State v. Munguia

2026 UT App 155
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
S TATE OF U TAH ,
Appellee,
v.
HECTOR L ABASTIDA M UNGUIA,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20240908-CA
Filed October 16, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Mark S. Kouris
No. 221907704
Freyja Johnson and Hannah K. Leavitt-Howell,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Alexandra Herlong,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE D AVID N. M ORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. O RME and A MY J. O LIVER concurred.
MORTENSEN, Judge:
¶1 	Lucy 	awoke 	to 	find 	her 	clothing 	askew 	and 	Hector
Labastida Munguia hovering over her with his hand between her
legs.1 Over the next day or so, Lucy told multiple people about the
assault. Testimony at trial from these individuals included what
Lucy had told them, but Munguia’s trial counsel (Counsel) did
not—for the most part—lodge hearsay objections. Munguia now
claims that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by this failure.
We reject this claim and affirm Munguia’s conviction.
1. Apart from Munguia, we anonymize or use pseudonyms for all
individuals mentioned in this opinion.

State v. Munguia
20240908-CA 	2 	2026 UT App 155
BACKGROUND2
Sexual Assault
¶2 	Munguia and Lucy socialized at a local bar on a regular
basis. They occasionally spent time together outside the bar when
they would go to Lucy’s apartment, though their relationship was
not intimate. However, one time at Lucy’s apartment—after
drinking—Munguia lifted Lucy up on a counter, angering Lucy
and resulting in an apology from Munguia. Munguia tried to kiss
Lucy on another occasion in an apparent attempt to console her
when she was upset. This unsolicited move again angered Lucy
and led to another apology from Munguia. Lucy told Munguia
that she no longer wanted to be friends because he did not listen
when she told him no. Even so, the two continued to frequent the
same bar.
¶3 	After a month or so, the two reconciled. Lucy agreed to
resume their friendship provided that Munguia respect its strict
platonic parameters. The next evening, Lucy and her friend
(Friend) were at the bar and found Munguia there. Lucy asked
him to go with them to another bar. At some point, Friend
departed because of work responsibilities the next morning. Lucy
and Munguia eventually returned to her apartment to continue
drinking. While there, the two sat together on her bed watching
videos, 	but 	they 	did 	not 	have 	any 	physical 	or 	romantic
interaction.
¶4 	Around 4:00 a.m., Lucy awoke and tried to get Munguia
out of her apartment by calling an ex-boyfriend (Ex-Boyfriend) to
come over to her place and take him home because neither she nor
2. “On appeal, we review the record facts in a light most favorable
to the jury’s verdict and recite the facts accordingly. We present
conflicting evidence only as necessary to understand issues raised
on appeal.” State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 2, 10 P.3d 346 (cleaned
up).

State v. Munguia
20240908-CA 	3 	2026 UT App 155
Munguia had a car and because Lucy felt awkward about asking
him to leave at that hour. Ex-Boyfriend declined to assist because
he was too far away. Lucy then fell back asleep.
¶5 	Later, Lucy awoke in pain when she felt something inside
her vagina. At first, she thought she was dreaming, but then the
painful feeling increased, progressing from a sensation of “light
pressure” to something that was “hard,” “fast,” and “scratchy.”
Once she was fully awake, she saw that her shorts had been pulled
down to her knees and her shirt had been pushed up below her
breasts, leaving her “stomach and [her] vaginal area” exposed.
And there was Munguia—crouched over her with 	his arm
between her legs.
¶6 	Realizing what was happening, Lucy “freak[ed] out” and
yelled at Munguia, “What the fuck are you doing?” An apparently
startled Munguia responded, “I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. Can
we talk about it?” Lucy grabbed her phone and ran out of her
apartment, with Munguia “just apologizing the whole time.”
¶7 	While outside her apartment, Lucy called Ex-Boyfriend. He
later described her “crying and screaming,” saying that she “woke
up” with someone “on top of her” and that he “was inside of her.”
Ex-Boyfriend said that he didn’t know who Lucy was talking
about but that it was “pretty obvious” that the incident had “just
happened.”
¶8 	Lucy next called her brother (Brother), who was eighteen
years old and riding the train on his way to school. He later
described Lucy’s voice as “scared and exacerbated” as she told
him 	that 	she 	had 	been 	“assaulted” 	by 	someone 	who 	had
“touched” her “vagina.” Brother got off the train and went to meet
her. Brother later said that while they were outside of her
apartment, Lucy told him she had just received a text. This text
was from Munguia, and it read, “Hey, can we talk? I’m sorry.
Please.” Brother apparently did not see the text, but he did check
Lucy’s apartment to verify that it was safe for her to return.

