode Driver sustained is not clear
from the record submitted to us. However, both sides appear to
agree that Driver experienced some sort of impairing medical
episode; as we understand it, the exact nature or medical cause of
the episode is not germane to the issues presented in this appeal.
3. The Schofields’ claims against all other defendants have been
resolved in some fashion and are not at issue in this appeal.

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Area 	open 	to 	the 	public 	for 	“purposes 	connected 	to 	[its]
business[].” 	And 	the 	Schofields 	alleged 	that 	Starbucks 	had
breached its duty by “fail[ing] to exercise reasonable care to
protect Joslyn . . . from the dangerous [Seating Area] or to warn
[her] of the danger.” In particular, the Schofields alleged that,
“[f]or years, the [Seating Area] was maintained in an unsafe and
dangerous manner, which created a substantially hazardous
condition 	and 	foreseeable 	risk 	of 	injury 	to 	patrons.” 	The
Schofields specifically pointed out that “[n]o protective barriers
existed” between the Seating Area and Highland Drive, and that
without such a barrier “a vehicle could drive unimpeded into the
[Seating Area] from Highland Drive or the adjacent parking lot.”
The Schofields further alleged that, prior to this incident, “other
drivers had collided into [other] Starbucks buildings, injuring and
killing 	[other] 	Starbucks 	patrons.” 	And 	they 	asserted 	that
Starbucks’ breach of its duty was the “direct and proximate
cause” of Joslyn’s death.
¶6 	In response to the Schofields’ complaint, Starbucks filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that it had “no duty to protect against
the unforeseeable actions of third parties” and that Schofield did
“not allege any prior incidents of rogue vehicles striking patrons
at this Starbucks” location. In particular, Starbucks argued that it
was unforeseeable that “a driver in the parking lot across a five-
lane 	road 	will 	experience 	[a 	medical] 	episode, 	fail 	to 	use
reasonable care, drive his vehicle perpendicular to the direction
of traffic across five lanes, jump three curbs, pass over a sidewalk
and strike patrons in the [Seating Area] in the front of its store
going 29 miles per hour.” Alternatively, Starbucks argued that the
court should dismiss the case because Starbucks’ “alleged failure
to act is not the proximate cause of [Joslyn’s] injuries” and that the
Schofields “cannot demonstrate that a different [Seating Area]
design would have made any difference in this case.”
¶7 	After full briefing and oral argument, the district court
made an oral ruling—later memorialized in a written order—

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granting Starbucks’ motion to dismiss due to the “lack of duty”
owed by Starbucks to Joslyn. The court—quoting Dwiggins v.
Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991)—stated that a
“possessor [of land] ‘is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any
care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third
person are occurring, or about to occur.’” And the court offered
its view that the Schofields “have failed to allege that any accident
has 	ever 	occurred 	on 	the 	subject 	property.” 	But 	the 	court
determined that proximate cause issues did not constitute an
alternative independent basis for dismissal at this procedural
stage, observing that “breach and proximate cause are questions
. . . which the fact finder determines on a fact specific basis.”
¶8 	The day after the court’s oral ruling, the Schofields filed a
motion asking for leave to amend their complaint. In their
proposed amended complaint, the Schofields included allegations
of over seventy specific incidents in which vehicles had crashed
into other Starbucks stores. The proposed amendments also
included a letter that was allegedly sent to Starbucks—by a
company interested in placing barriers in front of businesses—
offering to assist Starbucks in “combat[ing] the costly problem of
vehicle crashes into retail storefronts.” All these allegations, the
Schofields argued, established that “Starbucks had a duty to
protect customers at its outdoor seating areas because [it] had
actual and constructive notice” that vehicle crashes into such
areas “are neither rare nor isolated events.” Starbucks opposed
the Schofields’ motion to amend, asserting that the motion was
untimely, prejudicial, and futile.
¶9 	After full briefing, the district court denied the Schofields’
motion to amend on three grounds. First, the court viewed the
motion as untimely because it had been filed after the court’s oral
ruling granting Starbucks’ motion to dismiss. Second, the court
noted that the proposed amendment included information that
had been available to the Schofields at the time the original
complaint was filed, yet they “made no attempt” to amend their