State v. Munguia
20240908-CA 	4 	2026 UT App 155
¶9 	Later 	that 	same 	morning, 	Lucy 	called 	her 	boyfriend
(Boyfriend), who was out of town. He described her as very
“distraught” and “emotional,” and he related what she told him
as follows:
[Munguia] and her were hanging out at the bar the
night before and then closing time came and people
weren’t done hanging out, so they went over to her
house. 	And 	then 	the 	night 	just 	got 	long 	and
everybody went to sleep. And then she woke up
having 	sensations 	that 	there 	was 	something
happening to her. And she basically just kind of like,
ran 	out 	of 	the 	apartment 	apparently 	and 	then
started calling to get some help.
¶10 	That afternoon, Lucy messaged Friend, and she later
related what Lucy told her as follows: “[S]he invited [Munguia]
over to spend the night, because they were both drunk. And that
she suspected that he had—she woke up and he was inside her,
and she didn’t know what to do and was freaking out.” Friend
took Lucy to the hospital for a sexual assault examination.
¶11 	A sexual assault nurse examiner (Nurse) documented an
abrasion on Lucy’s left arm, a bruise on her right wrist, several
bruises on her knees and legs, a bruise on her buttocks, and a
small red abrasion of the skin just below the vaginal opening.
Nurse later testified about Lucy’s account of the assault:
She said that they were watching videos on her bed,
and she fell asleep. And then she woke up. And she
said that she thought it was a sex dream at first, but
she realized that the guy was putting something
inside of her. And she said that was his fingers, and
she started freaking out. And . . . then the guy was
saying he was sorry, if they could talk about it. But
she ran out of her house without her keys, and
barefoot.

State v. Munguia
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¶12 	While Lucy was at the hospital, a police officer (Officer)
took Lucy’s statement, which he later summarized as follows:
So she said once they had got done with the bars,
they . . . came back to her apartment and they started
watching videos. She said at some point, [Friend]
left and then it was just her and [Munguia]. And
then at some point, she had fallen asleep. And then
she was awakened, found that her pants were down
by her knees and felt something that—being stuck
inside her—in reference to her vaginal area and said
that [Munguia] was hovering over her.
¶13 	A few days later, Lucy returned to the bar. Noticing that
she seemed troubled, a bartender (Sean) asked if she was okay.
Sean later testified that Lucy “spilled this story” out:
[S]he told me that something had happened. That
she had gone home and somebody was at her house
with her. They’d crashed there for the night. And
they both passed out, watching TV. And when she
woke up, this person was over [her], and . . . her
clothes were askew. And . . . that person had stuck
something in her, and she flipped out and ran out of
. . . her house . . . . Anyway, she was frightened and
freaked out that there was this thing in her when she
woke up.
After learning that the person was Munguia, Sean assured Lucy
that Munguia would never be allowed back in the bar.
¶14 	Another bartender (Monty) arrived for his shift that same
night and found Lucy still there. Monty later explained that Lucy
told him that “she woke up, her underwear was down, and she
could feel that something was inside of her . . . vagina.” He added,
“[S]he wasn’t quite sure what it was that was being inserted in

State v. Munguia
20240908-CA 	6 	2026 UT App 155
her. She just knew that that was happening, and panicked,
because that’s, you know, a very difficult way to wake up.”
¶15 	Munguia never returned to the bar.
Investigation and Legal Proceedings
¶16 	After some hesitation about whether to go forward with
the case against Munguia, Lucy—upon encouragement from her
friends—agreed 	to 	meet 	with 	the 	detective 	(Detective)
investigating the case. About two months after the incident,
Detective 	conducted 	a 	full 	interview 	with 	Lucy. 	Detective
contacted individuals—whose information Lucy had shared—to
corroborate her account.
¶17 	Munguia was subsequently charged with object rape. He
pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The State
called 	twelve 	witnesses. 	Eight 	fact 	witnesses—Ex-Boyfriend,
Brother, Boyfriend, Friend, Officer, Sean, Monty, and Lucy—
testified as summarized above. The four other witnesses were
Nurse, a DNA analyst, a toxicologist, and Detective. Detective’s
testimony included Lucy’s account of the assault, specifically that
Lucy said that she “woke up” with “something inside of her
getting more aggressive,” which she described as “[f]riction or
pressure.”
¶18 	As relevant here, Counsel lodged two hearsay objections.
First, when Officer testified about what Lucy had told him
regarding the events inside her apartment, Counsel objected on
hearsay 	grounds. 	At 	a 	sidebar, 	the 	prosecutor 	argued 	the
testimony was admissible as a prior consistent statement. The
court 	allowed 	the 	testimony 	to 	proceed. 	Second, 	when 	the
prosecutor began eliciting testimony from Monty about what
Lucy had told him, Counsel again objected on hearsay grounds.
The prosecutor again argued the testimony was admissible as a
prior consistent statement. The court allowed the testimony to
proceed.