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pleadings for approximately six months while Starbucks’ motion
to dismiss was pending. The court concluded that “such practice
constitutes 	unreasonable 	neglect 	in 	terms 	of 	pleading
preparation.” Finally, the court concluded that the amendment
would be futile in any event because the proposed amended
complaint did not “include any information regarding car crashes
at the property at issue in the present case.”
¶10 	Some time later, after the Schofields’ claims against the
other defendants had been resolved, the court entered final
judgment in Starbucks’ favor on the Schofields’ claims.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶11 	The Schofields now appeal, and they ask us to consider two
issues. First, they challenge the district court’s order granting
Starbucks’ motion to dismiss their claims. We review a decision
granting 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	“for 	correctness, 	granting 	no
deference to the decision of the district court.” Scott v. Universal
Sales, Inc., 2015 UT 64, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 1172 (cleaned up); see also
Boynton v. Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC, 2021 UT 67, ¶ 17, 500 P.3d
847 (“The determination of whether a legal duty exists is a purely
legal question.” (cleaned up)). In this context, “a reviewing court
is obliged to construe the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, ¶ 14, 155 P.3d 893 (cleaned up).
And “dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only where it
is certain that the plaintiff cannot prevail under any potential set
of facts.” Zubiate v. American Family Ins. Co., 2022 UT App 144,
¶ 13, 524 P.3d 148.
¶12 	Second, the Schofields challenge the district court’s order
denying their motion for leave to file an amended complaint. But
our decision reversing the district court’s dismissal order obviates
the need for us to consider the merits of the Schofields’ challenge
to the court’s denial of their motion to amend.

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20230875-CA 	7 	2025 UT App 29
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Dismiss
¶13 	We 	first 	address 	whether 	the 	district 	court 	erred 	by
dismissing the Schofields’ complaint for failure to state a claim.
Our analysis of this issue contains two sections. The first concerns
duty, and in this section we address the Schofields’ argument that
the district court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that
Starbucks owed Joslyn no duty. For the reasons discussed, we
agree 	with the 	Schofields that 	the 	court’s duty 	ruling 	was
erroneous. That conclusion compels us to address, in the second
section, Starbucks’ invitation for us to affirm the district court’s
dismissal 	order 	on 	an 	alternative 	basis, 	namely, 	that 	the
Schofields cannot demonstrate proximate cause as a matter of
law. For the reasons discussed, we decline Starbucks’ invitation,
at this procedural stage, to affirm the dismissal order on this
alternative ground.
A. 	Duty
¶14 	To succeed on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show
“(1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the
defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) that the plaintiff
in fact suffered injuries or damages.” Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d
893, 897 (Utah 1993). The last three elements of a negligence
claim—breach, 	proximate 	cause, 	and 	damages—present
questions of fact that typically require the attention of a factfinder;
as discussed more fully below, only in clear cases may such issues
be decided as a matter of law on summary judgment. See Reath v.
Brian Head Town, 2024 UT App 194, ¶ 12 (“[T]he questions of
breach and causation are questions of fact that should ordinarily
be left to the jury.”); Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 34, 103 P.3d 135
(stating that “damages are a question of fact” that is “distinctly
within the jury’s province”). But the first element—whether a
duty exists—presents a question of law, which may be (and often

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is, in appropriate cases) decided at an earlier procedural stage of
the litigation, such as via summary judgment or even at the
motion-to-dismiss stage. See B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012 UT 11,
¶ 23, 275 P.3d 228 (stating that “[d]uty must be determined as a
matter of law”); see also Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 2022 UT App
87, ¶ 18, 514 P.3d 1209 (“Whether a duty exists is a question of law
that we review for correctness.” (cleaned up)).
¶15 	As we discuss later in this opinion, historic Utah appellate
caselaw has not always been entirely clear about where duty
questions end and breach questions begin. But more recently, our
supreme court has made clear that the main conceptual difference
between duty and breach is that “duty is a question of law
determined on a categorical basis” regarding an entire class of
cases, “while breach and proximate cause are questions for the
fact finder determined on a case-specific basis.” Jeffs, 2012 UT 11,
¶ 25; see also id. ¶ 23 (“Duty determinations should be articulated
in relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable
to a general class of cases.” (cleaned up)). Accordingly, we have
explained that “case-specific analyses are unwarranted at the
duty stage of the negligence inquiry.” Davis, 2022 UT App 87,
¶ 18. Indeed, “a court should not engage in a fact-intensive
analysis regarding the question of duty” because “fact-intensive
analyses 	are 	instead 	generally 	conducted 	at 	the 	breach 	or
proximate cause stages.” Id. ¶ 25.
¶16 	The complexity of a court’s categorical-level duty analysis
depends, in large part, on whether the plaintiff is invoking a duty
that has already been recognized and established under Utah law.
If the plaintiff is invoking such a duty, then “the existence of the
duty in question has already been established, and a district court
therefore need not engage” in any further analysis to determine
whether a duty exists. See D.W. v. FPA Sandy Mall Assocs., 2024 UT
32, ¶¶ 23, 27, 554 P.3d 1052 (cleaned up); accord Davis, 2022 UT
App 87, ¶ 15. In such cases, at least at the motion-to-dismiss stage,
a court must simply decide “whether the case, based on the

Schofield v. Starbucks
20230875-CA 	9 	2025 UT App 29
allegations in [the plaintiff’s] complaint,” falls “within the ambit
of” the established duty that is being invoked. FPA Sandy Mall
Assocs., 2024 UT 32, ¶¶ 23, 25 (cleaned up).
¶17 	In contrast, when a plaintiff invokes a duty that has not
already been recognized in Utah, a court must engage in the five-
factor analysis set forth in Jeffs to determine whether recognition
of a new categorical-level duty is appropriate. See FPA Sandy Mall
Assocs., 2024 UT 32, ¶¶ 21, 23–25 (“[A] Jeffs analysis is necessary
only when a party seeks to establish a previously unrecognized
duty for a category of cases.”). In Jeffs, for instance, the plaintiff
was suing a doctor, but the plaintiff was not the doctor’s patient;
the court was thus asked to determine “whether a physician owes
nonpatients a duty to exercise reasonable care in the affirmative act
of prescribing medications that pose a risk of injury to third
parties,” a duty that had not previously been recognized under
Utah law. 2012 UT 11, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
¶18 	In this case, the Schofields invoke a duty that has long been
recognized 	and 	established 	under 	Utah 	law: 	the 	duty 	of
reasonable care that all business owners owe to their invitees. See
FPA Sandy Mall Assocs., 2024 UT 32, ¶ 18 (recognizing the
business-invitee duty of care as an “established dut[y] under Utah
law”); see also Davis, 2022 UT App 87, ¶ 15 (stating that “both the
supreme court and this court have already held that a business
does owe a duty of reasonable care to its invitees”); cf. Zazzetti v.
Prestige Senior Living Center LLC, 2022 UT App 42, ¶ 32, 509 P.3d
776 (“All possessors of land . . . owe duties of reasonable care to
invitees who come onto their land.”). This duty is simply one of
reasonable care; indeed, “the duty of a business is simply to
exercise 	due 	care 	and 	prudence 	for 	the 	safety 	of 	business
invitees.” See Proctor v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226,
¶ 20, 311 P.3d 564 (cleaned up). In general, this requires business
owners to “keep [their] premises reasonably safe for business
invitees.” Rodriguez v. Kroger Co., 2018 UT 25, ¶ 14, 422 P.3d 815.
And 	from 	a 	duty 	perspective—as 	opposed 	to 	a 	breach

Schofield v. Starbucks
20230875-CA 	10 	2025 UT App 29
perspective—it does not matter whether a particular unsafe
condition is created by the business owner or by some other third
party (such as an independent contractor, a member of the public,
or even a criminal actor): a business owner has a duty to exercise
reasonable care—whatever that might entail in a particular case—
to keep its premises safe for invitees. See FPA Sandy Mall Assocs.,
2024 UT 32, ¶ 18 (“A possessor of land who holds it open to the
public . . . is subject to liability to members of the public . . . for
physical 	harm 	caused 	by 	the 	accidental, 	negligent, 	or
intentionally harmful acts of third persons . . . .” (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (Am. L. Inst. 1965))).
¶19 	And based on the allegations set forth in their complaint,
the Schofields’ case clearly falls within the ambit of this long-
established duty. The Schofields have alleged that Starbucks
operated a business in the strip mall that was open to the public,
and they have alleged that Joslyn “was a patron and a business
invitee of Starbucks” and was on Starbucks’ premises when she
was injured. Thus, unlike the FPA Sandy Mall Associates case—
where it was unclear whether the case fell within the ambit of the
business-invitee duty, because the defendant was the lessor
landlord and not the business itself, see id. ¶ 25—the facts here (at
least as alleged) are clear: Starbucks was a business and Joslyn
was its customer, and therefore the facts as alleged fall within the
ambit of the long-established business-invitee duty.4
4. Although we recognize that the term “invitee” has a broader
definition than the term “customer,” see Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores
Inc., 2022 UT App 87, ¶ 11, 514 P.3d 1209 (“The status of invitee
includes business visitors who are invited to enter or remain on
land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business
dealings with the possessor of the land.” (cleaned up)), we
nevertheless—for 	simplicity 	and 	readability—use 	the 	term
“customer” at times in this opinion. As alleged, Joslyn was a
(continued…)