State v. Munguia
20240908-CA 	7 	2026 UT App 155
¶19 	Munguia testified in his own defense. He admitted that he
had slept in Lucy’s bed after they had been drinking at her
apartment. But he denied that anything untoward happened. He
said that when he woke up, he shook Lucy’s shoulder to wake her,
which apparently startled her because she “freaked out” and said,
“What are you doing?” He claimed that he texted her later that
morning because he “startled her in the morning” and “was
sorry.”
¶20 	Counsel advanced the theory that Lucy had falsely accused
Munguia. Indeed, in closing, Counsel emphasized that Lucy had
described feeling “foggy” and “hazy” and believed she was
dreaming at the time of the incident. He told the jury, “You know
the problem with being foggy, you know what the problem with
driving in the fog is? You can hit something.” Counsel further
suggested that Lucy’s friends had influenced her to report the
incident.
¶21 	The jury found Munguia guilty of object rape. Munguia
was sentenced to five years to life in prison. Munguia timely
appealed.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶22 	Munguia 	claims 	that 	Counsel 	provided 	ineffective
assistance by failing to lodge hearsay objections to witnesses’
repetition of Lucy’s out-of-court allegations against Munguia. We
evaluate ineffective-assistance claims raised for the first time on
appeal for correctness. State v. Reid, 2018 UT App 146, ¶ 17, 427
P.3d 1261.
ANALYSIS
¶23 	Munguia 	contends 	that 	Counsel 	provided 	ineffective
assistance 	because he 	failed to raise objections to allegedly

State v. Munguia
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inadmissible hearsay statements repeated by seven prosecution
witnesses.3 Specifically, he asserts that the prosecution had these
seven 	individuals—Ex-Boyfriend, 	Brother, 	Boyfriend, 	Friend,
Officer, Sean, and Monty—recount the story that Lucy had told
them about the incident. Munguia argues that despite these out-
of-court 	statements 	being 	inadmissible 	hearsay, 	Counsel
permitted each witness to testify about Lucy’s narrative without
making 	sufficient 	objection. 	But 	because 	the 	allegedly
inadmissible 	hearsay 	was 	merely 	cumulative 	of 	properly
admitted evidence, we conclude that Munguia’s claim fails for
lack of prejudice.
¶24 	To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant
must demonstrate both (1) “that counsel’s performance was
deficient,” meaning that it “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,” 	and 	(2) 	that 	the 	deficiency 	prejudiced 	the
defendant, meaning that the outcome would have been different
absent counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984). “[T]here is no reason for a court
deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in
the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry
if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697;
see also State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, ¶ 21, 9 P.3d 777
3. Munguia doesn’t bring an ineffective-assistance argument with
respect to Nurse’s and Detective’s testimony. However, in one
sentence in his brief, Munguia appears to challenge the lack of an
objection: “Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he
failed to consistently and fully object to the repeated improper
hearsay 	testimony 	from 	Lucy’s 	friends 	and 	family, 	law
enforcement, 	and 	Nurse.” 	But 	in 	his 	argument 	section, 	he
challenges only the seven witnesses identified above as offering
inadmissible hearsay and does not challenge the testimony of the
Nurse 	and 	Detective. 	The 	passing 	inclusion 	of 	Nurse 	and
Detective 	appears 	to 	have 	been 	an 	oversight 	that 	was
subsequently abandoned in briefing.