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¶20 	Thus, on the face of the complaint, the Schofields invoked
the long-established business-invitee duty, and they supported
that invocation with allegations that, if proved, would place this
case directly within the ambit of that duty. And at least at this
procedural stage, that is the end of the duty analysis: on the facts
as alleged, Starbucks unquestionably owed Joslyn a duty of
reasonable care. The remaining points of contention—whether
that duty required Starbucks, in this specific case, to take any
particular action that could have prevented Joslyn’s injuries and
death—are case-specific (as opposed to categorical) questions that
go to breach and proximate cause, and not to whether a duty
exists. See Davis, 2022 UT App 87, ¶ 11 (holding that it was
“undisputed that [the defendant] is a business and that [the
plaintiff] was visiting [the defendant] as its customer,” and that
“[a]s a result, [plaintiff] enjoyed the status of ‘business invitee’
while upon [the defendant’s] property” (cleaned up)); see also
Boynton v. Kennecott Utah Copper, LLC, 2021 UT 67, ¶ 23, 500 P.3d
847 (“The litigants will have the opportunity to address the facts
of their specific cases when they argue about whether a breach of
duty occurred and whether it caused the injury.”).
¶21 	Starbucks resists this conclusion by arguing that this case
involved a “tragic freak accident” and that the injury to Joslyn
arising from Driver’s medical episode was wholly unforeseeable
to Starbucks; indeed, Starbucks points out that the Schofields do
not allege that such a thing has ever happened before at this
Starbucks location. In support of its position, Starbucks relies
heavily on Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991),
in which our supreme court affirmed the dismissal of a negligence
case on summary judgment, stating at one point that a business
owner “is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he
knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are
occurring, or are about to occur.” Id. at 183 (cleaned up). In this
customer of Starbucks, which rendered her by definition also an
invitee of Starbucks.

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vein, Starbucks attempts to frame the scope of its duty on a case-
specific level, arguing that—while it might have had a general
duty of reasonable care to Joslyn—it had no duty “to protect
patrons outside the store from a third-party . . . losing control of
his truck in a parking lot across the street, crossing five lanes of
traffic, traveling up a curb onto a sidewalk, and striking patrons
sitting outside on the sidewalk with his vehicle at 29 mph.”
¶22 	But these are breach and proximate cause arguments, not
duty arguments. As discussed above, Starbucks (a business open
to the public) unquestionably owed a general duty of reasonable
care to Joslyn (its customer) to keep the premises in a safe
condition. 	Whether 	that 	duty 	required 	Starbucks—in 	this
particular case and in this particular location—to take any specific
action that might have prevented Joslyn’s injuries and death are
questions that implicate breach and proximate cause.
¶23 	We acknowledge that some of the language our supreme
court used in Dwiggins is at least potentially confusing on this
point. But our best reading of Dwiggins—especially when viewed
through the lens of our supreme court’s more recent cases, most
notably Jeffs—is that Dwiggins is a breach case and not a duty case.
¶24 	For starters, Dwiggins frames the case, at the outset, like
this: 	“[The 	plaintiff] 	argues 	that 	the 	lower 	court 	erred 	in
determining that [the defendant] did not breach a duty of care or
proximately cause [the plaintiff’s] injuries as a matter of law.” 811
P.2d at 182 (emphasis added). And later, the court stated that the
question presented was one of “negligence” that is ordinarily “a
question of fact for the jury.” Id. at 183. Indeed, the court’s analysis
was quite granular: it involved an assessment of whether the
defendant jewelry store breached its duty to the plaintiff-invitee
by failing to provide adequate security, and specifically, whether
a prior robbery at the store made a future robbery reasonably
foreseeable such that better security measures were warranted. Id.
at 182–83. This analysis necessarily raised case-specific factual

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issues, including how often and how recently the store had
previously been robbed, as well as the adequacy of the store’s
security measures at the time of the alleged harm. Id. The court
also clearly stated that “[o]wners of land must . . . exercise due
care and prudence for the safety of business invitees,” and that
this duty includes “a duty to protect [the business’s] customers
from criminal acts by third parties.” Id. at 183.
¶25 	But later in the opinion, the court stated as follows:
Comment 	f 	to 	section 	344 	[of 	the 	Restatement
(Second) of Torts] makes it clear that the possessor
“is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care
until he knows or has reason to know that the acts
of the third person are occurring, or are about to
occur.” Consistent with our earlier cases, we follow
the Restatement and hold that this duty exists in
Utah, but recognize that the duty does not arise until
the business owner knows, or should know, that
criminal acts are likely to occur.
Id. (cleaned up). Starbucks leans heavily on this passage, and it
asserts that it means a court can dismiss a business owner from a
negligence case, as a matter of law at the motion-to-dismiss stage,
for lack of duty where there are no allegations that the business
owner knew or should have known that a previous similar third-
party event had occurred at the location in question. We read
Dwiggins differently, for two reasons.
¶26 	First, we think Dwiggins—even on its own terms and
without regard to later cases from our supreme court—is best
read as a breach case and not as a duty case. As already noted, the
court originally framed the question as one of “breach” and
“negligence.” Id. at 182–83. But even the quotation Starbucks
relies on strikes us as more of a breach holding than a duty
holding. The court stated that a business owner “is ordinarily
under no duty to exercise any care” against third-party actions

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“until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third
person are occurring.” Id. at 183 (emphasis added). As we read
this statement, the court was simply saying that, while of course
the business owner owed a general duty of reasonable care to its
customers, this duty did not require the business owner to do
anything 	specific, 	in 	the 	exercise 	of 	that 	duty, 	regarding
protection against third-party actions until the owner knew that
such actions might be likely. Thus, while the court used the word
“duty,” its analysis actually focused on whether the defendant
breached that duty by failing to implement specific security
measures. Id.
¶27 	Second, and relatedly, this reading is the only one that can
reconcile 	Dwiggins 	with 	our 	supreme 	court’s 	more 	recent
pronouncements. See, e.g., FPA Sandy Mall Assocs., 2024 UT 32,
¶¶ 20–25 (discussing duty as a categorical concept and breach as
a case-specific concept); accord Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, ¶¶ 21–28. If there
are two potential interpretations of our supreme court’s cases, it
makes sense to select the one that harmonizes the court’s caselaw.
See, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 929 F.3d 1238, 1255 (10th Cir. 2019)
(“[W]e must endeavor to interpret our cases in a manner that
permits them to coexist harmoniously with overarching and
controlling Supreme Court precedent and with each other.”);
Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 36, 300–02
(2016) (explaining that a court should harmonize “discordant
opinions” of “equal authority” and that a lower court specifically
should 	“exhaust 	all 	possibilities 	of 	reconciling” 	seemingly
contradictory opinions from a higher court before finding a
conflict). Indeed, we did exactly that in a very similar context in
Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 2022 UT App 87, 514 P.3d 1209,
where we interpreted several pre-Jeffs cases—opinions that had
not been entirely clear on the distinction between duty and
breach—as “turn[ing] on questions of breach, not duty.” Id.
¶¶ 26–28 (analyzing Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476
(Utah 1996); Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah
1973); and Price v. Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 2011 UT App