State v. Munguia
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(“Because a defendant has the burden of meeting both parts of the
Strickland test, it is unnecessary for this court to apply both parts
where our inquiry reveals that one of its parts is not satisfied.”
(cleaned 	up)). 	Thus, 	“when 	it 	is 	easier 	to 	dispose 	of 	an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,
we will do so without addressing whether counsel’s performance
was professionally unreasonable.” Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,
523 	(Utah 	1994) 	(cleaned 	up). 	Here, 	Munguia’s 	ineffective-
assistance claim fails on the prejudice prong, so we accordingly
limit our analysis to that component.
¶25 	“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.” Utah
R. Crim. P. 30(a). And “where testimony is merely cumulative, we
are disinclined to find prejudice even when the testimony was
improperly admitted.” State v. Jones, 2020 UT App 31, ¶ 35, 462
P.3d 372; see also State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 449–50 (Utah 1989)
(concluding that because an “officer’s [improperly admitted
hearsay] 	testimony 	was 	merely 	cumulative 	to 	that 	already
testified to by the victim, the error was harmless”); State v. Jackson,
2010 UT App 328, ¶ 17, 243 P.3d 902 (“[T]he alleged hearsay
evidence was cumulative because it reiterated the essence of
testimony presented by the victims or other eyewitnesses, even if
the exact wording was different.”), overruled on other grounds by
State v. DeJesus, 2017 UT 22, 395 P.3d 111. “This is so because
cumulative testimony typically doesn’t offer anything new or
additional to the evidentiary picture.” State v. Samples, 2022 UT
App 125, ¶ 74, 521 P.3d 526 (cleaned up).
¶26 	Munguia’s 	claim 	of 	error 	fails 	because 	the 	multiple
witnesses who repeated Lucy’s account did not supply any new
inculpatory facts. Lucy’s account was that she and Munguia fell
asleep on her bed while watching videos. She awoke to feeling
something inside her vagina. She then saw that her shorts had
been pulled down and Munguia was crouched over her with his
arm between her legs. When she yelled at him, demanding to

State v. Munguia
20240908-CA 	10 	2026 UT App 155
know what he was doing, Munguia repeatedly said he was sorry
and begged to talk to her about what had happened. Two other
witnesses—whose testimony Munguia does not challenge as
inadmissible—corroborated Lucy’s account. Nurse recounted the
core of Lucy’s story as relayed to her in the exam. And Detective
repeated Lucy’s account to her in her testimony at trial.
¶27 	The alleged hearsay testimony from the seven witnesses
tracks this same narrative to varying degrees: Lucy said that she
and Munguia had fallen asleep, she awoke to find Munguia over
her, she felt something inside of her, she yelled at Munguia, and
she ran out of the apartment in a distressed emotional state. Thus,
the alleged hearsay testimony was cumulative not only of Lucy’s
account but also of unchallenged testimony from Nurse and
Detective.
¶28 	Notably, Counsel’s theory was that Lucy’s allegations
against Munguia were falsely made. Under this theory, Lucy was
mistaken about the assault not only during her trial testimony, but
also in recounting it to the seven witnesses who subsequently
recounted her story. The mere repetition of a false allegation does
not generate prejudice. If Lucy’s initial accusation of object rape
was indeed falsely made, the seven witnesses were simply
echoing that mistake. Logically, if the jury found Lucy’s direct
testimony unbelievable, it would necessarily reject the testimony
of the witnesses who merely repeated her narrative as told to
them. Williams v. State, No. 12-12-00413-CR, 2014 WL 356995, at *3
(Tex. App. Jan. 31, 2014) (“[I]f the jury disbelieved the victim’s
testimony, then they necessarily would have disbelieved the
testimony of the other witnesses, because the complained-of
testimony was solely derived from the victim’s statements to
them. Stated another way, if the jury disbelieved the victim, it
would 	necessarily 	disbelieve 	these 	witnesses, 	because 	they
relayed only what the victim told them.”). Because repetition
cannot transform a falsehood into truth, any error in admitting
these repetitive accounts was harmless; they did not introduce

State v. Munguia
20240908-CA 	11 	2026 UT App 155
new 	substantive 	facts 	but 	merely 	reiterated 	Lucy’s 	original
assertion, the credibility of which the jury was charged to
determine.
¶29 	Ultimately, this case was a simple matter of credibility
between Lucy and Munguia. The jury faced a binary decision: it
had to either believe Lucy’s account of object rape or accept
Munguia’s claim that Lucy panicked for no apparent reason and
falsely accused him. The contested statements from the seven
witnesses 	did 	not 	provide 	any 	new 	details, 	independent
knowledge, or clarification of Lucy’s account—an account that
was supported by the uncontested testimony of Nurse and
Detective.4 	Hearing 	the 	same 	story 	repeated 	in 	a 	brief,
secondhand manner from the seven witnesses did not add any
missing facts or change the fundamental choice facing the jury
about whom to believe. Given this dynamic and recognizing “our
disinclination 	to 	find 	prejudice 	when 	improperly 	admitted
testimony 	is merely 	cumulative 	of 	other 	properly 	admitted
evidence,” State v. Garcia, 2024 UT App 38, ¶ 39, 546 P.3d 990,
Munguia’s claim of error fails.
CONCLUSION
¶30 	Because 	the 	complained-of 	testimony 	was 	merely
cumulative of properly admitted testimony, Munguia has not
demonstrated the prejudice necessary to support his ineffective-
assistance claim.
¶31 	Affirmed.
4. Indeed, Counsel was quite adroit in cross-examining each of
these seven witnesses to make clear to the jury that they had no
firsthand knowledge of the incident.