Schofield v. Starbucks
20230875-CA 	15 	2025 UT App 29
66, 252 P.3d 365). In doing so, we clarified that “[w]hat those cases
hold is that summary judgment is appropriate when reasonable
minds cannot differ about whether the defendant’s actions violated
the duty of reasonable care.” Id. ¶ 27 (emphasis added). In turn,
we explained that “[the defendant] could in theory rely on these
cases to argue that, under these circumstances, th[e] accident was
so unforeseeable that no reasonable mind could conclude that [the
defendant] had breached the duty of reasonable care that it owed
to [the plaintiff].” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added). But we held that
those cases could not be used to support the notion that a business
owner owes no duty at all to its customers. Id. ¶¶ 26–28. We reach
a similar conclusion here with regard to Dwiggins.5
5. At oral argument before this court, Starbucks referenced
another case—in addition to Dwiggins—that it believed supported
its position: Gray v. Scott, 565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977). But Gray is yet
another example of a pre-Jeffs case that did not clearly separate the
question of duty from the question of breach and that—post-
Jeffs—is best viewed as a breach case. At the outset of its analysis,
the Gray court framed the issue on appeal as whether “there were
sufficient facts in the record to submit to the jury the issue of
whether [the] defendants had violated their duty to anticipate that
another fight or shooting would be committed on the premises.”
Id. 	at 	78 	(emphasis 	added). 	The 	plaintiff 	argued 	that 	the
defendants “should have investigated” a shooting in the alley
near their premises and “should have taken precautionary steps
to guard against the potential hazard posed by” third-party
“belligerents.” Id. at 78. The court rejected that argument and
explained that the “trial court properly ruled these tenuous facts
to be insufficient to submit to the jury the question . . . whether it
was 	reasonable 	or 	not 	for 	[the] 	defendants 	to 	anticipate 	a
shooting” at a celebration to be held at the defendants’ premises
on New Year’s Eve. Id. The court concluded that “[u]nder the
particular facts in evidence, it was not error to instruct that [the]
(continued…)

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20230875-CA 	16 	2025 UT App 29
¶28 	For all of these reasons, Starbucks owed Joslyn a duty of
reasonable care, and Dwiggins is not to the contrary. The district
court therefore erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that
Starbucks owed Joslyn no duty.6
defendants had no duty to anticipate the commission of the
subject crime.” Id. (emphasis added). Again, the court did not
hold that the defendants owed no duty of reasonable care to their
patrons generally; rather, the issue was whether a jury could find
that 	the 	defendants 	had 	acted 	unreasonably 	by 	failing 	to
investigate a fight and intervene to protect the plaintiff. Id.
6. At oral argument before this court, Starbucks argued that a
more robust duty analysis is necessary as a matter of policy
because the duty element of a negligence case is the only element
that presents a legal (as opposed to a factual) question, and
because—in its view—business owners should be allowed, in
appropriate cases, to obtain early dismissals of negligence cases
pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
should not be compelled to go through the often-expensive
discovery phase of litigation. We see two problems with this
contention. First, in some cases defendants might still be able to
obtain a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on duty grounds; this may be
appropriate, for instance, where the plaintiff does not invoke an
already-established duty and where Jeffs’s five-factor analysis
leads to the conclusion that no new duty should be recognized, or
where the plaintiff does not include in its complaint allegations
sufficient to implicate an established duty. See D.W. v. FPA Sandy
Mall Assocs., 2024 UT 32, ¶¶ 19, 25, 554 P.3d 1052. Second, and in
any 	event, 	our 	supreme 	court 	has 	already 	made 	whatever
“policy” choices might be relevant here when it held, in Jeffs and
other cases, that the duty analysis requires a categorical approach
and the application of bright-line rules. See, e.g., FPA Sandy Mall
Assocs., 2024 UT 32, ¶¶ 19, 25; Boynton v. Kennecott Utah Copper,
(continued…)

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20230875-CA 	17 	2025 UT App 29
B. 	Proximate Cause
¶29 	Our conclusion that the district court erred in dismissing
the Schofields’ case for lack of duty requires us to address
Starbucks’ alternative argument, in which it invites us to affirm
the district court’s dismissal order on the alternative ground that
the Schofields cannot show proximate cause. Starbucks made this
argument to the district court too, and that court rejected the
argument as premature at this procedural stage. On this point, we
agree with the district court.
¶30 	As noted, proximate cause is one of the elements of a
negligence action that presents questions of fact that are, in most
cases, reserved for the factfinder at trial. See Steffensen v. Smith’s
Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“It is well
established that the question of proximate cause is generally
reserved for the jury.”), aff’d, 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). Indeed,
“the issue of proximate cause should be taken from the jury only
where: (1) there is no evidence to establish a causal connection,
thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable
persons could not differ on the inferences to be derived from the
evidence on proximate causation.” Id. at 487 (cleaned up). And at
this early stage of the litigation, dismissal is appropriate “only
where it is certain that the plaintiff cannot prevail under any
LLC, 2021 UT 67, ¶ 23, 500 P.3d 847; B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, 2012
UT 11, ¶ 23, 275 P.3d 228. We are bound by those decisions as well
as our own prior decision in Davis. See Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates
LLC, 2016 UT App 131, ¶ 30, 379 P.3d 18 (“We are bound by
vertical stare decisis to follow strictly the decisions rendered by
the Utah Supreme Court.” (cleaned up)); Sterling Fiduciaries LLC
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 2017 UT App 135, ¶ 14, 402 P.3d 130
(“Horizontal stare decisis requires that a court of appeals follow
its own prior decisions. This doctrine applies with equal force to
courts comprised of multiple panels, requiring each panel to
observe the prior decisions of another.” (cleaned up)).

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20230875-CA 	18 	2025 UT App 29
potential set of facts.” Zubiate v. American Family Ins. Co., 2022 UT
App 144, ¶ 13, 524 P.3d 148 (emphasis added).
¶31 	We acknowledge that the Schofields bear the ultimate
burden of demonstrating that Starbucks committed a breach of
duty that proximately caused Joslyn’s injury and death. In order
to prevail, the Schofields will need to show, among other things,
that Starbucks’ duty of reasonable care required it to take certain
specific actions with regard to the Seating Area, and that those
actions (if taken) would have been likely to prevent Joslyn’s
injuries. And here, where the object that caused the injuries was a
large runaway pickup truck moving at 29 miles per hour, we
wonder what sort of actions Starbucks reasonably could or should
have taken that might have prevented the truck from injuring
Joslyn. But be all of that as it may, our task at this procedural stage
is to examine the Schofields’ allegations and to consider whether,
if proved true, those facts might support the Schofields’ claims of
breach and proximate cause. And we are not now prepared to say
that there exists no potential set of facts under which 	the
Schofields might be able to make the required showing.
¶32 	Starbucks will, of course, be free to make a motion, at the
summary judgment stage and after the record has been more fully
developed, for dismissal on breach or proximate cause grounds.
While any such motion will involve factual issues that are usually
reserved for the factfinder, see Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 486, the grant
of such motions is nevertheless sometimes appropriate, see, e.g.,
Richmond v. Bateman, 2024 UT App 103, ¶ 43, 554 P.3d 341
(observing that “there are cases in which summary judgment may
be appropriate on questions of causation generally or superseding
cause more particularly” (cleaned up)); Doutre v. Box Elder County,
2024 UT App 58, ¶ 56, 548 P.3d 914 (affirming a district court’s
summary judgment order and observing that “this is a case where
reasonable minds cannot differ” about whether the defendant
acted “with reasonable diligence”), cert. denied, 554 P.3d 1096
(Utah 2024). We of course offer no opinion as to how any such

Schofield v. Starbucks
20230875-CA 	19 	2025 UT App 29
motion ought to be decided. For now, however, we conclude
simply 	that 	dismissal 	on 	proximate 	cause 	grounds 	is 	not
appropriate at this procedural stage. And on that basis, we decline
Starbucks’ invitation to affirm the court’s dismissal order on the
alternative ground of lack of proximate cause.
II. Motion to Amend
¶33 	Finally, the Schofields challenge the district court’s ruling
denying their motion to amend their complaint. We need not
reach the merits of this issue, though, because we have reinstated
the initial complaint that the district court erroneously dismissed
as a matter of law. With that initial complaint reinstated, it is no
longer clear to us that the Schofields still desire to amend their
complaint. In the event that they do, they are of course free to
renew their motion to amend on remand, and the district court
should consider any such motion afresh and in context, and it
should take note that at least two of the court’s stated rationales
for denying the Schofields’ motion to amend—timeliness and
futility—are no longer valid in light of our decision herein.
CONCLUSION
¶34 	Businesses 	owe 	a 	duty 	of 	reasonable 	care 	to 	their
customers, and this duty of care is well-recognized under Utah
law. When a plaintiff invokes that duty of care in a complaint and
grounds that invocation with allegations showing that the duty
applies, dismissal for failure to state a claim on the issue of duty
is 	improper. 	In 	this 	situation, 	disputes 	concerning 	the
foreseeability of the alleged harm and the circumstances that gave
rise to Starbucks’ purported failure to warn or protect Joslyn are
questions that go to breach and proximate cause, and not to duty.
Accepting the allegations in the Schofields’ complaint as true,
Starbucks owed Joslyn a duty of reasonable care, and the district
court’s determination to the contrary was erroneous.

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20230875-CA 	20 	2025 UT App 29
¶35 	Accordingly, 	we 	reverse 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	of
dismissal and remand this matter to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.